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Abstract		The	thesis	examines	the	articulations	of	a	dominant	interpretation	of	Malay	identity	as	observed	within	the	Malaysian	Malay	situation	comedy	(sitcom)	
Senario,	produced	from	1996	to	2013.	As	the	longest	running	sitcom	in	Malaysian	broadcast	history,	Senario’s	performance	of	a	specific	interpretation	of	Malayness	embodies,	among	other	things,	the	nuances	of	critical	social	and	political	issues	across	a	period	of	17	years,	thereby	providing	an	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	Malay	nationalist	ideology	and	Malay	social	desires.	While	other	episodes	are	referenced,	primary	to	the	discussions	are	eight	episodes	ranging	from	1997	to	2011:	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	Raya	…	Raya	…	
Raya,	Kantoi,	Gong	Xi,	Ta	Ti	Tu,	Salah	Sangka,	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman,	and	Bina	
Semangat.	The	thesis	begins	by	charting	the	evolution	of	the	Malay	primacy	narrative,	its	conflation	with	Malay	Islamic	discourse	from	a	socio-political	dimension,	and	their	impact	on	Malay	gender	relations.	The	focus	then	shifts	to	developments	within	the	broadcasting	sphere	where	the	bearing	of	the	Malay	and/or	Islamic	primacy	narratives	towards	the	development	of	national	television	is	examined.	Theoretical	ideas	and	frameworks	that	will	direct	the	close	textual	reading	of	the	sitcom	are	then	discussed.	This	is	followed	by	the	three	chapters	of	analysis	which	will	address	in	turn	the	themes	of	Malay	nationalism	and	ethnic	stereotyping,	Islamic	didacticism	and	Pan-Malay	identity,	and	Malay	gender	relations.	The	conclusion	discusses	the	overarching	problematics	of	Malayness	identified	on	Senario	when	located	within	a	contemporary	and	globalized,	21st	century	Malaysian	society.			 	
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alim	 	 	 religious,	or	pious		
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encik	 	 	 mister	
	
ilmu	 	 	 knowledge,	cultural	and	spiritual		
kampung	 	 village,	rural		
ketuanan	 	 primacy	
	
latah	 	 	 Malay	cultural	elaboration	of	the	startle	reflex	involving	pathomimetic	behaviour	
	
mak	 	 	 mother	
	
makcik	 	 aunty	
	
Melayu	 	 Malay		
Melayu	Baru	 	 New	Malay		
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nenek	 	 	 grandmother	
	
santun		 	 respectable,	decent,	well	mannered,	or	conforming	to		accepted	standards	of	what	is	proper	
	
semangat	 	 spirited,	motivation	
	
tok	 	 	 grandfather		
wanita	 	 woman	
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Of	course	to	forget	the	past	is	to	lose	the	sense	of	loss	that	
is	also	memory	of	an	absent	richness	…	the	art	is	not	one	
of	forgetting	but	letting	go.	And	when	everything	else	is	
gone,	you	can	be	rich	in	loss.	
	
Rebecca	Solnit	(2006,	23)	
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CHAPTER	1	
	
Introduction	This	thesis	examines	the	articulations	of	a	dominant	interpretation	of	Malay	identity	as	observed	within	the	Malaysian	Malay	situation	comedy	(sitcom)	
Senario,	produced	from	1996	to	2013.	While	the	work	intersects	with	both	the	fields	of	Malay	studies	and	television	studies,	the	primary	focus	will	be	on	
Senario‘s	reproduction	of	Malayness.1	Identity	is	a	contentious	issue	in	an	ethnically	diverse	Malaysia	and	tensions	are	further	compounded	by	the	ethnicized	nature	of	interfaith	relations.	Inter-ethnic	and	inter-faith	conflicts	have	a	long	history	that	can	be	traced	to	colonial	Malaya.2	More	contemporarily,	the	rhetoric	of	Malaysian	social	actors	such	as	politicians,	religionists,	and	ethno-chauvinist	non-governmental	groups,	is	increasingly	polarized	along	ethnic	and	religious	boundaries	(Dahlia	2012;	Daniels	2013;	Farish	2001;	2002;	Liew	2008;	Lopez	2008;	Ting	2009;	Wong	2014a,	2014b,	2015;	Yeoh	2010).3	While	the	corpus	of	academic	work	on	Malaysian	and	specifically	Malay	identity	is	vast,	the	breadth	of	work	on	Malaysian	television	is	comparatively	small.	To	date,	there	is	no	critical	work	that	addresses	these	issues	and	the	representation	of	Malay	identity	within	television	sitcoms.4		This	thesis	seeks	to	address	this	academic	lacuna.	By	providing	a	critical	study	of	
Senario,	Malaysia’s	longest-running	sitcom,	I	aim	to	reveal	how	the	constituents	of	a	dominant	form	of	Malayness	are	reconstructed	televisually	and	how	they	further	encapsulate	nuances	of	critical	social	and	political	issues.	A	close	textual	reading	of	Senario	here	yields	an	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	Malay	nationalist	ideology	and	Malay	social	desires.	While	I	identify	these																																																									1	I	employ	the	term	‘Malayness’	as	defined	by	Anthony	Milner	to	mean	the	entirety	of	tradition,	culture,	customs,	ritualisms,	religion,	social	order,	and	state	of	being	involved	in	being	a	Malay	(Milner	2011,	xi-xii,	16-17).	I	thus	use	‘Malayness’	interchangeably	with	‘Malay	identity’.	2	As	suggested	by	Collin	(2011,	52-53),	Khoo	G.C.	(2006,	85),	Reid	(2006,	14-18),	Shamsul	(1996b,	17-19;	2006,	136),	Shamsul	&	Athi	(2015,	267,	269,	271-273),	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	(2006,	166-169),	and	Vickers	(2006,	26,	28-29).	3	Instead	of	a	family	name,	Malay	last	names	are	patronymic.	I	will	therefore	cite	Malay	names	under	their	given	names	rather	than	their	father’s	name.	This	follows	in	the	tradition	of	the	works	of	many	scholars	of	Malaysia	like	Edmund	Terence	Gomez	(2008),	Khadijah	Khalid	(2008),	Khoo	Gaik	Cheng	(2006),	Marzuki	Mohamad	(2008),	Maznah	Mohamad	(2002,	2004,	2011),	Meredith	Weiss	(2015),	and	Shamsul	A.	B.	&	Athi,	S.	M.	(2015),	among	others.	4	The	television	sitcom	genre	will	be	discussed	more	critically	in	Chapter	4.	
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televisual	manifestations	of	Malay	identity	and	explore	the	potency	of	their	articulations	as	the	dominant	national	culture,	I	simultaneously	foreground	the	associated	political	expediencies	of	the	state’s	interpretation	of	Malay	identity.		The	objectives	above	are	largely	motivated	by	the	various	polemics	driving	contentions	over	the	fluidity	of	Malaysian	identity.	While	Malay	culture	has	been	the	determinant	for	a	national	identity	since	the	National	Culture	Policy	of	1971,	both	Chinese	and	Indian	socio-political	actors	have	continued	to	challenge	the	fundamental	assumptions	legitimizing	the	Malay-bias	(Ting	2009,	39,	44-45,	47).	Further,	developments	within	the	Malay	sphere	itself	have	seen	the	emergence	of	subaltern	cultures;	“Other	Malays”	(Kahn	2006),	“New	Malays”	(Collin	2011;	Foo	2004;	Halim	2000;	Khoo	G.C.	2006),	and/or	“hybrid	Malays”	(Kahn	2006;	Khoo	G.C.	2006),	whose	existence	pose	a	challenge	to	the	nationalist	imaginary	of	Malay	nationhood.	One	response	has	been	a	heightening	of	national	Islamization	efforts	(e.g.	legislation)	that	increasingly	encompass	all	Malaysians	regardless	of	their	beliefs	(Gomez	2008;	Hussin	1990,	1993;	Liow	&	Afif	2015;	Ting	2009).	Timothy	Daniels	observes	succinctly	that	Islamic	proselytizers	–	Muslim	nongovernmental	organizations,	the	Islamic	Party	of	Malaysia	(PAS,	
Parti	Islam	SeMalaysia),	and	the	UMNO5-led	government	–	have	exerted	a	major	influence	in	the	public	sphere	(2013,	105).	However,	political	or	religious	discourse	within	the	national	and	socio-religious	framework	is	inadequate	by	itself	in	exerting	dominance	over	multiple	trajectories	that	emerge	from	the	quotidian.	Instead,	the	Barisan	Nasional6	government	has	in	the	past	five	decades	used	its	available	resources,	including	its	influence	on	media,	to	ensure	its	continuous	domination	of	the	nation’s	cultural	and	political	milieu	(Foo	2004,	26).	Malaysia’s	media	and	broadcasting	facilities	have	consequently	been	steered	by	proxy	owners	who	are	closely	linked	to	the	political	parties	of	the	ruling	coalition	(Foo	2004;	Mohd.	Sidin	&	Amira	2010;	Wang	2010).																																																										5	The	United	Malays	National	Organisation,	is	the	dominant	Malay	political	party	in	the	government’s	ruling	coalition	Barisan	Nasional	(National	Front).	UMNO	was	formed	in	1946	and	has	been	in	power	since	Malaysian	independence	in	1957.	6	“The	National	Front”,	is	the	ruling	coalition	led	by	UMNO.	It	includes	other	smaller	Chinese	and	Indian	ethnic-based	component	parties.	
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Malaysian	free-to-air	(FTA)	stations	are	all	owned	directly	or	indirectly	by	the	government	and	UMNO.	The	non-commercial	stations	TV1	and	TV2	for	example,	are	operated	by	Radio	Televisyen	Malaysia	(RTM)	and	are	part	of	the	Ministry	of	Information.	All	Malay,	English,	and	Chinese-language,	commercial	FTA	stations	are	fully	owned	by	the	media	investment	group,	Media	Prima	Berhad	(MPB)7	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Annual	Report	2015,	49).	MPB	also	owns	three	radio	stations	as	well	as	98%	equity	interest	in	The	New	Straits	Times	Press	(Malaysia)	Berhad8	(NSTP)	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Financial	&	Business	Review	–	1st	Quarter	2012,	4).	MPB	in	turn,	is	owned	by	UMNO	(“No	decision	yet”,	2007).	Including	the	state-run	TV1	and	TV2,	this	monopoly	of	Malaysia’s	commercial	mass	media	landscape	by	MPB	in	effect,	places	all	terrestrial	or	FTA	channels	under	direct	or	indirect	control	of	the	government,	and	specifically	UMNO.	Additionally,	while	there	is	strong	viewership	for	all	television	stations,	Malay-language	stations	consistently	draw	the	largest	audiences	(Foo	2004;	Mohd.	Sidin	&	Amira	2010;	Wang	2010;	Mohd.	Azlanshah	2012).	UMNO’s	monopoly	on	broadcasting	thus	situates	television	as	a	potential	site	for	normalizing	state-determined	nationalist	narratives.	This	can	result	in	a	totalizing	discourse,	foreclosing	any	possibility	of	alternative	interpretations	to	this	constructed	imaginary.		Academically,	UMNO’s	direct	and	tangential	ability	to	determine	Malay,	and	by	extension	non-Malay,	narratives	has	been	widely	documented	in	scholarship	on	Malaysian	Malay	films.10	While	much	has	been	written	about	Malaysian	film	and	cinema,	there	has	been	comparatively	little	focus	on	textual	analyses	of	contemporary	Malaysian	television,	with	almost	none	on	Malaysian	sitcoms.11																																																									7	MPB-owned	television	stations	are	TV3,	8TV,	ntv7,	and	TV9.	These	stations	broadcast	in	different	languages.TV3	is	a	Malay	channel,	8TV	is	a	Chinese/English	channel,	ntv7	is	a	Malay/English	channel,	and	TV9	is	a	Malay	channel	with	Islamic	content.	There	are	no	dedicated	Indian-language	FTA	channels.	8	NSTP	is	Malaysia's	largest	publisher	which	publishes	three	national	newspapers;	the	English	language	New	Straits	Times	(NST),	and	the	Malay	language	Berita	Harian	and	Harian	Metro	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Financial	&	Business	Review	–	1st	Quarter	2012,	4).	As	an	English	daily,	NST	also	has	the	widest	circulation	in	Malaysia.	10	Khoo	Gaik	Cheng’s	(2006)	book	‘Reclaiming	Adat’	is	one	example.	11	With	the	exception	of	Abdul	Ghani	bin	Ahmad’s	(2009)	study	on	Pi	Mai	Pi	Mai	Tang	Tu,	a	Malay	Malaysian	sitcom	that	was	produced	by	RTM	for	15	years	from	1985-1999.	However,	Abdul	Ghani’s	focus	is	on	the	sitcom’s	stage	management,	discussed	through	his	personal	involvement	in	the	production	as	stage	manager.	As	such,	it	does	not	have	relevance	to	our	focus.	
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This	does	not	in	any	way	imply	that	works	engaging	with	Malaysian	television	do	not	exist.	Of	note	are	works	by	Edmund	Terence	Gomez	(1990,	1999),	R.	Karthigesu	(1986,	1991,	1994),	and	Zaharom	Nain	(1995,	1996,	2000).	However,	their	focus	has	primarily	been	on	the	medium’s	economy	of	production	or	historical	developments.	Earlier	studies	on	actual	content	focus	mainly	on	Malay	television	dramas	and	musical	entertainment,	due	perhaps	to	both	genres’	early	proliferation	since	the	1970s	(see	for	example,	Juliana,	Wang,	&	Sharifah	2013;	McDaniel	1994,	122-124;	Noor	Bathi	1996;	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	160-161).	More	recently,	Malaysian	reality	television	programmes	have	attracted	some	attention	(Juliana	2010;	Rosya	2011;	Rosya	&	Morris	2013).	When	scholars	do	speak	of	Malaysian	sitcoms,	however	briefly,	they	tend	to	simply	give	an	overview	of	the	content	produced	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	(Khoo	G.C.	2006,	110;	Noor	Bathi	1996).		There	is	at	least	one	presumptive	reason	that	the	scholarship	on	Malaysian	sitcoms	that	does	exist,	focuses	on	content	from	the	1980s	and	1990s.	This	period	marked	a	significant	engagement	between	the	state	and	television	towards	engendering	a	closer	assimilation	of	its	plural	citizenry	in	its	nation	building	exercises.12	Sitcoms	such	as	the	short-lived	2+1	(Othman	1991),	Baba	&	
Nyonya	(Noor	1990),	and	Jangan	Ketawa	(Cheong	&	Harith	1991),	and	the	longer-running	Pi	Mai	Pi	Mai	Tang	Tu	(Othman	1991)	are	examples	of	the	nation-building	discourse	that	emerged	from	this	period	(Noor	Bathi	1996).	Despite	these	sitcoms’	proliferation	on	Malaysian	television	however,	the	pronounced	brevity	of	available	scholarly	engagement	has	consequently	privileged	other	television	genres	in	scholarly	discourse.	From	the	comparatively	small	number	of	available	works	that	attempt	a	full	or	partial	textual	analysis	on	Malaysian	television	in	general,	I	have	found	the	work	of	Rosya	Shamshudeen	(2011),	Rosya	Shamshudeen	&	Brian	Morris	(2013),	Timothy	Daniels	(2013),	Mohd	Azlanshah	(2013),	and	Mohd.	Muzhafar,	Ruzy	Hashim	&	Raihanah	M.	(2014)	to	be	informative.		Rosya	(2011),	and	Rosya	&	Morris	(2013)	engage	with	reality	and	talent	shows,																																																									12	I	discuss	some	of	the	key	initiatives	in	Chapter	2.	
		 18	
while	Daniels	(2013)	explores	Malay	religious	dramas.	Research	by	Mohd	Azlanshah	(2013)	interrogates	soap	operas,	while	Mohd.	Muzhafar,	Ruzy	&	Raihanah	(2014)	focus	on	Malay	drama.	In	all	instances,	these	studies	locate	their	relevance	within	the	descriptors	of	the	Malay	cultural	and	religious	status	quo	through	either	a	mixed	audience	reception	and	textual	approach,	or	a	textual	analysis.	When	viewed	collectively,	two	dominant	overarching	thematic	structures	emerge.	I	propose	that	these	can	be	thematically	categorized	as	‘adat13	and	Islam’,	and	‘patriarchal	primacy’.		In	examining	the	talent	and	reality	components	of	the	popular	show	Akademi	
Fantasia	(Fantasy	Academy),	Rosya	(2011)	and	Rosya	&	Morris	(2013)	found	that	viewers	were	reliant	on	cultural	norms	in	their	consumption	of	the	text.	While	Akademi	Fantasia	(AF)	was	a	milestone	success	in	2013,	Rosya	&	Morris	note	that	it	initially	garnered	criticism	from	the	authorities	and	civil	society	who	viewed	it	as	“potentially	detrimental	to	the	country’s	moral	values”	(2013,	143).	
AF	as	a	popular	cultural	text	catalyzed	a	wide	range	of	debates	about	national	and	ethnic	Malay	identity.	For	the	traditional	Malay	chauvinists	and	religionists,	Rosya	&	Morris	observed	that	AF	further	epitomized	“Western	cultural	values”	and	specifically,	the	“glorification	of	celebrity	[culture],	glamour	and	competitiveness”	(2013,	143).	All	these	were	construed	to	be	a	threat	to	local	cultural	standards	that	would	eventually	result	in	a	host	of	detrimental	social	effects.	By	the	third	season	however,	the	researchers	noted	a	change	in	this	official	perception.	Viewers	were	consistently	voting	for	contestants	who	idealized	traditional	cultural	norms	over	those	who	were	better	performers	but	considered	too	liberal.	Encapsulating	this	audience	preference	was	the	contestant	Mawi	who	was	presented	as	a	“humble,	religious,	conservative	Malay	
kampung	(village)	man	strictly	adhering	to	Islamic	norms	of	personal	behaviour,	even	when	thrown	into	the	world	of	glamour	and	celebrity”	(Rosya	&	Morris																																																									13	Adat	literally	means	(traditional)	customs.	Adat’s	centrality	to	the	Malay	community	is	described	by	Milner	as	being	a	“secret	code”	that	bonds	the	village	community,	and	a	set	of	guidelines	that	determines	“correct	behaviour”	(2011,	236).	Zainal	describes	it	as	the	“collective	mind	of	the	Malay	peoples”	and	an	“expression	of	[their]	fundamental	unity”	(1997,	111).	A	brief	outline	of	adat	provided	in	the	Singaporean	‘culture	pack’	-	‘Gateway	to	Malay	Culture’	(2013),	is	descriptive	of	traditional	Malay	social	etiquette,	rituals,	crafts,	and	living	environs	(Milner	2011,	6-7)	and	is	projected	as	a	host	of	essentialist	values.	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	calls	it	“customary	law”	that	denotes	the	values	“common	to	the	Malay	world”	(2006,	136).	
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2013,	143).	Mawi’s	popularity	reached	an	unprecedented	level	in	viewer	support.	This	was	a	phenomenon	that	recurred	across	all	subsequent	seasons	where	contestants	who	remained	true	to	what	viewers	perceived	to	be	their	Malay	cultural	roots	were	favoured	by	the	voting	public.		The	researchers	found	that	audiences	enjoyed	the	“‘possibilities	of	identification’	with	the	ordinary	people	participating	in	these	shows”	(Rosya	&	Morris	2013,	144).	Further,	it	was	noted	that	audiences	were	actively	engaged	in	the	practice	of	“identification	and	distancing	as	they	(per)form	preferences”	for	certain	contestants	that	invariably	were	those	who	were	“genuine,	relatable	and	authentic”	(Rosya	&	Morris	2013,	144).	As	observed	earlier,	this	viewer	cultural	negotiation	was	determined	by	the	show’s	and	more	specifically,	the	contestants’	cultural	propriety.	This	complex	viewer	televisual	negotiation	implies	a	structured	and	pre-adjudicated	cultural	map	that	allowed	Rosya	&	Morris	to	understand	Malay	audiences’	perceptions	of	their	own	cultural	identity,	and	the	categories	they	regarded	as	representing	‘Malayhood’	(2013,	145).	The	researchers	found	that	audiences	were	rejecting	televisual	practices	deemed	to	be	incompatible	with	“Islamic	norms	of	modesty”	and	values,	and	were	accepting	towards	those	that	represented	a	localized	notion	of	Malay	cultural	and	Islamic	values	(Rosya	&	Morris	2013,	148).			Not	dissimilar	in	findings	was	Mohd	Azlanshah’s	investigation	into	rural	(kampung)	Malay	women’s	consumption	of	Asian14	soap	operas.15	Azlanshah																																																									14	Azlanshah	does	not	explicitly	name	the	Asian	countries	that	are	included	in	his	sampling	nor	does	he	name	the	programmes	that	his	interviewees	refer	to.	Based	on	his	discussions	in	other	sections	of	this	work,	we	can	assume	that	‘Asian’	here	refers	to	Japan,	Korea,	Thailand,	Indonesia	and	Philippines	(2013,	649-650).	15	Azlanshah	is	problematically	liberal	with	his	use	of	the	category	‘soap	opera’	for	some	local	Asian	formats	that	should	more	correctly	be	called	television	drama;	for	example,	those	from	Japan.	He	goes	to	great	length	to	provide	the	etymological	roots	of	the	term	‘soap	opera’	and	its	relational	identity	to	detergent	manufacturers,	including	its	historically	gendered	format	(Mohd	Azlanshah	2013,	647-648).	Therefore,	we	can	only	presume	he	is	referring	to	genuine	open-ended	soap	operas,	or	telenovelas,	while	also	including	Asian	television	dramas	into	the	same	category.	Within	our	context,	I	refer	to	the	Latin	American	“serial	melodramatic”	telenovelas	(Acosta-Alzuru	2003,	270)	that	have	been	dubbed	in	Malay.	Telenovelas	feature	a	“finite	number	of	episodes	(120-200)”	that	typically	run	longer	than	‘regular’	television	drama	(Acosta-Alzuru	2003,	270).	This	differs	from	soap	opera	that	is	a	“serial	form	which	resists	narrative	closure”	(Brown	1987),	for	its	storyline	has	an	“infinitely	extended	middle”	with	“no	ending”	to	be	anticipated	by	viewers	(Fiske	2011,	182).	
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found	that	these	kampung	Malay	women	were	thinking,	intelligent	viewers	with	sophisticated	“viewing	tactics”,	who	operated	within	their	sociocultural	boundaries	(2013,	649).	While	soap	operas	have	traditionally	been	regarded	as	a	format	highly	subversive	to	the	patriarchal	social	order,	he	notes	that	his	interlocutors	still	subscribed	to	the	“dominant	ideological	discourses	of	adat	and	Islam”	and	adhered	to	the	dictates	of	Malay	culture	(2013,	649).	Further,	he	found	that	these	women	were	able	to	invoke	the	ideological	discourses	of	adat	and	Islam	as	their	cultural	referents	in	rejecting	influences	that	transgressed	local	cultural	norms	(Mohd	Azlanshah	2013,	649-650).	Even	on	notions	of	beauty,	he	posits	that	these	kampung	women	subscribed	to	a	traditional	definition	of	“beauty	as	a	santun16	who	is	a	devoted	wife	and	mother”	(Mohd	Azlanshah	2013,	655).	From	this	perspective,	Azlanshah’s	findings	on	the	tactical	negotiation	of	televisual	text	through	an	interpretive	cultural	and	religious	lens,	are	similar	to	those	of	Rosya	&	Morris	with	respect	to	AF.		What	is	interesting	to	note	though,	are	the	polemics	directed	against	these	
kampung	women.	Television	dramas	from	Japan,	Korea,	Indonesia	and	the	Philippines	were	initially	imported	and	promoted	by	the	Malaysian	government	under	the	Look	East	Policy17	of	the	early	1990s.	Azlanshah	notes	that	they	were	initially	viewed	as	appropriate	vehicles	for	modernizing	the	“mindsets	and	attitudes	of	the	masses”	(2013,	649).	But	when	they	became	popular	amongst	women,	he	observes	that	this	generated	anxiety	over	their	potential	threat	to	the	“cultural	values	of	Malay	women”	(Mohd	Azlanshah	2013,	647).	Officially,	he	observes	that	these	programmes	were	regarded	as	a	threat	to	the	“’purity’	of	Malay	cultural	identity”,	and	there	were	concerns	that	they	would	incite	Malay	women	to	transgress	bonds	of	local	culture	and	identity	(Mohd	Azlanshah	2013,		648).	In	particular,	there	were	fears	that	Malay	women	would	deviate	from	the	“social	norms	of	Malay	adat	and	Islamic	faith,	two	important	elements	that	define	Malay	culture	and	identity”	(Mohd.	Azlanshah	2013,	649).		
Puteri	UMNO	(the	women’s	youth	wing	of	UMNO)	urged	the	government	to																																																									16	Respectable,	decent,	well	mannered,	or	conforming	to	accepted	standards	of	what	is	proper.	17	Part	of	Mahathir’s	modernization	effort	that	viewed	modernization	efforts	in	Japan,	Korea	and	other	Asian	countries	as	being	more	compatible	with	Malaysia,	than	modernity	in	the	West.	
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“curb	the	addiction	to	soap	operas	which	deviated	from	the	Islamic	faith	or	propagated	new	ideas	to	do	wrong,	practice	free	sex	or	damage	society’s	norms	and	social	fabric”	(Mohd.	Azlanshah	2013,	649).	UMNO’s	youth	wing	added	that	the	soap	operas	would	compromise	“religious	faith,	cultural	values	and	domestic	duties	of	Malay	women”	(Mohd.	Azlanshah	2013,	649).	With	these	developments,	Azlanshah	observed	that	Malay	women	emerged	as	the	prime	target	of	the	state’s	“cultural	and	moral	anxieties”	in	the	nation’s	“encounter	with	modernity”	(2013,	648).	It	would	seem	ironic	that	the	same	government	that	promoted	the	importation	of	these	cultural	texts	are	now	significantly	vehement	in	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	effects.		These	programmes	were	therefore	not	only	sites	for	a	negotiation	of	modernity	for	Malay	women.	They	also	became	a	site	of	contestation	against	a	patriarchal	force	whose	polemics	are	culturally	and	religiously	accepted	as	the	normative.18	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	this	culturally	and	religiously	constructed	position	of	fragility	and	susceptibility	to	hedonistic	transgressions	did	not	extend	to	Muslim	Malay	males.	Furthermore,	what	remains	unarticulated	within	the	research	is	the	implication	that	Muslim	Malay	males	were	widely	regarded	as	being	better	positioned	to	negotiate	the	indigenization	of	modernity.	That	this	was	unarticulated	within	the	findings	of	the	researcher	-	who	is	male	Malay	–	perhaps	implies	the	extent	of	which	patriarchy	has	been	stabilized	as	a	religio-cultural	norm.		Thus	far,	we	have	seen	how	the	themes	of	‘adat	and	Islam’,	and	‘patriarchal	primacy’	have	governed	the	negotiation	of	Malay	viewers’	consumption	of	televisual	cultural	texts.	We	have	also	seen	how	these	themes	form	the	rubric	for	an	essentialist	notion	of	‘Malayhood’	that	function	as	a	moral	or	cultural	high-ground.	Furthermore,	it	was	observed	that	this	rubric	provides	a	basis	for	an	articulation	of	the	hegemonic	norms	of	Islam	and	Malay	adat.	More	importantly,	Azlanshah’s,	Rosya’s,	and	Rosya	&	Morris’	research	confirm	that	Malay	viewers	are	largely	consenting	towards	these	hegemonic	norms	on	the	basis	that	these																																																									18	It	should	be	noted	that	this	idea	of	the	crisis	of	modernity,	and	the	tendency	to	put	fears	about	moral	change	to	women	is	not	unique	to	Malaysia.	This	similarly	occurs	in	Indonesia,	for	example.	
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are	unquestionable	cultural	and	religious	dictates.	The	works	of	Daniels	(2013)	and	Mohd.	Muzhafar,	et	al.	(2014)	engage	more	directly	with	these	notions	of	power	and	adat	within	the	televisual	context.	While	Daniels’	research	is	focused	explicitly	on	Islamic	Malay	drama	and	Mohd.	Muzhafar	et	al.	interrogate	the	notion	of	power	through	adat	in	Malay	drama,	both	explore	the	articulation	of	power.	It	appears	that	the	same	polemics,	discourses,	and	positionality	of	viewers	are	consistently	reproduced	within	all	the	works	and	related	programmes	mentioned	thus	far.		Engaging	with	television	from	a	different	perspective,	Foo	Tee-Tuan	(2004)	viewed	the	production	of	local	dramas	through	a	political	economy	approach	in	which	he	reified	the	links	of	politics	to	media	and	the	resulting	effect	on	the	nation	state	and	national	identity.	These	links	undergird	his	questions	on	the	role	and	motivations	of	Malaysian	television’s	gatekeepers	and	the	veracity	of	their	decisions.	With	a	grounding	in	the	policies	governing	the	media	industry,	Foo	interrogates	the	federal	media	controls	that	have	been	enacted	by	state	institutions	such	as	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	and	RTM.		My	thesis	diverges	from	this	corpus	of	work	very	simply	in	that	no	other	study	provides	a	close	interrogation	of	any	Malaysian	sitcom,	much	less	in	locating	Malayness	within	it.	Moreover,	while	existing	works	seek	to	understand	ethnic,	socio-political,	and	religious	structures	though	genres	other	than	sitcoms,	they	largely	do	so	through	methods	of	audience	reception	(eg.	Mohd	Azlanshah	2013),	focus	group	interviews	(eg.	Mohd	Azlanshah	2013;	Rosyah	2011;	Rosyah	&	Morris	2013),	political	economy	(eg.	Foo	2004;	Karthigesu	1986,	1991;	Zaharom	1996;	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000),	and	as	consequences	of	historical	processes	(eg.	McDaniel	1994;	Lent	1977,	1978;	Karthigesu	1994),	all	of	which	do	not	locate	their	focus	critically	on	the	televisual	text	itself.	Most	significantly,	while	Senario	has	been	in	production	for	17	years	–	the	longest	of	any	Malaysian	sitcom	in	history	–	no	studies	on	the	programme	currently	exist	at	any	level.		My	critical	examination	of	Senario	thus	makes	three	important	contributions	to	the	existing	intersecting	scholarship	on	Malaysian	television	and	in	the	field	of	
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Malay	studies	more	generally.	This	thesis	is	the	first	major	study	of	a	Malaysian	sitcom	and	the	first	ever	to	provide	a	close	textual	reading.	To	date,	this	is	also	the	only	study	ever	undertaken	on	the	longest	running	Malaysian	sitcom	(Senario)	in	the	history	of	Malaysian	television.	More	broadly,	this	thesis	represents	the	first	critical	textual	study	of	how	a	statist	Malay	identity	can	be	constructed	on	Malaysian	television	which,	as	a	framework,	is	transposable	to	similar	studies	of	other	Malaysian	screen	media.	The	findings	of	this	study	will	therefore	provide	critically	needed	insights	that	will	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	Malaysian	sitcoms,	and	the	wider	ideological	processes	of	Malaysian	television	in	general.		Presumably,	the	length	of	Senario’s	production	lifespan	totalling	17	years	is	not	incidental.	The	broadcaster’s	relationship	to	the	dominant	political	coalition	and	the	sitcom’s	ability	to	capture	the	essence	of	Malayness	as	understood	within	Malay	popular	consciousness	–	both	cultural	and	religious	lived	experience	–	are	variables	that	may	explain	its	longevity.	Notwithstanding	the	reasons	for	its	longevity,	what	were,	if	any,	Senario’s	contributions	to	the	discourse	of	‘Malay’?	How	did	Senario	encapsulate	the	general	ideas	and	meanings	of	Malay	identity	of	its	demographic	for	which	it	was	produced?	Perhaps	more	importantly,	how	much	of	this	encapsulation	of	identity	was	determined	through	political	will?	Before	we	even	begin	addressing	these	questions	in	the	subsequent	chapters,	we	first	need	to	begin	to	understand	what	is	Senario.		The	following	sections	will	provide	an	introduction	of	Senario	that	centres	on	the	sitcom	as	it	was	conceptualized,	as	it	was	performed	and	received,	and	its	many	associative	developments.	Since	no	scholarship	on	Senario	exists,	the	following	literature	is	based	primarily	on	information	from	interviews	and/or	conversations,	observations	from	archival	tapes	of	relevant	episodes	at	TV3,	and	data	from	both	TV3’s	Research	Department	and	Media	Prima’s	Resource	Centre.	While	I	spoke	with	many	individuals	about	Senario,	this	section	is	primarily	informed	by	my	interview	with	Hisyam,19	a	former	long-serving	member	of																																																									19	The	name	Hisyam	is	a	pseudonym.	Hisyam	does	not	say	anything	that	is	critical	of	his/her	employer,	or	of	the	institutions	that	he/she	operates	within.	Nonetheless,	I	have	chosen	to	
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Senario‘s	team	who	was	involved	with	Senario	for	many	years.	My	interviews	and	conversations	with	Hisyam	took	place	between	October	2015	and	June	2016.		
Senario	is	the	title	of	a	Malay-language	situation	comedy	that	was	produced	and	telecast	on	Media	Prima	Berhad’s	station	TV3,	from	the	years	1996	to	2013.	It	began	with	the	seven	participants	of	the	1995	television	talent	show	Sinaran	
Pasport	Kegemilangan	([Spot]Light,	the	Passport	to	Glory)	that	was	produced	and	aired	annually	by	TV3	from	1994-2002	(Hisyam,	personal	communication,	October	10,	2015;	Senario	in	Person,	1999).	Due	to	the	talent	displayed	during	the	competition,	the	seven	participants	were	given	an	opportunity	to	produce	a	television	program	of	their	own	(Senario	in	Person,	1999).	In	June	1996,	an	introductory	four-episode	sitcom	Senario	started	its	broadcast	on	Media	Prima’s	Malay	channel,	TV3.	The	original	cast	of	Senario	were	Shamsul	Ghau-Ghau,	Mazlan	Pet	Pet	(Lan	Pet	Pet),	Farouk	Hussein,	Wahid	Mohammad,	Ilya	Buang,	Hamdan	Ramli,	and	Azlee	Jaafar.20	The	cast	changed	several	times	between	the	years	1997	to	2001,	and	by	2002,	Wahid,	Lan	Pet	Pet,	and	Azlee	were	the	only	three	remaining	core	members	on	the	show.	They	would	be	joined	by	other	non-core	members	until	the	end	of	its	production	in	2013.		One	meaning	of	the	Malay	word	Senario	is	‘rangka	lakon’	(acting	framework/outline)	or	‘ringkasan	plot’	(plot	summary).	Senario	is	also	a	portmanteau	of	the	words	‘senang	riuh’	(easily	boisterous)	and	presumably	a	play	on	the	English	word	‘scenario’,	which	references	the	scenario	or	situation-based	comedy	performed	on	the	show.	Hisyam	recalls	that	the	name	Senario	was	initially	suggested	by	actor	Shamsul	Ghau-Ghau	during	a	brainstorming	session	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	While	Senario	was	primarily	meant	for	the	title	of	the	show,	it	also	subsequently	became	the	name	of	the																																																																																																																																																															anonymize	his/her	identity	which	also	means	I	will	not	provide	specific	information	regarding	the	time	period	of	his/her	involvement	with,	and	his/her	role	on,	Senario.	While	I	may	refer	to	Hisyam	as	male	in	the	text,	it	is	merely	to	facilitate	our	discussions.	All	ethical	considerations	have	been	respected	and	Hisyam	is	fully	aware	of	my	research	focus.	He/she	has	also	agreed	to	be	directly	quoted	in	this	thesis.	20	Based	on	the	archived	episodes	reviewed	at	the	Resource	Department’s	Ingest	Room	1,	Sri	Pentas,	TV3,	between	the	periods	of	October	2015	and	February	2016.	
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group	when	the	cast	released	a	music	album	alongside	the	sitcom.	The	group’s	first	album	sold	approximately	300,000	copies,	which	in	1999	was	among	the	top	10	highest	grossing	albums	in	Malaysia.	This	led	to	several	other	albums,	and	numerous	live	music	performances	and	concerts	in	Singapore,	Brunei,	and	many	parts	of	Malaysia	in	subsequent	years	(Senario	in	Person,	1999).	A	subsidiary	of	Media	Prima	Berhad,	Ambang	Klassik21	(established	in	1995),	was	responsible	for	the	management	of	Senario’s	creative	content	distribution,	sales,	talent	coordination,	and	events	(Hisyam,	personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	In	the	following	excerpt,	Hisyam	provides	a	glimpse	into	Senario’s	popularity	at	the	time.	
Orang	yang	tengok	recording	macam	tengok	konsert	Britney	Spears.	
Serius.	Zaman	tu	lah.	Serius	tau.	Orang	bergaduh-gaduh	nak	masuk	sebab	
dia	percuma.	Pintu	semua	pecah	sekali.	Berlaku	di	Sri	Pentas	2,	recording	
tu.	Pintu	semua	pecah	sekali.	Semua	orang	nak	masuk.	Senario	tu	memang	best-lah,	havoc	gila	masa	tu.	Sangat	best,	memori	sangat	best.	Dia	boleh	
muat	dalam	…	seating	tu	baru,	dalam	berapa…	300,	400	orang.	500.		Tapi	
orang…	gila	punya	tau.	You	tengok	dalam	ini	kan,	terpaksa	pasang	skrin	
dekat	luar	untuk	orang	recording	sekali	tau.”	The	people	who	came	to	watch	the	recording	were	[behaving]	like	[they	were]	attending	a	Britney	Spears	concert.	Serious.	During	that	time	lah.	Serious,	you	know.	People	were	fighting	to	get	in	because	it	was	free.	The	doors	were	all	broken	once	[or	broken	as	well].	[It]	happened	at	Sri	Pentas	2.	The	doors	all	broke.	Everyone	wanted	to	get	in.	Senario	was	just	amazing,	it	was	havoc	then	[in	popularity].	[It	was]	just	the	best	-	the	best	memory.	It	could	fit	…	seating	was	only,	how	many	…	300,	400	people.	500.	But	people	…	[it	was]	crazy,	you	know.	You	watch	inside	[the	studio]	isn’t	it,	but	we	had	to	install	a	screen	right	outside	for	them	to	watch	the	recording	as	well.	 –Hisyam	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015)		Given	these	realities,	at	the	height	of	its	popularity	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	
Senario	was	not	just	a	television	sitcom.	Rather,	it	was	synonymous	with	an	entire	spectrum	of	entertainment	that	ranged	from	radio	music,	television	music	(many	music	videos	were	produced),	television	sitcom,	movies,23	music	concerts,	and	event	performances,	to	national	and	regional	road	shows.	In	other																																																									21	Ambang	Klassik	ceased	operations	in	2002.	23	Senario	spawned	10	feature	films	–	Senario	The	Movie	(Aziz,	&	Aziz,	1999),	Senario	Lagi	(Shamsul,	Aziz,	&	Aziz,	2000),	Lagi-Lagi	Senario	(Ahmad,	Nor	Aliah,	Johari,	&	Aziz,	2001),	Lang	
Buana	(Johari,	Lazizah,	&	Mamat,	2003),	Senario	XX	(Ahmad,	Lazizah,	&	Aziz,	2005),	Senario	
Pemburu	Emas	Yamashita	(Puad,	&	Aziz,	2006),	Senario	The	Movie:	Episod	1	(Teo,	&	Ahmad,	2008),	Senario	The	Movie	Episod	2:	Beach	Boys	(Teo,	&	Ahmad,	2009),	Senario	Asam	Garam	(Teo,	&	Hatta,	2010),	and	Senario	The	Movie	Ops	Pocot	(Teo,	&	Ismail,	2011).	
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words,	as	a	Malaysian	entertainment	group	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	
Senario	was	institutional.		From	the	perspective	of	genre	or	format,	Senario	does	not	feature	recurring	narratives,	characters,	or	locations	unlike	a	conventional	sitcom.	There	are	occasionally	two-part	episodes	but	these,	like	other	single	episodes,	are	self-contained.24	While	TV3	promotes	Senario	as	a	sitcom	that	is	performed	live	with	a	studio	audience,25	Hisyam	suggests	that	stage	comedy	is	a	more	accurate	description	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	In	this	respect,	the	wide	range	of	narratives	and	characters	also	means	that	the	type	of	humour	employed	from	episode	to	episode	varies.	Then	assistant	manager	of	TV3’s	entertainment	department	Tan	Guat	Eyu	(Senario	in	Person,	1999)	observed	that	the	non-recurring	format	for	Senario	was	chosen	at	the	time	because	it	was	a	concept	that	was	new	to	Malaysian	television.	With	several	other	sitcoms	and	comedy	sketches	that	were	already	popular	with	viewers	on	Malaysian	television,	the	team	was	aware	of	the	challenges	that	a	new	comedy	series26	would	face	in	attracting	the	attention	of	viewers.	Tan	therefore	reasoned	that	part	of	the	strategy	was	to	feature	a	myriad	of	scenarios	–	the	1950s,	1960s,	and	situations	in	old	folk’s	homes.	These	were	intended	to	“explore	all	the	‘different	levels’	for	a	broader	viewer	appeal	which	would	range	from	children	to	the	elderly”.27		Speaking	on	the	success	of	Senario	in	1999,	veteran	Malaysian	actor	Aziz	Sattar28	(Senario	in	Person,	1999)	observed	that	Senario’s29	style	of	“overacting”	was	especially	popular	with	children	(anak-anak	kecil)	who	were	drawn	to	the																																																									24	The	only	exception	is	the	series	from	2011	which	had	the	title	‘Misteri	Bamboo’.	The	narrative	of	Misteri	Bamboo	stretched	across	all	13	episodes	of	the	series.	25	Towards	the	end	of	its	production	(2012-2013),	Senario	featured	several	episodes	that	were	recorded	on	location,	mostly	in	rural	locations.	26	In	this	instance,	the	use	of	the	term	‘series’	refers	to	a	production	title	with	episodes	that	may	or	may	not	run	sequentially	across	a	period	of	time.	27	Translated	by	the	researcher	from	the	original,	“Dia	menjelajah	pada	semua	peringkat.	Bila	
begitu	jadinya,	kita	punya	audience	pun,	daripada	pelbagai	peringkat.	Kita	dapat	secara	tidak	
langsung.	Daripada	kanak-kanak	sampailah	kepada	orang	tua”	(Senario	in	Person,	1999).	28	Aziz	Sattar	is	known	for	his	roles	in	the	early	black	and	white	Malayan	films	in	the	1950-1960.	He	is	an	actor,	comedian,	singer,	and	director.	29	Here	Aziz	is	referring	to	Senario	the	sitcom,	their	films,	and	the	performing	group,	since	there	is	also	a	little	acting	in	their	road	show	performances.	
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exaggerated,	over-excited	characters.	This,	Aziz	reasoned,	is	why	Senario’s	movie	spinoffs	for	example,	had	an	overwhelming	response	from	the	public.	Every	single	child	who	watched	the	movie,	Aziz	asserted,	was	accompanied	by	both	parents	leading	to	an	exponential	increase	in	ticket	sales.	In	this	sense,	he	suggests	that	‘Senario’s	success	lies	in	its	ability	to	capture	the	hearts	of	the	children’.30		More	than	629	episodes31	of	Senario	were	produced	between	1996	and	2013.32	While	Senario	is	no	longer	produced,	TV3	nonetheless	still	telecasts	re-runs	of	old	episodes.	In	2014,	Senario	was	awarded	the	Anugerah	Komedi	Sepanjang	
Zaman	(Award	for	[Best]	Comedy	of	All	Time)	at	the	Anugerah	Lawak	Warna	2014	(The	2014	Colours	of	Comedy	Awards).	As	of	June	2016,	the	remaining	three	members33	of	Senario	are	reportedly	working	on	Senario	Toons,	an	animated	cartoon	series	slated	to	air	on	TV3	at	an	undetermined	date	(Siti	Athirah,	2014).	It	is	instructive	that	with	Senario	Toons,	the	primary	demographic	is	now	firmly	identified	as	children.		The	observed	stress	on	children	is	important.	Besides	Senario	Toons’	obvious	demographic,	both	Tan’s	and	Aziz’s	accounts	for	example,	reference	‘children’	as	a	section	of	the	target	demographic	for	Senario.	This	is	curious,	for	based	on	my	watching	of	Senario’s	episodes,	most	of	the	jokes	and	dialogues	do	not	seem	to	be	targeted	for	the	consumption	of	children	–	at	least	not	those	young	enough	to	warrant	the	presence	of	parents	at	the	cinema.	Yet,	these	are	the	children	referred	to	by	both	Tan	and	Aziz.	The	effects	of	media’s	influence	on	children	within	domestic	and	social	environments,	have	long	been	the	focus	of	scholars	of	media,	among	others.		Within	the	context	of	television	sitcoms,	studies	about	sitcom’s	effects	on																																																									30	Translated	by	the	researcher	from	the	original,	“Inilah	keuntungan	Senario,	kerana	banyak	
memikat	hati	anak-anak”	(Senario	in	Person,	1999).	31	Based	on	archival	data	at	Media	Prima’s	Resource	Centre.	32	On	average,	this	equates	to	a	total	of	37	episodes	produced	annually	for	17	years.	A	typical	season	contains	anywhere	from	13-22	episodes.	33	Wahid,	Lan	Pet	Pet	and	Azlee,	are	the	only	members	who	will	be	featured	in	‘Senario	Toons’	(Siti	Athirah,	2014).	
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American	families	have	existed	since	at	least	the	1960s.	More	recent	studies	such	as	works	by		Judy	Kutulas	(2005),	Laura	Linder	(2005),	and	John	O’Leary	&	Rick	Worland	(2005)	centres	on	sitcoms’	role	in	reframing	the	family.	Through	these	studies,	we	observe	the	roles	of	mothers,	fathers,	and	children	being	rearticulated	in	an	exhaustive	number	of	configurations	of	a	household	or	family	unit.	Transcending	generational	levels,	these	idealized	narratives	of	American	sitcoms	provide	defining	contexts	that	engender	stability	to	the	roles	of	each	family	member	as	determined	by	the	American	domestic	and	social	status	quo.	On	this	basis,	it	would	be	natural	to	question	how	this	same	process	works	to	instil	Malay	identity	in	the	young	with	respect	to	messages/signs	that	are	normalized	within	Senario‘s	text.		A	similar	area	of	scholarship	that	relates	to	children	in	Malaysia	focuses	on	the	embedding	of	dominant	Malay	ideology	within	the	Malaysian	national	school	curriculum.	These	demonstrate	that	within	the	Malaysian	context,	ideological	links	to	the	young	do	also	exist.34	Helen	Ting’s	work	for	example,	proposes	that	Form	Three	and	Form	Five35	history	textbooks,	among	others,	continually	work	to	delegitimize	the	positions	of	non-Malays	and	non-Muslims	as	equal	citizens	while	simultaneously	constructing	these	communal	groups	as	threats	to	an	autochthonous	Malay	community	(2009,	39;	2014,	200-213).36	In	this	respect,	both	the	question	of	Senario’s	effects	on	the	young	and	the	related	discourse	of	national	curriculum	is	ideologically	similar	to	the	stabilization	of	household	roles	identified	by	Kutulas,	Linder,	and	O’Leary	&	Worland	above.		Hisyam	explained	that	Senario’s	stories	during	the	time	of	his	involvement	were	based	on	true	life	stories	scripted	from	the	writer-director’s	conversations	with	friends,	family,	and	also	life	experiences	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	Nanovil	Roy,	who	was	then	General	Manager	of	Strategy	and	Business	Development	for	Media	Prima	in	2004,	recounts	that	Senario’s	team	was	heavily																																																									34	Another	related	discourse	is	the	contribution	of	vernacular	schools,	national	schools,	and	Islamic	schools,	to	the	increasing	polarization	within	Malaysian	society.	These	narratives	however,	go	beyond	the	scope	of	our	discussions.	35	Form	5	is	when	the	Sijil	Pelajaran	Malaysia	(SPM)	examinations	are	held.	SPM	is	the	Malaysian	equivalent	of	GCSE	‘O’	Level.	36	See	Ting	(2009,	2014,	2015)	for	detailed	discussions.	
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influenced	by	local	Malay	pop	culture	at	the	time,	for	example	the	popular	Malay	cartoon	magazine	Gila-Gila37	(Crazy-Crazy)	(personal	communication,	October	24,	2015).	Both	Hisyam’s	and	Roy’s	accounts	reveal	that	while	Senario‘s	themes	are	based	on	lived-experiences,	and	if	Hisyam	is	to	be	believed,	large	sections	of	its	dialogue	did	occur	in	real	life,	its	fictionalized	re-enactments	on	Senario	necessarily	conform	to	the	genre’s	convention	of	stereotypes	and	preferred	meanings.		There	is	a	degree	of	creative	causality	in	the	producer’s	authorial	power	over	socio-cultural	and/or	religio-ethnic	myths	within	Senario	that	shapes	the	account.	This	is	primarily	due	to	its	construction	by	the	circular	movement	of	producing	Malayness	for	the	consumption	of	Malay	viewers,	by	Malay	subjects	constituted	through	a	prior	consumption	of	Malayness	(their	lived	experiences).	It	is	through	this	self-perpetuating	cycle	that	myths	are	able	to	turn	the	fabricated	into	naturalized	‘truth’	that	results	in	making	the	dominant	cultural	and	historical	values,	attitudes,	and	beliefs	seem	natural,	normal,	self-evident,	and	consequently,	an	objective	and	‘true’	reflection	of	reality	(Barthes	1974,	206;	1977,	45-46).38		In	this	sense,	the	connoted	ideological	experience-vision	of	the	text	can	be	ascriptive.	Without	exception,	it	may	assign	and	entrench	essentialist	interpretations	to	the	Malay	belief	and	value	systems	and	fix	them	as	truth.	Its	deployment	on	children	should	therefore	not	be	overlooked.	The	ability	of	such	myths	in	effecting	the	construction	of	Malay	subjects	in	minds	as	young	as	children	can	have	concerning	results.	In	any	case,	given	Senario‘s	popularity	during	the	1990s-2000s	and	the	diversification	of	the	franchise	into	a	number	of	different	media,	it	is	evident	that	its	potential	to	reach	young	fans	was	recognized	by	Media	Prima	Berhad.	One	reality	foregrounded	by	the	preceding	discussion	is	the	close-intertwined	nature	of	Senario	with	popular	Malay																																																									37	American	MAD	magazine	is	perhaps	the	nearest	Western	equivalent	to	the	Malay-language	
Gila-Gila.	This	Malay	magazine	was	printed	on	newsprint	paper,	and	featured	black-inked	illustrations	within	cartoon	panels.	Gila-Gila	was	very	popular	in	Malaysia	during	the	1980s	and	1990s.	38	The	notion	of	myths	and	myth-making	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	
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consciousness	within	a	specific	point	in	time.	Like	most	constituents	of	popular	culture,	the	nature	of	this	relationship	places	an	importance	on	understanding	what	it	is	that	Senario	communicates	to	its	demographic.	In	interpreting	the	(sub)textual	meanings	of	Senario	that	are	communicated,	I	however,	do	not	dismiss	the	relevance	of	my	own	positionality.		I	am	a	Malaysian	Chinese	who	was	raised	in	an	environment	of	Chinese	culture	and	faith.39	The	year	2017	will	however,	mark	my	14th	year	as	a	Muslim	living	within	a	Malay	cultural	environment.	As	such,	I	straddle	a	position	between	both	cultures	and	faith	while	simultaneously	not	fully	identifying	with,	nor	accepted	by,	those	with	prevailing	rigid	notions	of	either.	In	this	respect,	I	locate	myself	within	the	discourse	of	Malaysian	identity,	approaching	it	with	an	idealistic	aspiration	for	a	genuinely	hybrid	and	organic	national	culture.	This	likely	accounts	for	my	detached	appreciation	of	both	Malay	and	Chinese	culture	and	faith.	This	detachment	however,	does	not	mean	that	effort	has	not	been	invested	in	learning	both.40	Therefore,	simultaneous	to	an	understanding	of	both	cultural	and	religious	positions,	I	also	regard	their	positions	as	tautological	whereby	these	positions	exist	only	because	of	individual	and	communal	decisions	that	sustain	them.	I	state	these	points	not	merely	to	clarify	my	position	within	this	research,	but	also	to	explain	my	motivations	in	problematizing	the	re-constituted	televisual	performances	of	identity	that	provide	a	certain	rigidity	to	perceived	Malayness.		With	these	subjectivities	in	mind,	I	ask	three	broad	questions	pertaining	to	
Senario’s	performance	of	Malay	identity	that	forms	the	basis	of	inquiry	for	this	thesis:	(1)	What	dominant	narratives	of	Malay	identity	are	performed	on		
							Senario;																																																									39	I	refrain	from	naming	a	specific	‘Chinese	religion’,	though	here	I	am	in	fact	referencing	both	Taoism	and	Buddhism.	As	practiced	in	Malaysia,	Taoism,	Buddhism,	and	Confucianism	have	syncretized	other,	and	each	other’s,	systems	of	belief.	Further,	it	is	not	uncommon	to	simultaneously	subscribe	to	portions	of	several	or	all	these	religious	teachings,	since	their	syncretic	nature	allows	for	each	to	be	complementary	to	others.	40	I	make	the	distinction	between	learning,	and	practicing	or	’doing’	culture	and	faith.	The	distinction	lies	in	the	difference	between	mimicry	and	understanding,	the	latter	of	which	results	from	a	period	of	learning.	
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(2)	Who	are	exteriorized	through	the	differences	hierarchized	by	Senario									and	how	does	Senario	(re)construct	this	hierarchy	of	difference;	(3)	How	does	this	affect	the	fixity	of	state-defined	configurations	in	the												nationalist	Malay	narrative?		At	its	core,	this	thesis	seeks	to	identify	at	a	textual	level,	the	methods	by	which	
Senario	encodes	the	dominant	tropes	of	Malay	identity.	Taken	together,	these	questions	seek	to	unpack	Senario’s	role	as	a	site	that	aims	to	affirm	and	resolve	ambivalences	within	the	process	of	identity	formation	by	the	Malay	community.	This	is	framed	through	the	nation’s	power	structure	embodied	by	the	dominant	Malay	political	party	UMNO.	By	focusing	primarily	on	Senario‘s	significations	of	dominant	and	subversive	meanings	of	Malayness	as	understood	through	corresponding	political	and	popular	civic	pressures	of	the	time,	an	understanding	of	the	Malay	imaginary	as	staged	televisually,	can	be	gleaned.		From	a	methodological	perspective,	the	analysis	of	this	thesis	engages	directly	and	strictly	with	the	televised	content	itself;	in	other	words,	as	seen	by	a	viewer	on	a	television	set.	For	this	reason,	while	I	do	include	interviews	with	the	producers	in	other	aspects	of	the	thesis’	discussions,	I	have	consciously	excluded	their	input	in	my	actual	analysis	of	the	television	text.	This	process	by	which	I	interpret	ethnic,	religious,	and	political	structures	simply	as	they	are	writ-large	on-screen	is	important,	for	it	stresses	the	text’s	polysemic	potential,	allowing	for	a	wider	thematic	exploration	of	textual	meanings.	Moreover,	while	the	fore-knowledge	of	producers’	intent	is	certainly	insightful,	it	does	not	guarantee	that	these	same	meanings	will	be	‘decoded’	by	the	viewers’	subjective	viewing	experiences.	The	additional	ambiguity	of	relying	on	a	producer’s	memory	to	recall	their	intention	across	what	may	at	times	be	a	gap	of	19	years,	certainly	does	not	strike	me	as	ideal.	Finally,	a	focus	on	the	text’s	polysemy	of	meanings	also	makes	it	easier	to	avoid	considering	only	the	interpretation	of	the	producer	or	viewer.	To	this	end,	I	have	discriminately	applied	much	of	John	Fiske’s	and	John	Hartley’s	methods	of	analysis	that	are	outlined	largely	in	the	key	works	
Television	Culture	(Fiske	2011)	and	Reading	Television	(Fiske	&	Hartley	1985).	This	is	further	complemented	by	applicable	models	of	representation	and	
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signification	by	theorists	such	as	Stuart	Hall,	Levi-Strauss,	and	Roland	Barthes.	There	is	also	a	considered	deployment	to	selected	parts	of	Slavoj	Žižek’s	(1989)	transposition	of	Jacques	Lacan’s	psychoanalytical	theory	that	are	appropriate	to	the	Malaysian	context	of	identity	politics	and	Senario.	These	theories	will	be	discussed	more	critically	in	Chapter	4.		The	primary	material	on	which	my	analysis	is	based	–	the	Senario	episodes	–	is	sourced	from	Media	Prima’s	archival	department	at	Sri	Pentas	in	Bandar	Utama,	Selangor,	Malaysia	where	TV3	is	headquartered.	The	content	was	accessed	at	this	site	between	mid-November	2015	and	late-January	2016.	Based	on	archival	data	provided	by	Media	Prima’s	Resource	Centre	in	December	2015,	there	are	more	than	629	episodes	of	Senario	that	were	produced	between	1996	and	2013.	The	total	number	of	episodes	is	presumably	higher	since	there	are	gaps	in	the	system’s	record	log,	notably	between	2002	and	2006.	This	is	to	be	expected	since	most	of	the	content	was	recorded	on	analogue	media.	Their	availability	on	the	digital	server	is	therefore	dependent	on	the	inherent	difficulties	in	the	task	of	digitizing	an	entire	catalogue	of	episodes	numbering	in	the	hundreds.	My	access	to	the	catalogue	of	work	on	Senario	was	also	limited	by	the	availability	of	the	Resource	Centre’s	already	short-handed	manpower	as	well	as	the	availability	of	the	viewing	stations,	of	which	there	were	only	two.		While	I	could	not	make	any	copies	of	the	content	viewed	at	Media	Prima,41	I	have	since	obtained	copies	of	all	but	one	of	the	episodes	referenced	in	this	thesis;	the	exception	being	the	2007	episode	Bina	Semangat.	The	episodes	that	are	not	sourced	from	YouTube	are	however,	strictly	meant	for	personal	reference.	While	these	challenges	in	accessing	episodes	have	had	an	arguably	limited	bearing	on	the	outcome	of	the	thesis,	it	should	nonetheless	be	mentioned	since	a	conscious	effort	was	made	to	restrict	my	discussions	to	the	episodes	that	could	be	referred	to	and	re-watched	repeatedly	during	the	period	of	my	writing.	This	ease	of	access	to	the	episodes	during	my	formulation	of	the	three	chapters	of	analyses	is	an	important	factor,	since	a	close	reading	of	the	significations	meant	that	some																																																									41	The	chargeable	fee	of	Malaysian	Ringgit	600	per	episode	(pricing	for	educational	purposes)	meant	that	making	copies	of	the	episodes	from	Media	Prima	was	not	an	option.	
		 33	
of	the	episodes’	meta-narratives	were	always	not	obvious	or	understandable	even	after	several	rounds	of	viewing	and	note-taking.	This	is	presumably	attributed	to	my	non-Malay	upbringing	and	acculturation,	for	when	cursory	questions	about	certain	Malay	cultural	references	in	Senario	were	posed	to	the	Malay	Resource	Centre	officers42	who	were	tasked	with	assisting	me,	they	could	invariably	provide	a	form	of	explanation.		66	episodes	of	Senario	were	viewed	in	total,	translating	to	roughly	ten	percent	of	the	system’s	log	of	total	content	produced.	42	episodes	from	the	years	2001	to	2013	were	viewed	at	Media	Prima	while	a	further	24	episodes	that	ranged	from	the	years	1996	to	2000	were	viewed	on	numerous	YouTube	channels	online.	Detailed	information	regarding	the	episodes	watched	is	contained	in	Table	1.1.	Since	the	total	number	of	episodes	(629)	available	was	simply	too	large	for	even	a	quick	viewing,	the	preliminary	selection	of	66	episodes	was	based	entirely	on	a	cursory	reading	of	each	episode’s	synopsis	extracted	from	the	server’s	archived	metadata.	While	this	is	not	necessarily	ideal,	it	nonetheless	allowed	for	a	shortlist	based	on	an	approximation	of	content	contained	in	each	episode	that	might	explicitly	relate	to	themes	of	Malay	tradition-culture,	Islam,	gender,	and	socio-political	developments	within	their	corresponding	periods.	A	first	viewing	of	these	66	episodes	was	conducted	with	a	view	to	reducing	the	list	to	ten	episodes	based	on	three	broad	themes;	four	episodes	on	the	theme	of	‘Malayness’	for	Chapter	5,	three	on	‘Islam’	and	its	conflation	with	‘Malay’	for	Chapter	6,	and	three	on	Malay	‘gender	relations’	for	Chapter	7.		The	final	decision	on	which	episodes	to	include	in	the	analytical	chapters,	evolved	without	any	rigid	predetermined	objective	aside	from	the	criteria	of	adherence	to	the	loose	themes	of	‘Malayness’,	‘Islam’	and	conflation	with	‘Malay’,	and	‘gender’.	In	short,	the	structure	and	content	for	the	final	three	chapters	of	analysis	would	only	become	clear	once	I	knew	at	a	sub-textual	level,	what	the	episodes	naturally	articulated	about	the	broad	themes	above.	This	seemed	ideal	given	that	I	was	to	identify	what	Senario	was	contributing	to	the	discourse	of	Malayness	and	how	it	did	so.																																																									42	There	were	observably	no	non-Malay	officers	at	the	Resource	Centre.	
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Site	 First	airdate	
Episodes	
viewed	 Episode	Titles	
YouTube	
1996	 2	 Rajin	Adik	Rajin,	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	1997	 5	 Wad	Kemalangan,	Mesti	Jadi	Punya,	Ta	Ti	Tu,	Kubu	Askar,	Tandas	Awam	1998	 5	 Gua	Tempurung,	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	Ibu	MertuaMu,	Warong	60-an,	Jejak	Karun	1999	 6	 Babak	Sebabak,	Bayi	Ajaib,	Hait	Nippon	Hait	1	&	2,	Kelas	Pengacara	1	&	2	2000	 6	 Gong	Xi,	Muzium,	Pendekar	1	&	2,	Sedar	Tak	Sedar	1	&	2	
Media	Prima	
2001	 6	 KeranaMu	Malaysia,	Hijrah	1	&	2,	Fantasia,	Semangat	Yang	Hilang	1	&	2	2007	 4	 Bina	Semangat	1	&	2,	Siapa	Sedap	1	&	2	2008	 6	 Jalak	Senteng	1	&	2,	Hero	1	&	2,	Terdesak	1	&	2	2009	 7	 Wakil	Kampung	1	&	2,	Samseng	Kampung	Dusun	1	&	2,	Siapa	Besar	1	&	2,	Rezeki	Melayang	2011	 8	 Kantoi	1	&	2,	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	1	&	2,	Salah	Sangka	1	&	2,	Kuat	1	&	2	2012	 7	 Kepercayaan	Karut,	Berpacaran,	Nasib	Si	Anak,	Madu	3,	Anakku	Bapaku	Atokku	Sazali,	Penipu	Zaman	Berzaman,	
Warung	2013	 4	 Puteri	Gunung	Stong,	Sayang	Anak,	Cucu	Cicit	Tok	Pagor,	Be	With	You		Table	1.1:	List	of	Senario	episodes	viewed	for	research		It	was	obvious	right	from	the	first	viewing	that	both	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	and	
Ta	Ti	Tu	needed	to	be	included	in	the	thesis.	Both	are	very	early	examples	of	
Senario’s	blatantly	didactic	stance	on	the	themes	of	Malay	nationalism	(Negara	
Chekpa	Merdeka)	and	Islamic	practice	(Ta	Ti	Tu).	This	was	significant	since	both	themes	were	also	fundamental	to	many	different	contemporary	articulations	of	Malay	primacy.	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	was	selected	due	to	its	encapsulation	of	much	of	the	discourse	surrounding	Malay	identity	between	the	period	of	1980s	and	1990s.	The	urban-rural	and	modern-traditional	binaries,	and	the	subtle	hints	of	a	“Malay	colonialism”	mindset,	undergird	the	episode’s	narrative.	Upon	closer	examination,	episodes	from	2011	were	significantly	more	strident	in	their	ethnic	and	religious	chauvinism.	As	a	result,	three	two-parter	episodes	from	that	year	alone,	Kantoi,	Salah	Sangka,	and	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	were	selected	for	
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Chapters	5,	6,	and	7,	respectively	since	each	of	these	episodes	exemplified	much	of	each	chapter’s	thematic	direction.	The	initial	envisioned	number	of	episodes-per-chapter	for	analysis	was	eventually	revised.	While	other	episodes	are	often	referenced	to	nuance	certain	arguments,	the	core	episodes	that	facilitate	the	discussions	in	Chapters	5	to	7	are	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	
Kantoi,	Gong	Xi,	Ta	Ti	Tu,	Salah	Sangka,	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman,	and	Bina	
Semangat.43		The	chapters	of	this	thesis	are	thematically	organized	into	three	parts.	The	first,	Chapters	2	and	3	review	the	literature	and	key	arguments	on	Malay	identity	and	discuss	key	details	of	the	Malaysian	broadcasting	industry	to	provide	the	context	for	the	later	analysis	of	Senario.	In	Chapter	2,	I	track	the	evolution	of	the	Malay	primacy	narrative,	its	conflation	with	Malay	Islamic	discourse	from	a	socio-political	dimension,	and	the	developments	to	Malay	gender	relations	that	they	effectuated.	The	focus	shifts	to	corresponding	developments	within	the	broadcasting	sphere	in	Chapter	3	where	the	bearing	of	the	Malay	and/or	Islamic	primacy	narratives	towards	the	development	of	national	television	is	examined.	The	second	part	of	the	thesis,	Chapter	4,	is	theoretical	where	the	ideas	and	frameworks	that	will	direct	the	close	textual	reading	of	the	sitcom	are	discussed.	The	third	part	of	the	thesis	comprising	the	three	chapters	of	analysis,	Chapters	5	to	7,	will	each	address	in	turn	the	themes	of	Malay	nationalism	and	ethnic	stereotyping,	Islamic	didacticism	and	Pan-Malay	identity,	and	Malay	gender	relations.	The	analysis	in	these	three	chapters	draws	primarily	on	existing	studies	of	Malay	identity,	Malaysian	inter-ethnic	dynamics,	and	historical-contemporary	socio-political	developments.	The	conclusion	in	Chapter	8	discusses	the	overarching	issues	of	Malayness	that	are	identified	on	Senario	when	located	within	a	contemporary	and	globalized,	21st	century	Malaysian	society.	Possible	extensions	to	this	research	that,	among	others,	may	move	broadcasting	policies	toward	greater	assimilation	of	cultures	are	also	suggested.			 	
																																																								43	Full	references	will	be	provided	in	the	chapters	of	analysis	and	the	bibliography.	
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CHAPTER	2	
	
Constituting	‘Malay’:	Race,	Politics,	and	Islam	
	
Biduk	lalu,	kiambang	bertaut	
	
As	the	boat	passes,	the	water	lettuces	part	only	to	rejoin	
																		 				–Malay	Proverb		The	forging	of	a	national	narrative	is	complex	and	nations	continually	work	to	integrate	their	people	in	an	effort	to	construct	a	shared	imaginary	of	nationhood.	Within	this	process	of	nation	building,	Malaysia	has	had	to	contend	with	the	melding	of	diverse	ethnic	communities	and	their	heritages.	The	pivotal	status	and	position	of	the	Malaysian	Malays44	has	since	been	enshrined	in	the	Federal	Constitution,	paving	the	way	for	Malay	socio-economic	development	as	the	primary	national	agenda.	It	is	however,	a	position	that	is	historically	associated	with	the	prevailing	national	atmosphere	of	inter-ethnic	tension.		Works	by	scholars	such	as	Timothy	Daniels	(2005),	Khoo	Gaik	Cheng	(2006),	Anthony	Milner	(2011),	Anthony	Reid	(2006),	William	Roff	(1967),	Shamsul	A.	B.	(1996a,	1996b,	2006),	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	(2006),	and	Adrian	Vickers	(2006)	trace	these	inter-ethnic	tensions	to	colonial	Malaya.	This	suggests	that	struggles	for	Malay	identity	(which	extend	to	rights)	have	always	imbricated	the	identities	and	rights	of	Malaysia’s	ethnic	minorities.	While	the	outcome	of	the	contestations	over	Malaysian	identity	have	since	clarified	with	the	nationalization	of	Malay	culture	in	1971,	both	Chinese	and	Indian	socio-political	actors	have	continued	to	challenge	the	fundamental	assumptions	legitimizing	the	Malay	bias	(Ting	2009,	39,	44-45,	47).45			Within	political	frameworks,	national	identity	often	results	in	ethnic/interest	groups	trying	to	control	the	state	in	order	to	render	themselves	as	the	reference	point	for	the	nation’s	cultural	foundation	(Williams	1989).	This	chapter	will	thus																																																									44	Hereafter	referred	to	as	Malay/s.	While	there	may	be	similarities	to	Malays	elsewhere	in	the	world,	I	refer	contextually	to	the	Malays	in	Malaysia	unless	specified	otherwise.	45	Malaysia	is	a	multi-ethnic,	multi-cultural,	and	multi-religious	nation	comprised	primarily	of	three	major	ethnic	groups	–	Malays,	Chinese,	and	Indians.	
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track	the	strategies	deployed	by	the	state	to	legitimize	Malay	primacy	as	a	form	of	Malay	identity.	Of	particular	interest	is	the	rhetoric	of	Islamism46	and	its	eventual	political	conflation	with	the	Melayuisme47	nationalist	framework.	This	overview	of	the	state’s	influence	with	respect	to	both	spheres	of	identity,	is	not	merely	essential	to	our	discussions	of	Malaysia’s	broadcasting	infrastructure.	Its	effects	on	quotidian	Malayness	are	also	key	to	our	interpretations	of	Senario’s	subtext	in	the	three	chapters	of	analysis.		The	first	section	of	this	chapter	will	delimit	the	Malay	category	by	exploring	its	two	broad	sub-categories	as	constructed	through	official	state	lexicon.	This	will	be	followed	by	an	exploration	of	the	Malay	primacy	(Ketuanan	Melayu)	position	and	its	residual	effects	on	inter-ethnic	relations.	Competing	non-essentialist	Malay	identities,	both	envisioned	officially	and	emerging	from	the	periphery	of	social	spaces,	will	be	discussed	in	the	proceeding	third	section.	The	developments	catalyzed	through	both	state-funded	and	non-governmental	Islamic	constituents	will	be	the	focus	of	the	fourth	section.	The	fifth	section	will	explore	how	these	issues	–	Malay	identity	politics	and	its	close	relationship	with	Islam	–	have	impacted	Malay	gender	dynamics.	The	developments	identified	in	these	five	sections	will	finally	be	broadly	theorized	through	the	notion	of	‘Otherness’	in	the	sixth	section.		
Categorically	Speaking	The	academic	literature	on	what	comprises	the	Malay	category	is	vast,	and	many	in-depth	studies	grounded	in	both	historical	and	contemporary	contexts,	have	explored	different	variations	of	the	questions	of	“Who	is	a	Malay?”	(Roff	1967,	244),	“What	is	Malay?”	(Daniels	2000,	xx),	“who	are	‘the	Malays’”	(Milner	2011,	xi),	and	“What	is	the	meaning	of	Malay?”	(Barnard	&	Maier	2006,	ix).	Many	scholars	have	similarly	explored	contending	projections	of	inclusive	and	exclusive	counter	narratives	of	nationhood	(for	example,	Farish	Noor	2001,																																																									46	Liow	&	Afif	define	‘Islamism’	as	a	political	ideology	premised	on	the	primacy	of	Islam	as	an	organizing	principle	for	government	(2015,	50).	47	Ting	quotes	scholar	Ariffin	Omar	who	defines	Melayuisme	as	“the	belief	that	the	interests	of	the	
bangsa	Melayu	(Malay	race)	must	be	upheld	over	all	else”	(2009,	35).	She	refers	to	Mohammad	Yunus	Hamidi	who	in	1961,	noted	that	UMNO’s	founding	president	Dato’	Onn	Jaafar	said,	“UMNO	did	not	adhere	to	any	ideology	other	than	Melayuisme”	(2009,	35).	
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2002,	2010;	Joel	Kahn	2006;	Reid	2006;	Shamsul	1996a,	1996b,	2015;	Vickers	2006).	In	understanding	the	discourse	on	Malay	primacy,	two	categories	are	important	–	‘Malay’	and	‘bumiputera’	(sons	of	the	soil49).	While	they	can	and	do	include	other	ethnic	groups,50	both	are	key	in	legitimizing	Malay	ethnic	spaces	within	the	national	narrative	to	exclude	those	who	are	regarded	as	not	Malay.		Malay	is	defined	in	Article	160(2)	of	the	Malaysian	Federal	Constitution,	as	a	“person	who	professes	the	religion	of	Islam,	who	habitually	speaks	the	Malay	language,	and	conforms	to	Malay	custom”	(2013,	152).	This	definition	is	made	necessary	since	there	are	many	sections	within	the	constitution	that	deal	with	special	Malay	rights.	Presumably	because	this	constitutional	definition	does	not	address	the	criteria	of	ancestry	–	potentially	admitting	a	person	who	is	non-Malay	at	birth	–	there	is	a	non-constitutionally	defined	category	widely	associated	with	Malaysian	Malay	called	bumiputera.	The	category	or	term	
bumiputera	has	a	largely	ambiguous	scope	that	revolves	around	debates	over	its	inclusion	or	exclusion	of	indigenous51	people	and/or	Malays.	Since	there	is	no	genuinely	conclusive	or	official	definition	to	the	term,	the	fluidity	of	its	boundaries	needs	to	be	identified	for	us	to	understand	how	it	functions	as	a	socio-political	instrument	in	indicating	Malay	socio-economic	spaces.		Daniel	Goh	&	Philip	Holden	makes	a	distinction	between	the	Malay	category	and	the	wider	bumiputera	category	by	referring	to	Malaysian	Malays	as	“bumiputera	Malay”	(2009,	8).	Vijay	Devadas	alludes	to	a	more	limited	definition	when	he	describes	bumiputera	as	the	“majority,	dominant	Malay	community”	(2009,	86),	which	implies	that	Malays	are	the	bumiputera.	He	repeats	this	distinction	when	he	writes	“bumiputera	and	other	indigenous	populations”	(2009,	88).	Aihwa	Ong																																																									49	‘Putera’	is	more	accurately	translated	as	‘prince’.	50	For	example,	the	Federal	Constitution	of	Malaysia’s	definition	of	‘Malay’	does	not	address	ancestry.	51	The	indigenous	people	of	Malaysia	are	the	natives	of	Sarawak	and	Sabah	and	their	offspring.	The	Federal	Constitution	in	Article	161A(6)	and	161A(7)	provides	a	list	of	Sarawak	and	Sabah	
Orang	Asli	(Original	People)	tribes	that	are	included	in	this	legal	category.	This	definition	is	needed	since	Article	153	provides	a	long	list	of	privileges	that	are	available	only	to	those	defined	as	Malays	and/or	indigenous.	While	Article	160(2)	defines	the	peninsular	Orang	Asli	as	aborigines,	they	are	excluded	from	Article	153.	Their	special	rights	are	mentioned	instead	in	Article	8(5)	and	Article	45(2).	Informally,	Orang	Asli	refers	to	both	the	indigenous	people	of	Sarawak	and	Sabah,	and	the	peninsular	aborigines.	
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employs	the	term	in	a	similar	scope	when	she	describes	bumiputeraism	as	a	form	of	“pastoral	power	that	has	been	employed	on	behalf	of	the	Malay”	(2006,	80).	Edmund	T.	Gomez’s	usage	would	agree	with	Goh	&	Holden’s	wider	definition	when	he	makes	a	distinction	between	“Sabah’s	rural	Muslim	Bumiputeras”	and	“the	peninsula’s	rural	Malays”	(2008,	6,	7).			The	ambiguity	in	the	scope	of	the	bumiputera	category	–	whether	it	includes	only	peninsular	Malays,	or	also	the	indigenous	groups	–	can	best	be	understood	from	the	tenuous	Malay	assertion	of	indigeneity.	Milner	describes	the	origin	of	the	term	bumiputera	as	being	unofficially	formulated	by	the	UMNO52	elites	in	the	1960s	to	differentiate	‘Malay’	(who	were	Muslims)	from	bumiputera	(the	indigenous	peoples)	(2011,	160),	though	this	did	not	preclude	the	Malays	from	being	in	the	supra-bumiputera	category.	Mahathir	argues	that	Malays	are	also	considered	bumiputera	because	the	aborigines	who	were	the	“definitive	people”	did	not	set	up	states	in	Malaya,	but	the	Malays	did	and	thus	“defined	the	core	culture	and	set	the	conditions	by	which	subsequent	migrants	were	admitted”	(Reid	2006,	18).		Vickers	observes	that	in	this	sense,	“Malay	is	meant	to	be	coterminous	with	
bumiputera”,	denoting	the	“indigenous	status	of	the	Malays”	(2006,	27),	while	Khoo	G.C.	notes	that	it	also	refers	to	“several	other	indigenous	groups”	(2006,	13).	With	the	dual	definitions	of	constitutional	Malay	and	unofficial	bumiputera	each	reaffirming	the	other,	we	can	infer	that	this	complex	ethnic	rubric	has	created	an	exclusive	socio-political	and	economic	space	for	the	Malays	that	can	potentially	exclude	even	the	indigenous	bumiputeras.	This	is	implied	when	Khoo	G.C.	writes	that	bumiputera	was	created	“under	the	aegis	of	the	NEP	to	reassert	
Malay	dominance	and	privilege”	(2006,	13)(emphasis	added).	Reid	similarly	alludes	to	an	instrumentalization	of	this	distinction	between	two	intra-
bumiputera	categories	when	he	notes	that	Mahathir	finally	opened	up	UMNO’s	membership	to	non-Malay	bumiputeras	in	1994	(2006,	18).																																																										52	UMNO	-	United	Malays	National	Organisation,	is	the	dominant	Malay	political	party	in	the	government’s	ruling	coalition	Barisan	Nasional	(National	Front).	UMNO	was	formed	in	1946	and	has	been	in	power	since	Malaysian	independence	in	1957.	
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It	is	clear	the	category	of	bumiputera	makes	the	distinction	that	while	anyone	can	potentially	become	constitutionally	Malay,	only	born-Malays	and	Orang	Asli	can	be	bumiputera.	Moreover,	the	term	itself	–	sons	of	the	soil	–	implicitly	holds	the	assertion	that	Malays	are	indigenous	to	the	land,	even	if	it	is	contradicted	by	the	acknowledgement	of	being	preceded	by	the	Orang	Asli.	This	sophistic	emphasis	on	nuancing	Malayness	has,	from	as	late	as	the	1960s,	manifested	into	a	variety	of	communally	self-formulated	categories	ranging	from	Melayu	(Malay),	to	Bumiputera	(Sons	of	the	soil),	Bumiputera	Melayu	(Malay	sons	of	the	soil),	Melayu	Muslim,	Muslim	Melayu,	and	now	simply	as	Muslim	(Anisah,	2015;	Milner	2011,	163,	209,	215-218,	220-223,	230;	Roff	1967,	97,	109,	151,	183,	220,	244).		This	range	of	categories	can	be	regarded	as	symptomatic	of	the	ambivalence	over	Malay	identity,	especially	with	the	inconsistent	specificities	about	Malayness	from	the	state.	However,	it	can	also	be	argued	that	the	state’s	authoritarian	position	in	this	context	(even	if	the	state’s	stipulations	themselves	flounder	longitudinally),	is	made	more	relevant	as	the	prevailing	voice	of	‘clarity’	in	popular	discourse.54	This	need	for	a	range	of	identities	–	or	more	specifically,	for	a	continual	re-nuancing	of	Malay	identity	–	is	a	fundamental	assertion	of	Malay	difference.	As	will	be	observed,	this	assertion	undergirds	the	various	performances	on	Senario	that	subtextually	communicate	communal	anxiety	over	the	position	of	Malay	identity.	Most	significantly,	this	assertion	of	difference	is	the	central	overarching	rationale	for	many	(if	not	all)	of	the	state’s	strategies	for	Malay	exceptionalism,	as	distilled	into	the	concept	of	Ketuanan	Melayu	(Malay	primacy).		
Rise	of	Malay	Primacy	While	the	categories	of	bumiputera	and	constitutionally-defined	Malay	largely	reflect	the	state’s	identity	structure,	a	concept	widely	referred	to	as	Ketuanan	
Melayu	(Malay	primacy)	undergirds	their	constructions.	In	this	section,	we	will	be	engaging	with	the	literature	of	three	central	developments	commonly																																																									54	Khoo	Gaik	Cheng’s	(2006)	book	Reclaiming	Adat	is	one	of	many	that	specifically	address	this	ambivalence	of	post-independence	Malay	identity..	
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identified	by	scholars	as	being	pivotal	in	the	rise	of	Malay	primacy	–	the	1969	race	riots,	the	introduction	of	Malay	affirmative	action	policies,	and	the	nationalization	of	Malay	culture.	Ketuanan	Melayu	is	ideologically	described	by	Ting	to	be	variously	understood	as	“Malay	hegemony,	Malay	political	primacy,	Malay	sovereignty	[kedaulatan	Melayu]	or	Malay	dominance”	(2009,	34).	Mohd.	Azizuddin	(2009,	87)	refers	to	this	as	“Malay	supremacy”	while	Joseph	Liow	(2009,	xi,	44,	244)	defines	this	as	“Malay	primacy”.	These	notions	of	racial	supremacy	specifically	undergird	Malay-Chinese	bicultural	tensions	and	are	in	fact,	a	recurring	feature	in	Senario’s	episodic	subtexts.	It	is	therefore	necessary	for	us	to	understand	the	history	of	these	bicultural	developments,	and	the	role	of	UMNO	in	extending	these	bicultural	tensions.		Several	scholars	of	post-independence	Malaysia	are	of	the	opinion	that	the	tense	relations	between	the	Chinese	and	Malays	are	a	consequence	of	constructed	differences	encouraged	by	the	colonial	administration	at	the	time	(Collin	2011,	52-53;	Khoo	G.C.	2006,	85;	Reid	2006,	14-18;	Shamsul	1996b,	17-19;	2006,	136;	2015,	267,	269,	271-273;	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	2006,	166-169;	Vickers	2006,	26,	28-29).	Further,	many	view	the	race	riots	of	1969	as	a	culmination	of	these	constructed	differences	(Case	2015,	40-42;	Khoo	G.C.	2006,	65,	86;	Rosya	2011,	32;	Sam	2010,	57;	Shamsul	&	Athi	2015,	273-275;	Yeoh	2015,	250-251).	Ting	in	particular,	proposes	that	the	1969	racial	riots	is	one	of	two	events	(the	other	being	the	Islamization	policies	of	the	1980s)	that	are	key	to	the	development	of	national	identity	in	contemporary	Malaysia	(2009,	31,	33-34).		The	May	13,	1969	racial	riots	between	the	Malays	and	Chinese	can	be	attributed	to	the	existence	of	several	deep-rooted	differences.	Foo	Tee-Tuan	notes	that	Malay	special	privileges	instead	of	a	meritocracy-based	policy	system	was	one	contention	(2004,	82-83).	Shamsul	observes	that	the	Malays	viewed	the	Chinese	as	exploitative	and	instrumental	to	Malay	economic	backwardness	by	virtue	of	their	monopoly	on	the	banking	industry	and	the	country’s	economy	(1996b,	27).	Reid	observes	there	was	the	pervasiveness	of	the	colonial	Chinese	stereotype	of	“inherently	dedicated	to	making	money	by	any	means	possible”	(2006,	14-15)	that	underscored	these	dissatisfactions.	Ting	noted	that	these	served	to	heighten	
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communal	consciousness	against	the	non-Malays	for	their	“ungratefulness”,	for	not	“knowing	their	place”	and	not	knowing	how	to	“give-and-take”	(2009,	37).55		James	Baker	(1999,	333),	Foo	(2004,	83),	and	Ting	(2009,	37)	describe	the	1969	general	elections	as	the	catalyst	to	the	violence.	The	resultant	riots	lasted	for	a	week,	and	were	key	to	validating	two	consequent	hegemonic	national	policies	that	were	implemented	in	1971;	the	New	Economic	Policy	(NEP),56	and	the	National	Culture	Policy	(NCP)57	(Hooker	2006,	150;	Khoo	G.C.	2006,	85;	Marzuki	2008,	28;	Sam	2010,	57;	Ting	2009,	31).		Recognizing	that	“Malay	socio-economic	discontent”	and	“Chinese	political	and	economic	arrogance”	had	led	to	the	race	riots,	Khoo	G.C.	(2006,	14)	and	Shamsul	(1996b,	27)	explain	that	the	NEP’s	primary	goal	was	to	redress	the	Malay	economic	position	through	an	increase	in	public	expenditure	on	special	Malay	programmes.	Malay	quotas	were	instated	in	all	critical	areas	of	economic	activities	including	employment	(Halim	2000,	139;	Shamsul	1996b,	28;	Ting	2009,	38)	and	higher	education	(Halim	2000,	139;	Shamsul	1996b,	28),	with	the	goal	of	achieving	a	30%	Malay	equity	in	existing	and	future	wealth	(Halim	2000,	139).	As	Thomas	Williamson	observed,	almost	every	aspect	of	public	life	“took	on	an	NEP	dimension,	from	university	admissions	to	hawker	licenses	to	home	mortgages”	(2002,	407).		The	true	impact	of	the	NEP	as	a	national	policy	for	poverty	alleviation	–	specifically	for	the	wider	Malay	community	–	is	widely	debated.	In	assessing	its																																																									55	Chinese	and	Indian	communities	have	settled	in	the	Peninsula	since	the	6th	century	and	more	predominantly	in	the	15th	century,	and	are	hybrid	communities	(the	Straits	Chinese,	for	example).	When	Malays	reference	the	Chinese	in	Malaysia,	they	are	generally	referring	to	the	significant	number	of	Chinese	migrant	labourers	who	were	brought	in	by	the	British	administration,	and	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	became	more	economically	successful	than	the	‘indigenous’	Malays.	These	Chinese	who	had	been	domiciled	in	British	Malaya	for	decades	were	eventually	recognized	as	citizens	with	the	nation’s	independence	(see	Enloe	1967,	Milner	2011,	and	Roff	1967,	for	detailed	accounts).	56	The	New	Economic	Plan	(NEP)	or	Dasar	Ekonomi	Baru		was	mooted	as	part	of	the	Second	Malaysia	Plan	of	1971-1975,	and	lasted	for	20	years.	The	NEP	is	also	popularly	referred	to	as	the	
Bumiputera	(sons	of	the	soil)	policy	(Shamsul	1996b,	27-28)	since	it	was	primarily	seen	as	an	ethnic	preferential	policy.	57	The	National	Culture	Policy	(NCP)	or	Dasar	Kebudayaan	Kebangsaan	of	1971	was	implemented	with	the	aim	of	creating	a	national	culture	through	the	assertion	of	Malay	cultural	and	religious	primacy	(Ting	2009,	38).	
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results	and	political	motivations,	Gomez	contends	that	the	NEP	was	part	of	UMNO’s	hegemony,	and	its	implementation	was	meant	to	introduce	affirmative	action	in	Malaysia	based	on	an	“ethnicised	dimension	of	resource	allocation	by	the	government”	(2008,	6).	Resultantly,	Rosya	Shamshudeen	notes	that	the	“dramatic	socio-political	restructuring”	led	to	“Malay	dominance	and	widespread	privatisation”	(2011,	33).	Ting	reflects	on	the	NEP’s	success	in	transforming	Malay	socio-economic	conditions	within	a	generation,	but	asserts	that	its	logic	of	ethnic	preferential	treatment	at	the	state	and	political	level,	served	to	entrench	the	notion	of	Malay	‘special	position’	as	a	birthright	among	its	beneficiaries	(2009,	38).	Shamsul	though,	questions	if	some	non-Malays	did	not	also	benefit	from	the	NEP,	and	considers	the	lack	of	scholarship	in	this	area	a	result	of	an	ethnicized	production	of	knowledge	(1996a,	492-493).	Ultimately,	it	was	clear	that	the	NEP	constructed	a	fundamentally	contradictory	framework	where	the	policy	aimed	at	de-ethnicizing	economic	function,	by	ethnicizing	nearly	all	facets	of	it.	The	state’s	Malay	bias	was	again	reaffirmed	by	a	second	policy	in	that	same	year	–	the	1971	National	Culture	Policy	(NCP).		The	1971	NCP	sought	to	homogenize	the	socio-cultural	terrain	by	nationalizing	Malay	culture.	Both	Khoo	G.C.	(2006,	32)	and	Ting	(2009,	38)	agree	that	its	implementation	guaranteed	the	preservation	and	hegemony	of	the	Malay	language,	Islam,	and	the	monarchy	as	the	head	of	adat58.	Further,	Robert	Milne	&	Diane	Mauzy	(1978,	370),	Donald	Horowitz	(1989,	261),	and	Kua	Kia	Soong	(1990,	230)	note	that	its	arbitrary	enforcement	by	related	state	agencies	with	their	own	ideas	of	implementation,	provoked	incidents	of	protest	and	discontent	from	non-Malays.	Rosya	notes	that	in	its	stipulations,	“even	while	underscoring	indigeneity	as	a	claim	over	other	non-Malay	races,	the	policy	placed	Islam	as	the	foundation	of	national	culture,	thus	essentially	privileging	the	Malay	Muslim	
																																																								58	Adat	literally	means	(traditional)	customs.	It	is	described	by	Milner	as	being	a	“code”	that	bonds	the	village	community,	and	a	set	of	guidelines	that	determines	“correct	behaviour”	(2011,	236).	Zainal	Kling	describes	it	as	the	“collective	mind	of	the	Malay	peoples”	and	an	“expression	of	[their]	fundamental	unity”	(1997,	111).	A	brief	outline	of	adat	provided	in	the	Singaporean	‘culture	pack’	-	‘Gateway	to	Malay	Culture’	(2013),	is	descriptive	of	traditional	Malay	social	etiquette,	rituals,	crafts,	and	living	environs	(Milner	2011,	6-7)	and	is	projected	as	a	host	of	essentialist	values.	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	calls	it	“customary	law”	that	denotes	the	values	“common	to	the	Malay	world”	(2006,	136).	
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majority	and	marginalising	non-Muslim	Malays”59	(2011,	34).	This	key	stage	within	the	nation	as	represented	by	the	dual	policies	of	1971,	was	described	by	Shamsul	as	marking	the	transformation	from	“Malay	dominance”	to	“Malay	hegemony”	(1996b,	29).		In	the	same	year	that	the	NEP	and	NCP	were	launched,	UMNO	published	a	book	titled	Revolusi	Mental	(Mental	Revolution).	Communicating	the	central	premise	of	a	Malay	society	that	was	backward,	lackadaisical,	oppressed,	and	exploited	(by	other	races),	the	book	aimed	at	changing	the	“thought,	view	and	attitude”	of	the	Malays	towards	the	“requirements	of	the	age”	to	“acquire	progress	in	all	fields	of	life”	(Syed	2006,	147).	One	of	the	sternest	criticisms	of	Revolusi	Mental	came	from	the	prominent	scholar	and	member	of	the	National	Consultative	Council,60	Syed	Hussein	Alatas.	He	criticised	the	book’s	deployment	of	the	colonial	construction	of	the	Malays	towards	what	he	viewed	as	the	self-serving	interests	of	UMNO	(2006,	147-185).	Citing	its	“inaccuracies”,	“lack	of	intellectual	depth”,	“ridiculous	conclusions”,	and	“contradictory	statements”,	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	noted	that	the	Malays	were	characterized	“in	negative	terms	unexcelled	in	the	history	of	colonialism”	(2006,	150).	He	chastised	UMNO	for	operating	with	“colonial	categories”	of	“property,	income-tax,	business	institution	and	the	state”	despite	their	“anti-colonial	pronouncements”	(2006,	154).	These	assessments	led	him	to	question	UMNO’s	“vested	interest”	in	degrading	the	Malays	(2006,	154).	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	proposed	three	explanations,	the	most	elaborate	being	to	justify	the	use	of	public	funds	for	an	improvement	of	the	Malays	that	ultimately	will	only	be	beneficial	to	some	Malays	in	power	(2006,	154-155).	Further,	he	suggests	that	the	degradation	of	Revolusi	Mental	prepared	the	climate	for	The	Second	Malaysia	Plan’s61	eventual	failure.	In	that	instance,	the	government	would	be	absolved	from	all	blame,	and	the	blame	would	be	on	this																																																									59	It	is	instructive	that	Rosya	takes	issue	with	the	re-affirmation	of	the	Malay-Muslim	exclusion	of	non-Muslim	Malays,	but	not	the	marginalization	of	non-Malay	Malaysians.	Further,	the	polysemic	category	of	‘non-Muslim	Malay’	is	employed,	though	she	does	not	explain	its	polysemy.	60	The	National	Consultative	Council	was	part	of	the	National	Operations	Council	(NOC).	These	two	councils	were	established	at	the	end	of	the	1969	riots	as	a	national	emergency	plan	to	formulate	and	study	proposals	to	resolve	the	issues	that	led	to	the	riots.	During	their	operations,	parliament’s	executive	power	was	suspended	and	handed	to	the	NOC	(Sam	2010,	57).	61	The	Second	Malaysia	Plan	(1971-1975)	aimed	at	creating	a	Malay	entrepreneurial	class	in	20	years’	time,	when	30%	of	the	nation’s	business	and	industry	would	be	owned	and	run	by	Malays	(Syed	2006,	180).	The	NEP	and	NCP	were	part	of	this	plan.	
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constructed	Malay	character	instead	(2006,	180-181).	Such	criticisms	were	similarly	directed	toward	the	arguments	proposed	by	Mahathir	Mohammad	in	his	1970	book	The	Malay	Dilemma.		Mahathir	Mohammad	is	Malaysia’s	longest-serving	Prime	Minister	who	held	office	for	22	years	from	1981	to	2003.	Written	a	decade	prior	to	his	premiership,	the	book	was	regarded	by	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	as	a	belligerent	attempt	at	explaining	the	subordinate	position	of	the	Malays	(when	compared	to	the	Chinese).	Mahathir’s	arguments	are	predicated	on	an	innate	biological	or	hereditary	Malay	weakness	which	was	construed	by	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	to	be	more	extreme	than	Revolusi	Mental	in	its	degradation	of	the	Malays	(2006,	155).	While	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	admits	that	the	arguments	in	The	Malay	Dilemma	represents	a	“reasoned	defence	of	the	constitutional	protection	of	the	Malays”,	it	nonetheless	constructs	a	Malay	character	similar	in	tone	to	that	contained	in	
Revolusi	Mental	(2006,	159).		Drawing	similarities	to	Revolusi	Mental‘s	stress	on	the	predicament	of	the	Malays	to	legitimize	elementary	colonial	capitalist	ideology,	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	suggests	that	Mahathir	also	sought	to	validate	the	advancement	of	some	Malays	who	were	in	power	and	Chinese	businesses	that	were	closely	associated	with	the	Malay	governing	elite	(2006,	155,	163).	His	accusation	of	Mahathir	has	since	been	supported	by	more	contemporary	scholars	of	post-NEP	Malaysia	such	as	Edmund	Gomez	(1990;	1999;	2008),	Edmund	Gomez	&	Jomo	K.	Sundaram	(1999),	and	Shamsul	(1996b),	to	name	but	three.	This	notion	was	further	strengthened	by	Mahathir’s	support	for	feudalism	and	feudal	leadership	in	his	book,	both	of	which	he	proposes	can	engender	an	“orderly	law-abiding	society”	that	responds	well	to	“dynamism	at	the	top”	(leaders)	(Syed	2006,	163).	Syed	Hussein	Alatas’	responses	to	Mahathir’s	book	were	prescient.	Under	Mahathir’s	premiership,	the	fundamental	top-down	leadership	and	colonial	capitalist	framework	would	later	be	mirrored	in	national	projects	like	the	Malaysia	Incorporated	initiative,62	and	the	corporate	ownership	structure	of	the	
																																																								62	Discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	
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television	station	TV3.63	This	framework	was	similarly	observed	in	many	corporations	during	the	national	privatization	policies	that	started	in	the	1980s,	all	of	which	were	identified	by,	among	others,	Gomez	&	Jomo’s	(1999)	study	of	Malaysia’s	political	economy.		Curiously,	Milner	writes	about	the	same	1971	Revolusi	Mental	in	his	book	The	
Malays	(2011)	without	addressing	Syed	Hussein	Alatas’	insightful	and	structured	criticisms	nor	does	he	mention	its	reflection	of	colonial	legacy,	or	any	relational	conceptual	link	to	‘The	Malay	Dilemma’	(2011,	207).	Instead,	Milner	implies	that	the	1971	ruling	class’	initiatives	are	a	legacy	of	7th	century	Sri	Vijaya64	and	old	Melaka65	ideological	leadership	(2011,	207-208),	perhaps	qualified	by	Mahathir’s	fixation	on	feudal	leadership.	What	both	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	and	Milner	agree	on	though,	is	that	the	Malays	have	for	centuries	been	subjected	to	this	form	of	ideological	engineering	(Milner	2011,	207-209;	Syed	2006,	166-169).		Thus	far,	the	literature	suggests	several	things	about	the	ideological	leadership	of	UMNO	and	the	national	constructions	of	Malay	identity.	The	UMNO-dominated	ruling	class	is	described	as	having	retained	the	colonial	trajectory	of	governance	in	Malaysia,	including	an	advancement	or	extension	of	the	colonial	enactments	of	Malay	special	rights.66	Malay	privileges	were	not	a	new	phenomenon	introduced	by	the	NEP	or	UMNO.	Shamsul,	Roff,	Collin,	Reid,	and	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	all	note	that	they	have	existed	since	British	Malaya.67	Further,	with	the	exception	of	Roff,	whose	work	was	published	prior	to	the	NEP,	all	describe	the	results	as	being	longitudinally	detrimental	for	the	Malays	in	that	they	either	constricted	an	otherwise	natural	evolution	of	economic	communal																																																									63	Discussed	in	Chapter	3.	64	Sri	Vijaya	was	a	Hindu	empire	that	held	sway	in	parts	of	the	Malayan	Peninsula	and	Sumatra	during	the	7th-13th	centuries	(Milner	2011,	25).	65	Milner	notes	that	the	15th	century	sultanate	of	Melaka	was	a	renowned	entrepot	in	the	Peninsula	and	is	often	viewed	as	the	“golden	age	of	Malay	consciousness”	(2011,	26).	66	In	its	implementation,	colonial	enactments	and	the	retention	of	Malay	rights	did	not	necessarily	translate	to	a	marked	improvement	in	communal	conditions	for	a	variety	of	reasons	(see	Milner	2011,	and	Roff	1967).	67	Examples	are	The	Malay	Reservation	Enactment	1913	(Collin	2011,	35;	Reid	2006,	15;	Shamsul	2015,	271),	the	Malay	schooling	scheme	that	established	the	Kuala	Kangsar	Malay	College	in	1909	(Reid	2006,	15;	Roff	1967,	100-101,104)	and	the	1910	‘Scheme	for	the	Employment	of	Malays’	(Roff	1967,	104).	
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growth,	or	that	they	distorted	the	nature	of	the	Malays	(Collin	2011,	34-35;	Reid	2006,	14-15;	Shamsul	2006,	137;	Syed	2006;	Shamsul	&	Athi	2015,	271-273).	Syed	Hussein	Alatas,	who	was	closely	involved	in	formulating	post-1969	legislation,	suggests	that	the	UMNO	government,	in	deploying	reinterpreted	colonial	policies	and	categories,	did	so	for	self-serving	interests	at	the	expense	of	further	emancipating	the	Malays.		Milner	suggests	that	the	assertion	of	Malay	primacy	and	the	need	to	preserve	the	definitive	traits	of	Malay	identity,	reflects	an	anxiety	about	the	community’s	potential	disappearance	from	the	world	(2011,	15-16,	131-132,	186,	220,	237-238).	If	this	is	true,	it	is	a	condition	that	is	not	exclusive	to	the	Malay	community.	Khoo	Boo	Teik’s	(2013)	analysis	of	Chinese	politics	within	Southeast	Asia	uncovers	similar	anxieties	mobilising	Malaysian	Chinese	interest	in	politics.	As	such,	both	Milner’s	and	Khoo	B.T.’s	findings	underscore	Enloe’s	observation	that	both	ethnic	groups	formulate	their	political	goals	on	the	basis	of	their	anxieties	regarding	the	potential	political	aspirations	of	the	Malay	Muslims	(1967,	51).			What	are	the	political	aspirations	of	the	Malay	Muslims,	and	have	they	translated	to	the	quotidian?	As	we	have	explored	previously,	developments	motivated	by	irredentist	or	ethnic	aspirations	are	not	new	to	the	socio-political	milieu	in	Malaysia.	There	are	however,	recent	examples	of	political	rhetoric	in	the	quotidian	that	are	potentially	indicative	of	these	ethnicized	aspirations.	A	most	exemplary	case	is	the	protectionist	trajectory	invoked	by	incumbent	Prime	Minister	Najib	Razak	who	declared	on	1st	August	2015,	“[w]ithout	UMNO,	the	Malays	will	be	the	bastard	(amongst	other	races).	I	cannot	imagine	the	fate	of	Malays	without	UMNO”.68	Prime	Minister	Najib	repeated	the	sentiment	on	16th	August	2015	(“Jawatan	PM,	Presiden,”	2015),	and	again	on	22nd	August	2015	(“Orang	Melayu	akan,”	2015).	A	similar	rhetoric	was	echoed	by	UMNO	Supreme	Council	member	Ismail	Sabri	Yaakob	on	9th	August	2015,	who	reminded	the																																																									68	Translated	from	“Kalau	tiada	Umno	maka	‘terbangsat’	lah	bangsa	Melayu.	Saya	tidak	dapat	
bayangkan	nasib	bangsa	Melayu	tanpa	Umno”	(“3	juta	ahli,”	2015).	Bangsat	is	a	crude	word	which	usually	means	‘bastard’,	though	it	can	also	mean	‘downtrodden’,	‘backward’,	or	‘destitute’.	The	addition	of	‘ter’	can	either	mean	‘highly’/’very’	bangsat,	or	a	passive	meaning	where	
terbangsat	means	‘bastardized’.	
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Malays	and	bumiputeras	to	keep	UMNO	in	power	if	they	did	not	want	others69	to	rule	the	country	(“No	choice	but	Umno,”	2015).70		These	are	very	explicitly	expressed,	yet	old,	recursive	strategies	designed	as	reminders	for	UMNO’s	role	in	prioritizing	Malay	interest,	presumably	evidenced	through	the	outcomes	of	the	NEP,	NCP,	and	UMNO’s	suppression	of	other	claimants	to	primacy.	As	demonstrated,	paternal	UMNO’s	self-constructed	position	as	the	protector	of	Malay	rights,	identity,	and	status	is	anchored	by	its	successful	repression	of	other	claimants	to	primacy.	The	promise	to	preserve	Malay	rights,	identity,	and	position,	translates	to	a	guarantee	for	communal	entitlement	to	privileges	accorded	in	the	Federal	Constitution,	the	entrenchment	of	the	Malay	tenets,	and	the	right	to	further	the	Malay	cause	at	the	expense	of	minority	groups.		
Urbanism,	Modernity,	and	the	New	Malays	The	leadership	of	ex-Prime	Minister	Mahathir	Mohammad	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	was	largely	characterized	by	a	national	push	towards	industrialization	and	modernity	that	came	in	the	guise	of	the	1983	Malaysia	Incorporated	Policy.	The	developments	of	this	period	are	important	to	our	analysis	not	least	because	
Senario	was	founded	during	this	period.	Furthermore,	Senario	achieved	its	peak	popularity	during	the	Mahathir	years,	and	thus	a	large	number	of	episodes	were	produced	during	this	period.	Many	of	the	themes	discussed	in	this	section,	including	gender	relationships,	are	thus	present	in	the	episodes	of	corresponding	years.		The	1983	Malaysia	Incorporated	Policy,	or	“Malaysia	Inc.”	as	it	is	popularly	known,	is	described	by	Williamson	as	fundamentally	a	program	of	corporate	nation	building	that	achieved	a	form	of	non-indigenised	economic	nationalism																																																									69	Presumably	other	races.	70	These	are	all	referenced	from	news	reports	since	I	have	yet	to	encounter	these	specific	declarations	in	current	academic	discussions.	There	is	partisan	bias	with	media	channels,	but	a	politician/individual’s	right	of	reply	does	counter	any	such	bias.	“The	Sun	apologizes,”	(2014),	and	“Under-fire	Hamid,”	(2014)	are	two	such	examples	where	socio-political	actors	have	publicly	challenged	the	accuracy	of	news	reports,	or	for	quoting	them	out	of	context.	Furthermore,	as	an	indicator	of	communal	mindset,	these	are	better	examples	of	the	prevailing	quotidian	discourse,	and	how	UMNO	shapes	its	discursive	terrain.	
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that	momentarily	transcended	ethnic	boundaries	(2002,	409).	William	Case	(2015,	43),	Williamson	(2002,	407-408),	and	Yeoh	Seng	Guan	(2015,	251)	note	that	though	it	was	not	entirely	supraethnic,	Mahathir’s	rhetorical	strategy	was	focused	on	the	ideological	construction	of	a	new	nation	or	a	national	‘race’.	This	new	Bangsa	Malaysia71	would	include	the	re-imagining	of	the	Malays	as	modern	
Melayu	Baru72	(New	[modern]	Malay)	in	the	nation’s	development	map	towards	
Wawasan	2020	(Vision	2020);	a	vision	of	an	industrialized,	urbanized,	and	modern	Malaysia	(Case	2015,	43;	Kahn	2006,	90;	Lopez	2015,	333;	Milner	2011,	161,	208-210;	Williamson	2002,	403,	410-413;	Yeoh	2015,	252-257).		Williamson	views	Bangsa	Malaysia	as	having	galvanized	immense	support	from	all	ethnicities	since	“in	place	of	politics,	the	defining	quality	of	Bangsa	Malaysia	is	prosperity	and	the	affluence	of	Malaysia	in	2020”	(2002,	412).	He	suggests	that	it	provided	the	basis	for	a	national	identity	that	could	be	founded	on	a	“shared	destiny,	common	identity,	and	resilience”	(2002,	412).	By	contrast,	Mohd.	Marzuki,	Devadas	and	Ting	contend	that	the	rhetoric	of	a	national	modernization	effort	that	was	un-indigenised,	had	no	real	political	volition.	They	argue	that	in	reality,	the	hegemonic	UMNO-bumiputeraism	machinery	was	still	active	in	the	practice	and	assertion	of	ethno-communal	primacy	that	went	unabated,	simultaneously	with	the	national	initiatives	of	modernization	(Devadas	2009,	90-91;	Marzuki	2008,	35-36;	Ting	2009,	39-40,	44-45).			Greg	Felker	(2015,	138)	and	Williamson	(2002,	410-411)	regard	the	(arguably)	remarkable	success	of	Malaysia	Inc.	and	Bangsa	Malaysia	as	being	partly	attributable	to	the	Asian	economic	boom	of	the	1990s.	Further,	they	observed	that	it	quickly	fell	apart	in	the	period	of	the	Asian	financial	crisis	of	1997	(Felker	2015,	138;	Marzuki	2008,	35;	Williamson	2002,	415).	In	the	aftermath	of	the	economic	meltdown,	Felker	noted	that	part	of	the	government’s	post-crisis																																																									71	While	Bangsa	Malaysia	has	been	translated	in	a	variety	of	ways,	the	translations	all	share	a	core	concept.	Some	of	these	translations	are	“a	united	Malaysian	nation”	(Shamsul	1996a,	484),	“a	Malaysian	People”	(Williamson	2002,	403),	“a	Malaysian	Race”	(Williamson	2002,	411)	and	“an	ethnically	inclusive,	united	Malaysian	nation”	(Ting	2009,	39-40).	72	The	‘New	Malay’	was	antithetical	to	the	traditional	Malays;	a	modern	Malay.	The	New	Malay	was	envisioned	to	be	more	entrepreneurial,	assertive,	less	tradition-bound	and	“less	inclined	toward	the	type	of	self-effacing,	deferential	behaviour	that	can	lead	to	easy	domination	by	other	ethnic	groups”	(Milner	2011,	208).	
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strategy	involved	the	relaxing	of	ethnic	share-holding	quotas	which	allowed	for	Chinese	businesses	to	acquire	major	bumiputera	corporations	(2015,	143).	The	years	1997–2000,	Marzuki	observed,	were	marked	by	a	resurgence	of	ethnic	dissatisfaction	for	the	relinquishing	of	these	bumiputera	assets,	Mahathir’s	obduracy	in	the	nation’s	recovery	strategy,	and	the	clash	with	his	deputy,	Anwar	Ibrahim	(2008,	35-41).	Further,	Marzuki	(2008,	35-41),	Wong	Chin	Huat	(2014c),	and	Case	(2015,	43)	suggest	that	consequent	to	these	developments,	and	especially	after	the	political	tsunami73	of	the	2008	general	elections,	UMNO	once	again	reasserted	with	increased	intensity,	its	old	trajectory	of	communalist	ethno-nationalism	for	political	legitimacy.	Mohd.	Azizuddin’s	findings	suggest	that	this	led	to	an	increase	in	“hate	speech”	–	racialized	language	against	non-Malays	that	is	inflected	with	primordialist	terms	like	pendatang	(newcomer/immigrant)74	(2009,	87),	employed	by	UMNO	to	consolidate	control	on	the	Malays.		Several	key	vectors	to	the	ethno-nationalist	identity	discourse	can	be	attributed	to	developments	that	occurred	between	the	1980s	and	1990s.	One	is	the	emergence	of	the	Melayu	Baru	as	conceptualized	by	Mahathir;	a	modern	Malay	who	is	entrepreneurial,	assertive,	and	less	tradition-bound	(Milner	2011,	208).	Kahn,	in	quoting	Patricia	Sloane’s	1999	anthropological	study,	observes	that	the	
Melayu	Baru	signals	a	break	from	several	different	Malay	pasts:	(1)	““naïve	kampung	past”	of	poor	Malay	peasants”;	(2)	“retrogressive,	anachronistic	society	envisaged	by	fundamentalist	Muslims”;	and	(3)	“a	recent	NEP	past	rife	with	patronage,	Malay	elitism	and	feudalism”	(2006,	90).	Further,	Kahn	notes	that	most	who	saw	themselves	as	Melayu	Baru	were	critical	of	the	fatalistic	mentaliti	
kampung	(village	mentality)	that	relied	on	takdir	(fate)	and	rezeki	(livelihood,																																																									73	Case	notes	that	UMNO’s	renewed	burst	of	communalism	after	the	2004	general	elections	intensified	to	a	point	where	the	“suspicions	of	the	Chinese	were	reawakened”,	“driving	them	back	to	the	opposition”	and	eroding	support	for	the	ruling	coalition	component	party	MCA	(Malaysian	Chinese	Association)	(2015,	43).	At	the	2008	general	elections,	Barisan	Nasional	leaders	were	“stunned	by	the	extent	to	which	the	Chinese	voters	deserted	to	the	opposition”	comprising	the	Islamic	PAS,	the	predominantly	Chinese	DAP	and	Anwar’s	new	vehicle,	PKR	(Case	2015,	43).	MCA	lost	half	of	its	32	parliamentary	seats,	retaining	only	15.	74	The	pendatang	polemic	activates	the	primordial	perception	of	Malaysia’s	autochthonous	people	allowing	unappreciative	non-Malay	immigrants	to	attain	citizenship.	It	is	meant	to	be	a	term	of	insult	and	national	exclusion,	for	as	previously	mentioned,	these	non-Malays	are	citizens	and	many	have	been	in	the	Malay	Peninsula	for	generations.	
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wealth-allocation)	(2006,	90).	For	the	successful	Melayu	Baru,	Kahn	observed	that	adat	“is	not	merely	ignored,	but	consistently	devalued”	(2006,	90).			While	Melayu	Baru	was	to	be	modern	and	less	tradition-bound,	it	was	not,	rhetorically	at	least,	a	decisive	departure	from	Malay	values	and	tradition.	Mahathir	was,	in	the	1990s,	overtly	critical	of	Western	pluralist	democracy’s	emphasis	on	excessive	individualism	and	its	predisposition	towards	predatory	interest-group	politics	(Connors,	Davison	&	Dosch	2004,	141-143;	Milne	&	Mauzy	1999,	138-142).	His	foreign	policies	tended	towards	what	M.	Connors,	R.	Davison	&	J.	Dosch	observed	was	an	oppositional	“Asian	values	position”	that	prioritized	communitarian	Asian	values	and	culture75	(2004,	142).	This	Asian	values	discourse	was	thus	propounded	by	Mahathir	as	the	mediating	framework	through	which	his	understanding	of	‘Western	modernity’	–	a	broadbrush	conflation	of	everything	from	the	‘West’	–	and	its	values	could	be	made	applicable	in	an	Asian	(and	Malay)	context.	This	was	a	relativist	reinterpretation	that	still	prioritized	Malay	communitarianism	over	individualism,	the	function	of	societal	discipline	for	the	common	good	and	what	Carolina	Lopez	(2008,	56)	observed	was	deference	to	authority.76	Both	these	state	discourses	on	New	Malay	and	Asian	values	were	variously	reimagined	as	urban-rural	or	modern-traditional	dichotomies	that	are	a	major	part	of	Senario’s	subtextual	didacticism.		The	Melayu	Baru	identity	was	further	complicated	by	the	return	of	NEP	beneficiaries	who	had	been	educated	abroad.	Together	with	the	mixed-race	Malays,	Khoo	G.C.	categorizes	these	two	groups	as	the	“hybrid-Malays”	(2006,	66).	Drawing	from	diverse	sources,	Khoo	G.C.	describes	several	facets	to	the	hybrid-Malays:	(1)	the	bumiputeh77	(2006,	66);	(2)	the	Malay	embodying																																																									75	It	is	intrinsically	paradoxical	that	simultaneous	to	Mahathir’s	advocacy	for	a	progressive	Malay	category,	he	was	also	advocating	a	set	of	traditional	‘Asian	values’	in	opposition	to	the	West,	which	by	its	traditional	legacy	would	be	fundamentally	antithetical	to	the	former,	regardless	of	how	‘relativist’	the	interpretive	framework.	76	Regionally,	these	developments	were	not	unique	to	Malaysia.	For	instance,	the	Prime	Minister	of	Singapore,	Lee	Kuan	Yew,	similarly	deployed	the	Asian	values	rhetoric	to	justify	their	government’s	authoritarianism	as	an	Asian	brand	of	democracy	(Ng,	Maznah,	&	Tan	2006,	140).	77	Portmanteau	of	the	words	bumiputera	and	Orang	Puteh	–	white	man.	Refers	to	Malaysians	of	mixed	Malay/Caucasian	heritage	who	qualified	as	bumiputeras.	In	relation	to	the	NEP,	it	typically	refers	to	the	offspring	of	Malays	who	had	married	Caucasians	when	they	were	studying	abroad,	and	have	returned	to	live	in	Malaysia.	
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“hybridized	or	alternative	modernity”	–	a	localized	interpretation	of	Western	culture	and	modernization	(2006,	125);	and	(3)	the	Malay	embodying	a	local	culturally-hybrid	Malaysian	identity,	or	kebudayaan	rojak	(salad	culture)	(2006,	72-73),	constituting	a	“hybrid	national	subject”	(2006,	61)	embodying	a	“unity	in	diversity”	form	of	nation-building	(2006,	73).	Khoo	G.C.	quotes	Mandal	(2001)	in	asserting	that	these	expressions	of	a	“newer,	more	fluid,	cross-ethnic	hybrid	form	of	pluralism”	originate	from	the	NEP	Generation	(2006,	223).		These	alternate	narratives	form	the	basis	from	which	other	notions	to	intra-communal	identities	have	since	emerged.	Jerome	Collin	for	example,	broadly	ascribes	the	categories	of	New	Malays	or	Other	Malays78	to	the	queering	of	Malays,	that	includes	both	the	LGBT	Malays	as	well	as	the	non-traditional	Malays	(2011,	49-54).	While	Khoo	G.C.	suggests	that	the	hybrid-Malay	or	New	Malay	is	important	because	it	attempts	to	deconstruct	“the	stereotypes	of	Malay	identity	and	to	problematize	borders	that	separate	ethnicities”	(2006,	72),	these	new	trajectories	do	not	constitute	a	fully	formed	alternative	to	the	nationalist	narrative,	primarily	because	they	are	not	sanctioned	by	political	powers.		Lopez	observes	that	the	UMNO	ideological	model	often	stages	the	“virtuous”	nation-state	in	juxtaposition	with	the	“evil	other”79	of	the	West.	With	UMNO’s	rhetorical	self-positioning	as	the	“protector	of	local	virtue”	–	Asian	values,	morality,	and	universality	of	human	rights	(as	opposed	to	Western	rights),	–	she	observes	that	it	contrasts	itself	with	the	decadent	West;	the	anti-values,	oppressive	and	democratically	hegemonic	‘other’	(2008,	57).	In	this	manner,	UMNO’s	chauvinist	groups	have	staged	these	alternate	identities	against	the	nationalist	‘Malayhood’	into	urban-rural,	modern-traditional	dichotomies.	With	these	types	of	strategies,	traditionalism	and	Islamism,	and	the	conflated	ideological	framework	of	ketuanan	Melayu	and	ketuanan	Islam,	have	remained	
																																																								78	Other	Malays	is	a	broad	category	that	refers	to	Malays	who	do	not	conform	to	the	rigid	nationalist	conception	of	Malay.	It	is	employed	by	Kahn	(2006)	to	refer	to	Malays	living	in	Malaysia,	but	with	non-peninsular	roots	like	those	from	Indonesia,	who	are	different	in	attitude	and	are	still	practising	their	own	heritage	and	culture.	79	‘Otherness’	will	be	discussed	in	a	later	section	of	this	chapter.	
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dominant	within	the	nation,	and	has	largely	been	reproduced	–	perhaps	unwittingly	–	as	a	central	part	of	Senario’s	subtext.		
Islamization	A	key	implement	of	UMNO’s	Malay	nationalist	narrative	is	political	Islam,	which	Arnold	Puyok	describes	as	referring	loosely	to	the	“promotion	of	Islam	and	Islamic	symbolism	by	political	leaders	and	the	institutionalization	of	Islamic	religious	beliefs	to	justify	the	right	of	the	Malay-Muslim	population	to	power	and	dominance”	(2015,	63).	Farish	(2004,	18),	J.	Liow	&	P.	Afif	(2015,	53-54),	and	Milner	(2011,	219-221,	226,	239)	note	that	the	rise	of	modern	political	Islam	was	mainstreamed	by	the	efforts	of	the	Islamist	political	party,	Parti	Islam	Se-
Malaysia	(PAS	-	Pan-Malaysian	Islamic	Party).	Islamic	tajdid	(revival),	in	this	instance	characterized	by	the	PAS	religio-political	power	dynamic	(Case	2015,	42;	Milner	2011,	221,	223,	226),	has	historically	been	involved	in	the	production	of	a	discursive	terrain	that	is	bounded	within	the	rubric	of	daulah	Islamiyya80	(Islamic	sovereignty)	(Ting	2009,	34,	48).		Hussin	Mutalib	suggests	that	in	recognizing	Islam’s	potency	in	mobilizing	traditional	Malay	sentiments,	Mahathir	introduced	the	Islamization	Policy	in	1983	to	counteract	the	religio-political	force	of	PAS	(1990,	1993).	Ting	notes	that	it	aimed	to	“inculcate	Islamic	values	in	the	administration	of	the	government”	and	to	“Islamize	the	state	institutions”	(2009,	39).	This	animated	political	Islamism	of	PAS	and	UMNO	was	observed	by	Liow	&	Afif	to	have	resulted	in	growing	Islamic	consciousness	and	piety,	and	the	emergence	of	a	range	of	Islamic	civil	society	movements	further	fuelling	Islamist	discourse	in	the	nation	today	(2015,	50).	They	contend	that	under	the	federal	system	of	government,	Islam	is	policed	by	a	bureaucratic	infrastructure	of	state	authorities,	and	Syariah	(Islamic	law)	is	foremost	in	the	state’s	management	of	the	personal	affairs	of	Muslims	(Liow	&	Afif	2015,	50).		
																																																								80	Its	political	application	would	endeavor	to	render	Islamic	principles	as	the	encompassing	reference	for	governance	(Ting	2009,	34).	
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One	consequent	development	is	the	establishment	of	a	bureaucratic	Islamic	authority	in	every	state	of	Malaysia.	Furthermore,	not	one	but	two	Islamic	state	authorities	exist	both	in	Kuala	Lumpur	(JAKIM	and	JAWI)82	and	Selangor	(JAIS	and	MAIS).83	Non-governmental	religious	groups	also	proliferate	alongside,	such	as	Angkatan	Belia	Islam	Malaysia	(Muslim	Youth	Movement	of	Malaysia	-	ABIM),	and	Ikatan	Muslimim	Malaysia	(Malaysian	Muslim	Solidarity	-	ISMA),	to	name	but	two.	Given	these	developments	under	UMNO	and	their	religious	state	apparatuses,84	we	now	see	an	ideological	shift	from	Islamic	ijtihad	(individual	judgement)	to	taqlid	(unquestioning	acceptance	of	[Islamic]	authority).		The	consequent	rise	of	dakwah	(Islamic	mission)	in	almost	every	facet	of	daily	life	has	resulted	in	a	changing	emphasis	on	individual	identifiers	of	Malay	which	have	led	to	a	strident	increase	in	assertions	of	Islamic	piety	in	the	last	two	years	(2015	and	2016).85	An	August	2015	Merdeka	Center86	report	reflects	this	shift	where	60	percent	of	Malays	now	identify	themselves	as	Muslims	first,	27	percent	as	Malaysians	first,	while	only	6	percent	as	Malays	first	–	the	last	being	a	drop	from	2005’s	11	percent	(Anisah,	2015).	The	increase	in	the	policing	of	discursive,	behavioural	and	sartorial	boundaries	has	led	to	attempts	at	delineating	the	margins	of	where	Malay	ends	and	Muslim-Malay	begins,	often	extended	to	include	other	communities	as	a	diametric	force	to	define	Muslim-Malay	boundaries.	It	will	become	clear	in	Chapter	6’s	analysis	that	this	national	shift	is	perfectly	encapsulated	in	the	subtexts	of	two	episodes;	a	1997	episode																																																									82	Jabatan	Kemajuan	Islam	Malaysia	(Department	of	Islamic	Development	Malaysia)	and	Jabatan	
Agama	Islam	Wilayah	Persekutuan	(Federal	Territory	Islamic	Religious	Department).	83	Jabatan	Agama	Islam	Selangor	(Selangor	Islamic	Religious	Department)	and	Majlis	Agama	
Islam	Selangor	(Selangor	Islamic	Religious	Council).	84	Officially	recognized	under	these	state	authorities	as	of	October	2016,	are	approximately	15,000	imams	(prayer	leader	at	a	mosque	who	also	gives	sermons)	and	approximately	16,000	Bilal	(man	who	gives	the	calls	to	prayer	and	worship)	(“Salient	points	of,”	2016).	85	While	this	refers	to	the	years	2015	and	2016,	what	I	call	to	attention	is	the	trajectory	of	this	shift	which	presumably	stems	from	at	least	the	1980s	when	the	Islamization	policies	were	first	introduced.	While	national	statistics	from	the	same	period	as	Senario	do	provide	data	on	the	size	of	ethnic	groups	and	their	faiths,	they	do	not	reveal	how	individuals	identify	themselves.	86	The	Merdeka	Center	is	self-described	as	“an	opinion	research	firm”	comprised	of	social	scientists,	engaged	in	the	independent	gathering	of	public	opinion	and	“expressing	them	through	survey	results,	analysis	and	position	papers”	(Merdeka	Center,	2007).	This	report	is	only	indicative	of	a	possible	trend,	for	their	research	methods	and	sample	sizes	are	not	usually	revealed.	Notwithstanding	its	accuracy,	of	more	significance	is	the	publication	of	these	findings	by	news	media	channels	nationally.	Since	reports	such	as	these	are	featured	as	credible	and	authoritative	by	news	media,	they	contribute	to	prevailing	positive/negative	societal	assumptions	about	Malay	identity	of	the	time.	
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titled	Ta	Ti	Tu	that	features	the	clear	didacticism	of	the	dakwah	movement,	and	a	2011	episode	titled	Salah	Sangka	that	presumes	the	religious	foreknowledge	of	viewers.		One	consequence	of	the	dakwah	movement	is	the	fear	of	heresy	that	prevents	critical	questioning	of	anything	deemed	to	be	Islamic.	For	example,	while	fatwas	are	fundamentally	just	opinions	by	religious	scholars	(Ahmad	2009,	162),	little	constructive	debate	from	the	Muslim	community	at	large	attends	their	enactment.	The	widespread	acceptance	of	Islamic	taqlid	(unquestioning	acceptance	of	[Islamic]	authority)	and	the	seemingly	immutable	nature	of	these	official	interpretations	of	Islamic	law	have	led	to	more	conservative	fatwas	and	Islamic	legislation.	The	lack	of	significant	critical	opposition	from	the	wider	Muslim	populace	qualifies	the	state’s	presumption	that	the	Malay-Muslim	subject	is	incapable	of	critical	judgement,	and	needs	to	be	instructed	and	policed	to	be	truly	Islamic.	This	Muslim	character	typified	by	the	voluntary	relinquishment	of	individual	agency	seems	aligned	to	Azhar	Ibrahim’s	(2014)	description	of	the	‘traditionalists’	category.		Azhar’s	(2014)	analysis	of	Islam’s	role	within	the	Southeast	Asian	region	focuses	on	the	discursive	formations	of	religion	and	social	movements	influencing	the	trajectories	of	Islamic	discourse.	One	of	the	earliest	religio-political	Islamic	archetypes	identified	by	Azhar	is	the	‘traditionalist’	whose	character	seems	consonant	with	the	Muslim	ideal	encouraged	by	Malaysian	religious	authorities	(2014,	1-90).	In	the	Malaysian	context,	the	traditionalist	appears	to	be	motivated	by	demands	for	increased	protection	of	Muslim-Malay	rights	premised	on	alleged	infringements	on	Islam	that	erode	Muslim	faith.	Muslims	sensitivities	have	supposedly	been	affected	from	things	as	mundane	as	(1)	an	image	of	a	Hindu	deity	as	a	factoid	on	Malaysian	Indians	(featured	on	a	commercial	product),	and	the	naming	of	a	ketchup	as	‘Church’87	to	(2)	the	social	articulations	of	non-Muslims	that	Muslims	disagree	with,88	(3)	imagined	plots	against	Islam	and	Malays	that	involve	opposition	parties,	Christians,	Jews,	Israelis,	and/or																																																									87	On	Hindu	deity	mineral	water	bottle,	see	“Consumer	group	wants,”	(2014).	On	fried	chicken	sauce,	see	“TCM:	‘Church’	dipping,”	(2015).	88	On	Halloween’s	ploy,	see	Syed	Jaymal	(2014).	On	Oktoberfest,	see	“Oktoberfest	hype,”	(2014).		
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liberals,89	to	(4)	threats	against	other	Malay	Muslims	for	not	being	Islamic	enough.90	These	demonstrate	a	wide	range	of	issues	that	can	be	perceived	as	infractions	against,	or	deviations	from,	the	Islamic	taqlid	paradigm.	The	opposition	to	self-determination	through	logical	thinking	and	intellectualism91	is	perhaps	best	encapsulated	by	the	Perak	mufti’s	declaration	on	4	August	2015	that	intellectualism	and	logic	should	be	avoided	since	it	is	governed	by	desires	and	thus	susceptible	to	the	devil	(“Avoid	intellect,”	2015).		The	strident	increase	in	conservative	Islamic	expression	in	the	last	decade	has	however,	led	some	scholars	like	Mohd	Azizuddin	(2014)	to	interrogate	the	notion	of	religious	freedom	in	Malaysia	when	considered	against	the	country’s	religio-politics,	constitutional	stipulates,	and	Malay	cultural-traditional	legacies.	He	concludes	that	“[r]eligious	expression	is	allowed	only	if	approved	by	the	state	and	religious	authorities”,	and	that	“[t]he	government,	on	one	hand,	tries	to	maintain	political	stability	and	racial	harmony	but,	on	the	other,	attempts	to	maintain	the	status-quo	especially	with	regards	to	understanding	Malaysia	as	an	‘Islamic	state’	and	to	imposing	Islamization	policies”	(Mohd	Azizuddin	2014,	26).92	While	his	findings	only	serve	to	strengthen	the	foregoing	discourse	on	UMNO’s	role	within	Malaysia’s	Islamic	primacy	paradigm,	his	discussions	also	reveal	–	among	others	–	the	reasons	why	Malaysia	is	neither	fully	a	secular	state	nor	an	Islamic	state.	The	country’s	constitutional	structure	allowing	for	an	Islamic	law	system	to	exist	alongside	a	civil	law	system	is	one	primary	reason	for	the	nation’s	indeterminate	trajectory.	Mohd	Azizuddin	therefore	suggests	that	the	appellation	of	‘hybrid-state’	might	be	more	apt	(2014,	9).	Even	though	it	is	
																																																								89	On	Christmas	and	New	Year’s	plot,	see	Chi	(2014),	Joseph	(2014).	For	K-pop	agenda,	see	“After	BigBang	show,”	(2015).	On	Jews’	plot,	see	“Infidels	backed	by,”	(2015).	On	Israel,	see	“NGO	coalition	alleges,”	(2015).	For	jihad	on	liberals,	see	“In	Friday	sermon,”	(2015).	90	See	“JAWI	to	seek,”	(2015),	Sukumaran	(2015),	and	Zurairi	(2014).	91	Azhar	notes,	traditionalists	viewed	modern	Western	knowledge	as	“profane”	and	“devoid	of	‘Islamic	spirit’”	(2014,	11),	while	revivalists	had	an	“intellectual	indolence	and	disrespect	for	the	intellectual	and	scientific	endeavours	of	others”	(2014,	51).	92	The	need	for	this	precarious	balance	between	racial	harmony	and	Islam	is	ironic.	It	was	the	UMNO	government	under	then	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	that	declared	that	Malaysia	was	an	Islamic	nation	–	a	declaration	that	Azizuddin’s	analysis	reveals	as	unconstitutional.	Furthermore,	it	was	Mahathir	who	introduced	the	Islamization	policies	in	the	1980s	(Mohd.	Azizuddin	2014,	8,	13;	Ting	2008,	84;	2009,	34).	Both	Azizuddin	(2014,	13)	and	Ting	(2008	84;	2009,	34)	have	proposed	that	these	developments	are	politically	motivated	as	a	counter-strategy	to	PAS,	rather	than	an	expression	of	Islamic	piety.	
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unarticulated	in	his	study,	the	extent	of	UMNO’s	involvement	is	clear.	This	dual	constitutional	structure	was	made	possible	only	through	the	constitutional	amendments	of	then	Prime	Minister	Mahathir’s	administration	in	1988	as	part	of	the	nation’s	Islamization	initiatives	(Mohd	Azizuddin	2014,	7-12).		Mohd.	Azizuddin	is	one	of	many	providing	some	semblance	of	balance	to	this	site	of	Malay-Muslim	discursivity,	albeit	academically.	Notwithstanding	their	political	agendas,	other	Malay-Muslim	socio-political	actors	who	have	been	publicly	vocal	with	their	alternate	Islamic	views	include	opposition	party	members	Mohammad	Sabu	(see	Shazwan	2015	for	example)	and	Khalid	Samad	(see	Syed	2015	for	example),93	Perlis	mufti	Mohd.	Asri	Zainul94	(for	examples,	see	Rahimy	2016;	“Refrain	from	calling,”	2016),	and	groups	such	as	G25	(eg.	Boo	2016)	and	Sisters	in	Islam	(eg.	Boo	2015).	They	are	however,	a	minority	voice	when	compared	to	UMNO’s	overbearing	state-Islam	that,	within	a	framework	of	political	Islam,	is	further	strengthened	by	opposition	party	PAS’	Islamic	conservatism	(eg.	Norshazlina	2016;	Shazwan	2016).		We	have	previously	observed	the	rise	of	Malay	primacy	as	a	central	component	of	statist	Malay	identity.	We	have	now	summarily	outlined	the	numerous	ways	that	Islam	is	deployed	within	the	quotidian	to	guarantee	Muslim	primacy.	Islam’s	potency	in	mobilizing	traditional	Malay	sentiments	is	evidenced	by	its	popular	deployment	by	politicians,	especially	when	ketuanan	Islam	is	conflated	with	the	ideological	framework	of	ketuanan	Melayu.	In	the	following	section,	the	discussion	will	shift	to	a	focus	on	the	state’s	interpretation	of	Malay	gender	relationships	as	framed	through	both	‘ketuanan’	ideologies.		
Female	and	Malay	UMNO’s	dominance	over	the	discourse	of	Malayness	has	inevitably	led	to	their	ability	to	dictate	Malay-Muslim	gender	roles.	In	this	respect,	the	complex																																																									93	The	former	is	Parti	Amanah	Negara’s	president	while	the	latter	is	presently	the	party’s	communication	director.	94	A	mufti	is	a	Muslim	legal	expert	empowered	to	give	rulings	on	Islamic	matters.	In	Malaysia,	this	empowerment	is	state-sanctioned	through	either	the	monarchs	or	federal	religious	authorities.	Mohd.	Asri	is	the	only	state	mufti	in	the	country	who	is	consistently	vocal	against	Islamic	actions,	behaviours,	and	views	construed	as	‘extreme’	in	a	multi-faith	society.	
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relationship	between	Malayness	and	Islam	in	determining	the	specificities	of	Malay	and	Muslim	female	identity	is	succinctly	reflected	in	the	political	domain.	From	this	perspective,	the	works	of	scholars	such	as	Ayse	N.	Narli	(1984),	Cecelia	Ng,	Maznah	Mohamad,	&	Tan	Beng	Hui	(2006),	Nik	Safiah	(1990),	Helen	Ting	(2008),	and	Wazir	Jahan	Karim	(1992)	suggest	that	UMNO’s	attitude	towards	the	established	hierarchy	of	gender	is	one	of	ambivalence,	pragmatically	motivated	by	political	need.		This	section	will	thus	locate	the	shifting	roles	of	Malay-Muslim	women	as	determined	by	state	policies	that	largely	conflate	the	interpretations	of	Islam	and	Malayness.	We	will	first	review	the	prevalent	hierarchies	of	genders	found	in	the	Malay	social	structure,	followed	by	an	overview	of	several	socio-economic	and	political	developments	that	undergird	re-evaluations	of	gender	roles,	as	well	as	the	responses	they	elicited.	Several	key	groups	and	organizations	aimed	at	equalizing	gender	relationships	will	also	be	identified,	as	well	as	the	subsequent	effects	on	the	social	expectations	of	women	caused	by	their	struggles.95	These	are	intended	to	provide	a	general	understanding	of	Malay-Muslim	gender	relationships	in	Malaysia.	Much	of	the	fundamental	dissonance	resulting	from	opposing	ideologies	between	Malay	and	Muslim	men	vs	Malay	and	Muslim	women	are	not	unique	to	Malaysia.	Most	societies,	if	not	all,	are	grappling	with	these	same	fundamental	concerns	resulting	from	what	is	essentially	a	patriarchal	socio-political	structure.		Ng	et	al.	(2006),	Safiah	(1990),	Ting	(2008),	and	Wazir	(1992)96	all	agree	that	the	post-independence	construct	of	a	woman	within	the	Malay	social	hierarchy	is	one	who	is	subordinated	under	a	socio-political	structure	that	prioritizes	men.	This	stems	from	the	view	that	male	dominance	is	‘natural’	(Wazir	1992,	218),	since	it	is	supposedly	pre-determined	in	specific	interpretations	of	Islam	(Wazir	1992,	163).	Both	these	presumptions	about	male	dominance	are	centrally																																																									95	The	areas	of	gender	relations,	women’s	rights,	and	feminist	movements	in	Malaysia	each	represent	established	disciplines	of	study.	This	section	is	not	meant	to	be	an	exhaustive	review	of	the	topic;	that	would	be	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	Instead,	it	is	meant	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	trajectory	on	Malay-Muslim	women’s	rights	and	their	position	in	Malaysia.	96	However,	Wazir	contends	that	this	subordinate	role	is	constantly	being	contested	through	new	forms	of	identifications.	
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reproduced	on	Senario.	A	primary	reason	for	this	viewpoint’s	resilience	in	contemporary	Malay	social	systems	is	presumably	the	revived	Islamic	fervour	that	started	in	the	1980s	(Islamization	period).		The	conflation	of	both	Malay	and	Islamic	identity	during	the	nation’s	Islamic	revivalism	resulted	in	what	Wazir	calls	the	“adatization	of	Islam”	or	the	“Islamization	of	adat”	(1992,	16).	The	subsequent	ability	of	state	religious	authorities	to	vocalize	their	positions	on	matters	involving	Muslim	women	and	domestic	life	is	in	effect	qualified	by	this	Islamization	of	adat.	With	UMNO’s	delicate	negotiation	between	their	Islamic	credentials	and	Malay	interests,	it	became	expedient	for	the	party’s	state	assemblymen	to	locate	their	positions	on	issues	of	women’s	rights	and	protections	roughly	in	alignment	with	the	religious	authorities	(Ting	2008,	85-86,	89).	Part	of	this	compliance	was	the	fear	of	being	branded	by	opposition	Islamic	party	PAS	as	“being	‘un-Islamic’	or	of	violating	or	misrepresenting	the	conventional	understanding	of	Islam”	(Ting	2008,	86,	89).	Regardless	of	their	personal	stance,	what	followed	from	cases	cited	between	1984	and	200597	was	a	more	pronounced	articulation	of	resistance	to	legislation	that	aimed	to	offer	more	protection	to	women	in	the	areas	of	polygamy,	divorce	and	marriage,	and	domestic	violence	including	marital	rape98	(Maznah	2002,	233;	Ting	2008,	86;	Zainah	2001,	237).	One	concern	often	proffered	as	grounds	for	opposing	these	pro-women	initiatives	is	that	the	proposed	legislation	would	be	too	restrictive	of	Muslim	men’s	rights	(Aishah	1992,	198-201;	Zainah	2001,	233,	238)	though	the	diametric	assertion	of	encroachment	on	Muslim	women’s	rights	remains	unproblematic.		Wazir	notes	the	dissonance	between	the	constructs	of	women	in	early	and	contemporary	social	structures.	It	is	therefore	ironic	that	she	seems	to	qualify	this	inequality	by	citing	examples	that	she	suggests	demonstrate	a	mediation	of	this	unequal	gender	responsibilities	through	what	she	regards	as	‘opportunities’																																																									97	One	example	is	the	enactment	of	the	1984	Muslim	Family	Law	Act	for	Federal	Territories.	Two	other	examples	are	the	approval	of	the	Domestic	Violence	Act	in	1994	that	was	only	finally	gazetted	in	1996,	and	the	2005	proposed	revisions	to	the	Islamic	Family	Law.	98	Ting	notes	that	the	resultant	exclusion	of	marital	rape	from	the	definition	of	domestic	violence	in	the	Act	means	there	is	some	margin	for	justifying	“conditional	beating,	should	a	Muslim	woman	refuse	to	have	sexual	intercourse	with	her	husband”	(Ting	2008,	86,	95).	
		 60	
for	women	to	organize	themselves	(Wazir	1992,	220).	Within	a	socio-religious	context,	Wazir	suggests	this	is	observed	in	the	mobilization	of	women	for	the	organization	of	feasts	that	accompany	Islamic	ceremonies	like	do’a	selamat	(prayer	for	giving	thanks)	and	tah’lil	(recitation	of	verses	that	worship/praise	God)	(Wazir	1992,	220-221).99	However,	she	curiously	does	not	problematize	the	parallel	between	the	notion	of	a	subordinated	role	of	women	as	domestic	homemakers,	and	their	extension	as	‘homemakers’	for	the	Islamic	community	at	the	wider	societal	level.	Wazir	alludes	to	a	resumption	of	this	dynamic	herself	when	she	states	that	husbands	“who	attend	do	not	have	any	ritual	function	and	only	come	to	partake	of	the	feast”	(Wazir	1992,	221).	Unmentioned	is	also	the	reality	that	at	events	such	as	do’a	selamat	and	tah’lil,	the	main	congregational	prayers	are	still	led	by	men,	which	would	affirm	the	patriarchal	structure.		Politically,	Wazir	extends	this	argument	to	UMNO’s	women’s	wing,	Wanita	UMNO,	which	she	regards	as	allowing	for	women	to	organize	and	assert	their	political	relevance.	However,	the	works	of	Manderson	(1980),	Narli	(1984),	Ng,	Maznah,	&	Tan	(2006),	Nik	Safiah	(1990),	and	Ting	(2008)	provide	an	account	of	
Wanita	UMNO’s	struggles	that	is	less	optimistic	than	Wazir’s	assertion.	Ng	et	al.	(2006,	21),	Nik	&	Rokiah	(2003,	94),	and	Ting	(2008,	77-82)	note	that	since	the	1970s,	Wanita	UMNO’s	ability	to	formulate	and	to	pass	legislations	on	women’s	rights	has	invariably	depended	on	the	women	leaders’	ability	to	leverage	on,	and	work	within	the	patriarchal	political	structure.	In	effect,	Manderson	seems	to	echo	my	earlier	observation	about	female	domesticity	when	he	writes	that	
Wanita	UMNO	is:	…	a	group	subordinate	to	the	parent	party,	as	women	were	to	men.	The	members	of	the	section	were	nurturers	in	the	public	area	as	in	their	own	homes,	they	supported	rather	than	led,	deferring	to	the	wisdom	of	the	party	and	the	state.	 –Manderson	(1980,	192)		
																																																								99	These	Islamic	events	usually	comprise	of	the	primary	religious	component	of	congregational	praying,	supplications,	and	recitations	of	passages	from	the	Quran.	This	will	be	followed	by	a	communal	feasting	component.	
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There	were	two	noteworthy	political	developments	on	women’s	affairs	that	occurred	in	2001;	the	establishment	of	the	Ministry	of	Women	and	Family	Development	and	the	introduction	of	an	additional	UMNO	women’s	wing	called	
Puteri	UMNO	(Ting	2008,	90-91).	Puteri	UMNO	differs	from	Wanita	UMNO	in	that	it	only	admits	women	who	are	below	40	years	of	age.	While	the	image	of	a	“’new	Malay	woman’”	was	subtly	and	unofficially	introduced	through	Puteri	UMNO	initiatives	like	Malay	novels,	films,	and	media	interviews	(Maznah	2004,	139;	Ting	2008,	91-92),	this	was	merely	to	construct	the	image	of	a	woman	that	contrasted	with	the	conservative	female	ideal	of	PAS.		Curiously,	none	of	the	scholars	mention	the	debilitating	nature	of	Puteri	UMNO’s	name	since	puteri	translates	as	princess	which	can	allude	to	a	specific	sexist	stereotype.	This	irony	in	naming	extends	to	the	Ministry	of	Women	and	Family	Development.	Notwithstanding	the	ministry’s	belated	founding	–	44	years	after	independence	–	the	name	of	the	ministry	itself	seems	regressive	since	it	ideologically	sutures	‘women’	to	the	discursive	field	of	‘family’.	This	seems	to	echo	the	previously	unarticulated	yet	implicit	assertion	by	Wazir	that	the	central	domain	of	a	woman	is	found	within	the	rubrics	of	domesticity	and	family.	The	ministry’s	regressive	attitude	towards	women’s	rights	and	affairs	is	perhaps	best	epitomized	by	the	statement	of	its	first	Minister	Sharizat	Abdul	Jalil,	where	she	reportedly	said	that	an	area	of	focus	for	the	Ministry	was	to	“reinforce	women’s	basic	and	traditional	functions	such	as	cooking	and	caring	for	the	household”	(Maznah	2002,	372;	Ting	2008,	90).	It	will	become	clear	in	the	later	chapters	that	this	conventional	concept	of	women’s	relational	identity	to	domesticity	and	the	‘naturalness’	of	the	proposition,	are	in	fact	key	overarching	themes	in	
Senario’s	subtexts.		From	a	socio-economic	perspective,	one	of	the	most	significant	changes	in	the	social	status	of	Malay	women	occurred	in	the	years	between	1970	and	the	late	1980s.	This	period	was	marked	by	a	substantial	increase	in	foreign	investments	leading	to	immense	growth	of	the	industrial	manufacturing	sector	(Ng	et	al.,	2006,	67;	Stivens	1996,	41-42;	Ting	2008,	82;	Wazir	1992,	196-200).	With	a	30	percent	bumiputera	workforce	ensured	through	the	NEP	in	1971,	about	80,000	
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village	girls	of	ages	16	to	mid-20s	(presumably	mostly	Malay)	had	relocated	to	urban	centres	by	the	late	1970s	as	factory	workers	(Ng	et	al.,	2006,	67;	Stivens	1996,	98,	260;	Ting	2008,	82;	Wazir	1992,	196).	The	subsequent	economic	improvements	to	the	households	of	these	girls/women	were	accompanied	by	an	enhancement	of	female	socio-economic	status	within	the	nation	that	accorded	them	with	relative	freedom,	mobility,	and	some	autonomy	(Ong	1995,	176;	Stivens	1996,	228;	Ting	2008,	83-84;	Wazir	1992,	198-199,	201).	This	would	contrast	with	the	dominant	conservative	construct	of	Malay-Muslim	women	who	were	thought	to	be	defined	by	their	roles	within	the	family	unit,	a	point	that	would	later	allow	for	blame	to	be	laid	at	their	feet	on	the	issue	of	eroding	familial	bonds.		Both	Narli	(1984,	130)	and	Nik	Safiah	(1990,	85,	87)	noted	that	by	1984,	these	women	had	to	contend	with	conflicting	social	expectations	of	their	roles	even	as	they	were	themselves	rearticulating	their	newfound,	evolving	female	identity.	The	state	regarded	this	modern	role	of	women	as	being	able	to	“pull	their	families	out	of	‘backwardness’	and	as	housewives	(seri-rumah)	who	could	inculcate	‘progressive’	values	in	their	children”	(Ong	1995,	173-174,	181,	translation	in	original).	This	is	consonant	with	what	we	have	observed	of	the	government’s	‘revolutionizing’	initiatives	of	the	time	(such	as	New	Malay).	However,	the	emerging	Islamic	discourse	on	“Muslim	womanhood”	(Ong	1995,	181)	brought	forth	by	the	reinvigoration	of	Islam	meant	that	these	Malay	factory	women	were	eventually	blamed	for	an	erosion	of	familial	relations	and	the	emergence	of	other	domestic	ills	(Ong	1995,	174-184;	Ting	2008,	83-84;	Wazir	1992,	201-202).	Most	significantly	–	and	perhaps	most	damagingly	–	this	revived	religious	conservatism	entrenched	the	notion	that	the	‘traditional’	role	of	women	in	society	and	domestically,	is	aligned	with	the	stipulations	of	Islam	(Ng	et	al.,	2006,	102;	Ong	1995,	177-180,	185-186;	Ting	2008,	84;	Wazir	1992,	165-170,	175-180).		It	is	interesting	that	our	discussion	on	Azlanshah’s	findings	in	Chapter	1	regarding	Malay	women’s	consumption	of	‘Asian	soap	operas’	reflect	similar	concerns.	While	Azlanshah’s	studies	were	conducted	in	the	1990s	–	around	a	
		 63	
decade	later,	which	coincides	with	the	Asian	values	discourse	and	the	emergence	of	the	bohsia	girls100	(girls	with	moral	laxity)	–	the	anxieties	over	a	potential	erosion	of	women’s	Malay	cultural	values	and	faith	were	uncannily	similar	to	the	blame	that	accompanied	their	new	socio-economic	status	in	the	1980s.	This	would	suggest	an	almost	unchanging	persistence	in	UMNO’s	(and	by	extension,	the	Malay-Muslim	society’s)	ideological	attitude	to	the	hierarchical	nature	of	gender	relations	across	a	decade.		There	were	at	least	two	negative	stereotypes	of	women	that	emerged	from	this	period	of	industrialization	in	the	1980s,	and	the	period	of	economic	recession	that	started	from	the	mid-1990s.	The	first	was	Minah	Karan	(Minah,	the	Electronic	Lady),	as	these	factory	girls	came	to	be	known.	Their	newfound	economic	and	social	status	within	the	city	was	accompanied	by	the	freedom	of	being	away	from	the	communal	restrictions	of	a	close-knit	village	or	kampung	society.	Their	relations	with	men	in	the	city,	subsequently	earned	Minah	Karan	synonymity	with	“wantonness	and	promiscuity”	(Wazir	1992,	201).	The	second	stereotype	of	bohsia	girls	(girls	with	moral	laxity)	emerged	much	later	in	the	mid	to	late	1990s,	and	involved	“heterosexual	teenage	girls	and	young	women”	who	were	believed	to	indulge	in	similar	promiscuous	activities	(Ng,	Maznah,	&	Tan	2006,	141;	Peletz	2009,	198).		It	bears	pointing	out	that	Minah	Karan’s	male	counterparts	–	both	in	their	move	from	the	kampung	to	the	city,	and	their	sexual	improprieties	–	were	called	
Ahmad	Spaner	(Ahmad,	with	the	spanner)(Wazir	1992,	201).	However,	while	the	men	constituting	the	Ahmad	Spaner	category	often	formed	sexual	liaisons	with	the	Minah	Karan,	they	were	not	viewed	pejoratively	(Wazir	1992,	201-202).	In	fact,	while	the	Minah	Karan	were	subsequently	unable	to	find	suitable	marriage	partners,	the	Ahmad	Spaner	were	still	viewed	as	suitable	candidates	by	mothers	seeking	husbands	for	their	daughters	in	the	kampung	(Wazir	1992,	201-202).	These	differing	communal	standards	of	moral	evaluation	suggest	that,	regardless	of	the	underlying	reasons,	the	male-privileging	cultural	mindset	is	prevalent	as	lived-reality	amongst	the	community.																																																									100	Bohsia	girls	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	section.	
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	The	works	of	Maznah	(2004,	136),	Ng	et	al.	(2006,	72-76),	Tan	&	Ng	(2003),	and	Ting	(2008,	75,	86-90)	overarchingly	suggest	there	was	a	significant	political	emphasis	on	women’s	rights	in	the	period	leading	up	to	the	1999	general	elections.	While	women’s	advocacy	groups	have	been	lobbying	since	the	1980s,101	it	was	during	this	period	that	pro-women	initiatives	achieved	much	progress	(Ng	et	al.,	2006,	74-75;	Ting	2008,	88-90).	However,	Ng	et	al.	(2006,	75-76)	and	Ting	(2008,	88)	observe	that	UMNO’s	pivot	on	the	issue	of	women’s	rights	was	merely	a	political	response	to	the	massive	public	support	of	former	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Anwar	Ibrahim	who	was	imprisoned	by	then	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	on	charges	of	sodomy	in	1998.		One	Malay-Muslim	non-governmental	organization	(NGO)	that	became	more	vocal	during	this	period	of	the	1990s	is	Sisters	in	Islam	(SIS).	SIS	has	been	consistently	contentious	with	state	religious	departments	over	women’s	rights	since	1993	(Ng	et	al.	2006,	98).	Spurred	by	their	concerns	over	the	“injustice	[to]	women”	under	Syariah	law,	SIS	has	challenged	many	official	prescriptions	of	Islamic	law	which	it	views	as	symptomatic	of	a	“process	of	interpretation	and	codification”	that	is	“dominated	by	male	jurists	and	scholars”	(Ng	et	al.	2006,	98).	This	has	consistently	positioned	them	squarely	against	the	official	Islamic	bureaucracy102	(Azza	2016,	67,	107-108,	113-115,	137-140,	171;	Ng	et	al.	2006,	99,	101).	More	recently,	their	adversarial	stance	has	resulted	in	the	Selangor	Islamic	Religious	Council’s	(MAIS)	fatwa	branding	SIS	as	a	deviationist	group	(Bedi	2014).	It	is	presumably	this	institutional	view	of	SIS’s	‘un-Islamic-ness’	that	has	polarized	the	Malaysian	Muslim	community’s	opinions	about	the	group,	which	includes	opposition	from	some	Muslim	women	themselves	(Azza	2016,	21-22,	169,	171;	Ng	et	al.	2006,	101).																																																									101	For	example,	Violence	Against	Women,	Citizens	Against	Rape,	All	Women’s	Action	Society,	and	Women’s	Development	Collective	(Ng	et	al.	2006,	69-71).	102	One	of	SIS’s	three	female	founders	is	Marina	Mahathir,	daughter	of	former	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	who	instituted	the	nation’s	Islamization	policies.	This	is	most	ironic,	for	SIS	has	consistently	been	embroiled	in	contests	over	women’s	rights	with	these	same	institutions	that	were	established	by	Mahathir’s	Islamization	efforts.	However,	Marina’s	involvement	with	SIS	is	arguably	one	primary	reason	(daughter	of	a	Prime	Minister)	that	the	organization	survived	for	as	long	as	it	did.	This	last	observation	is	similarly	alluded	to	in	Ng	et	al.	where	it	is	noted	that	SIS	“implicitly	receives	the	backing	of	the	country’s	highest	leadership”,	thus	“they	are	relatively	well	protected	from	the	wrath	of	Islam’s	extremist	factions”	(2006,	99).	
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	The	discussions	in	this	section	suggest	that	the	female	Malay-Muslim	is	an	active	subject	who	is	consistently	negotiating	between	the	narrow	dictates	of	an	evolving	self-conceptualized	identity	and	the	rigid,	largely	unchanging	strictures	represented	by	communal	patriarchal	interpretations	to	adat	and	Islam.	As	we	have	seen	in	the	case	of	Sisters	in	Islam,	the	‘Asian	soap	opera’	female	viewers	in	Chapter	1,	and	the	independent	women	that	came	with	the	industrial	boom	in	the	1980s,	any	perceived	deviation	from	this	doubly-reinforced	rubric	is	translated	as	an	erosion	of	Malay	identity	and	Islam.	This	is	not	dissimilar	from	our	earlier	discussions	of	UMNO’s	strategies	in	both	the	ideological	terrains	of	Malayness	and	Islam.	Within	our	context	of	state-determined	identity,	this	institutionally	entrenched	prioritization	of	men’s	rights	over	those	of	women	has	become	ideologically	more	compelling	since	its	conflation	with	the	dictates	of	Islam.	Women’s	groups	may	struggle	against	this	statist	interpretation,	though	the	deployment	of	the	dual	reasoning	–	God-sanctioned	fixity	of	gender	roles,	and	female	domestic	responsibilities	required	by	adat	–	may	possibly	motivate	compliance	from	comparatively	more	women	who	may	not	agree	with	these	two	rubrics	but	nonetheless	aspire	to	be	‘socially	acceptable’.		
Constituting	Sameness	and	Difference:	Stereotypes	and	Others	Much	of	what	has	been	written	in	this	chapter	reveals	that	the	juxtaposition	of	‘us’	against	‘them’	is	a	central	tenet	of	UMNO’s	ideological	leadership	that	focuses	on	‘demarcating’	political,	religious,	and	social	space.103	Nowhere	is	this	more	evident	than	in	our	earlier	observation	of	the	evolving	categories	of	Melayu	(Malay),	Bumiputera	(Sons	of	the	soil),	Bumiputera	Melayu	(Malay	sons	of	the	soil),	Melayu	Muslim,	Muslim	Melayu,	and	Muslim.	It	is	therefore	clear	that	UMNO’s	national	initiatives,	political	rhetoric,	and	the	resulting	discourse	of	Malayness	are	fundamentally	divisive	in	nature.104	Given	the	consistency	of	this	strategy,	it	is	relevant	to	introduce	the	notions	of	Otherness	and	stereotypes,	both	of	which	I	will	discuss	primarily	through	Homi	Bhabha’s	(1994)	readings.																																																									103	As	mentioned	in	the	preceding	section,	I	view	Malay	gender	relationships	as	being	a	constituent	part	of	religious	and	socio-cultural	dynamics.	104	From	an	ethnic-relations	perspective,	the	economic	nationalism	of	Malaysia	Incorporated	was	arguably	the	least	divisive.	Though	one	can	contend	that	it	was	marked	by	class	divisions.	
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These	concepts	not	only	undergird	Malaysia’s	political	and	social	discourse,	but	are	also	present	in	Senario’s	subtexts.		Bhabha’s	(1994)	interpretations	of	both	the	‘other’	and	stereotypes	are	grounded	in	his	dissection	of	colonial	discourse	as	an	apparatus	of	power.	As	such,	this	will	provide	some	insight	into	UMNO’s	supposed	adoption	of	colonial	trajectories	as	well	as	the	prevailing	stereotypes	of	non-Malays	and	non-Muslims	that	seems	to	be	encouraged	by	the	Malaysian	state.	What	is	key	to	the	discursive	power	of	both	‘other’	and	stereotypes	is	the	concept	of	‘difference’	and	the	ability	of	dominant	powers	to	recognize	dissimilarities	of	race/culture/history	while	simultaneously	disavowing	their	differentiations	(Bhabha	1994,	96,	101,	107,	110).	This	can	be	observed	in	Malaysia’s	assertion	that	it	recognizes	the	diverse	cultures,	ethnicity,	and	faiths	while	simultaneously	nationalizing	Malay	culture	and	language	as	a	form	of	unofficial	criterion	of	nationality.	This	paradox	is	in	fact	the	underlying	process	of	ambivalence	that	produces	contradictory	modes	of	cultural	knowledge	or	sets	of	normatives.		Since	this	strategy	operates	on	‘difference’,	it	becomes	necessary	to	produce	a	social	reality	in	which	an	‘other’	–	that	which	departs	from	what	has	been	deemed	as	the	dominant	normative	–	is	made	clearly	visible	(Bhabha	1994,	101).	This	would	explain	the	prevailing	‘colonial	stereotype’	of	the	Chinese	within	the	Malay	social	mindset	(and	the	Malays	within	the	Chinese	mindset)	as	discussed	previously.	Within	the	Malay	context,	the	underlying	contradiction	of	aspiring	towards	progress	yet	bounded	by	a	traditional	feudal	rubric,	seems	to	encapsulate	the	internal	communal	ambivalence	of	Malayness.		This	othering	is	further	associated	with	the	production	of	stereotypes	(for	example,	the	‘colonial	Chinese	stereotype’	or	the	‘stereotype	of	the	lazy	Malay’105),	which	Bhabha	regards	as	a	central	discursive	strategy	for	entrenching	the	“concept	of	‘fixity’	in	the	ideological	construction	of	otherness”	(Bhabha	1994,	94-96).	Stereotypes	thus	ensure	that	the	boundaries	between	norms	and	otherness	are	maintained	as	rigidly	unchanging.	This	‘concept	of																																																									105	The	‘lazy	Malay’	myth	was	in	fact,	the	motivation	behind	Syed	Hussein	Alatas’	book	in	1971.	
		 67	
fixity’	is	the	reason	for	the	earlier	paradox	of	ambivalence	that	undergirds	the	strategy	of	‘difference’.	For	the	dominant	group	must	demarcate	the	difference	between	‘them’	and	‘us’	as	being	predicated	on	some	probabilistic	historical	truth	or	a	notion	of	traditionalism	that	imbues	this	difference	with	its	‘fixed’	or	unchanging	quality	(Bhabha	1994,	105-106,	213).	Within	Malaysia,	this	would	of	course	include	Malays	–	such	as	the	women’s	rights	groups	–	deemed	to	be	deviating	from	the	norms	established	by	the	dominant	order.		In	effect,	this	demarcation	is	the	displacement	of	the	dominant	group’s	anxiety	onto	the	‘other’	(Bhabha	1994,	213)	through	the	production	of	a	Foucauldian	regime	of	truth,	where	‘truth’	is	produced,	sustained,	valourized,	and	regulated	by	a	series	of	mechanisms,	techniques,	and	procedures	that	are	political	in	nature	(Foucault	1976,	14).	Since	this	‘truth’	is	produced	by	the	dominant	group,	it	can	therefore	be	deployed	across	time,	resulting	in	the	same	stereotype	or	‘other’	being	recurringly	reproduced	or	sustained	by	the	dominant	group	(Bhabha	1994,	95-96,	106,	108)	for	maintaining	the	identities	of	both	‘them’	and	‘us’.	This	is	observed	in	the	prevailing	Chinese-Malay	bi-cultural	tensions	that	have	remained	largely	unchanged	since	Malaysian	independence.	In	this	respect,	as	a	form	of	identification,	otherness	similarly	defines	that	which	it	differentiates	against,	for	the	identity	of	‘us’	is	often	defined	by	what	is	not	‘us’.	This	seems	evident	in	the	evolving	categories	of	Malayness,	since	the	need	to	continually	demarcate	Malay	identity	is	motivated	by	citizens	progressively	identifying	with	the	national	identity.	This	is	the	underlying	ambivalence,	where	Malay	culture	and	identity	must	be	nationally	adopted,	while	simultaneously	establishing	a	distinction	between	those	who	are	‘true’	Malays	(Melayu	jati)	and	those	who	do	not	share	Malay	ancestry.		In	more	than	one	respect,	Bhabha’s	reading	of	otherness	thus	occupies	a	similar	ground	with	Jacques	Lacan’s	psychoanalytical	theorization	of	the	Other	that	was	introduced	with	the	Mirror	Stage	in	1949.106	Lacan’s	diametric	positions	of	Self	and	‘other’	demonstrate	to	some	degree,	the	‘other’s	elementary	self-definition	
																																																								106	Lacan	is	in	fact	liberally	referenced	by	Bhabha	in	The	Location	of	Culture	(1994).	
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which	in	turn	provides	identity	to	the	Self.107	The	fundamental	Lacanian	(1989,	1-7)	human	condition	refers	to	the	formation	of	the	subject	around	an	impossibility,	which	is	the	absolute	disjuncture	between	the	ego’s	symbolic	system	and	the	material	real.	The	ego’s	first	identification	with	its	imaginary	‘other’	(what	it	sees	as	a	reflection	of	itself)	crystalizes	its	cognizance	as	being	separate	from	its	material	environment.	This	imaginary	identification	is	subsequently	organized	by	the	entry	of	the	symbolic	‘Other’	(laws,	language,	structures	of	culture	and	so	forth)	which	establishes	a	worldview	that	structures	the	ego’s	imaginary	perceptions	and	in	the	process,	constitutes	their	meaning.	But	a	gap	between	the	symbolic	and	the	real	is	revealed	when	the	symbolic	Other	generates	the	desire	to	act	on	the	materially	real	without	elucidating	how	to	achieve	the	object	that	is	desired.		Let	us	discuss	this	in	less	abstract	terms	by	framing	it	through	the	Malay	condition.	By	transposing	this	framework	with	Malay	‘other’	(or	‘authentic’	Malay)	as	the	object	of	desire,	the	ideological	fantasy	of	a	homogenous	Malay	Malaysia	becomes	the	determinant	for	the	state’s	ethno-nationalist	trajectories.	Subjects	are	taught	“how	to	desire”	through	this	fantasy	for	it	co-ordinates	the	frame	of	our	desire.	Therein	lies	its	paradox	–	for	desire	is	productive	of	fantasy,	which	in	turn	is	deployed	as	a	screen	to	conceal	the	gap	revealed	by	the	performative	demand	of	the	‘other’	(Žižek	1989,	132).	In	this	sense,	“desire	itself	
is	a	defence	against	desire”	is	tautological	(Žižek	1989,	132);	a	homogenous	irredentist	Malay	nationhood	exists	only	insofar	as	it	is	tautologically	sustained	by	the	Malay	community’s	vested	belief	in	it.	This	is	productive	of	the	gap	between	the	symbolic	discourse	of	ketuanan	Melayu/Islam	(Malay/Islamic	primacy)	and	the	increasingly	globalised	realities	of	urban	21st	century	Malaysia.108	However,	this	gap	can	never	be	closed,	for	the	fantasy	conceals	the	irreconcilability	of	both	and	is	productive	of	the	fantasmatic	myth	that	an	irredentist,	racially	pure	Malay	category	existed	before	British	Malaya,	and	is	
																																																								107	In	our	discussions	on	Bhabha,	the	Self	would	be	the	dominant	power.	108	I	refer	to	the	public	discourse	on	wider	democratization	and	other	secular-liberal	ideas	from	socio-political	vectors	within	the	nation.	
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therefore	a	condition	that	is	re-attainable	by	the	Malays.109			This	is	a	myth	of	“historical	origination”	–	an	irredentist,	racially	pure	Malay	–	that	functions	to	“‘normalize’	the	multiple	beliefs	and	split	subjects”	that	constitute	the	dominant	discourse	(Bhabha	1994,	106).	Within	the	context	of	ethnic	identification,	the	production	of	a	non-Malay	stereotype	or	‘other’	thus	“impedes	the	circulation	and	articulation”	of	“’race’	as	anything	other	than	its	fixity	as	racism”	(Bhabha	1994,	108).	However,	I	suggest	that	the	image	of	the	stereotype	can	also	be	applied	to	the	dominant,	for	it	similarly	needs	to	simplify	its	identity	for	it	to	be	adopted.	However,	“its	image	as	identity”	is	“always	threatened	by	‘lack’”	(Bhabha	1994,	110).	This	is	the	Lacanian	gap	between	the	symbolic	and	the	real,	for	this	identity	is	a	simplification	not	because	it	is	a	false	representation,	it	is	instead,	an	“arrested,	fixated	form	of	representation”	of	identity	(Bhabha	1994,	107)	that	does	not	address	the	realities	of	the	present.	The	stereotype	therefore	epitomizes	the	“desire	for	an	originality”	but	is	constantly	“threatened	by	differences	of	race,	colour	and	culture”	(Bhabha	1994,	107).	The	inherent	ambivalence	–	the	vacillation	between	what	is	normative	(the	rigid	‘fixity’)	and	the	paradoxical	repeatability	of	this	essentialism	in	multiple	forms	–	is	fundamental	to	the	‘other’s	and/or	stereotype’s	discursive	discriminatory	power	(Bhabha	1994,	94-96).	Let	us	now	review	how	several	other	scholars	have	applied	this	framework	to	the	Malaysian	context.		In	attempting	to	rationalize	the	riots	and	the	hegemonic	nature	of	the	NEP,	Khoo	G.C.	(2006)	employs	the	Lacanian	big	Other	as	a	framework	to	understand	their	bearing	on	contemporary	Malaysian	politics.	Lacan’s	symbolic	order	or	the	big	Other,	is	predominantly	language,	and	secondarily,	the	whole	social	network	of	laws,	ideologies,	and	linguistic	communication	that	socializes	individuals”	(Evans	1996,	136;	Khoo	G.C.	2006,	17).	In	her	political	context,	this	refers	to	Malaysians	living	under	policies	that	were	implemented	by	Mahathir,	as	well	as	the	heavy	reliance	on	the	“very	language	that	conveys	and	supports	the	fantasy	structure	meant	to	neutralize	and	incorporate	the	impossible	trauma	of	May	13,																																																									109	Milner	(2011),	Reid	(2006),	Roff	(1969),	and	Vickers	(2006)	are	but	several	who	note	that	from	as	early	as	6th	century,	the	Malayan	Peninsula	was	heterogeneous	in	ethnic	composition.	
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1969”	(Khoo	G.C.	2006,	17).	Central	to	Khoo	G.C.’s	theory	is	the	proposition	that	the	riots	represent	“an	eruption	of	the	Malaysian	traumatic	Real	that	cannot	be	symbolized”	(2006,	85).	Here,	the	Real	as	postulated	by	Lacan,	is	that	which	is	outside	of	language	and	inassimilable	to	symbolization.	The	Real’s	‘trauma’	therefore,	is	its	impossibility	of	being	integrated	into	the	symbolic	order	(Evans	1996,	135).	Khoo	G.C.’s	deployment	of	the	Lacanian	Real	in	this	context,	is	attributed	to	the	violent	return	of	the	‘repressed’,	i.e.	the	race	riots,	which	is	the	“”social	antagonism”	between	the	Chinese	and	Malay	that	traverses,	constitutes,	and	simultaneously	negates	Malaysian	society”	(2006,	85).	Khoo	G.C.’s	use	of	“social	antagonism110”	draws	upon	Ernesto	Laclau	&	Chantal	Mouffe’s	(1985)	postulate	where	the	“socio-symbolic	field	is	conceived	as	structured	around	a	certain	traumatic	impossibility,	around	a	certain	fissure	that	cannot	be	symbolized”	(Žižek	1990,	249),	i.e.	the	Real.		From	this	perspective,	Khoo	G.C.	views	the	NEP	as	an	attempt	to	incorporate	the	Real	of	May	13	into	the	symbolic	order	to	neutralize	and	avert	any	potential	recurrence	of	racial	violence.	She	argues	that	the	consequent	illegality	of	questioning	Malay	special	rights	through	the	legal	strictures	of	NEP	policies	for	one,	is	an	example	of	the	official	‘language’	supporting	the	“fantasy	structure”	that	neutralises	the	national	trauma	(2006,	85).	Therefore,	this	subsequent	internalized	ideological	notion	of	economic	disparity	between	the	Chinese	and	Malays	works	to	legitimize	the	hegemony	of	the	NEP.	The	locus	of	Khoo	G.C.’s	‘Other’	as	the	symbolic	order,	is	its	utilization	as	a	tool	of	repression	and	censorship	legitimized	by	the	supposed	inoculation	of	violence	in	society.	The	real	achievement	of	hegemony	is	crystallized	in	this	concept	of	‘social	antagonism’.	This	suppression-repression	facilitated	by	the	symbolic	order	is	key	to	understanding	the	state-defined	Malay	identity	as	a	racially	exclusionary	narrative	that	suppresses	the	emergence	of	alternative	communalist	interpretations	that	may	subvert	its	power	structure.		
																																																								110	Laclau	&	Mouffe’s	notion	of	antagonism	is	the	limit	of	all	objectivity	(the	reformulation	of	Lacan’s	idea	of	the	Real	as	impossible)	(Žižek	1990,	249).	Antagonism	is	thus	conceived	as	a	traumatic	kernel	around	which	the	order	is	structured	(the	socio-symbolic	field),	i.e.	the	social.	
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According	to	Lacan	(1977),	this	outward	projection	of	aggression	(the	act	of	demonizing)	and	the	formation	of	the	‘other’	is	caused	by	the	failure	of	the	symbolic’s	(the	Other,	the	law)	mediation.	Through	the	context	of	our	previous	transposition,	the	Malay	‘other’	(for	example,	that	of	a	‘true’	Malay)	is	again	the	object	that	is	desired	by	the	Malay	subject	who	is	located	within	the	symbolic	order	(that	represents	the	Laws).	The	failure	of	the	symbolic	to	mediate	this	desire	when	obstructed,	is	productive	of	the	destructive	drive	that	manifests	as	violence	and	aggression.	In	this	sense,	Bhabha	views	the	dominant’s	aggression	as	always	accompanying	this	form	of	Lacanian	identification	(1994,	110).	As	observed	in	this	chapter,	the	aggression	that	accompanies	the	demonization	of	what	is	un-Islamic	and	un-Malay	has	led	to	tensions	between	Islamic	authorities,	their	religio-chauvinist	partners	and	supporters	on	one	side,	and	Hindu,	Christian,	and	Chinese-religion	adherents	on	the	other.		In	providing	an	overview	of	interfaith	conflicts	that	occurred	in	the	last	two	decades,	Carolina	Lopez	observes	that	the	juxtaposition	of	‘us’	with	a	monolithic	‘other’	has	become	the	socially	constructed	narrative	of	a	default	Malay	‘race’	whose	religion	Islam,	provides	legitimization	for	political	and	economic	interests	to	use	at	will	(2015,	327).	Lopez	lists	several	key	examples	to	the	inter-faith	tensions,	some	of	which	are	the	2001	Kampung	Medan	incident111	(2015,	328),	the	2009	‘cow	head-Hindu	temple’	incident112	(2015,	328),	the	Alkitab	contentions	in	2010113	(2015,	327),	and	the	2014	JAIS	raids	on	the	Bible	Society	of	Malaysia114	(2015,	330).	Some	of	these	incidents,	like	the	contentions	between	
																																																								111	8-11	March	2001,	Malay-Muslim	and	Indian-Hindus	clashed	with	6	deaths	and	40	injured.	112	July	2009,	a	cow’s	head	–	the	cow	being	sacred	in	Hinduism	-	was	brought	from	a	mosque	to	the	state	office	where	it	was	stomped	on	and	spat	at.	This	was	a	show	of	Muslim	dissatisfaction	at	the	construction	of	a	Hindu	temple	in	their	area.	Legitimizing	their	act,	the	construction	of	the	temple	was	cancelled.	113	Malay-language	versions	of	the	Bible	were	seized	on	grounds	that	they	were	used	to	proselytize	to	Muslims	or	confuse	them.	Malay-language	Bibles	have	been	in	use	since	1612,	especially	in	Sabah	and	Sarawak	which	have	a	large	number	of	Malay-speaking	Christians.	These	bibles	are	also	regularly	used	by	Indonesian	Christians	in	Malaysia	who	do	not	speak	English.	114	In	January	2014,	JAIS	raided	the	Bible	Society	of	Malaysia	(BSM)	and	seized	320	copies	of	Malay-language	bibles,	and	10	copies	of	Iban-language	(indigenous)	bibles.	The	contention	here	is	that	JAIS	has	no	jurisdiction	over	non-Muslims,	nor	did	the	accompanying	police	officers	have	a	legal	warrant.	This	raid	was	consequently	qualified	by	authorities	on	grounds	of	protecting	Muslims.	
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Christians	and	state-Islam115	stemming	in	part	from	the	2014	JAIS	raids,	are	as	yet	unresolved	(for	example,	see	“High	Court	sets,”	2016).		From	a	broadly	similar	perspective,	Farish	Noor	employs	Julia	Kristeva’s	logic	of	oppositional	dialectics	that	shares	a	broad	basis	with	Lacan’s	‘other’	(2001,	6).	The	excluded	Other	is	viewed	as	a	constitutive	component	of	the	Self,	where	the	identities	are	always	relational.	But	the	relationship	between	these	relational	identities	of	the	Self	and	the	Other	are	never	truly	neutral,	nor	is	it	free	from	the	dictates	of	power	or	violence.	Thus,	the	Other	may	be	summoned	to	serve	as	a	counterpoint	to	the	Self,	but	the	entry	of	the	Other	is	always	a	disabling	(inferior)	one.	With	this	lens,	Farish	contends	that	the	Malay-Muslim	reformers	and	religionists	have	demonized	the	non-Islamic	Malay	past	as	the	subjugated	inferior	to	the	Muslim	present	(2001,	7-8).	By	constructing	a	historical	timeline	of	past	and	present,	Farish	applies	Kristeva’s	interpretation	of	the	Other	to	these	historical	blocs	in	describing	the	exteriorizing	of	the	Malays	from	their	Hindu	past,	while	interiorizing	their	Muslim/Malay	present	(2001,	2,	8-25).	He	proposes	that	in	creating	a	historical	timeline	that	constructs	a	discursive	cleavage	between	the	Hindu	past	and	the	Islamic	present,	the	past	in	effect,	became	the	inferior	Other	to	the	Malays.		
Conclusion	Since	the	nation’s	independence	in	1957,	Malay	identity	has	largely	been	defined	by	the	UMNO-dominated	government.	This	chapter	establishes	that	UMNO’s	success	in	this	regard,	is	broadly	dependent	on	at	least	three	strategies.	The	first	strategy	lies	in	the	potency	of	UMNO’s	religious	and	ethnic	discourse	in	securing	the	emotional	support	of	Malay	and/or	Muslim	communalists.	This	is	effectuated	through	the	mobilization	of	religious	and	cultural	meanings	encoded	in	Malay																																																									115	My	use	of	the	term	‘state-Islam’	refers	to	the	nation’s	Islamic	bureaucracy	as	a	category,	as	achieved	through	political	Islam	(a	term	defined	by	Arnold	Puyok	at	the	beginning	of	this	section).	This	needs	clarification	since	each	state’s	Islamic	authority	is	officially	autonomous	under	the	state’s	sultan,	except	for	Federal	states	which	are	under	the	jurisdiction	of	JAKIM	which	reports	to	the	government.	Unofficially	however,	the	variables	of	which	are	UMNO’s	political	influence,	the	correspondingly	reduced	political	powers	of	the	sultans,	and	the	many	overlapping	areas	of	Islamic	jurisdictions	between	the	religious	bodies,	means	the	true	dynamics	of	power	is	obfuscated.	A	discussion	of	these	dynamics	would	exceed	the	scope	of	this	study.	For	an	example	of	a	specialized	study	of	Islam	in	Malaysia,	see	Müller	(2014).	
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historical	narratives	and	race-encoded	Islamic	prerogatives.	The	second	strategy	is	the	formulation	of	national	policies	that	privilege	these	Malay	communal	priorities	at	the	expense	of	the	ethnic	minority	citizenry.	These	national	policies	consequentially	affirm	the	historical	and	race-encoded	narratives	as	a	truism,	and	thus	legitimate	grounds	for	racial	primacy.	The	third	strategy	is	the	consistently	ambivalent	state	rhetoric	that	obfuscates	any	clear	understanding	of	Malayness.	This	subsequently	produces	contradictory	state	positions	along	each	end	of	the	modern-traditional	binary	which	increases	the	general	anxiety	over	Malay	identity’s	position,	while	simultaneously	over-valorizing	constructed	external	threats.		In	unfolding	the	dynamics	of	these	Malaysian	Malay	identity	politics	and	the	accompanying	heightening	of	state	and	federal-level	Islamic	conservatism,	we	also	invariably	observe	their	detrimental	effects	on	Malay	gender	and	inter-communal	relationships.	These	wider	contests	over	identity	have	ramifications	on	intra-communal	expressions	and	ideas	over	Malay-Muslim	hierarchies	of	genders.	Pro-women	actors	have	continually	challenged	the	dominant	hegemony	of	male	privilege,	though	their	successes	in	obtaining	the	state’s	apparent	concessions	to	women’s	rights	is	without	real	political	will.	Instead,	it	is	evident	that	these	gender	struggles	were	utilized	by	the	administration	for	partisan	agendas,	notably	to	contrast	UMNO	against	the	more	conservative	opposition	party	PAS.	In	taking	a	longitudinal	perspective,	we	also	observe	that	since	there	was	no	genuine	change	in	male	attitudes	on	gender	issues,	the	years	after	2003	have	seen	a	regressive	slide	towards	the	public	articulation	of	conservative	gender	dynamics	framed	through	Islam	and	Malayness.		These	realities	reveal	that	ultimately,	sectarian	and	inter-communal	factions	on	either	side	of	the	liberal-Islamic,	traditionalist-revivalist,	or	moderate-conservative	dichotomies	are	essentially	embroiled	in	contests	for	the	right	to	decide	the	nation’s	Islamic	or	ethnically-linked	economic	trajectory.	UMNO’s	three	strategies	for	Malayness	are	thus	articulated	to	provide	the	party	with	its	grassroots	political	legitimacy.	As	we	have	observed,	this	discursive	site	
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continually	attempts	to	(re)determine	quotidian	Malayness,	while	simultaneously	obfuscating	any	clear	rendering	of	its	meaning.		In	taking	a	wider	perspective,	it	is	observed	that	the	contrasting	of	‘us’	with	‘them’	–	‘othering’	–	is	inherently	a	central	component	of	UMNO’s	strategy.	This	recurring	construction	of	‘others’	has	consistently	strengthened	the	constituents	of	UMNO’s	male-privileging	Malay	nationalist	narrative	of	nationhood	as	the	idealized	fantasy	of	Malay	otherness.	In	this	sense,	‘other’	takes	on	its	duality	of	meaning.	We	will	see	in	later	chapters	that	this	construction	is	projected	even	onto	the	television	text	of	Senario	in	a	variety	of	ways.	For	the	purposes	of	our	discussions,	I	will	hereafter	refer	to	‘other’	as	Other,	and	the	symbolic	Other	as	the	big	Other.		The	following	chapter	extends	our	discussion	of	UMNO’s	political	control	over	Malay	identity	to	the	nation’s	broadcasting	landscape	where	we	identify	the	controls	and	measures	set	in	place	by	the	administration	for	an	ideological	control	of	Malaysians	and	specifically	the	Malays.	Furthermore,	we	will	briefly	discuss	how	these	have	had	an	impact	on	the	television	situation	comedy	
Senario.		 	
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CHAPTER	3	
	
Situating	the	Malay	Narrative	on	Television	
	
Radio,	film,	and	television	by	degrees	reduce	to	a	minimum	the	distance	
that	a	reader	is	forced	to	maintain	toward	the	printed	letter	…	With	the	
arrival	of	the	new	media	the	form	of	communication	as	such	has	changed;	
they	have	had	an	impact	…	more	penetrating	…	than	was	ever	possible	for	
the	press	…	In	comparison	with	printed	communications	the	programs	sent	
by	the	new	media	curtail	the	reactions	of	their	recipients	in	a	peculiar	way.	
They	draw	the	eyes	and	ears	of	the	public	under	their	spell	but	at	the	same	
time,	by	taking	away	its	distance	…	deprive	it	of	the	opportunity	to	say	
something	and	to	disagree.																								 –Jürgen	Habermas	(1989,	170-171)		The	state’s	intervention	in	Malaysia’s	broadcast	framework	is	not	dissimilar	from	the	broadcasting	milieu	of	many	other	nations.	Primary	among	the	considerations	involved	in	formulating	broadcast	strategies	are	national	and	religio-cultural	sensitivities.	Within	the	wider	context	of	national	development	and	national	integration,	broadcast	media	and	specifically	television,	is	perceived	by	the	state	as	having	a	vital	role	to	play	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	152).	Elihu	Katz	&	George	Wedell	have	argued	that	most	social	planners	and	government	leaders	regard	mass	media	as	catalysts	for	national	socio-economic	development	(1977,	vi).	Zaharom	Nain,	Mustafa	Anuar	&	Carol	Kirton	(1995,	120-122),	and	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	(2000,	152)	observe	for	instance,	that	the	Malaysian	model	has	broad	similarities	with	Daniel	Lerner,	Wilbur	Schramm,	and	Everett	Rogers’	‘dominant	paradigm’	perspective	that	claims	a	connection	between	communication	and	a	nation’s	modernization.	Given	these	notions,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	Malaysian	state	has	long	regarded	television	as	being	especially	suited	for	the	task	of	changing	the	citizenry’s	anti-development	attitudes.	These	changes	would,	according	to	the	dominant	paradigm,	subsequently	lead	to	national	integration.		I	will	demonstrate	in	this	chapter,	however,	that	Malaysian	television	was	not	singularly	deployed	to	effect	national	integration	but	rather	to	further	the	
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objectives	of	UMNO,	the	dominant	Malay	party	within	the	governing	coalition.116	First,	I	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	history	of	Malaysia’s	broadcasting	legislation,	with	specific	attention	to	the	context	of	television,	before	addressing	its	programming	shifts	specifically	with	respect	to	commercial	station	TV3,	the	Malay	station	on	which	the	situation	comedy	(sitcom)	Senario	is	aired.	In	the	second	part	of	the	chapter	which	examines	UMNO’s	complex	television	ownership	structure,	we	will	observe	that	two	issues	related	to	Malaysian	television	are	of	particular	interest;	the	lack	of	restraint	in	the	state’s	institutional	control,	as	well	as	the	unmoderated	political	power	of	the	elites.	The	third	part	of	this	chapter	will	discuss	the	ethnicized	dimension	to	TV3’s	broadcast	model	yielding	a	further	understanding	of	UMNO’s	indirect	role	in	determining	television	content,	as	well	as	its	demarcation	of	ethnic-specific	televisual	spaces,	both	of	which	can	be	deployed	to	normalize	UMNO’s	religio-cultural	politics.		
The	State	On-Air	or	How	I	Learnt	to	Love	Malaysia	Like	the	governments	of	many	other	nations,117	the	government	of	Malaysia	is	the	dominant	force	in	shaping	the	national	television	landscape.	Foremost	among	the	methods	employed	by	the	state,	is	broadcasting	legislation.	It	is	however,	important	to	first	establish	the	state’s	attitude	towards	television	as	context	for	our	subsequent	discussion	of	broadcasting	laws.	With	that	aim,	our	discussion	will	explore	the	origins	of	Malaysian	television,	and	the	involvement	and	consistency	of	the	state’s	influence	since	its	establishment.	The	primary	studies	that	inform	these	discussions	are	by	John	Lent	(1977),	Asiah	Sarji	(1982),	R.	Karthigesu	(1986,	1991,	1994),	Drew	McDaniel	(1994),	and	Zaharom	Nain	&	Mustafa	Anuar	(2000).			
																																																								116	For	the	purposes	of	expediency,	I	will	only	make	references	to	UMNO	and	the	case	of	Malaysia	throughout	the	thesis.	By	excluding	mention	of	non-Malaysian	examples,	I	do	not	imply	that	this	relationship	between	a	nation’s	broadcast	infrastructure	with	the	state,	and/or	the	dominant	parties	that	govern	the	state,	is	unique	to	Malaysia	or	UMNO.	Neither	do	I	seek	to	imply	that	UMNO’s	motivations	for	control	over	broadcasting	is	a	unique	case.	117	See	Kira	Kosnick	(2004)	for	an	example	of	Germany,	and	Griseldis	Kirsch	(2015)	for	an	example	of	Japan.	
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Historically,	the	state’s	control	over	media	was	initiated	by	the	British	colonial	government	in	Malaya	when	they	established	the	wireless	system	in	1921	(Asiah	1982,	150).	Lent	(1977,	34)	and	Syed	Arabi	&	Shafizan	Mohd.	(2006,	86)	have	observed	that	by	the	1940s,	the	British	colonial	administration	had	established	control	over	Malayan	newspapers,	radio,	and	television.	State	control	over	mass	media	continued	fluidly	through	the	Japanese	occupation	of	Malaya	(1942-45),	where	it	was	used	in	a	similar	fashion	to	further	the	objectives	of	the	Japanese	administration	(Asiah	1982,	153).	Lent	suggests	that	two	“post-World	War	II	crises”	were	central	to	the	formulation	of	policies	and	regulations	that	underpin	Malaysia’s	contemporary	media	structure	(1977,	33-34).		The	first	crisis	was	the	Malayan	Emergency	of		the	1940s	and	1950s.	During	this	period,	the	threat	of	communist	insurgency	against	British	occupation	resulted	in	a	series	of	government	media	campaigns	(Lent	1977,	34;	Syed	&	Shafizan	2006,	86).	Lent	observed	that	private	media	thus	presented	news	that	sought	to	counteract	the	activities	of	Malaya’s	communist	insurgents	(1977,	34).	Concurrently,	government	leaflets,	posters	and	films	were	distributed	in	the	countryside	together	with	free	radio	sets	to	ensure	that	rural	communities	had	access	to	these	broadcasts	(Barber	1972,	270).	The	Printing	Presses	Act	was	also	enacted	in	1948	to	outlaw	publications	that	were	deemed	‘subversive’	by	the	government	(Lent	1977,	34).	With	respect	to	media	legislation,	this	Act	of	1948	is	arguably	the	most	significant	development	to	emerge	from	this	crisis,	for	it	introduced	the	requirement	for	an	annual	renewal	of	printing	permits	and	licenses	of	media	personnel.	Post-independence,	the	“entire	press	control	apparatus	designed	by	the	colonial	government”,	which	was	“preserved	intact	and	reinforced”	was	adopted	by	the	Malaysian	government	(Lowe	1987,	7-53).	In	its	present	permutation	-	the	Printing	Presses	and	Publications	Act	1984	–	the	Act	still	serves	as	a	dominant	print	media	regulator	within	the	nation.		The	second	crisis	revolved	around	the	Indonesian-Malaysian	confrontation	that	lasted	from	1963	to	1966	(Lent	1977,	34).118	Lent	describes	the	Malaysian																																																									118	The	Indonesian-Malaysian	Confrontation	or	Konfrontasi	(Confrontation),	stemmed	from	Indonesia’s	military	opposition	to	the	formation	of	the	Federation	of	Malaysia	(Mackie	1974).	
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Ministry	of	Information	and	Broadcasting	as		strengthening	and	expanding	the	nation’s	broadcast	facilities	to	circumvent	any	influence	by	Indonesian	broadcasts	during	this	period	(1977,	34).	The	consequent	unification	of	broadcasting	facilities	–	Radios	Malaya,	Sarawak	and	Sabah	–	resulted	in	the	formation	of	Radio	Malaysia	in	1963.	Within	three	weeks	of	Radio	Malaysia’s	founding,	a	new	radio	programme	-	Suara	Malaysia	(Voice	of	Malaysia),	was	created	to	counter	Indonesian	broadcasts	(Lent	1977,	34).	It	was	under	these	circumstances	that	Malaysia’s	first	television	channel	was	also	established	in	1963	for	similar	purposes.119		While	the	former	two	crises	were	fundamentally	important	to	the	founding	of	Malaysian	broadcasting,	Lent	(1977,	34),	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	(2000,	151),	and	Karthigesu	(1991,	190)	consider	the	race	riots	of	May	1969	as	the	catalyst	for	contemporary	mass	media	policy.	Karthigesu	(1991,	190)	notes	that	the	Alliance	government	ceased	the	printing	of	all	newspapers	when	a	state	of	emergency	was	declared	in	May	1969.	Radio	and	television	networks	were	severely	monitored,	with	operations	confined	primarily	to	broadcasts	of	emergency	announcements	and	statements	by	the	authorities.	But	the	media	blackout	was	disastrous.	Without	any	credible	authoritative	narrative	to	account	for	the	unfolding	developments	of	the	riots,	rampant	rumours	led	to	further	bi-communal	violence,	compounding	inter-ethnic	tensions	(McDaniel	1994,	82,	84;	Karthigesu	1991,	190).	In	the	riot’s	aftermath,	new	mass	media	policies	were	introduced	by	the	government	to	assist	in	achieving	nation-building	goals	(Lent	1977,	34).		Rationalizing	these	new	policies,	then	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Tun	Abdul	Razak	stated:	This	nation	cannot	afford	to	perpetuate	a	system	that	permits	anybody	to	say	or	do	things	which	would	set	one	race	against	another.	If	the	events	of	May	13	are	not	to	occur	again,	if	this	Nation	is	to	survive,	we	must	make	sure	that	subjects	which	are	likely	to	engender	racial	tensions	are	not	exploited	by	irresponsible	opportunists.	We	can	only	guarantee	this	by	placing	such	subjects	beyond	the	reach	of	race	demagogues	…	and	other	subversives.																																																																																																																																																															The	Federation	of	Malaysia	was	the	amalgamation	of	the	Federation	of	Malaya	(now	known	as	West	Malaysia),	Singapore,	and	the	then	British	protectorates	of	North	Borneo	and	Sarawak,	collectively	known	as	British	Borneo	(known	today	as	East	Malaysia).	119	These	purposes	are	discussed	later	in	the	chapter.	
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–National	Operations	Council	(1969)		The	authority	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	and	Broadcasting	was	subsequently	centralized	and	strengthened.	All	government	mass	media	was	channelled	through	its	three	departments	–	the	Department	of	Broadcasting,	the	Department	of	Information,	and	Filem	Negara	Malaysia	(National	Film	Department	of	Malaysia)(Karthigesu	1991,	135).120	Five	objectives	were	formulated	towards	the	end	of	1969	by	then	Minister	of	Information,	Hamzah	bin	Abu	Samah.	These	were	adopted	as	the	operational	objectives	for	national	radio	and	television	network	Radio	Televisyen	Malaysia	(RTM)121	(McDaniel	1994,	84;	Karthigesu	1991,	190).	While	the	phrasing	may	differ	slightly	in	each	of	their	three	accounts,	McDaniel	(1994,	85),	Lent	(1978,	143),	and	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	(2000,	154-155)	generally	agree122	that	these	objectives	were:	1. To	explain	in	depth	and	with	the	widest	possible	coverage,	policies	and	programs	of	the	government	in	order	to	ensure	maximum	understanding	by	the	people.	2. To	stimulate	public	interest	and	opinion	in	order	to	achieve	changes	in	line	with	the	requirements	of	government.	3. To	foster	national	unity	in	our	multi-racial	society	through	the	extensive	use	of	Bahasa	Malaysia	(Malaysian	Language).		4. To	assist	in	promoting	civic	consciousness	and	in	fostering	the	development	of	Malaysian	arts	and	culture.	5. To	provide	suitable	elements	of	education,	general	information	and	entertainment.		Lent	reasoned	that	these	objectives	allowed	Malaysia	to	inoculate	itself	against	criticisms	or	controversies	that	would	divert	attention	away	from	the	state’s	supposed	focus	on	socio-economic	development	(1978,	72).	Karthigesu																																																									120	These	three	departments	are	now	under	the	purview	of	Kementerian	Komunikasi	dan	
Multimedia	Malaysia	(Ministry	of	Communications	and	Multimedia),	more	popularly	referred	to	as	KKMM	(“Jabatan/Agensi	Di	Bawah	KKMM”,	2016).	121	RTM	was	the	only	radio	and	television	network	at	the	time,	and	operated	under	the	Ministry	of	Information’s	Department	of	Broadcasting.	The	stations	operating	under	RTM	will	be	discussed	in	a	later	section	titled	‘Television	in	Malaysia’.	122	While	Lent,	McDaniel,	and	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	list	the	five	objectives	in	different	sequential	orders,	the	first	two	objectives	have	consistently	occupied	the	same	first	and	second	positions.	
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observed	that	the	foci	of	these	objectives	were	Malay	nationalism	and	Malay	language,	both	of	which	were	guided	by	the	post-riot	dual	policies	of	1971	–	the	New	Economic	Policy	and	the	National	Culture	Policy	(1994,	94).	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	interpreted	these	objectives	to	mean	that	RTM’s	function	was	for	the	transmission	of	government	policies	and	programmes	and	would	marginalize	views	and	ideas	that	were	not	aligned	to	the	government’s	(2000,	155).	Drew	McDaniel	observed,	“a	higher	consideration	is	that	radio	and	TV	motivate	the	public	to	respond	to	the	government’s	‘requirements’”	(1994,	85).	Thematically,	these	scholars’	views	on	RTM’s	goals	would	appear	to	corroborate	the	purposes	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	at	the	time.	The	Malaysia	Official	Year	Book	1988	states	that	the	Ministry	strove	to	“analyse,	plan,	coordinate	and	implement	the	communication	policy	of	the	country	so	that	society,	both	in	the	country	and	abroad,	would	fully	appreciate	the	policies,	programs,	and	activities	of	the	Malaysian	government”	(1989,	188).		In	all	instances,	we	observe	that	these	developments	in	national	television	policy	were	designed	as	a	safeguard	against	any	encroachment	on	the	state’s	power,	and	as	RTM’s	objectives	reveal,	for	an	amplification	of	state	control.	It	is	notable	that	this	trajectory	has	remained	largely	unchanged	even	after	four	decades,	for	these	goals	are	still	broadly	echoed	by	RTM	(“RTM	Vision,	Mission	&	Objective”,	2015),	whose	present	objectives	are:	1. Menyebar	luas	maklumat	melalui	pelbagai	platform	siaran.	The	mass	dissemination	of	information	through	various	broadcasting	platforms.124	2. Memangkin	pembangunan	industry	kandungan	kreatif	negara.	To	develop	the	nation’s	creative	content	industry.	3. Mendukung	warisan	dan	budaya	bangsa	Malaysia.	To	uphold	the	heritage	and	culture	of	the	Malaysian	race/people.	4. Memperluas	jaringan	kerjasama	dan	kolaborasi	strategic	dalam	dan	
luar	negara.	To	widen	the	scope	of	strategic	cooperation	and	collaboration,	both	nationally	and	internationally.																																																									124	English	version	is	translated	by	the	researcher.	
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	The	meaning	of	‘the	heritage	and	culture	of	the	Malaysian	race/people’	is	unclear.	Its	vagueness	is	perhaps	deliberate,	allowing	for	varied	positions	according	to	political	need	that	shifts	from	one	interpretation	to	another	depending	on	the	identity	discourse	of	the	time.	From	the	perspective	of	programming	strategies,	RTM’s	website	reasons	that	alternating	entertainment	programmes	with	on-air	information	is	needed	since	“being	laden	with	too	much	information	creates	adverse	effects”	(“RTM	Background”,	2015).	It	is	instructive	that	RTM	does	not	describe	what	constitutes	“too	much	information”	and	for	whom,	nor	does	it	explain	what	these	“adverse	effects”	are.	The	ambiguity	of	the	reasoning	presumably	validates	the	need	for	the	state’s	control	over	information.		There	is	now	support	for	creative	content	production	within	RTM’s	objectives,	though	academic	findings	suggest	that	creative	content	development,	together	with	entertainment	and	education,	operate	primarily	to	disseminate	information	aligned	to	a	state	agenda.	In	1986	for	example,	Karthigesu	suggested	that	as	a	national	broadcaster,	RTM	is	central	to	the	promotion	of	national	values	and	identity.	Three	decades	later,	studies	by	Latiffah	et	al.	(2009),	and	Roslina	et	al.	(2013)	similarly	found	that	RTM	prioritizes	local	identity	and	culture.	In	2005,	Amos	Owen	Thomas	suggested	that	under	government	regulations,	RTM	and	other	Malaysian	commercial	stations	operated	to	ideologically	effect	national	integration	and	economic	development	(2005,	133).	McDaniel	(1994),	Lent	(1977),	Foo	(2004),	Asiah	(1982),	and	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	(2000),	share	the	same	view	as	Karthigesu,	Thomas,	Latiffah	et	al.,	and	Roslina	et	al.	above.		The	most	significant	acknowledgement	of	RTM’s	true	role	originated	from	the	Malaysian	Prime	Minister	Najib	Razak	in	April	2016,	who	praised	RTM’s	efforts	in	fostering	national	development	and	for	cultivating	“the	image	of	a	government	elected	by	the	people”	(“RTM	Promotes	Unity,”	2016).	Communications	and	Multimedia	Minister	Salleh	Said	Keruak	encouraged	RTM	to	continue	acting	“as	the	main	medium	to	build	the	perception	of	the	people	and	to	promote	loyalty	and	love	for	the	country”	(“RTM	Promotes	Unity,”	2016).	These	realities	suggest	
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that	notwithstanding	the	various	wordings	used	on	public	literature	throughout	the	years,	the	Barisan	Nasional	(BN)	government’s	stance	on	broadcasting,	primarily	channelled	through	RTM,	has	remained	largely	unchanged	since	1969.		These	observations	are	crucial	to	our	understanding	of	the	dynamics	between	the	BN	government	and	Malaysian	television.	They	reflect	the	notion	that	mass	media	needs	to	be	subservient	to	the	administration.	The	growth	of	RTM	and	Malaysian	television	more	broadly,	is	accompanied	by	its	role	as	an	intermediary	between	the	government	and	the	citizenry.	In	almost	all	cases,	RTM	has	adhered	to,	and	has	been	praised	for,	facilitating	a	positive	view	and	understanding	of	the	BN	government	to	the	citizenry.	When	we	consider	the	events	that	allowed	for	UMNO’s	political	dominance,126	it	would	not	be	overreaching	to	infer	that	RTM	has	been	operationalized	to	serve	sectional	interests	rather	than	Malaysian	society	at	large.	Given	our	focus	on	Malay	identity	within	the	sitcom	Senario,	RTM	is	of	great	significance	for	we	will	observe	in	the	subsequent	section	that	UMNO-owned	TV3	operates	with	similar	operational	frameworks.		Thus	far,	a	review	of	the	literature	highlights	several	points	regarding	the	ideological	grounding	delimiting	the	operations	of	Malaysian	television.	Like	their	approach	to	other	forms	of	governance,	the	BN	coalition	has	retained	a	colonial	trajectory	to	mass	media	governance	in	Malaysia.	This	includes	an	advancement	or	augmentation	of	these	controls	after	the	race	riots	of	1969.	In	examining	the	objectives	of	RTM	and	corroborating	them	with	state	institutions,	we	observed	that	broadcast	legislative	strategies	were	aligned	and	intensified	for	socio-political	control.	For	the	remainder	of	this	chapter,	the	different	legislative	strategies	established	by	the	BN	government	governing	television	broadcasting	will	be	explored	in	more	detail,	followed	by	a	discussion	on	narrowcasting127	and	its	implications	towards	social	stratification.	However,	it	is	important	to	first	establish	the	landscape	of	contemporary	television	in	Malaysia	by	identifying	the	‘main	players’.	I	discuss	these	by	first	providing	an	overview	of	
																																																								126	Discussed	in	Chapter	2.	127	Narrowcasting	is	the	practice	of	streamlining	channel	content	for	a	specific	demographic.	Examples	of	these	types	of	channels	are	Syfy	channel,	Cartoon	Network,	or	History	Channel.	
		 83	
RTM	and	its	bearing	on	the	commercial	station	TV3,	on	which	Senario	was	telecast.		
Television	in	Malaysia	Malaya’s	Department	of	Broadcasting	was	established	by	the	British	colonial	administration	on	1	April	1946	in	Singapore	for	the	management	of	all	radio	services	(“RTM	Background”,	2015).	Malaysia’s	first	television	channel,	Talivishen	Malaysia,	was	inaugurated	on	23	December	1963	by	then	Prime	Minister	Tunku	Abdul	Rahman	(Karthigesu	1991,	130;	Lent	1977,	34).	By	that	date,	the	Department	of	Broadcasting	had	moved	from	its	offices	in	Singapore	and	was	operating	from	its	new	premises	in	Kuala	Lumpur,	Malaysia.	On	17	November	1969,	oversight	and	regulation	of	all	broadcast	operations	were	incorporated	into	the	Ministry	of	Information.128	A	department	called	Radio	Televisyen	Malaysia	(RTM)	was	subsequently	established	by	the	Ministry	in	the	same	year	for	the	management	of	all	state-owned	television	and	radio	stations.	With	the	establishment	of	the	Ministry	of	Communications	and	Multimedia	(KKMM)	in	May	2013	(“Ministry	of	Communications,”	2015),	RTM	was	incorporated	into	the	KKMM	where	it	is	still	known	as	the	KKMM’s	Department	of	Broadcasting	Malaysia	(Jabatan	Penyiaran	Malaysia)	(“Ministry	of	Communications,”	2016).		Wang	Lay	Kim	(2010,	23),	and	Zainur	&	Nawiyah	(1996,	45)	note	that	RTM’s	first	channel	RTM	1,	started	its	telecast	on	6	October	1969.	A	second	channel	RTM	2,	started	its	telecast	on	17	November	1969.131	On	1	March	1994,	RTM	1	was	renamed	TV1,	while	RTM	2	was	rebranded	as	TV2	(“RTM	Background”,	2015).	From	the	outset,	both	channels	operated	according	to	very	different	rationales	where	RTM	1	was	focused	on	‘promoting	national	unity,	security	and																																																									128	This	was	the	post-1969	race	riots	unification	of	the	Department	of	Broadcasting,	the	Department	of	Information,	and	Filem	Negara	Malaysia	(National	Film	Department	of	Malaysia)	under	the	Ministry	of	Information	that	was	discussed	earlier.	131	Some	discrepancies	in	the	names	of	RTM	1	and	RTM	2	exist.	An	earlier	study	by	D.	Guimary	in	1977	asserts	that	the	first	channel	was	Network	One,	while	the	second	channel	introduced	in	1969	was	called	Network	Two	(1977,	161).	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	posit	instead,	that	these	two	channels	were	Channel	One	and	Channel	Two	(2000,	159).	Furthermore,	they	note	that	Channel	One	was	renamed	the	National	Network.	RTM’s	current	website	gives	credence	to	Guimary’s	naming	as	it	terms	the	two	channels	historically	as	Rangkaian	Satu	(Network	One),	and	
Rangkaian	Dua	(Network	Two)(“RTM	Background”,	2015).	
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development”,	while	RTM	2	was	given	a	“more	entertainment-oriented	role”	(Zainur	&	Nawiyah	1996,	45).	This	differing	operating	focus	meant	that	RTM	1	engaged	with	Malay	language	content,	and	was	focused	on	the	larger	task	of	national	development	and	national	integration.	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	notes	that	the	Ministry	of	Information’s	aim	to	propagate	“Malay-centric”	opinions	led	to	RTM’s	objective	of	entrenching	Malay	elements	on	local	television	(2000,	159).	This	ideological	directive	manifested	itself	in	a	wide	variety	of	Malay	programmes	that	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	suggest,	were	thematically	engaged	with	the	promotion	of	Malay	culture	(2000,	161).		As	a	counterpoint	to	RTM	1’s	locally	produced	content,	RTM	2	featured	foreign	imported	programming	alongside	vernacular	content.	Latiffah	Pawanteh,	Samsudin	Rahim	&	Fauziah	Ahmad	observe	that	RTM	2’s	content	was	aimed	at	minority	groups	and	aired	in	the	languages	of	Tamil	and	Chinese	(2009,	23).	Imported	English	programmes	were	also	included	for	the	English-speaking	viewers,	though	Juliana	Wahab,	Wang	Lay	Kim	&	Sharifah	Shahnaz	suggest	that	these	were	meant	to	help	with	the	development	of	local	programmes	(2013,	169).	Between	1969	and	1984,	both	channels	monopolized	the	nation’s	broadcasting	milieu.	It	was	the	appearance	of	privately-owned	channel	TV3	(TV-Three	or	TV-Tiga)	in	1984,	where	the	sitcom	Senario	first	began	to	air	more	than	a	decade	later,	that	finally	introduced	a	genuinely	commercial	element	in	the	nation’s	programming	direction132	(Zainur	&	Nawiyah	1996,	45;	McDaniel	1994,	151-160;	Thomas	2005,	133;	Wang	2010,	23).		Zaharom	&	Mustafa	noted	that	like	RTM1	and	RTM2,133	TV3’s	ownership	structure	reveals	that	it	was	neither	politically	nor	editorially	independent	(2000,	165).134	Any	anxieties	regarding	its	autonomy	or	independence	were	assuaged	by	the	obvious	involvement	of	the	state	in	TV3	–	politically,	legally,	and	economically	–	right	from	the	outset.	Wang	(2010,	23)	and	McDaniel	(1994,	149)	
																																																								132	The	difference	between	RTM’s	and	TV3’s	programming	is	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	133	Note	that	the	rebranding	of	RTM	1	and	RTM	2	to	TV1	and	TV2	only	occurred	in	1994.	134	The	laws	that	govern	television	and	the	operating	licenses	of	broadcasters	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
		 85	
observed	that	the	first	majority	shareholder	of	TV3136	was	Fleet	Group,	an	investment	company	owned	by	UMNO.	Gomez	(1990,	73;	1999,	114)	and	Gomez	&	Jomo	(1999,	91)	revealed	that	a	50	percent	stake	was	collectively	held	between	Fleet	Group	and	Daim	Zainuddin	(40	percent	and	10	percent	respectively).	Daim	was	incidentally,	also	the	director	of	Fleet	Group	and,	in	the	same	year	that	TV3	began	broadcasting	in	1984,	he	was	appointed	Minister	of	Finance,	a	post	he	held	for	almost	a	decade.	Another	UMNO	controlled	company,	Utusan	Melayu	Press,	held	20	percent	and	Maika	Holdings,	the	investment	company	of	the	Malaysian	Indian	Congress	(MIC),	another	governing	coalition	party,	held	a	further	10	percent	(Gomez	&	Jomo	1999,	91).	Former	UMNO	politician	Syed	Kechik,	held	the	remaining	20	percent	through	the	Syed	Kechik	foundation.	This	meant	that,	either	directly	or	by	proxy,	100	percent	of	TV3	shares	were	effectively	controlled	by	UMNO.		Zaharom	suggests	that	both	the	successes	of	Malaysia’s	privatization	policy	and	the	entrepreneurial	New	Malays	were	embodied	in	the	ownership	structure	of	TV3137	(1996,	165).	However,	TV3’s	ownership	structure	clearly	reflects	an	advancement	of	partisan	Malay	businesses	rather	than	wider	Malay	communal	interests.	As	such,	the	premise	for	criticisms	levelled	at	both	the	NEP	and	Mahathir’s	New	Malay	identity	–	that	they	primarily	enabled	influential	Malay	politicians	and	businessmen	with	close	links	to	UMNO	leaders	to	amass	wealth138	–	is	made	manifestly	clear	in	the	case	of	TV3.	Given	that	all	of	TV3	shares	were	held	either	directly	by	UMNO	through	ownership	or	indirectly	through	politically-connected	individuals,	the	control	of	all	three	free-to-air	(FTA)	stations	within	the	nation	at	the	time	lay	completely	with	UMNO.	Of	foremost	importance	is	TV3’s	complex	interconnected	ownership	structure,	for	it	reflects	the	multiple	layers	of	control	that	goes	beyond	any	simple	vertical	ownership	structure.	This,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	subsequent	changes	to	TV3’s	corporate	structure,	outlines	a	mechanism	where	political,	business,	or	communal	pressures	can	be	exerted	laterally,	from	different	vectors.	Within	our																																																									136	TV3	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	STMB	(Sistem	Televisyen	Malaysia	Berhad),	the	corporate	name	of	TV3.	137	Malaysia’s	privatization	policies	and	the	New	Malay	were	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	138	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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focus,	this	directly	translates	to	various	political	and	corporate	mechanisms	being	set	in	place	for	UMNO	to	exert	its	influence	over	popular	discourse	on	Malay	identity.		Operating	as	a	commercial	station	seeking	to	attract	advertising	revenue,	TV3’s	first	year	of	operations	resulted	in	the	import	of	newer	and	more	expensive	programmes	in	both	English	and	Chinese	(Thomas	2005,	145).	Even	as	a	state-linked	station,	this	practice	was	misjudged	for	it	eventually	elicited	public	censure	for	its	frequent	depictions	of	what	was	regarded	to	be	un-Islamic	cultural	practices	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	172).	Within	a	year	of	its	introduction,	TV3	had	become	a	consistent	and	convenient	target	for	the	nation’s	moral	guardians.	On	July	1985,	TV3’s	general	manager,	then	Mohammad	Noor	Salleh	declared,	“No	more	controversies.	It’s	easier	for	us	to	ride	on	RTM’s	coat-tails”	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	172).	This	change	in	TV3’s	programming	direction	underscores	the	importance	of	RTM’s	objectives.	For	the	state	broadcaster	(RTM)	is	now	at	the	centre	–	insofar	as	compliancy	to	the	state	is	concerned	–	from	which	all	periphery	broadcast	operations	are	adjudged.	With	this	view,	TV3’s	decision	to	emulate	RTM	(TV1	and	TV2)	was	made	under	the	pressures	of	communal	socio-cultural	demands	that	were	presumably	shaped	through	decades	of	social	engineering	by	the	administration.139	The	consequent	impact	on	production	practices,	specifically	on	TV3’s	production	of	
Senario,	will	be	discussed	in	a	subsequent	section	of	this	chapter.		The	environment	leading	to	TV3’s	programming	shift	exemplified	the	rural-urban	dichotomy	that	confronted	Mahathir’s	New	Malay	identity,	now	reformulated	into	a	divided	viewership,	some	of	whom	viewed	TV3’s	liberal	inclusion	of	foreign	programming	as	problematic.	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	observed	that	it	was	the	draconian	laws,	and	an	increasingly	conservative	population	socialized	through	an	education	and	religious	value	system	that	preached	conformity,	which	resulted	in	this	‘sensitive’	Malaysian	society	(2000,	173).	Within	the	wider	scenario	of	Malaysian	television,	this	programming	shift	firmly	aligned	all	three	FTA	channels	of	the	time	with	state	imperatives.																																																									139	This	was	discussed,	in	relation	to	Malay	statist	identity,	in	Chapter	2.	
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	The	subsequent	shifts	in	UMNO’s	political	leadership	in	the	1990s	led	to	TV3’s	1993	corporate	buyout	by	Malaysian	Resources	Corporation	Berhad	(MRCB)	(Wang	2010,	23;	Gomez	&	Jomo	1999,	126).	Under	MRCB’s	ownership	of	TV3,	four	close	associates	of	the	then	Finance	Minister,	Anwar	Ibrahim140	–	Khalid	Ahmad,	Mohd.	Noor	Mutalib,	Kadir	Jasin,	and	Ahmad	Nazri	Abdullah	–	collectively	owned	a	49.63	percent	controlling	stake	in	TV3	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	166).	Given	that	these	four	individuals	were	senior	NSTP	(The	New	Straits	Times	Press)141	editors	and	executives,	they	were	UMNO’s	channel	of	control	over	TV3,	for	at	the	time,	a	controlling	48.01	percent	of	NSTP	shares	were	held	by	UMNO	(Gomez	&	Jomo	1999,	68).		After	the	Asian	economic	crisis	of	1997,142	MRCB	relinquished	control	of	TV3	to	its	current	owner,	UMNO’s	media	investment	group	Media	Prima	Berhad	(MPB),	which	took	over	100	percent	equity	interest	in	TV3	(Wang	2011,	23;	“No	decision	yet”,	2007).	As	of	May	2016,	MPB’s	senior	management	includes	both	the	group	managing	editor	and	the	chief	executive	officer	of	NSTP	(Media	Prima	
Berhad	Annual	Report	2015,	84-85),	while	MPB’s	chief	executive	officer,	Kamal	Khalid,	was	formerly	the	Head	of	Communications	at	the	Prime	Minister’s	Department	from	2003	till	2009	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Annual	Report	2015,	83).	In	a	similar	rubric	to	previous	iterations	of	UMNO’s	control	over	TV3,	the	inclusion	of	NSTP	members	and	former	political	associates	within	MPB-TV3’s	corporate	structure	is	a	recurring	cross-ownership	strategy	that	augments	UMNO’s	control	across	the	party’s	media	assets.	Moreover,	MPB’s	station	ownership	now	extends	beyond	TV3	to	include	the	channels	8TV,	ntv7,	and	TV9,	which	collectively	accounts	for	four	out	of	the	nation’s	five	commercial	terrestrial	or	free-to-air	(FTA)	channels	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Annual	Report																																																									140	At	the	time	of	MRCB’s	buyout	of	TV3,	Anwar	Ibrahim	was	the	Minister	of	Finance.	He	was	appointed	Deputy	Prime	Minister	in	1993,	and	held	both	posts	until	1998.	141	NSTP	is	Malaysia's	largest	publisher	which	publishes	three	national	newspapers;	the	English	language	New	Straits	Times	(NST),	and	the	Malay	language	Berita	Harian	and	Harian	Metro	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Financial	&	Business	Review	–	1st	Quarter	2012,	4).	As	an	English	daily,	NST	also	has	the	widest	circulation	in	Malaysia.	142	Interestingly,	1998	was	the	year	when	Anwar	Ibrahim	was	formally	charged	with	sodomy.	As	a	company	associated	with	Anwar,	MRCB	would	by	then,	have	presumably	fallen	out	of	favour	with	UMNO.	
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2015,	49).	In	addition	to	television	stations,	MPB	also	owns	three	radio	stations,	as	well	as	what	is	now	an	increased	equity	interest	of	98	percent143	in	NSTP	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Annual	Report	2015,	49).		Malaysia’s	fifth	FTA	television	station,	TV	Al-Hijrah,	is	the	latest	terrestrial	station	to	be	established	in	Malaysia.	It	is	state-owned	and	operates	under	the	federal	religious	authority	–		the	Department	of	Islamic	Affairs	Malaysia	(JAKIM)144	(“TV	Al	Hijrah	to,”	2010).	On	16	September	2009,	it	started	broadcasting	as	Malaysia’s	first	Islamic	television	station145	with	the	primary	objective	of	“educating,	entertaining,	and	uniting	Muslims”146	(“TV	Al	Hijrah”,	n.d.).	Given	that	TV	Al-Hijrah	operates	under	JAKIM,	it	is	not	associated	with	RTM,	nor	is	it	subsumed	under	the	Ministry	of	Communications	and	Multimedia	(KKMM).148	Instead,	TV	Al-Hijrah	operates	in	cooperation	with	other	state	and	federal	Islamic	organizations	and	institutions,149	in	an	almost	parallel	broadcasting	eco-system	sustained	primarily	by	the	nation’s	substantial	Islamic	infrastructure.		State	influence	is	however	not	in	question,	for	JAKIM	is	a	federal-level	state	agency	and	TV	Al-Hijrah	still	conforms	to	national	censorship	laws	and	broadcast	legislations.	Within	the	wider	national	broadcasting	terrain,	the	state	thus	directly	controls	and	owns	TV1,	TV2,	and	TV	Al-Hijrah.	Indirectly	through	Media	Prima	Berhad,	UMNO	has	control	over	all	the	nation’s	commercial	FTA	stations.	This	once	again	places	all	terrestrial	or	FTA	channels	–	including	TV3	where	Senario	is	aired	–	under	the	direct	or	indirect	control	of	the	government	and	specifically	UMNO,	the	dominant	party	within	the	governing	coalition.																																																										143	UMNO’s	equity	in	NSTP	was	48.01	percent	during	MRCB’s	ownership	of	TV3	in	the	1990s.	144	JAKIM	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	145	Translated	from	“stesen	tv	Islami	pertama	di	Malaysia”.	146	Translated	from	“mendidik,	menghibur	dan	menyatukan	ummah”.	148	As	discussed	previously,	RTM	operates	as	one	of	the	departments	under	KKMM.	To	reiterate,	the	legislations	that	govern	all	these	broadcasters	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.	This	may	provide	more	insight	to	the	national	laws	that	do	apply	to	TV	Al-Hijrah.	149	Presumably	for	content	and	religious	verifications.	In	addition	to	JAKIM’s	emblem,	TV	Al-Hijrah’s	website	explicitly	features	the	emblems	of	state-level	religious	authorities	(JAWI,	JAIS,	IKIM,	JKSM,	YWM,	MUFTIWP,	YAPEIM,	YADIM,	WZ,	MAIWP,	JAWHAR),	and	the	Muslim	pilgrimage	fund	Tabung	Haji	(“TV	Al	Hijrah”,	n.d.).	
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While	the	scope	of	this	research	includes	only	terrestrial	or	free-to-air	(FTA)	channels,	an	overview	of	television	offerings	available	on	other	platforms	will	nonetheless	provide	a	more	complete	account	of	all	stakeholders	of	Malaysian	television	services.	There	are	now	three	platforms	in	addition	to	Media	Prima	and	RTM’s	more	traditional	method	of	broadcast.	The	oldest	of	the	three	is	the	satellite	digital	broadcast	services	(DBS)	platform	utilized	by	the	nation’s	subscription-based,	sole	satellite	DBS	television,	ASTRO	(All	Asia	Television	and	Radio	Company).	The	second	television	service	is	HyppTV	which	operates	on	an	Internet	Protocol	TV	(IPTV)	platform.	HyppTV	is	offered	by	the	national	telecommunications	provider	Telekom	Malaysia	and	is	available	only	as	a	subscription-based	service	that	comes	bundled	with	the	provider’s	internet	broadband	service.	The	newest	of	the	three	platforms	is	the	Digital	Terrestrial	Television	(DTT)	platform	operated	by	MyTV.	DTT	is	expected	to	transform	the	entire	Malaysian	television	landscape,	given	that	the	Ministry	of	Communications	and	Multimedia	aims	to	migrate	all	current	FTA	broadcasts	onto	the	DTT	platform,	and	“switch	off”	all	analogue,	non-DTT	FTA	streams	nation-wide	by	2018	(Singh,	2014).	To	date,	MyTV	retransmits	current	FTA	channels	–	TV1,	TV2,	TV3,	8TV,	nt7,	TV9,	and	TV	Al-Hijrah	–	but	does	not	host	any	unique	non-FTA	channels	(MCMC	2015).		It	is	notable	that	ASTRO’s	4th	quarter	report151	for	the	year	2014	reveals	that	it	commands	a	national	viewership	share	of	57%	while	FTA	channels	(TV1,	TV2,	and	MPB	channels)	have	a	combined	Malaysian	viewership	share	of	43%152	(“Astro	4th	Quarter”	2014,	6).	Two	obvious	exclusions	from	this	data	are	the	viewership	shares	of	HyppTV	and	MyTV.	The	national	viewership	data	above	was	extracted	from	a	DTT	presentation	given	by	the	Ministry	of	Communications	and	Multimedia	Commission’s	(MCMC)	in	2015	(MCMC	2015)	and	corroborated	with	ASTRO’s	4th	quarter	report	for	2014.	Neither	source	includes	data	for	HyppTV	and	MyTV,	though	the	reason	for	their	exclusion	is	unclear.	This	will	not	however,	affect	our	discussion	on	MPB’s	viewership	data	later	in	this	chapter																																																									151	We	review	ASTRO’s	viewership	instead	of	HyppTV	or	MyTV	since	ASTRO	has	been	operating	for	20	years.	Its	viewership	growth	would	by	now,	have	reached	an	approximate	saturation-point.	152	Based	on	television	viewership	data	sourced	from	Nielsen	Television	Audience	Measurement.	
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since	it	will	be	a	review	of	MPB’s	inter-station	viewership.	One	other	complication	with	the	data	lies	with	the	‘must-carry’	retransmission	arrangement.153	Malaysia’s	FTA	channels	are	also	telecast	on	ASTRO,	thus	allowing	subscribers	to	view	FTA	programming	through	ASTRO’s	satellite	service.	With	this	arrangement,	the	obvious	question	is	whether	an	ASTRO	subscriber	watching	FTA	channels	via	the	ASTRO	digital	service,	is	logged	as	an	FTA	viewer	or	an	ASTRO	viewer	by	Nielsen	television.	Since	this	would	affect	the	viewership	figures	on	either	side,	different	permutations	to	questions	like	these	only	serve	to	complicate	any	effort	in	neatly	dividing	the	viewership	share	between	FTA	channels	and	ASTRO.		In	any	case,	based	on	the	viewership	share	above,	there	is	still	relatively	strong	viewership	for	all	terrestrial	FTA	stations	in	spite	of	ASTRO’s	more	diverse	channel	offerings.	In	the	context	of	FTA	channels,	of	particular	note	are	the	Malay-language	stations,	specifically	TV3,	TV9,	and	TV	Al-Hijrah.	Foo	(2004),	Mohd.	Sidin	&	Amira	(2010),	Wang	(2010),	and	Mohd.	Azlanshah	(2012)	all	agree	that	these	stations	consistently	draw	in	the	largest	audiences.	With	the	Malay	ethnic	community	equating	to	approximately	63%	of	Malaysia’s	population,	this	is	not	surprising.154	Let	us	view	this	reality	through	the	lens	of	UMNO’s	strategic	monopoly	on	broadcasting.		As	I	have	indicated	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	RTM’s	broadcast	objectives,	at	the	elementary	level,	prioritize	the	administration’s	agenda.	The	point	at	issue	is	UMNO’s	‘dynastic’	hold	on	Malaysian	politics	–	insofar	as	Malay	religio-cultural	identity	markers	are	predicated	–	that	frames	the	agenda	of	the	administration.	In	the	previous	chapter,	I	suggested	certain	attributes	to	UMNO’s	social	engineering	of	the	Malays	and	the	resulting	communal	ideological	imprint	left	by																																																									153	I	refer	to	a	broadcast	model	that	broadly	references	the	‘must-carry’	channels	that	originate	from	the	American	cable	broadcast	system	where	the	Federal	Communications	Commission	regulates	that	locally	licensed	TV	stations	must	be	carried	on	a	cable	provider’s	system.	A	retransmission	consent	rule	originates	from	the	same	legislative	body	to	state	that	cable	operators	must	obtain	permission	from	broadcasters	before	carrying	their	programming	(“FCC	Strengthens	Retransmission,”	2014).	154	According	to	the	2010	Population	and	Housing	Census	of	Malaysia	conducted	every	10	years	by	the	Department	of	Statistics	of	Malaysia,	the	ethnic	distribution	of	Malaysia	is	63.1%	Malays,	24.6%	Chinese,	7.3%	Indians,	4.3%	other	non-Malay	Bumiputeras,	and	0.7%	classified	as	Others.	(Jadual	Hayat	Ringkas	Malaysia	2010-2013).	
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the	Malay	party’s	persistent	socio-political	positioning.	Nowhere	is	this	phenomenon	more	acutely	manifested	than	in	the	Malay-language	stations,	for	as	indicated	previously,	ethnically	categorized	demographics	can	be	politically	mobilized	by	the	state.	One	potential	for	this	political	actuation	is	clarified	in	the	subsequent	section	on	censorship	and	TV3’s	production	processes.	When	we	consider	that	UMNO	derives	its	political	currency	from	a	self-constructed	role	as	the	saviour	of	the	Malays	–	a	theme	that	was	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	–	the	significance	of	UMNO’s	ideological	influence	over	TV3,	TV9,	and	TV	Al-Hijrah	is	brought	into	clearer	focus.	Within	the	dynamics	of	this	politico-ideological	determination,	Malay	television	and	specifically	our	focus,	TV3,	is	appropriately	positioned	for	the	formulation	of	a	Malay	identity	that	is	defined	almost	solely	by	UMNO.	The	complex	broadcasting	legislative	apparatus	–	that	at	an	elementary	level	functions	to	normalize	and	maintain	state	configurations	of	Malay	identity	–	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.		
Overview	of	the	Broadcasting	Legal	Framework	Besides	ownership	of	the	mass	media	institutions	themselves,	governmental	control	is	also	exerted	through	other	channels.	This	control	is	primarily	manifested	through	the	legal	framework.	There	are	several	acts	related	to	this	control	with	overlapping	jurisdictions.	Furthermore,	regulatory	bodies	for	both	film	and	television	are	closely	linked	in	Malaysia,	and	broadcasting	legislation	often	applies	to	both	simultaneously	(Foo	2004,	112,	114-115,	124).	McDaniel	identified	two	types	of	Malaysian	broadcasting	laws.	The	first	type	of	laws	are	regulations	that	define	and	limit	content,	while	the	second	type	are	enactments	that	delimit	actions	or	responsibilities	(McDaniel	1994,	92).	In	the	proceeding	sections,	both	facets	to	the	legislative	framework	for	Malaysian	broadcasting	will	be	discussed,	starting	with	an	overview	of	the	government’s	primary	legislation	for	broadcast	governance	–		the	Communications	and	Multimedia	Act	1998	–	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	state’s	apparatus	for	the	implementation	and	facilitation	of	the	television	legislative	process	–	the	Film	Censorship	Board.		
Communications	and	Multimedia	Act	1998	The	boundaries	of	freedom	of	speech	and	expression	accorded	to	broadcasting	is	
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primarily	delimited	by	the	Broadcasting	Act	1988.	This	Act	was	enacted	to	facilitate	the	development	of	new	media	technologies	such	as	satellite,	cable	and	digital	technology,	and	the	convergence	of	the	multimedia	environment.	According	to	Juriah	Abdul	Jalil	(2000,	98),	the	Broadcasting	Act	1988	works	to	restrict	the	freedom	of	broadcasting	in	the	following	three	ways:	1. Section	4	requires	all	private	broadcasters	to	obtain	an	operating	license.	The	section	also	authorizes	the	Minister	of	Information	to	impose	any	conditions	to	the	issuance	of	licenses.	2. The	regulating	of	programme	content	through	the	conditions	that	accompany	the	issuance	of	a	license.	This	may	include	restrictions/limitations	to	violent,	obscene,	or	such	similar	content	by	the	licensee.	3. Regulating	television	advertising	through	the	requirement	of	an	advertisement	license.	Licensees	are	expected	to	operate	within	the	guidelines	outlined	by	the	Ministry	of	Information	under	Section	21,	as	well	as	the	RTM	Code	of	Advertising.		R.	Sonia,	P.	Puah,	&	S.	Loone	(2005,	61)	observe	that	these	stipulations	do	not	in	fact,	regulate	broadcast	censorship.	Rather,	it	is	the	legal	control	of	broadcasters’	terms	of	operations	that	indirectly	influence	what	content	is	telecast.	The	three	methods	of	control	suggested	by	Juriah,	foreground	the	administration’s	primary	strategy	-	the	issuance	of	operating	licenses.	With	the	1988	Act’s	subsequent	replacement	with	the	Communications	and	Multimedia	Act	1998	(CMA),	the	government’s	scope	of	jurisdiction	has	since	been	widened	to	include	the	areas	of	telecommunication,	the	internet,	and	information	technology	(Juriah	2000,	134-135;	Sonia	et	al.	2005,	61).		The	CMA	is	currently	under	the	purview	of	the	Kementerian	Komunikasi	dan	
Multimedia	Malaysia	(Ministry	of	Communications	and	Multimedia	-	KKMM)	and	is	overseen	by	the	Communications	and	Multimedia	Commission	that	was	established	through	a	related	Act	of	Parliament155	(“Ministry	of	Communications,”	2014).	Citing	then	Chairman	of	the	Commission	Syed	Hussein																																																									155	The	Malaysian	Communications	and	Multimedia	Commission	Act	1998	(Act	589).	
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Mohammad,	Juriah	suggests	that	the	CMA	is	structured	around	the	principles	of	national	interest,	transparency,	and	a	deregulated	framework	that	focused	on	more	flexibility	(2000,	141).	The	success	of	this	deregulated	framework	was	to	be	achieved	through	more	sensible	self-censorship	(Juriah	2000,	141),	even	as	the	supposed	flexibility	offered	through	the	CMA	was	meant	to	accommodate	the	fast	pace	of	development	that	came	with	media	convergence.	Several	issues	associated	with	the	terms	‘flexibility’,	‘deregulation’,	and	‘self-censorship’,	need	to	be	discussed.		Sonia	et	al.	(2005,	61)	observe	that	compared	to	the	older	Broadcasting	Act	of	1988,	the	CMA	aims	for	greater	transparency.	This	is	presumably	attributed	to	the	establishment	of	a	Commission	as	the	administrative	body	that	makes	recommendations	on	issues	of	licensing	–	the	conditions	for	restrictions,	fees,	fines,	jail	penalties	and	other	such	matters	(Sonia	et	al.	2005,	61-62).	While	this	is	predicated	on	the	logic	of	not	having	the	Minister	as	the	sole	arbiter,	its	supposed	greater	transparency	is	mitigated	by	the	reality	that	its	members	are	appointed	by,	answerable	to,	and	operate	under,	the	Communications	and	Multimedia	(KKMM)	Minister.	This	is	explicitly	stipulated	in	Sections	10(1)	and	(3)	which	state	respectively:	The	Minister	may,	from	time	to	time,	determine	any	matter	specified	in	this	Act	as	being	subject	to	Ministerial	determination,	without	consultation	with	any	licensees	or	persons.		 The	Commission	shall	exercise	its	powers	conferred	under	this	Act	in	a	manner	which	is	consistent	with	the	determination.										–Communications	and	Multimedia	Act	1998	(2006,	29)		This	establishes	two	points.	Firstly,	while	the	Commission	is	meant	to	administer	and	adjudicate	on	matters	pertaining	to	the	CMA,	it	is	in	turn,	legally	bound	to	implement	the	directives	of	the	KKMM	Minister.	Curiously,	it	did	not	stipulate	that	the	determination	be	implemented	in	a	manner	consistent	with	other	sections	of	the	Act,	which	would	have	provided	the	semblance	of	a	check-balance	mechanism,	regardless	of	its	efficacy.	Secondly,	the	Minister’s	authority	over	the	Commission	is	further	delineated	in	Subsections	10(4)	to	10(7)	and	Sections	11	to	15,	all	of	which	are	centred	on	the	notion	of	Ministerial	
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determination	without	any	requirement	of	consultation	with	any	party.	Therefore,	it	is	clear	that	while	the	CMA	‘deregulates’	by	being	less	explicit,	and	with	fewer	stipulations	to	licensees,	the	notion	that	it	is	flexible	or	transparent	is	an	arguable	point	since	the	factors	contributing	to	the	adjudication	on	many	matters	pertaining	to	licenses	are	now	less	clear.		At	first	glance,	the	CMA	appears	–	and	it	arguably	is	–	suitably	poised	to	embrace	the	digital	age	since	the	flexibility	of	arbitrary	executive	decisions	can	result	in	effective	quick	responses	that	adapt	to	rapidly	shifting	times.	However,	quick	decisions	may	also	include	license	revocation	or	suspension.	This	incentivizes	more	stringent	self-censorship	from	broadcasters	since	elements	that	can	potentially	be	deemed	prejudicial	or	sensitive,	must	be	deduced	on	the	part	of	television	producers.	This	practice	of	self-censorship	and	deducing	the	nature	of	non-appropriate	material,	will	be	further	clarified	below	when	considering	comments	made	by	TV3’s	former	Senario	production	member	Hisyam	regarding	TV3’s	in-house	censorship	workflow.	As	we	will	observe	from	Hisyam’s	account,	television	producers	–	under	pressure	from	broadcasters	–	are	now	content	to	err	on	the	side	of	caution	when	it	comes	to	acceptable	material.	A	case	in	point	relating	to	the	CMA	and	the	unpredictable	deductive	element	of	self-censorship,	is	a	recent	infraction	by	RTM’s	TV2.		On	27	October	2015,	TV2’s	8pm	prime	time	Mandarin	news	featured	a	montage	of	photographs	related	to	the	nation’s	1MDB	financial	scandal.156	Included	in	the	montage	footage	was	the	photograph	of	a	solemn-looking	Prime	Minister	Najib	Razak	and	the	millionaire	Jho	Low,	the	two	protagonists	who	at	the	time	were	rumoured	to	be	at	the	centre	of	the	scandal	(“RTM	News	Crew,”	2015).	In	spite	of	its	justification	as	visual	accompaniment	to	the	news	being	read,	by	the	following	day,	RTM’s	management	had	issued	a	ban	on	all	visuals	by	the	Mandarin	news	team	for	all	its	programmes.	The	cause	for	the	ban	was	presumably	the	implications	of	featuring	images	of	the	Prime	Minister	and	Jho	Low	in	the	same	segment,	even	though	their	photographs	were	included	at																																																									156	For	an	overview	of	the	scandal,	see	(“1MDB:	The	case,”	2016).	For	a	series	of	detailed	reports	tracking	its	development,	see	(“Malaysia	Controversy,”	n.d.).	
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different	moments	in	the	montage.	By	29	October,	the	newsreaders	had	to	contend	with	reading	continuously	for	20-30	minutes	with	no	visual	breaks,	without	any	visual	headlines	or	crawlers	(words	at	the	bottom	of	the	screen)	and	unaccompanied	by	any	form	of	visual	programme	introduction.	The	only	on-screen	visual	for	the	duration	of	the	entire	Mandarin	news	programme	was	a	single	sentence	in	Malay	–	“Ikut	prosedur	atau	lesen	dibatalkan”	(Follow	procedure	or	license	will	be	revoked)	(“Minister	Orders	Return,”	2015).	On	30	October	a	directive	was	presumably	given	by	KKMM	Minister	Salleh	Said	Keruak	for	operations	to	resume	as	normal	(“Minister	Orders	Return,”	2015).	Curiously,	this	was	relayed	to	the	public	by	Wee	Ka	Siong,	deputy	president	of	Barisan	Nasional’s	(BN)	Chinese	coalition	party	-	the	Malaysian	Chinese	Association	–	rather	than	by	Minister	Salleh	himself.	However,	on	1	November	viewers	noted	the	programme’s	format	had	been	restructured	to	include	a	repositioning	of	the	news	anchor	that	now	obstructed	the	background	visual.	Moreover,	Chinese	headlines	were	replaced	with	Malay	headlines	and	the	practice	of	screening	relevant	footage	in	the	background	accompanying	the	reading	of	news	was	discontinued	(“Remove	Restrictions	On,”	2015).		The	above	example	foregrounds	the	primary	method	by	which	the	CMA,	through	the	Communications	and	Multimedia	Minister,	controls	the	broadcasting	terrain.	The	case	highlights	the	conditions	by	which	a	broadcaster’s	license	to	operate	can	be	revoked	if	they	are	found	to	have	impinged	on	regulations	and	sensitivities.161	As	discussed	however,	the	exact	interpretation	of	these	sensitivities	may	not	be	explicitly	stated.	As	mentioned	at	the	outset,	this	strategy	is	central	to	the	government’s	legislative	control	over	media,	for	the	CMA	directly	controls	broadcasters’	terms	of	operations	which	indirectly	influences	what	content	is	telecast,	and	in	turn,	results	in	more	rigorous	self-censorship.																																																										161	This	is	ironic	since	TV2	is	under	RTM,	both	of	which	are	state-run	and	state-owned.	This	is	presumably	a	demonstration	of	state	power	meant	for	the	wider	public,	and	a	cautionary	tale	to	other	broadcasters	who	may	be	similarly	inclined	–	especially	to	the	Chinese	media	community	–	who	were	unreservedly	vocal	in	their	criticisms	of	the	Prime	Minister	and	his	purported	role	in	the	state-linked	1MDB	financial	scandal.	
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Lembaga	Penapis	Filem	(Film	Censorship	Board)	and	the	Censorship	Process	A	central	part	of	the	government’s	control	over	broadcast	content	is	censorship.	The	resilience	of	censorship	as	an	integral	part	of	administrative	control	is	evidenced	by	its	existence	in	Malaya	(in	the	form	of	film	censorship)	from	as	early	as	1908	during	the	period	of	governance	by	the	British	colonial	administration.	At	the	time,	it	was	facilitated	through	the	Theatre	Ordinance	1908	which	authorized	the	police	to	determine	the	suitability	of	film	content	(Ministry	of	Home	Affairs,	2016).	Today,	film	censorship	in	Malaysia	involves	a	complex	process	that	is	facilitated	through	the	Lembaga	Penapis	Filem	(Film	Censorship	Board	-	LPF)	as	part	of	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs’	Bahagian	
Kawalan	Penapisan	Filem	dan	Penguatkuasaan	(Film	Censorship	Control	and	Enforcement	Division)	(Ministry	of	Home	Affairs,	2016).		LPF	was	initially	established	in	1954	under	Section	3	of	the	Film	Act	(Censorship)	1952	(revised	in	1971).	It	served	to	enforce	the	Cinematograph	Films	Act	1952	before	its	subsequent	replacement	with	the	Film	Censorship	Act	2002	(Act	620)	(“Lembaga	Penapis	Filem”,	2016a).	LPF	is	meant	to	function	as	a	safeguard	for	national	security	and	racial	harmony	(“Lembaga	Penapis	Filem”,	2016a)	by	protecting	the	nation	and	its	people	from	negative	influences	in	films,	and	for	ensuring	that	content	is	aligned	with	the	Rukun	Negara164	(National	Ideology)	(Garis	Panduan	Penapisan	Filem	2011,	1).	With	jurisdiction	over	both	film	and	television	content	in	Malaysia	(Foo	2004,	114,	115),	LPF	works	with	another	government	body	-	the	Perbadanan	Kemajuan	Filem	Nasional	(National	Film	Development	Corporation	–	FINAS),	to	regulate	on-screen	content.		Under	the	Act,	LPF’s	board	chairman,	deputy	chairman,	and	63	of	its	members	are	recommended	by	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	and	appointed	by	the	Yang	DiPertuan	Agong165	(Foo	2004,	114).	By	way	of	ensuring	that	the	decisions	from	LPF	are	aligned	with	the	government,	Foo	notes	that	most	of	its	members	are	retired	senior	civil	employees	(Foo	2004,	115).	Working	closely	with	the																																																									164	Note	that	this	operational	remit	does	not	differ	significantly	from	RTM’s	objectives	discussed	in	the	preceding	section.	165	The	King	or	ruler	of	Malaysia,	selected	from	within,	and	by	the	Council	of	Rulers	comprising	the	Sultans	from	each	respective	Malaysian	state.	
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different	divisions	under	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs,	the	LPF	determines	which	films	or	television	content,	both	foreign	and	local,	are	aired	(Foo	2004,	115).	Once	approved	by	the	LPF,	licenses	are	then	issued	through	another	governmental	regulatory	body	-	FINAS	(Foo	2004,	137).		For	content	that	has	been	censored	or	banned	by	the	censorship	board,	there	is	a	Committee	of	Appeal	within	LPF	that	is	convened	under	Section	22(1)	of	the	Film	Censorship	Act	2002	(Act	620)	(Akta	Penapisan	Filem	2002,	2006).	The	committee	consists	of	18	members	–	a	Chairman	and	Deputy	Chairman	appointed	by	the	Minister	of	Home	Affairs,	the	Inspector-General	of	Police	or	a	nominee	above	the	rank	of	Assistant	Superintendent,	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs’	Executive	Secretary,	the	Chief	Education	Director,	and	13	members	nominated	by	the	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	(Akta	Penapisan	Filem	2002,	2006).166	Given	the	composition	of	the	members	and	their	backgrounds,	Foo	observes	that	the	leniency	or	rigidity	of	enforcement	is	often	aligned	to	political	sentiment	at	the	time	of	appeal	(2004,	118).		Furthermore,	partisan	decisions	through	LPF	are	augmented	through	Section	25(1)	of	the	Film	Censorship	Act	2002	(Act	620).	Through	this	section,	the	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	has	the	authority	to	issue	general	directives	to	LPF	or	the	Committee	of	Appeal,	as	long	as	it	does	not	contravene	the	dictates	of	the	Act,	when	it	pertains	to	the	Government’s	position	on	the	public	screening	of	films	and	associated	publicity	materials.	Further,	Subsection	(2)	outlines	that	the	board	or	the	committee	is	legally	obliged	to	implement	the	directives	issued	through	Subsection	(1)	(Akta	Penapisan	Filem	2002,	2006).	In	this	respect,	the	Cabinet	is	empowered	to	control	the	LPF	through	the	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	–	who	is	currently	the	Deputy	Prime	Minister	and	also	UMNO	deputy	president	Zahid	Hamidi.	Interestingly,	Karthigesu	(1994,	77)	observed	that	the	Information	Minister	was	similarly	tasked	with	ensuring	that	RTM’s	policy	and	practices	are	aligned	with	the	government’s.	These	realities	foreground	the	fact	that	UMNO’s	control	over	Malaysian	television	is	explicitly	provided	for	under																																																									166	The	power	of	appointment	and	distribution	of	members	as	stipulated	in	the	actual	government	documentation	appear	to	differ	slightly	from	Foo’s	observations	(2004,	117).	
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legal	provisions.		The	processes	of	censorship	and	content	approval	that	govern	on-air	media	material	is	however,	slightly	different	with	Media	Prima.	According	to	Media	Prima’s	Resource	Centre167	executive	Farah	Asmanina,	the	broadcaster’s	censorship	and	approval	process	occurs	on-site,	within	their	premises	at	Seri	Pentas,	Bandar	Utama,	Selangor	(personal	communication,	December	22,	2015).	TV3’s	former	Senario	production	member	Hisyam168	explained	that	the	large	volume	of	weekly	content	produced	by	Media	Prima,	and	the	speed	by	which	it	is	telecast	–	for	Senario,	typically	within	14	days	from	the	studio	recording,	which	includes	LPF’s	censorship	process	–	makes	this	on-site	approval	process	an	ideal	arrangement	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	In	order	for	this	on-site	approval	to	function,	LPF	thus	maintains	a	team	within	Media	Prima	itself,	though	it	is	inferred	that	with	the	volume-time-team	size	ratio,	the	censorship	process	may	not	be	as	rigorous	as	external	submissions	to	LPF.	In	fact,	to	minimize	obstacles	for	productions	to	go	on-air	at	the	scheduled	time	slot,	Hisyam	asserts	that	TV3	directors	and	producers	ensure	a	certain	degree	of	institutional	compliance	even	before	a	programme	is	filmed.	This	self-imposed	compliance,	and	the	ambiguous	nature	of	LPF	guidelines	are	explained	by	Hisyam	in	the	following	interview	excerpt:		 Researcher:		 Untuk	sitkom	yang	baik,	in	view	of	guidelines,	bila	buat	
skrip	tu	ada	yang	nak	testkan	boundary	ke?		In	order	to	produce	a	good	sitcom,	in	view	of	guidelines,	have	you	ever	written	a	script	that	tested	their	boundaries?169		Hisyam:	 Oh,	takde.	Sebab	masa	tu,	dah	queue	production	ni,	you	tak	
boleh	retract-kan	dia,	sebab	apa	–	dia	kos	…	tak	silap	I,	
Senario	dalam	tu	ada	10	yang	kena	ban,	I	rasa	lah.	
	 Oh,	no.	Because	at	the	time,	when	you	have	queued	the	production,	you	can’t	retract	it	because	of	the	cost	involved.	If	I’m	not	mistaken,	there	were	10	of	Senario	that	were																																																									167	One	task	of	MPB’s	Resource	Centre	is	the	archiving	and	cataloguing	of	all	Media	Prima	television	content.	168	To	reiterate,	Hisyam	is	a	pseudonym.	Hisyam	was	a	long	serving	member	on	Senario’s	team,	fulfilling	a	number	of	different	roles,	during	the	period	of	the	sitcom’s	popularity.	169	Translated	to	English	by	the	researcher.	
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banned,	I	think.170	
	Researcher:		 Tapi	bila	buatkan	skrip	tu,	perlu	ke	dia	approve	dulu?		But,	was	it	a	requirement	for	the	script	to	be	pre-	approved?		Hisyam:	 Tak	payah.	LPF	ni	satu.	Dia	suruh	kita	–	zaman	tulah	–	dia	
suruh	kita	buat	dulu.	Buat	dulu,	dia	tengok.	Itu	stail	LPF.	Dia	
tak	ada	trial	error,	hantar	skrip	dulu	ke,	takde.	So	jadi	kita,	
bila	nak	tahu	ada	guideline	dia,	jadi	kita	tengoklah,	kita	
hati-hati	lah	…	Lepas	tu	tak	boleh	sentuh	apa	politik,	apa	
semua.	itu	tak	boleh	sentuh	…	tak	boleh	sentuh	politik,	
paling-paling	kita	tak	boleh	sentuh.	Benda	yang	sensitif	saja	
yang	ada	kaitan	dengan	race.	No	need.	This	LPF,	they	told	us	–	during	that	period	–	we	were	told	to	complete	it	first.	Complete	it,	then	they’ll	have	a	look.	That’s	LPF’s	style.	There	is	no	trial	and	error,	nor	can	we	submit	the	script	first,	no.	So	for	us,	if	we	want	to	know	what	the	guidelines	are,	we	will	have	to	observe,	and	we’ll	have	to	be	careful	…	Further,	politics	and	anything	related	to	it	are	off-limits.	We	cannot	touch	on	the	issue,	cannot	touch	politics,	that’s	absolutely	something	we	can’t	touch	on.	Also,	sensitive	issues	associated	with	race.		In	the	above	excerpt,	we	note	the	primary	factor	underscoring	Hisyam’s	compliance	with	LPF	guidelines	in	the	production	of	Senario,	is	economic	in	nature.	Moreover,	his	reference	to	“stail	LPF”	(LPF’s	style)	describes	a	process	that	is	not	entirely	explicit	in	its	stipulations.	As	discussed	previously	with	specific	reference	to	TV2’s	Mandarin	news,	Hisyam’s	mention	of	“stail	LPF”	draws	attention	to	the	issue	of	arbitrary	and	partisan	interpretation	of	CMA	and	LPF	guidelines.	In	spite	of	some	ambiguity	in	guidelines,	it	is	clear	from	Hisyam’s	account	that	several	themes	–	politics	and	race,	for	instance	–	are	clearly	understood	to	be	prohibited.		It	is	important	to	note	that	most	MPB-TV3	internally-produced	programmes171	have	short	turn-around	cycles.	Our	research	focus	Senario	for	example,	has	an	approximate	seven-day	rehearsal-filming-editing	turn-around	time	per	episode,																																																									170	Hisyam	only	remembers	three	of	the	episodes	that	were	banned.	They	were	Selit!,	Mahligai	
Impian	Part	1,	and	Mahligai	Impian	Part	2.	The	discussions	involving	Hisyam’s	explanations	in	the	next	chapter	may	provide	some	insights	into	the	reasons	for	the	ban	on	these	episodes.	171	All	the	different	divisions	under	MPB’s	individual	stations	have	been	streamlined	into	one	consolidated	content	creation	subsidiary	called	Primeworks	Studios,	that	now	produces	content	for	all	MPB	stations.	
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with	each	episode	often	completed	only	approximately	two	weeks	–	the	censorship	duration	–	before	its	scheduled	telecast	date	(Hisyam,	personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	This	narrow	margin	for	uncertainty	contextualizes	Hisyam’s	reasoning	for	the	mitigation	of	potential	problems.	In	this	respect,	when	exercising	this	form	of	self-censorship,	erring	on	the	side	of	caution	is	usually	the	practice,	and	very	little	is	left	to	chance.		It	is	instructive	that	Karthigesu,	in	observing	RTM’s	responsibilities	of	transmitting	government	policies	in	1994,	had	suggested	that	television	producers	often	compromised	their	content	to	accommodate	the	nation’s	multi-ethnic/cultural	sensitivities	(1994,	72).	In	fact,	in	the	interest	of	avoiding	unwanted	attention	from	the	administration,	they	skirted	away	from	any	potential	cultural	controversies	of	their	own	volition	(Karthigesu	1994,	72).	Moreover,	Zaharom	&	Mustafa	view	the	act	of	circumventing	any	offence	to	cultural	communities	as	being	fundamental	to	the	practice	of	institutional	censorship,	leading	eventually	to	self-censorship	(2000,	155).	Sonia	et	al.	(2005,	61)	similarly	noted	that	the	common	practice	of	self-censorship	by	Malaysian	television	broadcasters	is	to	avoid	any	revocation	of	their	operating	licenses.	When	we	juxtapose	these	observations	with	Hisyam’s	account,	it	appears	that	though	Media	Prima	is	a	commercial	station,	its	operational	processes	do	not	differ	much	from	state-owned	TV1	and	TV2.172	This	resilience	of	self-censorship	both	in	state-run	and	commercial	FTA	stations	can	be	explained	by	UMNO’s	layered	structure	of	control,	resulting	in	guidelines	that	dictate	how	broadcasts	are	produced,	regardless	of	whether	by	public	or	private	owned	stations.		Hisyam’s	descriptions	of	TV3’s	production	of	the	Malay	sitcom	Senario,	provide	an	insight	into	the	immense	political	and	institutional	pressures	governing	TV3’s	operations,	as	experienced	internally	by	the	producers	themselves.	By	all	accounts,	television	directors	and	producers	are	pressured	into	producing	‘safe’	content	that	introduces	and	reaffirms	the	status	quo	as	interpreted	by	the	state.	Given	TV3’s	resolve	in	1985	to	“ride	on	RTM’s	coat-tails”,	this	indirect	adoption																																																									172	This	was	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter	where	we	drew	attention	to	TV3’s	programming	shift	in	1985,	and	the	declaration	that	it	was	easier	to	ride	on	RTM’s	coat-tails.	
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of	RTM’s	objectives	would,	at	the	very	least,	see	a	distillation	of	state	imperatives	onto	the	TV3	platform.	Within	the	dynamics	of	TV3-RTM-BN,	the	accounts	of	Karthigesu,	Sonia	et	al.,	Zaharom	&	Mustafa,	and	Hisyam	describe	an	unshifting	production	mind-set	reflecting	a	trajectory	that	has	largely	remained	unchanged	with	Media	Prima,	and	with	current	television	producers.		
Media	Prima’s	Narrowcasting	and	Its	Implications	for	Senario	In	the	preceding	sections,	we	have	observed	how	state	control	over	media	–	and	specifically	television	–	is	enhanced	through	media	ownership	and	the	broadcasting	legal	framework.173	By	establishing	the	relationship	between	broadcasters	and	state	power,	we	are	presented	with	a	media	industry	that	is	monopolized	by	UMNO.	Furthermore,	it	was	suggested	that	Malay	FTA	television	stations	hold	the	highest	FTA	viewership	within	the	nation.	In	this	respect,	the	state’s	monopoly	over	FTA	television	means	that	Malay	stations	can	potentially	be	utilized	for	the	construction	of	statist	narratives	of	Malay	nationhood,	and	we	observed	its	impact	on	content	production	as	described	by	TV3’s	Hisyam	in	producing	the	Malay	sitcom	Senario.	This	function	of	Malay	stations	becomes	more	apparent	when	we	consider	its	explicitly	defined	role	as	the	government’s	tool	for	‘nation	building’.	In	this	section,	we	will	examine	Media	Prima	Berhad’s	(MPB)	viewership,	and	by	extension	TV3’s	and	Senario’s	viewers,	as	a	consequence	of	MPB’s	narrowcast	model174	which	categorizes	audiences	along	tiers	of	race,	language,	and	perhaps	not	inadvertently,	social	class.	By	understanding	how	MPB	categorizes	its	viewers	and	who	those	viewers	are,	it	will	become	clear	that	these	categories	can	be	made	to	serve	political	objectives.		Given	the	diverse	ethnic	composition	of	Malaysia	and	more	specifically,	given	the	prevalence	of	inter-ethnic	identity	contestations,	the	use	of	languages	on	television	has	changed	since	RTM	started	broadcasting	television	in	1969.	The	administration	has	since	regarded	television’s	use	of	different	vernacular	(or	ethnic)	languages	as	an	ideal	method	for	the	dissemination	of	messages	in																																																									173	See	also	Foo	(2004,	112,	114-115,	117,	119-120,	123-124,	137),	Juriah	(2000,	77-98,	115-116,	134-135),	and	Roslina,	Wan	Amizah	&	Ali	(2013,	53-55).	174	Broadly,	this	refers	to	the	targeting	of	content	into	specialized	channels	that	each	appeal	to	specific	audience	demographics.	The	narrowcast	model	will	be	discussed	later	in	the	section.	
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promoting	inter-ethnic	or	national	cohesion	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	153-154).	To	ensure	the	state	could	reach	the	country’s	different	ethnic	groups,	the	languages	utilized	by	these	minority	ethnic	groups	were	therefore	maintained	on	television	even	though	Malay	was	the	national	language	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	154).175		The	inclusion	of	non-Malay	vernacular	languages	has	clearly	been	present	since	the	start	of	Malaysian	television	in	1963.	Karthigesu	cites	G.F.	Brickenden’s	1960s’	study	of	Talivishen	Malaysia	that	focused	on	language	distribution	to	have	arrived	at	a	language	ratio	of	45	(Malay)	:30	(Chinese)	:25	(English)	(Karthigesu	1994,	35).	With	the	subsequent	outcry	from	the	Indian	community	at	the	exclusion	of	Indian	programmes,	this	ratio	was	corrected	to	45:30:20:5,	the	last	being	the	introduction	of	Tamil	language	content	on	television.176	With	respect	to	the	Indian	communal	position	within	the	nation’s	socio-political	dynamics,	it	is	instructive	that	while	state-owned	RTM	channels	do	still	roughly	adhere	to	a	similar	language	ratio	within	each	broadcast	day,	Media	Prima’s	FTA	station	offering	does	not	include	an	Indian-language	channel.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	Malaysia’s	inter-ethnic	and	inter-faith	tensions	have	primarily	been	between	the	Malays	and	the	Chinese.	In	this	context,	it	may	be	suggested	that	the	exclusion	of	Indian	channels	–	which	may	also	be	interpreted	as	the	lack	of	a	need	for	these	channels	–	reflect	the	administration’s	view	towards	the	ideological	utility	of	Malay	television	stations.	In	practice,	the	exclusion	of	Indian	language	channels	means	that	audiences	who	are	thus	inclined,	will	have	to	resort	to	the	Indian	language	channels	provided	through	subscription-based	DBS	service	ASTRO,	or	subscription-based	IPTV	service	HyppTV.		This	brings	to	the	foreground,	the	practice	of	narrowcasting	within	Malaysian	television.	As	we	observed	in	an	earlier	section	of	this	chapter,	TV3’s	initial	telecasts	were	neither	mono-ethnic	nor	mono-lingual.	Similarly,	up	until	March																																																									175	It	is	unclear	how	this	was	aligned	with	RTM’s	guidelines,	as	per	our	discussion	at	the	start	of	this	chapter.	Though	it	can	arguably	be	qualified	as	part	of	RTM’s	nation-building	objectives.	176	It	is	unclear	exactly	when	Tamil	programmes	were	included,	though	it	is	presumed	to	be	within	the	periods	of	1963	when	Talivishen	Malaysia	was	established,	to	1969	when	RTM	was	established.	
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2016,	MPB’s	8TV177	was	a	two	language	station	which	meant	that	there	was	a	Chinese	content	belt	during	the	day	and	an	English	content	belt	from	the	evening	onwards.	Under	a	narrowcast	framework,	channel	offerings	are	single-streamed	into	specialized	channels	that	appeal	to	specific	groups	of	audiences,	segmenting	viewers	along	language,	race	and	class	tiers.	This	would	explain	why	the	Malay	sitcom	Senario	for	example,	is	aired	on	MPB’s	Malay	channel	TV3.	With	these	factors	determining	the	categorization	of	specialized	channels,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	narrowcast	model	is	largely	based	on	commercial	determinants.	Its	business	model	is	shaped	by	the	aim	of	delivering	very	specific	viewership	to	advertisers,	since	channel	content	is	not	produced	to	appeal	to	a	generic	viewership.	However,	as	a	political	tool,	it	can	work	to	attract	and	categorise	very	specific	groups	of	electorates.		From	the	perspective	of	ethnic	segregation,	this	dimension	to	television	narrowcasting	can	work	to	entrench	and	potentially	widen	existing	ethnic	fissures.	The	presupposition	of	fixity	to	these	lines	of	differences	is	reinforced	in	the	concept	of	an	‘ethnicized	channel’,	where	programming	is	specific	to	a	particular	ethnic	category.	In	its	deployment,	it	indicates	that	the	channel	as	a	spatial	marker,	draws	its	boundaries	not	just	with	televised	content	but	also	simply	with	the	channel	being	ethnically-specific.	A	large	corpus	of	work	by	television	scholars	asserts	that	genre	or	interest-based	televisual	content	categories	are	ethnicized	and/or	gendered	in	and	of	themselves	(for	example,	John	Fiske	2011,	Jane	Gerhad	2005,	and	Sharon	Sharp	2006).	However,	my	deployment	of	the	epithet	refers	to	the	privileging	of	race	and	its	associated	language-use	in	MPB’s	categorization,	above	any	other	considerations.	I	also	refer	to	the	statist-influenced	ascription	of	interests	or	social-economic	function	to	specific	ethnic	groups	–	in	short,	racial	stereotypes.	Within	the	context	of	this	research,	the	Malaysian	‘ethnicized	channel’	therefore	references	a	
																																																								177	Until	the	end	of	8TV’s	‘The	Quickie’	programme	on	31	March	2016,	8TV	had	a	unique	strategy	whereby	the	morning	and	day	segments	of	the	channel	contained	Chinese	programmes,	while	the	remainder	of	the	broadcast	day	after	the	Mandarin	news	at	8pm	was	dedicated	to	English	programmes.	8TV	is	now	a	Chinese	station,	marketed	by	MPB	as	“Malaysia’s	No.	1	Chinese	television	station”	(Tontonextra	8TV,	2017).	
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particularized	term	that	needs	to	be	understood	within	the	nation’s	inter-ethnic	and	inter-faith	history.		On	this	basis,	the	notion	of	an	‘ethnicized	channel’	goes	beyond	a	mere	categorization	of	interest-based178	or	genre179	viewing	choices	and	overlays	it	with	an	additional	religio-racialist	perspective.	This	conflates	interest-based	or	genre	categorizations	with	ethnicity/race,	religion,	culture,	and	their	associated	language	preferences.	It	is	curious	that	these	same	considerations	are	similarly	echoed	on	TV3’s	Senario,	where	one	of	our	primary	inquiries	engages	with	the	erasure	or	marginalization	of	non-Malays	within	on-screen	Malay	imaginaries.	This	similarity	between	the	‘ethnicized	channel’	and	Senario’s	‘ethnicized	content’	lies	within	their	construction	of	ethnically-exclusive	televisual	spaces.	From	a	strictly	economic	perspective,	MPB’s	narrowcast	strategy	has	thus	far	proven	to	be	successful	and	resilient	–	by	the	simple	fact	that	it	has	incorporated	all	commercial	FTA	channels	under	its	operations.180	We	may	be	able	to	gain	some	insights	into	the	underlying	criteria-set	employed	in	MPB’s	narrowcast	(or	channel	ethnicization),	and	its	influence	in	determining	the	viewership	of	TV3’s	sitcom	Senario,	by	examining	the	demographic	categorizations	contained	within	the	broadcaster’s	2015	annual	report.		According	to	data	collected	by	the	Nielsen	Audience	Measurement,	MPB’s	stations	collectively	have	a	37	percent	national	television	viewership	share	in	2015	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Annual	Report	2015,	9).	From	this	37	percent	national	viewership	share,	MPB	further	segregates	their	audiences	into	categories	of	‘Malay’,	‘Urban’,	‘Chinese’,	and	‘4-14	years’	of	age	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Annual	Report	2015,	63).	The	viewership	data	for	MPB’s	Malay	and	Chinese	categories	are	reproduced	in	Table	3.1.																																																										178	Though	not	available	on	FTA	stations,	Asian	Food	Channel,	History	Channel,	and	HBO	are	examples	of	content	delivery	based	on	audience	interests.	179	Though	not	available	on	FTA	stations,	Syfy	Channel,	Comedy	Central,	and	Al	Jazeera	are	examples	of	content	delivery	based	on	genre	types.	180	In	addition	to	TV3,	MPB	acquired	both	Channel	9	(relaunched	as	TV9)	and	ntv7	in	2005.	Metropolitan	TV	was	acquired	in	2003	and	relaunched	as	8TV.	Prior	to	MPB’s	ownership,	all	stations	were	also	owned	by	individuals	connected	to	UMNO	(Wang	2010,	23-24).	
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Station	 Malay	(%)	 Chinese	(%)	TV3	 28.8	 1.9	TV9	 9.9	 0.6	ntv7	 1.7	 14.6	8TV	 0.7	 22.9	Total	 41.1	 40		Table	3.1:	Media	Prima’s	Malay	and	Chinese	viewership		According	to	the	viewership	breakdown	in	Table	3.1,	41.1	percent	of	MPB’s	total	viewership	is	Malay,	and	40	percent	of	its	total	viewership	is	Chinese,	equating	to	81.1	percent	of	MPB’s	total	viewership	across	its	stations.	It	is	presumed	that	the	remaining	18.9	percent	is	comprised	of	non-Malay	and	non-Chinese	viewers	such	as	the	Indian	community,	and	the	sizeable	foreign	workforce	living	in	Malaysia.	In	any	case,	MPB’s	inclusion	of	only	these	two	ethnic	categories	and	by	extension,	MPB’s	view	of	their	significance,	once	again	reflects	the	political	and	economic	importance	accorded	to	Malay	and	Chinese	audiences.	While	on	the	surface,	this	simple	classification	is	based	on	economic	considerations,181	there	is	an	additional	political	factor	since	MPB	is	owned	by	the	governing	coalition’s	dominant	political	party.	In	light	of	MPB’s	association	with	UMNO,	it	will	be	beneficial	to	consider	these	Malay	and	Chinese	categorizations	separately	through	two	realities	–	the	obvious	economic	determinant	in	categorizing,	and	the	ethnically-homogeneous	category’s	potential	for	political	actuation.	Each	will	be	discussed	in	turn.		The	economic	determinant	is	best	observed	through	the	perspective	of	Malaysian	television	advertisements.	Malaysian	television	advertisements	were	first	introduced	in	1965	with	the	primary	intention	of	focusing	not	on	advertising	profits,	but	of	attracting	more	Malaysian	buyers	to	locally	produced	goods	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	155).	These	advertisements	were	predominantly	in	English,	since	the	buying	power	at	the	time,	lay	squarely	with	
																																																								181	The	delivery	of	specific	higher	disposable	income	groups	to	advertisers,	for	example.	
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the	English-educated183	citizenry	who	were	located	in	the	urban	areas	where	television	broadcasts	were	easily	accessible	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	155-156).	The	next	communal	group	with	big	spending	potential	were	the	Chinese-speaking	viewers	who	lived	in	towns	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	155-156).	Malay	and	Indian	advertisements	were	fewer	by	comparison	since	the	majority	of	the	Malays	and	Indians	were	located	in	the	rural	areas	where	television	was	a	rarity,	and	both	groups	had	little	spending	power	(Zaharom	&	Mustafa	2000,	155-156).	These	ethno-spatial	identifiers	were	in	fact,	a	consequence	of	the	British	colonial	strategy	of	land	gazetting.184		This	trend	in	advertising	would	however,	reverse	its	trajectory	in	the	following	years.	Beginning	with	the	NEP	policy,	the	subsequent	success	of	Malaysia	Incorporated,	and	the	consequent	economic	rise	of	the	New	Malays,	the	paradigm	shifted	favourably	towards	the	Malays.	This	new	Malay	socio-economic	power	led	to	more	Malay	advertisements	and	a	corresponding	reduction	in	Chinese	and	English	advertisements.	These	developments	explain	two	points	in	relation	to	MPB’s	ethnicized	channels	and	its	Malay	and	Chinese	viewership	data.		Firstly,	the	prioritization	and	increase	of	Malay	language	content	can	be	explained	by	its	status	as	the	national	language.185	An	increase	in	its	televisual	presence	is	therefore	consonant	with	the	administration's	language	policies	post-1971	(Enloe	1967,	154-177),	and	it	remains	the	language	promoted	televisually	by	the	state	(Wang	2010,	24).	Furthermore,	the	protection	of	the	Malay	language	is	aligned	to	UMNO’s	self-styled	role	as	protector	of	the	Malays	–	a	significant	consideration	among	Malay	electorates.	Therefore,	sustaining	this	televisual	language	status	quo	is,	in	reality,	a	simple	exercise	of	socio-political																																																									183	These	were	presumably	the	Malay,	Chinese,	and	Indian	citizenry	who	had	the	opportunity	to	receive	an	English	education	at	school	–	primarily	in	the	urban	areas	–	established	by	the	British	colonial	administration.	Moreover,	English	speakers	also	included	some	of	the	British	nationals	who	had	decided	to	reside	in	the	country	even	after	its	independence	(Roff	1967).	184	Shamsul	&	Athi	(2015)	and	Milner	(2011)	for	example,	have	written	at	length	about	the	colonial	land	segregation	strategies	that	resulted	in	the	identification	of	particular	ethnicities	with	specific	geographical	localities	and	thus	economic	functions.	185	We	noted	earlier	that	RTM	adheres	to	a	language	ratio	breakdown	of	roughly	45	(Malay)	:30	(Chinese)	:20	(English)	:5	(Indians).	
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positioning	on	the	part	of	UMNO.	Secondly,	as	many	scholars	of	both	the	NEP	years	and	the	subsequent	Malaysia	Incorporated	phenomenon	have	observed,	while	these	two	policies	catalyzed	the	emergence	of	a	Malay	business	elite	class	which	was	politically	well-connected,	this	did	not	necessarily	result	in	a	reduction	of	non-Malay	wealth,	primarily	that	of	the	Chinese	(Shamsul	1996a,	24).			From	a	commercial	perspective,	these	realities	are	presently	reflected	in	MPB’s	key	channels	–	TV3	for	the	Malays	and	8TV	for	the	Chinese	–	each	reflecting	the	economic	positions	of	the	Malays	and	Chinese,	as	well	as	their	population	sizes.	This	is	perhaps	unsurprising,	considering	our	previous	observation	on	the	comparatively	larger	population	size	of	63.1	percent	for	Malays,	while	the	Chinese	are	less	than	half	that	percentage	at	24.6	percent.	(Jadual	Hayat	Ringkas	Malaysia	2010-2013).	All	these	account	for	MPB’s	Malay	and	Chinese	narrowcasting	categorizations	through	obvious	economic	determinants.	Let	us	now	consider	how	the	inherent	ethnic	homogeneity	resulting	from	MPB’s	narrowcasting	can	potentially	be	mobilized	for	political	purposes.		As	mentioned	earlier,	there	is	an	urban	percentage	for	MPB’s	viewership	that	is	tabulated	separately	from	the	Malay	and	Chinese	percentages.	Based	on	Media	Prima	data,	TV3’s	total	urban	viewership	is	at	19	percent	while	8TV’s	total	urban	viewership	at	5.3	percent	(Media	Prima	Berhad	Annual	Report	2015,	63).	Focusing	on	Malay	viewership,	if	19	percent	are	categorized	as	urban	viewers,	it	follows	that	81	percent	are	non-urban	viewers.	MPB	however,	does	not	have	explicit	data	for	a	‘non-urban’	category.	Nonetheless,	by	this	logic,	the	urban	category	can	be	used	to	determine	the	size	of	the	non-urban	Malay	viewership	which	due	to	its	substantial	size,	represents	the	true	demographic	for	TV3.	This	is	a	fact	corroborated	by	Media	Prima’s	then	Chief	Executive	Officer	Ahmad	Izham	Omar	who	stated	that	urban	television	viewers	are	not	the	majority	viewers	of	MPB’s	stations	(Goh	2015).	This	may	explain	the	absence	of	an	explicitly-scheduled	urban	content	belt	on	TV3.	In	contrast,	while	8TV’s	urban	audience	is	only	5.3	percent	(less	than	TV3),	it	features	an	urban	content	belt.	This	disparity	in	MPB’s	programming	rationale	will	become	clearer	in	the	
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following	discussion	where	it	will	become	evident	that	the	actual	‘urban’	and	‘non-urban’	Malay	viewership	are	in	fact	categories	that	may	refer	to	viewers	with	similar	content	preferences.	In	such	a	case,	TV3’s	total	Malay	viewership	–	a	majority	of	whom	are	rural	–	will	in	fact	be	much	larger	than	previously	stated.		It	is	unclear	how	MPB	defines	its	‘urban’	category.186	One	obvious	presumption	is	the	urban	category	is	defined	purely	by	location	of	the	audience		–	those	geographically-located	in	cosmopolitan/city	areas.	Another	plausible	explanation	is	that	MPB	has	identified	TV3’s	cosmopolitan-located	Malay	viewers	to	be	primarily	non-English	speakers	who	prefer	Malay	content.	In	short,	this	would	mean	that	TV3’s	urban	Malay	viewers	(located	in	urban	centres),	prefer	Malay	content.	The	ethnographical	studies	of	Eric	Thompson	(2002)	and	Tim	Bunnell	(2002)	may	provide	further	insight	to	these	understandings	of	TV3’s	urban-rural-programme	dynamics,	and	by	extension,	TV3’s	targeted	demographic	for	the	Malay	sitcom	Senario.		In	studying	the	Malay	communities	living	in	Malaysia’s	capital	city	Kuala	Lumpur,	both	Thompson	(2002,	69-71)	and	Bunnell	(2002)	found	a	correlation	between	the	translocation	of	traditional	Malay	kampung	(village)	culture	and	social	mobility.	Even	while	those	who	ventured	from	the	periphery187	states	were	now	spatially	located	within	Kuala	Lumpur,	both	Bunnell	and	Thompson	found	that	the	majority	from	this	group	were	not	culturally	invested	in	urbanization	or	modernization.	The	effect	was	compounded	when	their	families	from	the	kampung	joined	them	in	the	city,	or	when	these	individuals	or	family	units	then	congregated	with	other	kampung	individuals	or	families	who	had	similarly	moved	from	the	periphery	states	to	the	city.	Instead,	they	were	more	invested	in	constructing	a	cultural	bubble	to	buffer	what	was	perceived	as	an	incompatible	cosmopolitan	culture,	through	communal	solidarity	that	would	strengthen	existing	Malay	religio-cultural	convictions.																																																										186	My	efforts	in	seeking	clarification	with	Media	Prima’s	research	department	and	public	relations	department	between	March	2016	to	May	2016,	yielded	no	real	answers.	187	I	refer	to	the	states	at	the	periphery	of	the	main	cities	in	Malaysia.	These	periphery	states	include	Perlis,	Kedah,	Kelantan,	Terengganu,	and	Sabah.	
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This	phenomenon	may	perhaps	explain	TV3’s	‘urban’	category,	for	if	MPB’s	definition	of	‘urban’	is	derived	purely	from	locality,	it	would	include	this	large	category	of	Malays	who	may	be	disinterested	in	watching	‘non-traditional’	content	even	if	they	are	in	urban	areas.	It	would	therefore	be	reasonable	to	surmise	that	even	when	TV3	makes	a	distinction	between	urban	and	non-urban	viewers,	its	programming	strategies	are	targeted	at	the	latter,	for	as	observed,	the	viewers	constituting	the	urban	category	may	not	actually	be	cosmopolitan	in	their	content	preferences	or	their	worldviews.	The	political	significance	of	TV3’s	actual	demographics,	neatly	categorized	by	its	practice	of	narrowcasting,	therefore	lies	in	the	reality	that	the	true	bastion	of	UMNO’s	political	power	lies	with	the	rural	Malays	(Gomez	2009,	2,	5-6)	who	–	perhaps	not	incidentally	–	are	also	Senario’s	primary	demographic.		
Conclusion	Much	of	what	was	discussed	in	this	chapter	implies	that	the	state	assumes	control	of	all	FTA	television	stations,	commercial	or	otherwise,	and	that	consequently,	the	ultimate	criteria	regulating	television	production	are	determined	by	political	decisions.	Such	a	situation	does	not	of	course	preclude	the	continued	development	of	creative	content	provided	it	is	within	the	limits	of	state	legislation;	though	any	real	creative	exploration	has,	as	observed	by	TV3-
Senario’s	Hisyam,	been	curbed	through	stringent	self-censorship.	This	suggests	that	the	controls	and	measures	set	in	place	by	the	administration	for	an	ideological	control	of	Malaysians	and	specifically	the	Malays,	extend	fluidly	to	television	broadcasting.		One	theme	that	runs	throughout	this	chapter’s	discussions	is	the	ambiguous	nature	of	officially-formulated	institutional	literature.	One	example	is	RTM’s	vaguely	worded	objectives	and	rationalizations	(‘heritage	and	culture	of	the	Malaysian	people/race’	and	‘too	much	information’	having	‘adverse	effects’).	Another	example	is	the	subtly	contradictory	positions	of	privileging	Ministerial	determinations	over	all	else	in	the	Communications	and	Multimedia	Act	1988.		This	ambiguity	is	similarly	observed	in	TV3’s	deliberately-unofficial	true	demographics	(nowhere	is	it	stated	or	published	in	MPB’s	official	literature)	
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though	they	have	long	identified	the	rural	Malays	as	MPB’s	primary	viewers.	These	mirror	the	discrepancies	between	formal	positions	scripted	in	official	literature,	and	what/how	it	is	practiced	and	implemented	in	reality.		Moreover,	while	Malay	and	Chinese	stations	exist,	Indian	stations	are	starkly	missing	(though	Indian	programmes	are	presently	available	on	RTM	stations).	Since	RTM’s	first	initiatives	on	language	programming,	there	is	a	tendency	to	sideline	Indian	content.	Why	are	the	Indians	consistently	absent	from	the	Malay	imaginary	of	what	RTM	–	and	by	extension,	the	Ministry	of	Information	and	KKMM	–	considers	‘the	Malaysian	people/race’?	Would	it	be	overreaching	to	perceive	this	oversight	as	an	insistence	of	the	state’s	focus	on	Malay-Chinese	bicultural	relationship	–	positively	or	negatively	–	to	the	exclusion	of	the	Indians	and	other	minority	communities?	Given	that	TV3’s	Malay	viewership	is	the	largest	among	all	of	MPB’s	FTA	channels,188	it	would	be	logical	to	question,	among	other	things,	what	kind	of	a	nationhood-imaginary	is	proposed	televisually.		Furthermore,	if	Malay	culture	and	language	are	references	for	a	national	identity,	why	does	the	state,	through	RTM,	view	the	retention	of	minority	languages	on	television	as	serving	the	purposes	of	nation	building?	Considering	contemporary	realities,	one	wonders	if,	on	the	pretext	of	preserving	diverse	cultural	and	traditional	heritages,	these	are	in	fact	strategies	for	a	continual	strengthening	of	differences	between	ethnic	groups.	The	vagueness	or	ambiguity	of	official	literature	certainly	does	contribute	to	the	blurring	of	the	state’s	formal	position	on	these	issues.		Certainly,	rural	Malays	are	the	primary	ideological	focus	for	UMNO,	and	thus	central	to	the	state’s	ability	to	constitute	Malay	identity.	It	is	not	accidental	that	TV3’s	primary	demographic,	urban	or	otherwise,	is	similar	in	origin	with	the	characters	in	the	Malay	sitcom	Senario.	As	we	will	observe	in	the	next	chapter,	in	portrayal	of	those	who	came	not	from	privileged	backgrounds	but	from	the	peripheral	rural-suburban	states	of	Malaysia,	Senario’s	precise	reflection	of	the																																																									188	As	discussed,	this	includes	both	the	urban	and	non-urban	Malay	viewers.	
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non-urban	viewership	made	the	its	institutionally-constructed	myths	and	narratives	highly	relatable.		 	
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CHAPTER	4	
	
The	Ideologues:	Representation,	Situation	Comedy,	and	Senario	
	
I’m	not	sure	people	look	to	sitcom	for	100%	reality,	do	they?	–Sophie	Clarke-Jervoise	(Mills	2009,	24)		Television	is	often	viewed	as	a	site	for	the	representation	and	contestation	of	identity.	Like	other	products	of	media	culture,	television	provides	a	basis	from	which	we	constitute	a	perception	of	ourselves,	and	helps	us	frame	how	others	and	the	world	are	understood.	It	is	however,	also	true	that	cultural	and	social	factors	shape	television	far	more	than	television	shapes	culture	(Fiske	2011,	xviii).	Nowhere	is	this	two-directional	influence	more	evident	than	in	television	comedy,	where	the	genre	has	often	been	regarded	as	a	barometer	for	society	(Berman	1987,	6-8;	Dalton	&	Linder	2005,	10;	Hurd	2006,	763;	Kenton	2016,	75;	Lee	1991,	20;	Mills	2009,	125).	The	abundance	of	scholarship	dealing	with	television,	television	comedy	–	and	specifically	our	focus,	the	situation	comedy	(sitcom)	–	demonstrates	the	complex	nature	of	definitively	demonstrating	what	comedy	on	television	is	all	‘about’	(Mills	2009,	10).189		These	studies	assert	that	television	comedy	and	sitcoms	are	not	merely	good	entertainment;	due	to	their	very	comedic	nature	there	is	a	common	misconception	that	sitcoms	do	not	require	thinking	from	viewers,	or	that	they	are	not	reflective	of	deeper	and	more	critical	issues.	Michael	Teuth’s	(2005)	examination	of	South	Park	as	transgressive	comedy	for	example,	reveals	alternate	social	conventions	expressed	through	the	violation	of	cultural	taboos.	Lori	Linday’s	(2005)	analysis	of	‘I	Love	Lucy’	uncovers	the	innate	articulation	of	power	relations	between	genders.	David	Marc	(2005)	explores	the	deeper	issues	of	identity	and	representation	in	the	context	of	race	through	the	sitcoms	‘Amos	‘n’	Andy’	and	‘The	Cosby	Show’.	These	demonstrate	that	real	issues	are	foundational	to	the	narratives	that	drive	sitcom’s	comedy.	In	the	context	of	
																																																								189	See	for	example,	the	works	of	Glen	Creeber	(2001),	Mary	Dalton	&	Laura	Linder	(2005),	and	Brett	Mills	(2009).	
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Malaysian	TV3’s	sitcom	Senario,	of	interest	are	the	discursive	formations	of	Malayness	that	influence	interpretations	of	Senario’s	comedy	and	narratives.		With	these	realities,	one	central	focus	of	this	chapter	is	to	demonstrate	that	sitcoms	are,	at	a	more	elementary	level,	a	reflection	of	society.	Furthermore,	whether	through	actor	improvisations	or	rigidly	scripted	performances,	sitcoms	do	in	fact	take	the	status	quo,	popular	norms,	and	contemporary	events	as	their	narrative	and	dialogic	reference	point.	This	is	in	fact	part	of	their	intertextual	basis.	To	this	end,	the	present	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections	structured	according	to	the	themes	of	meaning-making	through	representation,	the	genre	of	situation	comedy,	and	theories	on	humour.		The	first	section	accounts	for	the	derivation	of	meaning	through	the	process	of	televisual	representation	and	the	polysemic	potential	of	its	interpretive	meaning-making.	This	first	section	will	outline	the	methods	by	which	we	identify,	and	make	sense	of,	the	different	elements	within	Senario’s	text.	These	methods	are	crucial,	for	they	inform	us	of	how	different,	and	seemingly	disparate	and	‘random’	elements,	are	not	disassociated	when	interpreted	through	a	signification	chain.	These	are	discussed	primarily	through	the	theories	of	Ferdinand	de	Saussure	(1983),	John	Fiske	(2011),	John	Fiske	&	John	Hartley	(1985),	Roland	Barthes	(1974,	1977),	Slavoj	Žižek	(1989)	and	Stuart	Hall	(2013).		The	second	section	extends	the	discussion	by	introducing	the	situation	comedy	genre	and	its	conventions	to	establish	how	the	signification	chains	of	meaning	in	the	first	section	function	to	engage	with,	or	reflect,	that	which	has	been	normalized	within	society.	It	will	be	clear	in	this	section	that	Senario	does	not	fit	perfectly	with	all	conventional	definitions	of	sitcom	though	conceived	as	such	by	TV3.	For	more	context	to	our	study,	former	TV3	production	member	Hisyam’s	accounts	of	Senario	are	also	juxtaposed	accordingly.	Studies	by	Andy	Medhurst	&	Lucy	Tuck	(1982),	Brett	Mills	(2011),	Mary	Dalton	&	Laura	Linder	(2005),	Phillip	J.	Glenn	(2003),	and	Susan	Turnbull	(2009)	will	primarily	inform	the	discussions	in	this	second	section.	
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	The	third	section	explores	two	theories	on	humour	–	the	Superiority	Theory	and	Incongruity	Theory.	I	discuss	both	theories	by	framing	them	through	Hisyam’s	accounts	of	Senario	to	reveal	the	different	attitudes	that	can	undergird	humour	and	its	potential	to	normalize	behaviours	that	would	otherwise	be	unacceptable	in	society.	More	importantly,	I	reflect	on	what	each	of	these	two	theories	reveal	about	Malaysia’s	social	and	institutional	realities	when	transposed	to	Senario.	While	our	discussion	on	sitcom	addresses	the	social	function	of	the	genre/format,	this	third	section	engages	with	the	element	of	humour	itself.		
The	System	of	Representation	as	the	Bearer	of	Meanings	Television’s	societal	role	has	often	been	as	a	cultural	storyteller	(Baran	2012,	14-15)	in	that	it	propagates	a	culture’s	values	and	beliefs	within	its	televisual	narratives.	John	Fiske	called	this	a	process	of	storytelling	–	that	of	production	and	reproduction	of	“meanings,	popular	pleasures,	and	their	circulation”	–	as	part	of	the	dynamics	by	which	the	social	structure	attempts	to	maintain	itself	(2011,	1).	Stanley	Baran	describes	this	process	as	the	“construction	of	social	reality”,	where	reality	is	produced,	maintained,	repaired,	and	transformed	(2012,	375)	through	the	cultural	agent	that	is	television.		These	methods	by	which	television	communicates	with	its	audience	rely	on	the	fact	that	the	medium	is	a	human	construct	and	thus	is	contingent	upon	human	choices	that	are	cultural,	social,	and	political	in	nature.	In	this	respect,	understanding	the	way	that	meaning	is	derived	by	audiences	and	specifically	how	meanings	are	contained	within	the	televisual	text,190	will	provide	an	insight	into	the	cultural	and/or	social	elements	implicated	in	its	production.	When	Fiske	proposed	the	term	“television-as-culture”	(2011,	1)	to	indicate	the	centrality	of	television	within	the	economy	of	cultural	production,	I	suggest	that	he	also	–	wittingly	or	unwittingly	–	identified	a	social	structure	formulated	along	the	notion	of	myths.	The	present	section	seeks	to	delineate	these	processes	by	which	television,	as	the	scholars	above	noted,	has	secured	for	itself	a	central																																																									190	The	use	of	‘text’	refers	to	the	similarities	between	how	viewers	understand	television	content	and	the	reading	of	a	literary	text,	since	other	mediums	have	been	understood	through	the	original	conventions	established	in	literacy	and	the	oral	tradition	(Fiske	&	Hartley	1985,	2-3).	
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communicative	role	within	our	culture	and	society.	Primary	among	these	processes	is	a	system	that	Stuart	Hall	refers	to	as	“representation”	(2013,	1).		Hall	suggests	there	are	two	representational	systems.	The	first	representational	system	is	premised	on	what	Ferdinand	de	Saussure	called	the	signifying	system	and	works	to	correlate	ideas,	events,	people	and	objects	to	a	pre-existing	set	of	concepts	or	mental	representations	in	our	heads	(Hall	2013,	3-4).	The	second	is	that	of	language	which	translates	these	shared	conceptual	maps	into	a	common	language,	correlating	our	concepts	and	ideas	to	written	words,	spoken	sounds	or	visual	images	(Hall	2013,	4).	In	the	first	system,	Saussure	proposed	that	a	‘sign’	is	produced	when	a	‘signifier’	(the	language	or	physical	object)	is	correlated	to	a	‘signified’	(our	pre-existing	mental	concepts)	(Hall	2013,	3-4,	7,	20-21;	Fiske	&	Hartley	1985,	38).	In	this	way,	an	image	of	a	tree	(the	signifier)	is	given	meaning	when	we	correlate	it	to	our	conceptual	notion	of	“a	large	plant	that	grows	in	nature”	(the	signified)	(Hall	2013,	7).	This	literal	and	descriptive	understanding	of	the	sign	‘tree’	operates	only	at	the	denotative	level	of	the	signifying	system.	In	the	second	system,	Roland	Barthes	suggests	that	a	connotative	understanding	to	the	sign	can	result	when	it	is	read	through	cultural	themes	(Hall	2013,	23;	Fiske	&	Hartley	1985,	41-45).	At	this	level,	the	connotative	tree	is	now	associated	with	meanings	of	growth,	fertility,	vigour,	strength	and	nature.	However,	these	are	meanings	that	can	only	be	activated	when	they	exist	and	circulate	within,	and	inform,	a	particular	culture.	Susan	Hayward	explains	for	example,	that	a	photograph	of	Marilyn	Monroe	can	only	activate	the	proposed	connotative	meanings	of	her	star	qualities,	her	depression	and	untimely	death,	when	communities	have	seen	her	films,	or	can	relate	to	her	in	their	culture	(1996,	310).	In	this	respect,	Hall	views	representation	as	the	“process	by	which	meaning	is	produced	and	exchanged	between	members	of	a	culture”	(2013,	1).		
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	Figure	4.1	A	common	feature	in	Senario	is	the	kampung	house.	Senario:	Cucu	Atok	(2010)	&	Senario:	Jejak	
Kasihan	(1996).		Take	the	example	of	a	Malaysian	Malay	kampung	house,	which	is	a	common	feature	in	the	mise-en-scene	of	TV3’s	sitcom	Senario	(Figure	4.1)	(while	
kampung	is	more	accurately	translated	as	‘compound’,	the	most	common	meaning	is	‘village’).	As	a	‘sign’	in	a	majority	of	Senario’s	episodes,	the	kampung	house	embodies	sets	of	ideas	and	conceptual	maps	that	are	historically	and	culturally	situated.	Notions	of	Malay	tradition,	roots,	lineage,	preservation	of	culture,	adat,	and	family	are	probable	concepts	that	may	be	communicated	symbolically	through	the	sign	of	the	kampung	house.	The	historical	tradition	and	legacy	of	the	kampung	house	as	being	central	to	the	socio-cultural	Malay	community	(as	well	as	its	dichotomous	nature	within	the	discourse	of	an	urban-imposed	social	construct)	has	been	widely	documented	by	scholars	(for	example,	Shamsul	A.B.	1991;	T.	Yoshihiro	2001;	E.	Thompson	2002,	52-53).	These	are	the	historical	socio-cultural	pre-existing	conceptual	maps	that	are	being	correlated	to	the	sign;	without	which,	a	viewer	would	not	understand	the	significance	of	the	sign	‘kampung’	and	the	many	associated	discourses	that	exist	within	the	community’s	social	mindset.	When	the	‘signifier’	is	thus	linked	to	the	‘signified’	through	cultural	themes,	we	are	now	interpreting	the	sign	at	the	second	connotative	level.		Denotation	is	thus	only	a	literal	descriptive	understanding,	while	connotation	is	the	understanding	gleaned	through	a	certain	insight	of	cultural	ideas	(Hall	2013,	23).	What	this	implies,	is	a	certain	‘fixity’	in	shared	meaning	that	is	facilitated	by	
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a	code	that	governs	the	relationship	of	translation	between	our	conceptual	maps	and	language	codes	that	exist	within	our	culture	(Hall	2013,	7).	Meaning	is	therefore	stabilized	and	is	“fixed	socially,	fixed	in	culture”	(Hall	2013,	7-8).	This	process	of	interpretation	ensures	that	we	are	all	‘reading’	the	sign	in	the	same	way.	However,	different	meanings	can	be	produced	when	there	are	differences	in	conceptual	maps	and	language	codes	that	govern	the	subject’s	connotative	interpretation.	While	varying	meanings	can	co-exist	for	the	sign,	its	polysemy	can	be	limited,	or	‘fixed’,	through	the	imposition	of	dominant	socio-cultural	normatives.191		This	process	of	organization,	arrangement	and	categorization	of	concepts	and	ideas	is	key	to	our	interrogation	of	Malayness	as	represented	through	a	televisual	signifying	system.	These	two	representational	systems	are	used	to	structure	and	organize	our	concepts	in	the	production	of	meaning,	and	are	therefore	crucial	to	our	ability	to	function	as	culturally	competent	subjects.	The	‘fixity’	in	shared	meaning	stabilizes	a	sign’s	socio-cultural	meanings	to	constitute	a	cultural	subject	and	one’s	cultural	proficiency.	This	would	therefore	appear	to	function	in	the	same	capacity	for	Malay	identity	through	the	code	of	Malay	
adat.192		However,	one	obvious	question	regarding	Hall’s	process	of	representation	through	the	signifying	system	relates	to	the	circulation	of	meaning	within	a	specific	culture.	While	this	establishes	a	degree	of	fixity	in	meaning	communally,	it	similarly	works	to	exteriorize	cultures	or	communities	that	do	not	have	access	to	the	same	culture	bank.	How	do	communities	that	possess	little	or	no	experience	with	the	full	breadth	of	adat	for	instance,	interpret	and	respond	to	signs	that	require	such	fore-knowledge?	This	act	of	exclusion,	takes	on	new	significance	when	we	consider	that	TV3’s	Malay	sitcom	Senario	is	telecast	specifically	on	a	Malay	channel	that	is	meant	for	a	largely	Malay	demographic.	Given	that	Malaysia	has	a	diverse	multi-ethnic	and	multi-faith	citizenry,	what	do																																																									191	How	meanings	are	‘fixed’,	even	with	resistant	or	oppositional	readings	will	be	discussed	later	in	the	discussion	on	John	Fiske	and	Slavoj	Žižek.	192	The	meaning	of	adat	and	its	centrality	to	the	discourse	of	Malay	identity	were	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	
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the	two	representational	systems	reveal	about	the	inter-faith	and	inter-cultural	relations	within	the	nation?	Furthermore,	what	types	of	meta-discourses	are	contained	within	these	exclusionary	televisual	spaces	even	as	they	occur	within	very	public	channels	of	communication?	These	questions	will	be	addressed	in	the	next	three	chapters	of	this	thesis,	where	my	attention	turns	specifically	to	a	thematic	analysis	of	specific	episodes	of	Senario.		From	an	ideological	perspective,	Slavoj	Žižek’s	(1989)	reading	of	Jacques	Lacan’s	“ideological	‘quilt’”	appears	to	share	a	similar	theoretical	basis	with	the	representational-signifying	system	proposed	by	Hall,	Saussure,	and	Barthes	above.	Insofar	as	achieving	a	fixity	in	meaning,	Žižek’s	description	of	the	ideological	quilt	seems	to	address	the	same	result.	“[F]loating	signifiers”	of	“proto-ideological	elements”	are	described	by	Žižek	as	being	“structured	into	a	unified	field	through	the	intervention	of	a	nodal	point”,	also	known	as	the	point	
de	capiton	(1989,	95).	This	nodal	point	‘quilts’	them	into	place,	a	process	that	stops	the	slippage	of	meaning	and	as	a	result,	fixes	their	meaning.	The	point	de	
capiton	is	described	as	the	point	in	the	signifying	chain	at	which	“the	signifier	stops	the	otherwise	endless	movement	of	the	signification”	(1989,	303).	This	in	short,	‘fixes’	or	‘sets’	the	sign’s	meaning.		What	is	key	to	Žižek’s	description	of	the	ideological	quilt	is	that	ideological	space	is	initially	a	terrain	constructed	by	non-bound,	non-tied	elements	“whose	very	identity	is	‘open’”	(1989,	95).	Individual	elements	within	the	ideological	space	are	thus	undetermined	at	the	start.	Their	meaning	can	only	be	derived	contextually	to	the	other	elements	within	the	ideological	field.	What	structures	the	connection	between	one	ideological	element	and	the	next	(and	as	a	result,	imbues	them	with	meaning),	is	the	nodal	point	which	‘quilts’	these	free-floating	ideological	elements	to	become	parts	of	a	structured	network	of	meaning.	Thus,	a	sign	is	retroactively	given	meaning	(and	contextually	to	other	related	signs)	only	at	the	point	when	it	is	interpreted	through	a	“master-signifier”	(Žižek	1989,	112).	Varying	meanings	can	co-exist	since	these	free-floating	elements	may	belong	to	more	than	one	ideological	field	and	more	than	one	nodal	point.	Key	to	this,	is	the	master-signifier	that	organizes	them.	In	this	sense,	it	is	similar	to	the	
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connotative	stabilization	of	meaning	through	social	conventions.	Through	this	framework,	nuances	to	the	performativity	of	Malay	adat	for	example,	can	only	be	of	significance	when	one	understands	them	through	the	identity	Malay.194		It	is	clear	from	Žižek’s	description	that	every	element	of	a	signification	chain	functions	to	signify.	Nothing	is	devoid	of	meaning,	and	no	element	is	random	or	arbitrary.	Within	our	context	of	screen	media,	it	is	notable	that	this	relational	meaning-making	similarly	undergirds,	among	others,	the	contextual	nature	behind	each	aesthetical	element	comprising	a	set’s	mise-en-scene.	These	altogether	describe	how	the	polysemy	of	a	sign	–	which	Hall	had	earlier	suggested	can	be	productive	of	different	meanings	–	is	ideologically	‘fixed’	to	certain	dominant	meanings	through	this	process	of	‘quilting’	effected	by	the	construction	of	a	signifying	chain.	In	short,	the	nodal	point	acts	to	‘frame’	how	one	interprets	(and	makes	meaning	of)	the	disparate	elements	relationally	to	each	other.	As	we	will	shortly	observe,	this	is	a	process	that	John	Fiske	similarly	describes	as	the	production	of	dominant	preferred	meanings	within	a	televisual	text.		It	was	established	in	Chapter	2	that	Malay	identity	is	largely	determined	by	the	state.	In	Chapter	3,	we	discussed	the	potential	for	a	politicization	of	the	narrowcast	model	based	on	a	state	agenda	led	by	the	dominant	party	of	the	governing	coalition.	Additionally,	we	have	explored	how	TV3,	as	an	UMNO-owned	station	through	Media	Prima	Berhad,	is	perceived	to	be	targeting	a	largely	homogenous	Malay	demographic.	Framed	through	these	realities,	the	quilting	system	at	the	connotative	level	can	ensure	that	TV3’s	televisual	signs	are	read	specifically	through	conceptual	maps	of	Malayness	which	simultaneously	stabilize	their	meanings	to	a	dominant	few.	While	the	Lacanian-Žižekian	system	proposes	a	retroactive	construction	of	meaning,	these	meanings	can	be	anticipated	when	they	are	directed	at	an	ethnically	and	religiously	homogenous	demographic,	such	as	in	the	case	of	TV3.	This	homogeneity	in	turn,	accounts	for	the	ease	by	which	a	specific	interpretation	(amidst	all	potential)	can																																																									194	However,	this	is	tautological;	Malay	identity,	as	commonly	understood,	is	in	turn	largely	given	form	by	adat	–	one	reaffirms	the	other.	It	is	tautological	in	that	either	exists	only	insofar	as	the	Malays	believe	in	them.		
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be	encoded	within	the	sign,	which	is	to	say,	a	meaning	that	John	Fiske	(2011,	21)	suggests,	is	the	preferred	meaning	of	its	producer.		Fiske’s	(2011)	work	refocuses	television	theory	towards	a	more	audience-centered	theory	that	largely	revolves	around	two	central	discussions	–	realism	and	ideology,	and	subjectivity	and	polysemy.	According	to	Fiske,	these	underlie	all	television	genres	and	are	deployed	towards	the	ultimate	objective	of	producing	pleasure	for	the	audience/viewer	as	a	form	of	gratification.	Thus	the	role	of	television	in	this	capacity,	is	to	encode	‘reality’	as	understood	by	social	and	cultural	norms,	and	in	doing	so,	to	produce	a	cultural	text	that	is	appropriate	for	its	viewers	(Fiske	2011,	4-5).	This	is	not	the	production	of	reality	but	a	reproduction	of	the	“dominant	sense	of	reality”	(Fiske	2011,	21).	Fiske	explains	that	the	“essence	of	realism	is	that	it	reproduces	reality	in	such	a	form	as	to	make	it	easily	understandable”	(2011,	24).	This	suggests	that	reality	and	realism	as	encoded	on	television	is	a	reality	interpreted	by	the	dominant/mainstream	segments	of	society	that	has	since	become	socio-cultural	‘common	sense’.	This	representation	is	further	simplified	for	the	screen	to	ensure	it	is	easily	consumed.	Through	its	wide	propagation,	it	thus	encourages	or	provokes	a	dominant	ideology	of,	for	example,	masculinity	and	patriarchy.	In	this	sense,	by	providing	viewers	gratification	through	the	production	of	pleasure,	dominant	social	and	cultural	norms	are	made	‘digestable’	to	the	viewing	public	at	large.		Similar	to	both	the	Lacanian-Žižekian	and	connotative	representational	systems,	Fiske	(2011,	2,	90,	108,	145)	suggests	that	while	messages	may	be	encoded	within	television,	it	is	open	to	a	multitude	of	readings.	Furthermore,	while	the	producers	of	the	text	can	encode	a	preferred	subject-reader	position,	it	is	the	viewers	that	ultimately	make	meanings	out	of	the	text	at	the	point	of	decoding.	This	is	what	he	calls	a	producerly-text,	where	viewers	take	up	different	subject	positions	–	dominant	and	resistant	–	depending	on	their	preferred	manner	of	reading,	informed	through	issues	such	as	social	class,	gender,	race,	and	socio-economic	positions.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	sign’s	meanings	are	not	‘fixed’	to	several	dominant	meanings,	for	even	oppositional	or	resistant	readings	exist	only	in	reference	to	the	dominant	preferred	meanings	of	the	text.	
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This	is	in	fact,	observed	by	how	the	ideological	quilt	‘totalizes’	all	positions,	for	it	‘halts’	or	‘fixes’	meanings	by	referencing	the	nodal	point	(the	dominant	preferred	meaning)	which	contextualizes	all	potential	positions	to	itself	(Žižek	1989,	95-97).198		Fiske	describes	this	same	nodal	point	on	television	as	‘realism’	(2011,	21).	Televised	‘reality’	is,	in	this	context,	“the	dominant	sense	of	reality”	that	focuses	television’s	polysemic	potential	into	a	more	singular	preferred	meaning	(Fiske	2011,	6,	21,	64).	This	advances	Hall’s	proposition	of	fixity	in	cultural	codes,	though	in	Fiske’s	application,	it	is	ideology199	that	stabilizes	televised	reality’s	many	meanings	through	the	televisual	ideological	structure	(2011,	6,	64).	In	this	sense,	the	ability	of	Fiske’s	dominant	televisual	reality	to	naturalize	and	make	innocent	what	is	inherently	constructed	and	ideological,	is	in	fact,	similar	to	the	primary	function	of	‘myths’	(Hall	2013,	156).		Claude	Lévi-Strauss	explains	that	a	myth	is	a	narrative	that	has	been	preserved	through	generations	which	in	turn	legitimates	the	status	quo	of	the	present	(2001).	Roland	Barthes	argues	that	by	stating	the	fabricated	plainly	as	fact,	myths	serve	the	ideological	function	of	naturalization	(1977,	45-46),	a	process	that	enables	myths	to	turn	culture	into	nature	(1974,	206).	This	results	in	making	the	dominant	cultural	and	historical	values,	attitudes,	and	beliefs	seem	natural,	normal,	self-evident,	and	consequently,	like	an	‘objective’	and	‘true’	reflection	of	reality.	Its	function	within	television	is	thus	key,	for	myths	invite	audiences	to	identify	with,	or	disassociate	from,	characters	and	values	that	are	peddled	by	the	televisual	text.	While	these	theories	stress	the	importance	of	signs	to	culture,	its	utilization	by	culture,	and	how	signs	derive	and	convey	meaning,	of	equal	importance	is	the	way	signs	relate	to	one	another.	To	understand	the	full	scope	of	this	last	point	–	of	how	the	ideological	quilt	
																																																								198	For	example,	both	pro-male	privilege	(dominant)	and	gender	equality	(resistant/oppositional)	positions	exist	only	by	referencing	the	same	dominant	discourse	of	patriarchy.	199	Boundaries	are	however,	progressively	blurred	since	‘culture’	may	essentially	be	‘ideology’,	as	alluded	to	by	our	assertion	of	‘statist	Malay’,	for	example.	
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constructs	televised	‘reality’	–	it	might	be	best	to	frame	the	discussion	through	the	‘paradigmatic-syntagmatic’	(or	‘paradigm-syntagm’)	system.		John	Fiske	&	John	Hartley	described	a	paradigm	as	a	‘set’	of	units	–	each	unit	being	a	sign	or	word,	and	a	syntagm	as	a	‘chain’	“into	which	it	is	linked	to	others,	according	to	agreed	rules	and	conventions,	to	make	a	meaningful	whole”	(1985,	50-51).	As	an	example,	alphabets	(paradigms)	are	combined	into	syntagms	called	words.	Paradigmatic	(alphabet)	modifications	thus	result	in	different	syntagms	(words).	This	can	further	be	taken	to	a	broader	context	where	each	word	can	be	considered	a	paradigm	that	when	linked	to	other	paradigmatic	words,	create	a	syntagmatic	chain.	The	flexibility	of	this	systematic	relationship	between	signs	thus	allows	for	a	narrower	or	broader	construction	of	signification	chains	within	the	context	of	the	ideological	quilt.	Let	us	illustrate	this	process	with	an	example	so	it	is	less	abstract.		One	Malay	artefact	imbued	with	cultural	meaning	is	the	keris	(traditional	Malay	dagger	with	a	wavy	blade).	At	the	denotative	(literal)	level,	the	keris	is	merely	a	blade	used	as	a	weapon.	Reading	the	keris	connotatively,	it	becomes	a	repository	of	cultural	meanings.	The	keris	is	transformed	from	a	mere	weapon	to	that	of	a	Malay	spiritual	object,	imbued	with	a	presence	or	essence	possessing	magical	powers	that	can	aid	its	wielder	in	battle	(Farish	2010,	26-30).	In	a	televised	scene,	the	keris	is	then	held	by	a	Malay	male	character	who	is	dressed	in	the	garb	of	a	traditional	Malay	warrior	and	featured	in	the	setting	of	a	kampung.	Each	element	in	the	description	–	the	mise-en-scene,	if	you	will	–	is	a	repository	of	Malay	cultural	meanings.	In	this	instance,	the	keris,	the	male	gender,	his	Malay	ethnicity,	and	the	warrior	garb,	each	becomes	a	paradigmatic	unit	that	when	considered	in	relation	to	each	other,	constructs	a	syntagmatic	meaning	(ideological	quilt)	that	finds	its	nodal	point	in	‘traditional	Malay’.	This	nodal	point	of	‘traditional	Malay’	can	only	be	gleaned	when	one	first	understands	the	connotative	significance	of	each	of	these	elements	individually.	It	is	clear	in	this	example	that	if	even	one	of	these	individual	paradigms	is	modified	(say,	the	character’s	gender	or	ethnicity),	the	syntagmatic	meaning	would	change,	for	the	shared	cultural	conceptual	map	would	be	altered.	
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	Further,	other	characters	in	the	same	scene	would	function	similarly	as	individual	syntagms	with	meanings	derived	out	of	their	own	paradigms.	However,	individual	syntagm-characters	can	also	become	paradigms	again	when	viewed	from	a	broader	perspective	since	collectively,	the	characters	are	productive	of	meaning	when	understood	in	relation	to	other	characters.	This	constructs	a	wider	syntagmatic	chain	–	and	thus	a	broader	ideological	quilt	–	that	expands	its	reading	to	the	entire	scene,	rather	than	individual	characters.	In	an	even	wider	construction,	each	scene	that	is	a	syntagm	can	once	again	be	considered	as	paradigms	when	linking	between	scenes	in	a	broader,	inter-scene	syntagmatic	construction	of	meaning.	This	makes	clear,	that	within	the	paradigm-syntagm	construction	that	exists	as	part	of	the	ideological	quilt	giving	meaning	to	televised	‘reality’,	every	element,	act,	and	line	of	dialogue	–	as	well	as	different	permutations	to	each	of	their	combinations	–	is	productive	of	meaning	and	is	never	devoid	of	signification,	even	if	it	is	seemingly	random.		The	discussions	thus	far,	have	demonstrated	some	of	the	various	ways	that	significations	occur	within	a	televisual	text.	Further,	we	have	observed	how	meaning	can	be	derived	from	a	paradigmatic	detail	at	the	lowest	level,	to	affect	a	change	in	meaning	on	a	much	broader,	syntagmatic	level.	The	next	section	discusses	the	situation	comedy,	which	grounds	the	largely	theoretical	discussions	of	this	first	section	with	an	emphasis	on	how	the	representations	in	sitcoms	resonate	with	society’s	self-conceptualization	of	its	own	social	reality.		
The	Situation	Comedy		The	situation	comedy	(sitcom)	is	a	genre	of	television	comedy.	The	term	‘genre’	is	a	French	word	which	means	‘kind’	or	‘type’,	and	has	been	used	widely	in	the	study	of	literary,	television,	film,	theatre	and	other	media	theories	(Neale	2001,	1).	There	are	always	more	definitive,	yet	less	obvious	traits	beneath	the	explicit	characteristics	of	any	particular	genre	type.	Within	the	context	of	sitcoms	for	example,	Sioned	Wiliam,	then	Controller	of	Comedy	at	the	British	channel	ITV,		explained	in	2005	that	there	is	a	common	misconception	that	sitcoms	are	made	up	of	jokes	when	the	converse	is	actually	true	(Mills	2009,	24).	For	while	a	
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sitcom	can	be	“defined	by	its	comic	impetus”	simply	because	it	relies	significantly	on	that	for	“all	of	its	textual	elements”	(Mills	2009,	25),	less	obvious	factors	such	as	narrative,	character,	and	representation	do	play	equal	parts	in	defining	this	genre.	So	if	humour	or	comedy	does	not	solely	define	sitcoms,	how	are	they	defined?		The	academic	literature	suggests	that,	beyond	the	broad	synonymy	of	sitcom	with	television	humour,	the	sitcom	genre	continues	to	elude	any	rigid	or	precise	definition.	This	is	evidenced	by	the	diverse	and	differing	descriptors	of	sitcom	on	the	part	of	television	broadcasters	as	well	as	scholars	of	television.	Brett	Mills	for	example,	suggests	that	sitcoms	feature	metadrama	fleshed	out	as	an	‘acknowledgement’	of	the	audiences’	presence	through	the	addition	of	a	laugh	track	(2009,	31).	Kristin	Thompson	reasons	that	sitcoms	feature	recurring	characters	in	regular	settings	with	the	aim	of	telling	stories	in	an	entertaining	and	easily	comprehensible	fashion	(2003,	ix).	Alan	Rubin	observes	that	sitcom’s	primary	goal	is	to	be	funny,	and	is	thus	defined	by	its	humorous	content	which	audiences	watch	with	the	expectation	of	laughter	(1981,	159).	Mills	notes	that	sitcoms	are	filmed	in	front	of	a	live	studio	audience	to	mirror	the	genre’s	roots	in	theatrical	comedy	(2009,	14-15).	Britain’s	broadcasting	regulator,	Ofcom,	defines	sitcom	through	its	on-air	duration,	which	is	that	of	25-30	minutes	(2004,	Appendix	B).	This	is	used	to	differentiate	it	from	another	closely	related	hybrid	genre,	the	comedy	drama,	which	Ofcom	defines	as	being	in	excess	of	25	minutes	in	length	(2004,	Appendix	B).		Malaysian	broadcaster	TV3’s	definition	of	sitcom	is	similarly	vague.	Then	senior	analyst	for	TV3’s	Research	Department	Ahmad	Bashah	Mat	Wasi200	explained	in	2014,	that	a	programme	will	be	categorized	by	TV3	as	a	sitcom	if	its	objective	is	to	generate	laughter,	and	it	is	not	the	length	of	a	movie	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2014).	This	makes	it	evident	that	broadcasters	have	their	own	definitions	to	what	constitutes	a	sitcom,	which	explains	why	it	is	often	“open	to	negotiation	for	those	who	produce	it”	(Mills	2009,	2).																																																										200	Ahmad	Bashah	is	now	Manager	for	MPB’s	TV9.	
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Based	on	these	definitions,	it	becomes	clear	that	Senario	does	not	fit	perfectly	into	some	of	the	conventions	of	sitcoms	mentioned	above.	One	feature	of	Senario	is	its	non-recurring	characters	and	locations.	This	also	means	that	Senario	features	different	episodal	stories	that	do	not	relate	to	previous	episodes	(even	if	themes	may	recur).	It	will	also	become	evident	in	the	three	chapters	of	analysis	that	Senario	is	more	often	didactic	than	it	is	comical,	though	it	still	aims	to	generate	some	laughter.	All	of	these	do	not	entirely	align	with	the	descriptions	of	sitcom	mentioned	earlier.	There	are,	however,	features	of	Senario	that	do	fit	into	the	genre.	For	one,	Senario	is	recorded	in	front	of	a	live-studio	audience	and	it	does	include	laughter	from	these	audiences.	Of	more	significance	is	that	TV3	advertises	Senario	as	a	sitcom,	which	is	a	process	that	frames	the	viewing	experience	and	viewer	expectations	to	popular	understandings	of	television	humour,	all	of	which	potentially	affects	how	one	approaches	and	interprets	the	televisual	text.	Therefore,	how	accurately	we	define	sitcom	as	a	genre,	and	
Senario	as	a	format	is,	in	this	sense,	less	crucial	than	TV3’s	branding	of	Senario	since	TV3’s	labelling	largely	determines	the	boundaries	governing	the	consumption	of	the	text.	In	this	respect,	it	is	more	useful	for	us	to	regard	Senario	broadly	as	a	sitcom,	where	‘sitcom’	is	defined	simply	(by	TV3’s	definition)	as	a	half-hour	programme	characterized	by	its	television	humour.		While	the	preceding	discussion	sought	to	define	sitcom	(and	consequently	how	
Senario	conformed	with	the	genre),	we	shall	now	shift	to	a	discussion	of	sitcom’s	social	function.	It	is	evident	from	the	descriptions	of	sitcom	that	the	genre’s	boundaries	are	fluid,	though	one	defining	trait	is	still	its	comedic	impetus.	The	genre’s	reliance	on	laughter	is	important,	since	it	strengthens	emotional	bonds	because	of	humour’s	innate	social	nature	(Glenn	2003).	This	communal	or	social	collective	nature	of	sitcoms	is	further	enhanced	with	the	use	of	laugh	tracks,	for	they	simulate	a	homogenous	appreciation	of	humour	that	communicates	a	“collectively	agreed	notion	of	when	it	is	appropriate	and	inappropriate	to	laugh”	(Mills	2009,	103).		Andy	Medhurst	&	Lucy	Tuck	(1982,	45)	found	that	this	collective	experience	encourages	a	degree	of	‘conservatism’	in	comedy,		so	that	sitcoms	‘make	sense’	
		 126	
to	the	majority.	In	its	desire	to	reach	a	mass	audience,	sitcoms	may	generally	sideline	the	needs	and	ideologies	of	minority	groups.	The	resultant	unambiguity	that	is	central	to	their	success	functions	to	discourage	viewers	from	reading	the	text	in	a	variety	of	ways.	In	attempting	to	homogenize	the	text	to	create	this	collective	experience,	one	can	argue	that	messages	may	be	normalized	to	the	point	of	denying	alternative	ideologies	that	are	central	to	critiques	of	media	power	(Winn,	1985;	Postman,	1986;	Barker	&	Petley,	2001).	This	in	fact,	aligns	with	Fiske’s	notion	of	encoded	preferred	meanings	and	televised	‘reality’	that	was	discussed	previously.		From	a	cultural	perspective,	the	sitcom	exists	and	functions	as	a	socio-cultural	text.	While	it	may	often	be	assumed	to	be	a	self-evident	category,	it	is	reliant	on	many	cultural	factors	for	its	meanings	(Mills	2009,	2).	Here,	we	observe	again	that	signs	(the	comedic	elements)	must	be	understood	within	the	context	of	the	milieu	for	which	it	was	intended	before	any	meaning-making	can	occur	(Hall’s	fixed	socially,	fixed	in	culture).	Susan	Turnbull	observed	that	the	highly	popular	British	sitcom	The	Office201	for	instance,	was	rewritten	and	remade	in	a	new	format	by	NBC,	before	it	could	achieve	the	same	degree	of	success	in	America	(Smith	2009).	Turnbull	explained,	it	was	not	merely	that	the	comedic	forms	in	each	country	were	different.	American	societal	sensitivities	were	also	entirely	different	in	nature	from	British	sensitivities,	a	trait	that	Turnbull	attributed	to	a	difference	in	socio-cultural	environments	(Smith	2009).	In	a	sense,	she	explains	that	American	audiences	are	in	this	way	xenophobic,	being	more	conservative	and	less	open	to	things	that	are	unfamiliar	(Smith	2009).202	Turnbull’s	account	alludes	to	a	conscious	attempt	at	maintaining	ease	in	the	consumption	of	sitcoms	for	its	viewers	by	reiterating	that	which	is	comfortable	to	watch.	This	is	fundamentally	echoed	by	Mills	who	argues:	While	high-profile	drama	and	landmark	documentaries	can	be	seen	to	make	up	those	programmes	which	broadcasters	often	define	themselves	by	(especially	in	public	service	regimes	such	as	that	in	the	UK),	sitcom	has	quietly	and	consistently	given	pleasure	to	millions	for	decades,	rarely																																																									201	Turnbull	notes	that	the	popularity	of	The	Office	extended	beyond	Britain	and	was	sold	to	over	80	countries	(Smith	2009).	202	Turnbull	qualifies	this	by	noting	that	imported	non-American	television	content	only	made	up	2%	of	America’s	on-air	programming	in	2009	(Smith	2009).	
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occupying	the	rarefied	space	which	makes	up	the	landscape	of	television	history.	 –Mills	(2009,	4)		The	excerpt	suggests	that	sitcoms	are	inconspicuous	by	the	standards	of	its	society	for	the	primary	reason	of	being	consumed	with	little	fuss	and	attention	by	its	viewers.	This	would	of	course,	corroborate	with	Turnbull’s	case	of	The	
Office.	Turnbull	explains	that	the	British	version	with	actor	Ricky	Gervais’	“offensive”,	“racist”,	and	“sexist”	(Smith	2009)	main	character	David	Brent	would	have	hardly	been	inconspicuous	or	‘comfortable’	to	an	American	demographic	who	have	very	different	understandings	of	political	correctness.	This	feeling	of	‘comfort’	is	in	fact	integral	to	sitcom’s	popularity,	since	as	a	genre,	the	sitcom	goes	“out	of	its	way	to	fit	into	the	lives	of	its	viewers”	by	appearing	to	be	simple	even	when	it	is	actually	highly	complex	(Mills	2009,	4).		This	ease	of	consumption	is	further	reinforced	by	a	familiarity	with	the	sitcom’s	underlying	framework	which	Jane	Feuer	notes	is	“so	simple	and	so	easy	to	recognise”	that	it	is	literally	“child’s	play”	(2001,	69).	Thus,	further	to	its	subtle	underlying	premise	as	a	cultural	text,	the	intended	ease	of	the	sitcom’s	consumption	by	a	large	majority	of	people	imbues	it	with	a	significant	cultural	import	from	another	perspective,	that	of	culture	as	lifestyle.	The	flow	is	thus	circular,	where	the	expectations	of	the	audience	is	shaped	by	the	sitcom’s	familiarity,	yet	this	familiarity	itself	is	a	response	to	perceived	audience	expectations.	In	this	respect,	a	sitcom	does	not	merely	reflect	socio-cultural	norms	in	its	meta-discourse	at	a	textual	level.	From	the	perspective	of	viewer	consumption,	it	similarly	reflects	the	culture	within	which	it	must	be	made	suitable	for	easy	consumption.	This	circular	flow	is	in	fact	a	primary	reason	for	our	interest	in	TV3’s	Senario	as	a	gauge	for	the	Malay	social	mindset.		Entertainment	is	often	erroneously	accepted	as	an	“end	point	in	discourse”	and	mistakenly	perceived	to	only	offer	enjoyment	without	truly	positing	any	questions	or	ruminations	on	society	and	popular	culture	(Dyer	1992,	2).	This	would	speciously	imply	that	all	entertainment,	including	sitcoms,	does	not	encourage	or	require	any	critical	thinking	and	analysis	for	viewers	to	derive	
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enjoyment,	since	it	does	not	require	one	to	think.	This	can	only	be	true	if	sitcoms	are	understood	at	a	superficial,	literal	level.	Head	of	Comedy	at	the	BBC,	Jon	Plowman,	is	one	who	reasons	that	the	sitcom	must	be	more	than	merely	its	humour	or	comedy:	Comedy’s	about	character,	it’s	not	about	jokes,	so	I	will	quite	often	say	to	writers,	‘Look,	just	take	the	jokes	out	and	see	if	it	still	works’.	I	think	there	has	to	be	a	deeply	serious	thing	in	there	as	well.	If	you	look	at	all	the	great	sitcoms,	there	is	a	fundamental	question	to	answer	which	is,	‘What’s	it	about?’	And	what	it’s	about	should	be	something	quite	straightforward	and	serious.	Fawlty	Towers	is	about	a	man	who,	wherever	he	is,	his	aspirations	will	never	be	met	by	the	world.	He	could	be	running	the	Ritz,	and	he’d	still	be	upset	by	the	customers.	Absolutely	Fabulous	is	about	a	mother	looking	after	a	daughter	and	a	daughter	looking	after	a	mother.	
The	Office	is	about	life	in	an	office	run	by	somebody	who’s	incompetent.	There	has	to	be	a	fundamentally	serious	thing	which	is	the	thing,	if	you	like,	that	gives	it	legs.	 –	Mills	(2009,	57)		This	emphasis	on	character	rather	than	jokes	is	what	provides	the	sitcom	with	relevance	to	popular	culture	and	how	it	engages	with	social	norms.	For	while	comedy	is	the	vehicle	of	the	narrative,	it	is	the	fundamental	human	condition	contextualized	within	a	specific	societal	framework	that	is	the	true	appeal	of	sitcoms.	In	this	sense,	it	is	not	merely	social	norms	but	how	characters	themselves	interpret,	live	with,	and	experience	this	engagement	with	society.	More	contextually	to	Malaysia,	former	TV3	Senario	production	member	Hisyam	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015)	similarly	alludes	to	this	process	when	he	recounts	that	the	narratives	for	Senario	were	in	fact,	based	on	real-life	experiences	of	individuals	who	are	obviously	bounded	within	society’s	framework:	
Cerita-cerita	yang	berlaku,	…	kebanyakan	dia	adalah	cerita-cerita	yang	
berkaitan	dengan	diri	kami.	Cakap	jujur.	Ia	berkaitan	dengan	pengalaman	
kami-lah.	Okay,	contohnya,	kami	buat	cerita	bersolat-lah,	cerita	60-an-lah.	
…	so	kita	ada	kenangan	cerita	mak	bapak	kitaorang,	cerita	kita	orang	kat	
kampung.	So	benda	tu	yang	banyak	menjadi	tau.	…	Kisah	tu	kisah	benar.	
Cerita	tu	memang	rapat	dengan	orang-lah.	Cerita	tu	orang	mudah	terima.	
…	Kebanyakan	dia,	benda	tu	mesti	ada	kaitan	dengan	…	kalau	you	cakap-
lah,	cerita	tu	memang	ada	kaitan	dengan	ahhh	…	apa	you	cakap	tadi	–	ah,	social	trend	tadi.	Dia	[social	trend]	macam	fillers	je	lah.	Tapi	dia	punya	
teras	cerita	tu,	mesti	dekat	dengan	hati	orang	which	is	mesti	kena	dalam	
hati	orang.	Kalau	kita	buat	cerita	dengan	hati	kita,	ramai	yang	connect.	
Ramai	yang	connect	sebab	ramai	ada	pengalaman	tu.	
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The	stories	that	occurred	[in	Senario],	…	they	were	mostly	stories	that	were	associated	with	ourselves.	To	be	honest,	it	was	from	our	own	experiences.	Okay,	for	example,	there	was	a	story	about	[Islamic]	prayers,	a	story	set	in	the	1960s	…	so	it	was	a	nostalgic	story	about	our	parents,	our	story	when	we	were	in	the	kampung	[village	or	hometown].	So,	it	turned	out	really	well	…	The	story	was	a	real	story.	The	story	was	really	close	to	the	heart	for	many.	The	story	was	easy	to	accept.	…	Most	of	the	time,	it	must	be	associated	with	…	if	you	were	to	call	it,	the	story	must	be	associated	with	ahhhh	…	what	did	you	call	it	–	ah,	social	trend.	It	[social	trend]	functions	only	as	fillers.	The	actual	basis	of	the	story,	it	must	be	close	to	the	hearts	of	the	viewers,	which	is,	it	must	be	agreeable	to	the	viewers	emotionally.	If	we	produce	a	story	with	our	hearts	[a	story	with	heart],	many	will	connect	with	it.	Many	will	connect	because	it	will	be	a	relatable	experience.203	–Hisyam	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015)		From	Plowman’s	and	Hisyam’s	accounts,	it	is	evident	that	comedy	is	not	the	primary	variable	that	connects	with	viewers,	even	if	it	is	the	definitive	element	in	determining	the	text’s	classification	as	a	genre.	This	is	ironic,	for	it	seems	designed	to	misdirect	attention	even	as	it	comments	and	reflect	on	far	less	simplistic	societal	issues.	More	interesting	is	how	both	Plowman’s	and	Hisyam’s	accounts	describe	the	emphasis	on	characters	who	engage	with	social	conventions	to	articulate	the	realities	governing	their	lives.	Though	Plowman	refers	to	British	sitcoms	and	Hisyam	to	a	Malaysian	sitcom,	their	fundamental	considerations	transcend	what	are	potentially,	different	cultural	and	religious	values	of	Western	and	Eastern	audiences.		This	link	between	character	and	wider	society	is,	among	others,	the	‘relatable	factor’	that	resonates	with	viewers.	Thus,	if	sitcoms	require	cultural	contexts	within	which	the	televisual	texts	will	make	sense,	then	those	who	consume	these	texts	must	similarly	produce	these	cultural	contexts	in	order	for	them	to	feel	included.	This	is	the	same	tautological	premise	outlined	in	the	Lacanian-	Žižekian	system.	In	this	respect,	it	would	not	be	overreaching	to	suggest	that	
Senario’s	popularity204	might	be	attributed	to	its	success	in	televisually	constructing	a	relatable	microcosm	of	Malay	communal	reality.																																																									203	English	translation	provided	by	the	researcher.	204	Senario	was	produced	for	17	years	(1996-2013),	and	re-runs	are	still	telecast	on	TV3	and	on	HyppTV’s	video-on-demand	service.	
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More	Than	Just	Humour	To	further	appreciate	sitcom’s	function	within	a	broader	social	context,	a	discussion	of	Humour	Theory	may	provide	some	valuable	insights.	Humour	Theory	is	a	collection	of	works	from	seemingly	unrelated	disciplines	such	as	sociology,	politics,	psychology,	linguistics,	biology	and	mathematics	(Mills	2009,	76).	Three	distinct	approaches	or	categories	broadly	subsume	the	many	different	discussions	within	Humour	Theory	itself.	These	three	main	theoretical	approaches	are	the	Superiority	Theory,	the	Incongruity	Theory,	and	the	Relief	Theory	(Mills	2009,	76).	I	discuss	two	of	these	theories	–	Superiority	Theory	and	Incongruity	Theory	–	for	they	directly	relate	to	Hisyam’s	account	of	Senario.	I	am	interested	in	how	the	fundamental	themes	of	these	two	theories	on	humour	can	be	related	to	the	realities	of	producing	Senario	and	how	they	may	be	reflected	in	
Senario’s	content.	As	such,	I	frame	the	discussion	of	Superiority	Theory	through	Hisyam’s	account	of	specific	episodes	of	Senario	where	their	humour	were	deemed	unsuitable	by	the	censors.	The	discussion	on	Incongruity	Theory	will	also	draw	on	Hisyam’s	explanation	of	Senario’s	“cross-gender”	characters	as	a	source	of	humour	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	Framing	
Senario’s	comedic	impetus	broadly	through	these	two	theories	will	allow	us	to	situate	our	understanding	of	the	sitcom’s	subtext	within	its	broader	social	context.		The	Superiority	Theory	is	the	oldest	of	the	three	theories	and	has	at	its	foundation,	the	supposition	that	“people	laugh	when	they	feel	a	kind	of	superiority,	particularly	over	people”	(Mills	2009,	77).	For	this	reason,	humour	is	regarded	as	a	negative	emotion	where	enjoyment	and	its	subsequent	laughter,	is	derived	out	of	the	misfortune	or	distress	of	others.	Laughter	is	thus	seen	as	an	immoral	act,	which	prompted	Aristotle	to	view	humour	as	a	“sort	of	abuse”	(Mills	2009,	77)	for	this	is	laughter	‘at’	a	subject	rather	than	‘with’	a	subject.	Analyses	of	the	sitcom	as	a	platform	for	repeated	mocking	of	minorities	and	social	groups	find	its	roots	here	(Medhurst	&	Tuck,	1982;	Porter,	1998).		
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The	most	notable	development	in	the	Superiority	Theory	is	the	inclusion	of	Thomas	Hobbes’	work	that	viewed	this	humour	as	the	result	of	‘sudden	glory’	(Mills	2009,	77)	–	a	tactic	used	by	those	with	little	power	to	mock	others	to	reassure	themselves	of	their	own	dominance.	Hobbes	thus	viewed	humour	as	an	adverse	consequence	of	social	distinctions,	which	in	turn	revealed	the	relationship	of	humour	with	social	power.	Of	significance	is	what	comedy	actually	‘does’.	In	its	social	context,	this	humour	and	laughter	is	employed	by	‘inferior	groups’	to	mock	those	viewed	as	‘superior’,	in	order	to	point	out	that	they	are	just	as	flawed	(Mills	2009,	78-79).	It	is	no	surprise	therefore,	that	Mills	suggests	contemporary	broadcasting	regulations	are	in	fact	designed	to	regulate	the	topics	which	can	be	joked	about	in	an	attempt	to	mitigate	comedy’s	negative	effects,	when	compared	to	other	more	educating	or	“civilising”	television	genres	(2009,	78).		While	Mills	writes	primarily	about	British	sitcoms,	Malaysian	television	regulators	similarly	address	these	‘negative’	comedic	effects	that	are	identified	by	the	Superiority	Theory.	While	the	reasoning	of	the	Lembaga	Penapis	Filem	(Film	Censorship	Board	-	LPF)	is	based	more	on	national	considerations,	the	delimiting	of	certain	non-political	and	non-racial	topics	are	based	on	the	same	premise.	LPF’s	role	in	Malaysian	television	censorship	was	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	and	TV3’s	former	Senario	production	member	Hisyam	recounted	some	of	his	experiences	with	LPF	during	the	years	of	Senario’s	production.	He	mentions	10	episodes	that	were	banned	by	LPF,	though	he	only	remembers	the	titles	of	three.	In	Hisyam’s	following	account	on	one	of	the	unremembered	titles,207	it	is	clear	that	the	fundamental	logic	of	Superiority	Theory	is	present	in	LPF’s	censorship	considerations,	where	the	humour	of	laughing	‘at’	someone,	can	be	perceived	as	inappropriate	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).		 Hisyam:		 Lagi	dia	ada	kisah	yang	mak	dia	lari	daripada	rumah.	Mak	
dia	lari	daripada	rumah	sebab	konon-konon	birthday	mak	
diaorang	nak	surprise-kan	mak	dia	tau.	Mak	dia	terasa	
diabaikan-lah	,	orang	semua	ignore	dia	…	dia	sensitif	…																																																									207	On	checking	with	Hisyam	on	4	June	2016,	he	clarifies	that	this	story	refers	to	‘Mahligai	
Impian’.	
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zaman	itu	sangat	sensitif	sebab	kita	tunjukkan	macam	bad	on	mak-lah,	tapi	kisah	tu	kisah	betul	tau.	Serius	tau.	Kisah	tu	
warga	tua	yang	diabaikan	tapi	bila	kita	tunjuk	…	bila	realiti	
sangat	yang	kita	tunjuk,	and	lepas	kita	lawakkan,	LPF	rasa	
benda	itu	sensitif.		 There	was	also	a	story	about	a	mother	who	ran	away	from	home.	The	mother	ran	away	from	home	because	apparently,	they	wanted	to	surprise	her	for	her	birthday,	you	know.	But	the	mother	thought	she	was	neglected	since	everyone	was	ignoring	her	…	she	was	sensitive	…	that	period	in	time	was	very	sensitive	[to	themes	like	these]	because	we	portrayed	something	that	was	‘bad	on’	the	mother.	But	it	was	a	true	story,	you	know.	Seriously.	It	was	a	story	about	old	folks	who	have	been	neglected,	but	when	we	showed	it	…	when	it	was	too	realistic,	and	then	we	made	it	comedic,	LPF	found	the	issue	to	be	sensitive.		 Researcher:		 So	ok	ke,	kalau	cerita	tu	kalau	bukan	sitkom,	kalau	drama?		So	would	it	be	OK	if	the	story	wasn’t	a	sitcom,	if	it	was	a	drama?		 Hisyam:		 Ok.	I	think	ok.	Tapi	bila	kita	….	benda	tu	jadi	sensitif	tau.	I	
rasa	masa	I	nak	buat	cerita	apa	pun	takut.	(laughs)	…	
Contoh	eh,	realiti	kan	ada	anak	yang	kurang	ajar	dengan	ibu	
bapa	kan.	Tapi	bila	kita	tunjuk	on	TV,	benda	itu	jadi	komedi,	
…	Orang	gelak.	Benda	itu	macam	eh	-	asal	dia	kurang	ajar	
ah?	Asal	dia	jerit-jerit	dengan	mak	dia?	Ah,	tapi	kalau	
drama,	benda	tu	lain	tau?	Benda	tu	lain	tau.	Macam	you	buli	you	punye	mak	dekat	sitkom,	orang	gelak	kan,	benda	tu	
mesti	ada	orang	yang	tak	best	nya.	Sebab	benda	tu	sangat	
sensitif	untuk	komedi	….	sangat	sensitif.		Ok.	I	think	ok.	But	when	we	…	it	becomes	sensitive,	you	know.	I	think,	at	the	time,	I	would	be	afraid	to	even	write	the	story.	(laughs)	…	For	example	eh,	in	reality	we	have	children	who	are	disrespectful	to	their	parents,	isn’t	it?	But	when	we	show	it	on	TV,	it	becomes	comedy,	…	People	laugh.	It	becomes,	eh	–	why	is	he	disrespectful?	Why	is	he	shouting	at	his	mother?	When	its	drama,	its	different,	you	know?	It’s	different.	Like,	if	you	bully	your	mom	in	a	sitcom,	people	laugh,	[but]	there	are	definitely	some	who	aren’t	happy	with	it.	Because	it	is	very	sensitive	material	for	comedy	…	very	sensitive.		The	central	concern	with	Hisyam’s	televisual	narrative	above,	appears	to	be	its	potential	to	be	misconstrued	as,	and	perceived	to	be,	laughter	‘at’	a	subject	rather	than	‘with’	a	subject.	However,	this	is	the	exact	fundamental	basis	for	humour	identified	by	the	Superiority	Theory.	LPF’s	rationale	in	this	case,	is	that	
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the	comedic	narrative’s	polysemy	should	not	contain	the	potential	for	viewer	misinterpretation,	which	in	Hisyam’s	case,	is	the	misinterpretation	of	mocking.208	Of	equal	interest	is	also	how	the	Superiority	Theory’s	elementary	notions	about	laughter	and	humour	are	in	fact,	put	into	practice	as	legislation.	These	foreground	concretely,	the	function	of	humour	and	sitcoms	within	the	society	they	circulate	within.		The	key	concern	with	Malaysian	sitcoms	in	general,	revolves	around	the	previously	discussed	polysemy	of	a	televised	text	that	may	be	open	to	viewer	interpretation.	While	Mills	does	not	mention	it,	he	takes	on	Fiske’s	perspective	by	similarly	proposing	that	a	“variety	of	audience	positions	are	available”	within	the	text	(Mills	2009,	80).	This	explains	why	regulators	attempt	to	narrow	this	polysemy	through	constrictive	policies.	Further	to	the	potential	for	misconstrued	mocking,	Hisyam’s	account	also	reveals	a	concern	that	stories	may	be	too	realistic	for	sitcoms.	This	seems	to	contradict	Plowman’s	observation	that	sitcoms	should	be	driven	by	something	rooted	in	reality,	as	well	as	Hisyam’s	own	assertion	that	stories	need	to	be	grounded	in	lived-experience.	This	may	reflect	the	fundamental	logic	of	the	Asian	values	discourse	in	balancing	between	local	cultural	sensitivities	and	global	culture,	insofar	as	Malaysian	sitcoms	can	only	portray	certain	forms	of	‘realism’	or	lived-reality.		The	point	to	note	here,	is	that	the	episode	described	by	Hisyam	was	not	prohibited	on	the	usual	grounds	of	race	or	politics.	Given	that	TV3	is	a	Malay	channel	primarily	for	a	Malay	demographic,209	this	references	a	heavy-handed	attempt	by	the	state	to	decide	what	is	suitable	for	the	consumption	of	the	Malay	community.	While	an	argument	can	be	made	that	LPF’s	decision	in	this	case,	was	guided	by	an	effort	to	ensure	that	neutral,	uncontroversial,	and	non-offensive	content	was	aired,	there	is	another	facet	to	the	argument.	From	an	ideological	perspective,	the	determining	of	what	is	suitable	for	Malay	viewers	by	the	state,	
																																																								208	When	Hisyam	explains	that	the	mother	in	the	story	is	reflective	of	‘old	folks’	being	‘neglected’,	he	also	makes	explicit	our	earlier	point	that	sitcoms’	characters	(individuals)	must	be	understood	within	the	wider	rubric	of	their	society	(communal).	209	Discussed	in	Chapter	3.	
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references	Fiske’s	proposition	of	televisual	‘realism’	where	televised	‘reality’	is	“the	dominant	sense	of	reality”	(2011,	6,	21,	64).		LPF’s	rationale	thus	contradicts	the	basis	for	this	type	of	humour	when	explained	by	the	Superiority	Theory,	where	it	is	the	‘inferior’	or	‘marginalized’	groups	that	mock	those	viewed	as	‘superior’.	Instead,	in	the	episode	of	the	neglected	mother	(marginalized	party),	it	is	an	inversion	of	the	‘superiority	humour’s	social	power	dynamics	since	the	marginalized	party	is	protected	from	being	the	source	of	humour	for	the	dominant	group.	In	essence,	this	represents	a	mismatch	with	the	central	problematics	of	sitcoms	where	debates	over	stereotyping	of	marginalized	groups	for	humour	(Greene	2007;	King	2002,	143-147;	Mills	2009,	79)	seem	to	invert	the	Superiority	Theory’s	social	power	dynamics.212	It	is	precisely	this	attribute	of	duality	that	has	prompted	debates	over	sitcom	to	assert	that	it	is	a	highly	political	form	(Greene	2007)	since	the	“genre	problematically	upholds	power	structures	within	society	and	is	a	useful	tool	for	normalising	the	demonization	of	certain	social	groups”	(Mills	2009,	79).	In	all	of	our	cases	on	Senario	for	instance,	the	joke	itself	lies	with	the	victimized	party,	or	the	vulnerable	groups,	which	was	the	central	problem	that	LPF	had	with	Hisyam’s	runaway	mother	story.	In	this	respect,	the	Superiority	Theory	only	addresses	some	facets	of	contemporary	sitcoms.		The	second	key	theory	to	humour	is	the	Incongruity	Theory.	At	its	centre	is	the	understanding	that	laughter	is	an	oral	expression	of	the	surprise	at	confounded	expectations	(Mills	2009,	82).	Humour	in	this	case,	is	found	in	the	disparity	that	occurs	when	things	that	are	expected	in	the	sitcom	are	not	actually	how	they	are,	or	are	not	portrayed	in	the	way	that	one	expects	them	to	be.	This	unexpectedness	can	occur	in	a	myriad	of	ways,	from	the	inclusion	of	character	dialogue	that	isn’t	associated	with	the	narrative	or	a	scene	that	has	no	narrative	purpose,	to	the	parody	of	television	conventions	like	characters	walking	around	the	walls	of	the	set	rather	than	doors,	thus	breaking	the	‘rules’	of	broadcasting	(Mills	2009,	82-83).	It	could	be	as	simple	as	a	play	on	words	where	a	word	is																																																									212	To	reiterate,	the	Superiority	Theory	describes	a	type	of	humour	that	occurs	when	the	marginalized	group	laughs	‘at’	the	dominant	or	‘superior’	group.	
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used	to	mean	one	thing,	but	is	understood	by	a	character	differently,	resulting	in	unexpected	reactions,	quite	to	the	perplexity	of	the	originator	of	the	words.	Parodies	of	genres	for	instance,	rely	on	audiences	knowing	the	conventions	of	that	genre,213	and	it	is	these	expectations	of	the	conventions	that	the	jokes	undercut	(Mills	2009,	83).	More	recently,	this	approach	of	incongruous	humour	was	used	by	several	scholars	to	analyze	the	popular	American	sitcom,	the	‘Big	Bang	Theory’	(for	example,	K.	McGrath	2014;	S.	Walters	2013).		Incongruity	Theory	“clearly	positions	humour	as	a	cognitive	rather	than	emotional	phenomenon,	while	acknowledging	the	physical	process	which	is	its	outcome”	(Mills	2009,	83).	The	central	dependence	on	expectations	and	norms	is	clear,	for	unless	a	viewer	understands	the	way	things	are	‘supposed’	to	be,	the	incongruity	will	go	unnoticed	and	laughter	will	not	be	achieved.	In	this	respect,	the	deployment	of	stereotypes	is	thus	seen	as	being	a	‘safe	bet’	since	it	draws	upon	archetypes	that	are	socially	recognizable	–	even	if	they	may	be	inaccurate.	In	similar	fashion,	Barthian	myths	serve	their	key	function	here;	dominant	cultural-historical	values,	attitudes,	and	beliefs	that	have	become	natural	and	normal,	invite	audiences	to	identify	with	them	before	they	are	undermined	through	the	humour.			There	are	limits	for	this	approach	to	humour.	Pure	unnarrativized	incongruity	can	lead	to	confusion,	incomprehension,	and	even	distress	–	since	not	all	surprises	have	comedic	value	–	such	as	the	surprises	in	the	horror	genre	(Mills	2009,	84).	In	this	respect,	what	differentiates	the	incongruities	employed	in	sitcoms	from	those	employed	by	other	genres,	is	how	audiences	are	encouraged	to	read	sitcom’s	incongruities	in	particular	ways.	The	conventions	of	the	sitcom	such	as	the	laugh	track,214	are	in	fact	cues	that	make	it	clear	to	audiences	how	to	respond	when	incongruities	occur	(Mills	2009,	85).	Here	again,	Fiske’s	production	of	preferred	meaning	can	be	transposed,	for	within	Incongruity	Theory,	the	genre’s	conventions	work	to	ensure	that	incongruities	are	read	as	funny	rather	than	shocking	or	scary.	Central	to	the	notion	of	surprise	here,	is																																																									213	For	example,	when	watching	a	Western,	one	would	expect	to	see	horses,	and	cowboys.	214	To	reiterate,	we	noted	previously	how	laugh	tracks	ensure	that	viewers	all	find	the	text	‘funny’	at	specific	junctures	of	the	sitcom,	engendering	a	homogenous	response	to	the	text.	
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that	audiences	must	get	the	joke	rather	than	having	it	slowly	dawn	on	them.	In	the	case	of	TV3’s	Senario,	Hisyam’s	reasoning	on	the	show’s	use	of	“cross-gender”	characters,215	would	appear	aligned	(unknowingly)	to	the	Incongruity	approach	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015):	
Dia	cross-gender	ni	senang	nak	dapat	laughter.	Cross-gender	ni	senang	…	
bila	diaorang	jadi	perempuan,	laughter	senang	dapat.	Diaorang	gerak	sikit,	movement	diaorang,	dah	gelak	dah.	Dah	lawak	dah.	You	boleh	dapat	
benda	tu	dengan	(snaps	fingers)	lawak	mudah	tau.	Lawak	ni	pun	cepat,	
pantas,	easy,	dan	tak	yah	fikir.	Ah	…	tak	yah	fikir.	…	bila	tengok	diaorang	
jatuh,	jatuh	sikit,	nampak	movement	diaorang,	ah,	benda	tu	yang	jadi	
mudah.	Mudah,	mudah	sangat	dapat	laughter	jika	watak	perempuan.	Tapi	
watak	perempuan	ni	ada	bahaya	sikit.	Kalau	dia	jadi	over,	orang	tak	suka.	
Orang	jadi	benci,	orang	jadi	menyampah.	So	jadi	diaorang	kena	play	minimal	saje.	Tak	boleh	over	sangat.	Tak	boleh	ghairah	sangat	–	jadi	
perempuan	tu	tak	boleh	lah.	Tapi	…	ok,	maybe	they	look	like	pondan	tapi	
takde	dalam	fikiran	scripwriter,	tak	pernahlah	dia	buat	cerita-cerita	tu	
cerita	pondan.	Takde.	Tapi	watak	perem	(corrects	himself)	lelaki	lembut	
ada.	Watak	lelaki	lembut	ada.	It	is	easy	to	generate	laughter	through	cross-gender	[characters].	It’s	easy	…	when	they	act	as	females,	it’s	easy	to	achieve	laughter.	They	move	a	little,	their	movements,	there	is	already	laughter	there.	Its	already	funny.	You	can	get	it	with	(snaps	fingers)	humour	is	easy.	Its	comedy	that’s	fast,	quick,	easy,	and	you	don’t	have	to	think	about	it.	Ah	…	don’t	have	to	think.	…	when	you	watch	them	fall,	or	just	trip,	you	see	their	movements,	ah,	it	becomes	easy.	Very,	very	easy	to	get	laughter	if	it’s	a	female	character.	But,	female	characters	can	be	a	bit	dangerous.	If	it	is	overdone,	people	will	not	like	it.	They	will	hate	it,	they	will	find	it	disgusting.	So	they	have	to	keep	it	to	a	minimum.	You	can’t	overdo	it.	Can’t	be	too	enthusiastic	[or	too	extroverted]	–	as	a	female,	you	can’t	lah.	But	…	ok,	maybe	they	look	like	transgenders/cross-dressers	but	in	the	mind	of	the	scriptwriter,	it	was	not	intended.	There	aren’t	any.	But	fema	(corrects	himself)	effeminate	male	characters,	there	are.	Effeminate	male	characters,	yes.	–Hisyam	(personal	communication,	October	10,	2015)		The	incongruity	occurs	through	the	obviously	male	actor,	performing	as	a	female	or	as	effeminate.	In	this	way,	the	comedy	occurs	when	there	is	a	disparity	between	the	true	gender	of	the	actor	and	the	gender	performed	–	when	masculinity	is	feminized.	This	is	explicitly	identified	by	Hisyam	who	explains	that	it	is	a	humour	that	is	easy	to	achieve,	where	even	little	movements	by	the	character	can	work	to	elicit	laughter.	His	assertion	that	this	humour	is	triggered																																																									215	Cross-gender	or	cross-dressed	characters	were	banned	on	sitcoms	by	the	LPF	from	around	1999.	To	feature	such	characters	as	the	joke,	was	considered	by	LPF	as	an	insult	to	women	(Hisyam,	personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).		
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quickly,	without	any	room	for	thinking,	also	aligns	to	incongruous	humour’s	cognitive	process	rather	than	emotional.	All	these	are	further	grounded	on	social	expectations	as	the	basis	on	which	the	disparities	occur.		Mills	notes	the	Incongruity	Theory	reveals	that	humour	rests	on	diversions	from	social	norms	(2009,	87).	In	such	a	way,	it	can	be	used	by	sitcoms	to	demonstrate	the	artificial	nature	of	social	normatives	and	undermine	their	supposedly	natural	or	self-evident	state.	However,	this	works	both	ways;	it	is	as	likely	to	be	utilized	for	mocking	the	socially	deviant,	as	much	as	it	can	be	a	subversive	tool	against	the	status	quo.	Regardless,	in	both	cases,	this	theory	suggests	that	there	is	a	relationship	between	comedy	and	social	norms,	where	laughter	can	only	be	elicited	when	audiences	possess	an	understanding	of	the	norms	that	the	incongruities	rely	on	for	humour.	In	this	sense,	the	theory	can	be	used	to	detect	the	differences	between	one	culture	and	another,	as	well	as	the	(non)changes	to	a	culture	across	time.	For	what	is	revealed	as	suitable	comedic	material	also	exposes	what	is	unsuitable.	Both	in	turn,	uncovers	the	cultural	values	of	the	era.	In	short,	the	performance	of	what	is	incongruous	within	social	norms	also	reveals	what	exists	outside	of	these	dominant	normatives.	For	this	reason,	when	framed	through	the	Incongruity	Theory,	sitcoms	can	be	regarded	as	offensive,	anti-establishment,	or	excessive,	though	the	converse	is	also	true.		Both	these	theories	on	humour	engage	with	different	understandings	of	social	humour,	and	they	serve	to	account	for	the	social	worth	of	humour.	While	these	two	theories	originated	before	the	advent	of	television,	they	have	nonetheless	been	broadly	transposed	to	broadcasting	and	sitcoms.	What	is	significant	are	the	wider	societal	responses	to	these	comedies	that	actuate	their	social	function.	They	are	therefore	necessary	to	the	process	of	understanding	sitcom’s	importance	to	culture	as	it	places	comedy	within	a	social	context.	While	these	two	theories	are	not	the	only	theoretical	expositions	on	sitcoms,	comedy,	or	humour	–	for	the	corpus	of	work	on	these	are	vast	–	they	are	nonetheless	relevant	to	our	understanding	of	Senario.			
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Conclusion	By	establishing	the	relationship	between	broadcasters	and	state	power	in	Chapter	3,	we	are	presented	with	a	media	industry	that	is	monopolized	by	UMNO.	We	have	also	considered	that	with	Malay	media	drawing	the	largest	audiences,	the	state’s	monopoly	over	Malay	media	could	potentially	result	in	its	use	as	a	site	to	embed	a	nationalist	trajectory	to	the	narrative	of	Malay	nationhood.	The	present	chapter	demonstrated	how	this	argument	can	be	extended	to	TV3’s	sitcom	Senario,	where	we	first	addressed	the	polysemy	of	the	television	format,	the	political	form	of	the	situation	comedy	genre,	the	social	value	of	comedy	and	humour,	and	the	different	signifying	methods	by	which	all	these	are	represented	televisually.		These	theories	of	representation,	signifying	chains,	ideological	quilting,	and	televisual	‘reality’	as	applied	within	the	sitcom’s	socio-ideological	spaces,	serve	as	the	starting	point	for	our	analysis	of	Senario.	One	central	consideration	is	
Senario’s	format	which	differs	from	the	typical	conventions	of	sitcoms	that	have	been	discussed	in	this	chapter.	Senario‘s	non-recurring	characters	therefore	place	more	emphasis	on	how/what	its	characters	do	feature.	This	means	that	
Senario	is	not	able	to	progressively	develop	its	characters,	provide	the	nuances	of	the	real	world	that	it	mirrors,	or	critically	pose	questions	about	the	moral	positions	of	its	characters.			As	we	will	observe	in	the	next	three	chapters,	Senario	must	instead	establish	its	characters	and	achieve	a	bond	between	character	and	viewer	within	the	first	scene,	since	it	effectively	‘begins	anew’	with	each	episode.	This	places	a	significant	emphasis	on	the	deployment	of	stereotype	characters	since	it	must	draw	upon	archetypes	that	are	immediately	socially	recognizable	–	even	if	they	may	be	inaccurate	representations.	The	meanings	of	the	lowest	level	paradigms	that	are	represented	thus	become	more	significant	in	Senario,	since	they	affect	acute	changes	in	syntagmatic	meanings.	The	concern	is	that	Senario	then	skirts	towards	essentialism,	since	it	must	adopt	dominant	socio-cultural	conventions	of	the	lowest	common	denominator	for	it	to	achieve	mass	relatability.	Hisyam’s	account	of	an	effeminate	character	being	funny	for	instance,	similarly	relies	on	
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essentialist	notions	of	male-female	attributes.	The	final	effect	is	further	augmented	because	every	single	representation	in	the	mise-en-scene	is	productive	of	meaning	within	the	ideological	signification	chain.			In	the	analysis	of	Senario	which	follows	in	the	next	three	chapters,	I	shall	be	interested	primarily	to	observe	how	these	concerns	are	manifested	in	Senario,	and	what	effects	they	produce.	This	is	particularly	interesting	since	the	need	for	
Senario	to	have	an	‘immediate	relatable	factor’	means	that	it	needs	to	rely	heavily	on	popular	references	to	Malay	culture,	current	events,	historical	narratives,	and	political	rhetoric,	among	others.	Of	interest	is	how	these	popular	references	to	Malay	culture,	tradition,	and	religion	contribute	to,	and/or	reflect	the	wider	discursive	terrain	of	the	Malay	imaginary.	I	will	seek	to	observe	whether	subjective	affects,	and	the	experiences	derived	from	sites	of	inter-communal	exchanges	and	contestations,	all	represent	the	multitude	of	discourses	that	are	incorporated	into	Senario,	and	if	these	are	truly	subjective	or	statist.		 	
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CHAPTER	5	
	
Situating	the	Malay	Narrative	in	Senario	
	
Masyarakat	hari	ini,	dia	ada	beberapa	kategori.	Kategori	pertama,	dia	
betui-betui	paham	erti	kemerdekaan	…	yang	keduanya,	dia	paham,	tapi	
buat	tak	paham	…	yang	ketiganya,	langsung	tak	paham.	…	Hang	tengok	…	
sinilah	dia	penyakit	penjajah	la	ni	…	
	
Society	today	is	comprised	of	several	categories.	The	first	category	
understands	the	meaning	of	[the	nation’s]	independence.	The	second	
understands,	but	chooses	to	ignore.	The	third	totally	has	no	understanding	
…	look	…	here,	we	have	the	sickness	of	the	colonials	(or	colonizers)	…	–Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	(Abdul	Samad,	1996)		The	analysis	in	this	chapter	and	the	next	two	chapters	are	focused	on	interpreting	Senario	in	relation	to	the	broader	cultural,	historical,	religious,	and	socio-political	milieus	outlined	in	the	preceding	chapters.	They	are	thus	categorized	according	to	the	broadly	interrelated	themes	of	Malayness,	supra-Malay	and	Islam,	and	gender	relations,	respectively.	We	have	already	observed	that	the	nation’s	broader	religious	and	socio-political	milieus	shape	the	discursive	terrain	of	Malay	irredentism	that	undergirds	the	rhetoric	of	Malay	nationalism.	Focusing	on	notions	of	Malayness,	this	chapter	will	discuss	Senario	against	this	wider	discourse	of	Malay	nationalism	and	its	deployment	as	a	primary	constitutive	element	providing	substance	to	the	imaginings	of	Malay	identity.			Three	broad	themes	to	Senario’s	televisual	Malayness	direct	the	discussions	in	this	chapter.	The	first	is	the	urban-rural	dichotomy	exemplified	through	the	binary	of	New	Malay	and	traditional	Malay.	This	includes	a	strengthening	of	imagined	Malayness	through	a	shifting	of	Malay	adat	from	the	periphery	to	the	centre.	The	second	is	the	threat	of	the	West	to	the	Malays	–	the	us-them	othering	and	demonization	of	‘foreign-ness’	–	as	effected	through	the	relativist	Asian	values	position.217	The	third	is	the	construction	and	affirmation	of	partisan	historical	myths	that	validate	the	existing	dynamics	of	inter-ethnic	relations	and																																																									217	Former	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	Mohamad’s	aspiration	for	Asian	values	to	be	embraced	against	the	influence	of	Western	culture.	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.		
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political	structures	within	the	nation.	These	three	themes	do	not	constitute	the	complete	construction	of	what	it	means	to	be	Malay;	that	would	be	an	oversimplification	of	a	complex	group	identity.	They	are	however,	the	dominant	discourses	contained	within	the	televisual	text	that	is	Senario	and	are	broadly	recurrent	in	various	forms	throughout	the	episodes	analyzed.	These	three	themes	will	be	discussed	in	turn.		The	first	section	of	the	chapter	will	focus	on	the	theme	of	Malay	nationalism	as	articulated	in	the	episode	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	(Abdul	Samad,	1996).	We	will	observe	how	the	episodes’	characters	are	represented	as	direct	participants	of	the	independence	movement.	This	in	turn,	legitimizes	a	monolithic	historical	narrative	to	establish	an	ethnically	tiered	structure	of	Malaysian	citizenship.	This	will	be	followed	by	an	analysis	of	the	episode	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	(Jamil,	Ilya,	&	Norwani,	1998)	in	the	second	section	where	the	narratives	first	introduced	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	are	expanded	to	include	even	wider	themes	accenting	statist	Malayness.	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya’s	statist-traditional	interpretation	of	the	urban-rural,	West-Malay,	and	Malay-non-Malay	contests,	will	be	the	primary	focus	in	this	section.	It	will	be	observed	that	these	binaries	are	in	fact,	state	strategies	of	othering.	The	third	section	will	foreground	
Senario’s	deliberate	aesthetic	caricaturization	of	ethnicity	which	in	fact,	is	a	manifestation	of	Homi	Bhabha’s	concept	of	stereotypes	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	The	overarching	type-casting	of	non-Malays	through	visual,	aural,	and	behavioural	markers	that	were	first	introduced	by	British	Sinophobia	will	be	examined	across	Tandas	Awam	(Aznil,	&	Adiel,	1997),	Jejak	Karun	(Nizam,	1998),	Gong	Xi	(Muhd.	Sufian,	&	Kamalia,	2002),	and	Kantoi	Part	1	&	2	(Nurul,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011).	In	all	of	these	three	sections,	it	will	be	observed	that	the	characters	on	Senario	demonstrate	rhetorical	positions	that	are	ideologically	aligned	with	the	administration.		
Tanah	Tumpahnya	Darahku218	or	‘The	Land	Where	My	Blood	Was	Spilt’	One	of	the	earliest	episodes219	of	Senario	that	explicitly	addressed	the	theme	of	Malay	nationalism	is	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka220	(Uncle’s	Nation	[Has	Achieved]																																																									218	This	is	a	line	from	the	Malaysian	National	Anthem	–	Negaraku	(My	Nation).	
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Independence)(Abdul	Samad)	which	first	aired	in	1996.	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	tells	the	story	of	the	elderly	ketua	kampung	(village	head)	Pak	Teh	visiting	his	old	friend	Pak	Ark	and	his	wife	Mak	Bedah221	on	Malaysia’s	Independence	Day.222	The	couple	live	in	a	traditional	kampung.	Accompanying	Pak	Teh	is	Jefri	Lemon,	a	university	student	who	is	keen	to	interview	both	men	for	they	are	regarded	as	Tokoh	Kemerdekaan	(Independence	Leader[s]).	After	Pak	Ark	and	Pak	Teh	recount	their	struggles	prior	to	the	nation’s	independence,223	Jefri	wonders	if	Malaysian	youths	and	the	people	of	the	kampung	understand	its	significance.	Two	youths,	Ucop	and	Daruih	(see	Figure	5.2)	who	seem	to	have	adopted	non-traditional	habits	and	culture,	come	across	the	group	and	are	subsequently	questioned	about	their	understanding	of	the	nation’s	independence.224		It	should	be	noted	from	the	outset	that	as	a	sitcom	episode,	Negara	Chekpa	
Merdeka	comes	across	as	uncharacteristically	overt	in	its	didacticism.	It	is	sparse	on	humour	which	occurs	only	in	between	the	brief	interstices	of	very	lengthy	blocs	of	what	I	suggest	are	Malay	nationalist	rhetoric.	Very	little	actually	happens	in	the	narrative	with	the	characters’	dialogue	mainly	functioning	to	move	the	rhetoric	forward.	The	discussion	of	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	will	therefore	be	primarily	focused	on	the	narrative’s	unspoken	and	dialogic	rhetoric,	and	the	creation	of	the	rhetoric’s	basis	through	a	specific	interpretation	of	the	nation’s	history.																																																																																																																																																															219	According	to	Media	Prima’s	Resource	Centre	data,	this	was	the	seventh	episode	aired.	220	Unless	specified,	all	episodes	discussed	were	recorded	on-stage	with	two	or	three	non-mobile	cameras	in	front	of	a	live	studio	audience.	Further,	unless	specified,	they	all	feature	a	Malay-only	cast	performing	as	characters	who	are	Malay,	in	its	wider	polysemic	application.	221	Pak	and	Mak	are	terms	commonly	used	to	address	the	elderly,	translating	to	Uncle	and	Aunty,	respectively.	222	Mak	Bedah	is	played	by	a	female	actor.	I	point	this	out	since	male	actors	do	perform	as	female	characters	in	several	of	the	episodes	discussed.	223	Their	actual	contribution	towards	the	independence	initiative	is	never	mentioned.	What	is	recounted	are	the	struggles	they	encountered	by	living	in	the	jungles	of	Malaya.	However,	because	they	are	recognized	as	Independence	Leaders,	the	narrative	implies	that	they	did	contribute	to	the	nation’s	independence.	This	vagueness	in	Senario’s	narratives	is	present	in	all	the	episodes	discussed.		224	Given	its	narrative,	I	initially	assumed	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	(episode	7)	was	a	commemorative	31	August	National	Day	episode.	However,	this	is	not	the	case.	Its	exact	airdate	is	unknown	(undated	on	Media	Prima	Resource	Centre	records),	though	episode	11	(4	episodes	after)	is	logged	as	being	aired	on	10	May	1996,	which	suggests	that	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	aired	well	before	the	annual	National	Day	celebrations.	
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	Figure	5.1	Still	from	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	From	left:	Jefri,	Pak	Teh,	Mak	Bedah,	and	Pak	Ark.		 	
	Figure	5.2	Still	from	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	From	left:	Ucop,	and	Daruih.		At	the	start	of	the	episode,	Pak	Teh	hands	three	vernacular	language	newspapers	–	Tamil	Nesan	(Indian),	Nanyang	Siang	Pau	(Chinese),	and	Berita	Harian	(Malay)	–	to	Pak	Ark	and	his	wife	Mak	Bedah	to	read.	At	first	sight,	this	is	ethnically	inclusive,	for	the	newspapers	symbolically	include	the	three	main	ethnic	communities	into	the	wider	discourse	of	Malaysian	nationalism.	This	however,	is	the	only	reference	to	non-Malay	citizens	and	it	occurs	obliquely	through	the	
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newspapers	as	an	Andersonian225	phenomenon	of	national	imagining	(Anderson	2006,	6-7,	31-46).	As	signifiers,	the	newspapers’	role	can	therefore	only	be	explained	by	its	attempt	at	defining	this	national	inclusiveness	among	the	nation’s	citizenry.	There	are	two	interrelated	layers	to	its	signification.		The	first	layer	functions	to	dictate	the	criteria	of	inclusion	on	the	basis	of	inter-ethnic	dynamics.	These	three	vernacular	papers	were	chosen	presumably	for	their	political	association	with	UMNO,	as	well	as	their	symbolic	meaning	within	the	context	of	the	nation’s	leadership.	At	the	time,	the	leaders	of	UMNO’s	Indian	coalition	partner,	the	Malaysian	Indian	Congress	had	business	links	with	Tamil	
Nesan	(Mohd.	Azizuddin	2009,	39).	Nanyang	Siang	Pau	was,	at	the	time,	owned	by	Huaren	Holdings,	the	investment	arm	of	UMNO’s	Chinese	coalition	partner,	the	Malaysian	Chinese	Association	(Mohd.	Azizuddin	2009,	39).	Berita	Harian	is	published	by	NSTP	which	is	owned	by	Media	Prima	Berhad,	UMNO’s	media	investment	arm.226	All	three	are	dominant	ethnic-based	parties	within	the	UMNO-led	Barisan	Nasional	(BN)	coalition	government	that	has	been	in	power	since	independence.		Within	the	scene,	minority	inclusion	is	furthermore	made	possible	only	by	the	performance	of	the	Malay	Independence	leaders’	reading	of	vernacular	papers;	the	mediating	element	of	Malay	that	‘enables’	national	inclusivity.	Here,	Pak	Teh	and	Pak	Ark	are	signifiers	for	Malay	nationalism,	for	both	are	Malay	(pre)independence	movement	leaders	and	the	former	is	now	a	government-sanctioned	village	head.	Notwithstanding	Pak	Teh’s	bureaucratic	position,	both	men’s	significations	are	associated	with	UMNO	by	the	connoted	pre-independence	Malay	opposition	to	the	Malayan	Union227	that	led	to	the	
																																																								225	I	refer	to	Benedict	Anderson’s	view	that	national	imaginings	are	made	possible	through	technological	and	economic	advancements	in	modernity	(2006,	6-7,	31-46).	226	Instead	of	Malay	daily	Utusan	Melayu	which	UMNO	owns	directly,	Berita	Harian	is	presumably	chosen	because	like	TV3	(which	telecasts	Senario),	it	is	owned	by	Media	Prima.	Furthermore,	contextually	to	the	present	discussion	on	national	inclusion,	Berita	Harian	is	less	ethnically	chauvinistic	in	its	editorial	when	compared	to	Utusan	Melayu.	227	The	Malayan	Union	was	an	attempt	by	the	British	administration	at	unifying	the	Malay	Peninsula.	A	federation	of	the	Malay	states	and	the	Straits	Settlements	of	Penang	and	Malacca,	it	lasted	from	1946	to	1948.	Two	primary	factors	that	motivated	significant	Malay	opposition	to	the	Union	were	the	perceived	loss	of	powers	by	the	Malay	Sultans,	and	the	granting	of	citizenship	
		 145	
formation	of	UMNO	(Milner	2011,	152).	When	these	significations	are	considered	together,	one	connotation	seems	to	be	that	national	inclusivity	can	only	be	guaranteed	when	Malay	interests	are	protected	by	the	UMNO-led	
Barisan	Nasional	(BN)	coalition	government.	This	signification	will	become	clearer	when	the	Malays’	–	and	by	default,	UMNO’s	–	instrumental	role	in	achieving	independence	is	asserted	later	in	the	narrative.	Correspondingly,	the	implicit	quality	of	Pak	Teh’s	proposed	Malay	nationalist	meta-discourse	becomes	more	explicit	as	the	narrative	progresses.		The	second	layer	of	signification	is	particularistic.	It	structures	this	‘inclusive’	nationalism	through	Pak	Teh’s	wider	ideological	rejection	of	Western228	culture	and	values	–	what	he	terms	as	penyakit	penjajah	(sickness	of	the	colonials/colonizers).229	There	are	two	possible	explanations	for	Pak	Teh’s	rejection;	then	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	Mohamad’s	adversarial	stance	towards	the	West	and	Pak	Teh’s	notion	of	language’s	symbolic	value.	We	have	previously	discussed	the	Asian	values	position	proposed	by	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	in	the	1990s.	Mahathir	was	overtly	critical	of	what	he	viewed	to	be	Western	pluralist	democracy’s	emphasis	on	‘excessive	individualism’	and	its	predisposition	towards	predatory	interest-group	politics	(Milne	&	Mauzy	1999,	138-142;	Connors,	Davison	&	Dosch	2004,	141-143).	His	foreign	policies	tended	towards	what	Connors,	Davison	&	Dosch	observed	was	an	oppositional	“Asian	values	position”	that	prioritized	communitarian	Asian	values	and	culture230	(2004,	142).	Pak	Teh’s	rejection	of	the	‘colonizers’	sickness’	similarly	aligns	itself	with	the	fundamental	arguments	of	Mahathir’s	‘Asian	values	position’	against	the	West.	This	is	the	first	possible	explanation	for	Pak	Teh’s	wider	ideological	rejection	of	Western	culture	and	values.																																																																																																																																																															to	the	large	number	of	domiciled	Chinese	who	would	then	have	had	equal	rights	to	the	Malays	(Milner	2011,	151-153,).	228	In	these	analyses,	I	employ	the	term	‘West’	or	‘Western’	within	the	context	of	its	use	by	the	characters	on	Senario	to	refer	to	the	‘orang	putih’	(white	people),	and	their	similarly	ambiguous	reference	to	the	‘penjajah’	(colonizers/colonials).	This	also	aligns	with	Mahathir’s	deployment	of	the	term	in	his	political	rhetoric.	229	The	full	extract	is	featured	as	an	opening	quote	at	the	start	of	this	chapter.	Note	that	both	terms	–	sickness	and	colonials/colonizers	–	connote	negativity.	230	It	is	intrinsically	paradoxical	that	simultaneous	to	Mahathir’s	advocacy	for	a	progressive	Malay	category,	he	was	also	advocating	a	set	of	traditional	‘Asian	values’	in	opposition	to	the	West,	which	by	its	traditional	legacy	would	be	fundamentally	antithetical	to	the	former.	
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	The	second	explanation	is	grounded	on	a	rejection	that	finds	symbolic	value	in	the	contest	for	language,	for	only	vernacular	papers	were	handed	out.	While	this	contest	for	the	Malay	language	can	presumably	be	grounded	in	Mahathir’s	Asian	values	discourse,	it	can	be	traced	further	back	as	a	pre-independence	rallying	call	for	Malay	solidarity,	taking	form	in	nationalistic	slogans	of	“Bahasa	Jiwa	
Bangsa”	(Language	is	the	soul	of	the	Nation)	(Milner	2011,	233)	and	“Hidup	
Bahasa!	Hidup-lah	Bangsa!”	([If]	Language	Lives!	The	Nation	[or	Race]	Lives!)	(Roff	1967,	219).	However,	the	elementary	factors	motivating	these	slogans	are	arguably	the	same	communal	anxieties	over	the	future	of	Malayness	that	presumably	undergird	Mahathir’s	Asian	values	position.	From	this	perspective,	the	insistence	on	an	‘erasure’	of	English	by	prioritizing	the	Malay	language,	is	part	of	the	same	dialogue	of	rejecting	the	West.	Malay	language	is	consequently	ideologically	located	at	the	centre	of	Malayness	and	by	default,	the	wider	Malay	nation.	Malay	anxieties	over	the	status	of	the	English	language	persist.231	Its	present	permutation	–	threat	to	the	national	supremacy	of	the	Malay	language	–	is	largely	responsible	for	communal	resistance	to	the	English	language	today	(for	examples,	see	Kashuerin	2015,	Aizyl	2016,	Chan	2016,	and	Radzi	2016).	It	is	therefore	unsurprising	that	the	English	dailies	The	Star	and	The	New	Straits	
Times	are	omitted	by	Pak	Teh.		Language	thus	functions	as	a	historically-determined	ideological	component	of	Pak	Teh’s	Malay	nationalism.	Pak	Teh’s	omission	symbolically	denies	a	space	for	Western	culture	and	values	within	the	discourse	of	Malay(sian)	nationalism.	Within	this	ideological	field,	Pak	Teh’s	earlier	performance	of	national	inclusiveness	towards	Malaysia’s	minority	citizenry	appears	to	be	operative	only	under	the	wider	binary	of	colonizer-colonized.	This	is	central	to	the	scene’s	second	layer	of	signification.	This	us-them	othering	of	Malaysians-colonizers/Westerners	will	be	brought	into	sharper	relief,	when	we	analyze	Pak	Teh’s	criticisms	of	the	two	youths,	Ucop	and	Daruih.																																																										231	See	Enloe	(1967,	153-157)	for	early	developments	of	Malay	anxiety	over	language.	See		“Wanita	to	highlight,”	(2014)	and	Zulhilmi	(2015)	for	more	recent	public	expressions	of	these	same	anxieties.	Note	that	these	cases	are	more	than	37	years	apart.	
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Ucop	and	Daruih’s	on-screen	introduction	is	preceded	by	Pak	Teh’s	polemic	on	society.	He	explains	that	the	first	category	in	society	today,	understands	the	meaning	of	Malaysian	independence.	The	second	category	similarly	understands,	but	chooses	to	ignore	its	meaning.	The	third	societal	category	however,	has	no	understanding	whatsoever	because	they	are	afflicted	with	‘colonizers’	sickness’	(or	sickness	of	the	colonials/colonizers).232		When	Jefri	asks	about	the	motivations	of	this	third	societal	group,	Pak	Teh	is	unable	to	answer.	At	this	point,	Ucop	and	Daruih,	dressed	in	comparatively	more	urban	clothing,	boisterously	enter	the	scene	(see	Figure	5.2).	With	headphones	on,	they	are	listening	to	what	is	presumed	to	be	Western-influenced	music	as	they	mimic	the	sounds.233	The	timely	introduction	of	the	youths	serves	as	an	‘answer	by	example’	regarding	this	third	category	that	is	afflicted	with	‘colonizers’	sickness’.	Pak	Teh	exclaims	“Tak	payah	aku	jawab.	Hang	nak	tengok	
jawapan,	dia	di	sini”	(There’s	no	need	for	my	answer.	If	you	want	to	see	the	answer,	its	right	here).	This	is	a	visual	confirmation	of	what	may	earlier	have	been	mere	rhetoric	on	the	part	of	Pak	Teh	–	since	Jefri’s	request	for	clarification	carried	an	implicit	need	for	verification.	The	entry	of	the	two	youths	thus	serves	to	deprive	the	sign	–	‘colonizers’	sickness’	–	of	its	un-specificity	and	grounds	it	with	an	explicit,	observable	context	that	invokes	the	myth	of	‘incompatible’	Western	culture.		In	this	instance,	the	myth	is	validated	from	two	directions.	The	first	is	provided	by	specificity	that	formulates	its	denotative	meaning.	The	myth	needs	to	relate	specifically	and	accurately	to	similar	realities	that	can	be	seen	–	hence	its	actuation	through	the	observable	‘answer	by	example’.	In	this	way,	the	habits,	values,	and	attitudes	of	youths	who	act	beyond	the	boundaries	of	Malay	adat	by	mimicking	what	is	discernibly	observed	through	mass	media	as	Western	culture,																																																									232	Translated	from	“Masyarakat	hari	ini,	dia	ada	beberapa	kategori.	Kategori	pertama,	dia	betui-
betui	paham	erti	kemerdekaan	…	yang	keduanya,	dia	paham,	tapi	buat	tak	paham	…	yang	
ketiganya,	langsung	tak	paham.	…	Hang	tengok	…	sinilah	dia	penyakit	penjajah	la	ni	…”	233	Another	performance	of	their	Western	habits	is	through	their	greeting	to	Jefri.	Instead	of	the	usual	salam,	it	is	(said	in	English)	“Yo!”	by	Ucop,	and	“Hey	friend!	Long	time	no	see!”	by	Daruih.	A	
salam	as	practiced	in	Malaysia,	is	a	Muslim	way	of	greeting	another	Muslim	that	refers	to	the	spoken	“Assalamualaikum”	(Peace	be	upon	you).	Towards	an	elder,	it	can	be	accompanied	with	a	deferential	clasping	of	the	elder’s	hand	with	both	palms.	
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becomes	relationally	linked	by	its	televisual	sign	to	observable	lived	reality.	Their	display	of	individualism	–	by	differing	from	the	coherent	traditional	adat-adhering	kampung-unit	–	contrasts	with	Mahathir’s	Asian	values	position	that	prioritized	communitarianism,	the	role	of	discipline	for	the	common	good	and	what	Carolina	Lopez	(2008,	56)	observed	was	deference	to	authority.	The	scene’s	denotative	‘accuracy’	in	mirroring	lived	reality	thus	catalyzes	the	myth’s	second	meaning.	The	second	meaning	is	connotative	and	occurs	through	the	fulfilment	of	viewers’	cultural	expectations	of	what	are	perceived	in	reality	as	foreign	threats	to	traditional	Malay	values	and	culture.		These	meanings	are	contained	in	the	sign	‘penjajah’	(colonials	or	colonizers),	whose	deployment	consequently	activates	the	myth	and	both	its	validating	denotative	and	connotative	meanings.	The	mnemonic	association	of	‘incompatible	culture’	or	‘transgressive	behaviour’	(against	the	rubric	of	adat)	to	the	signifier	of	colonizers-colonials	is	not	accidental.	The	signifying	chain	of	‘independence	leaders’,	‘colonizers’,	and	‘anti-colonial	heroes’	completes	the	connotation	to	narratives	of	heroic	feudal	Malay	struggles	–	Maharaja	Lela,	Mat	Kilau,234	and	Tok	Janggut,235	for	instance	–	against	the	British	colonial	administration.	These	individuals	have	since	been	hailed	as	national	heroes	and	as	anti-colonial	fighters,	though	whether	their	true	motivation	was	Malay	nationalism,	has	been	a	point	of	much	academic	rather	than	social	or	political	debates.236		
																																																								234	Maharaja	Lela	is	known	for	leading	the	uprising	against	the	British	in	Perak	when	James	Birch,	the	first	British	Resident	in	Perak,	reneged	on	the	terms	of	the	1874	Pangkor	Treaty.	Birch	was	assassinated	and	Lela	was	subsequently	tried	and	hanged	by	the	British	administration	(Black	2014,	xvii-xviii).	Mat	Kilau	is	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	anti-British	uprising	in	Pahang	that	occurred	between	the	years	of	1891	and	1895	(Black	2014,	xviii).	235	Tok	Janggut	is	best	known	for	‘leading’	(or	starting)	a	peasant	uprising	against	the	colonial	administration	in	Pasir	Putih,	Kelantan,	that	lasted	from	29	April	to	24	May	1915.	While	he	is	presented	as	a	Malay	hero,	the	dominant	narrative	places	his	loyalties	with	the	common	people	rather	than	the	Sultan	(who	was	advised	by	the	British),	against	whom	he	rebelled.	However,	different	studies	have	described	his	motivations	as	ranging	from	(1)	resistance	to	injustice	over	taxation,	(2)	a	Jihad	(Islamic	holy	war),	(3)	political	manoeuvrings	of	Malay	feudal	lords,	(3)	ousting	of	the	Kelantanese	royalty,	to	(4)	personal	revenge	over	the	murder	of	his	father	(Cheah	2006,	19-32).	236	For	instance,	Cheah	Boon	Kheng’s	work	(2006),	which	explores	the	variety	of	historical	accounts	that	often	construct	narratives	revealing	contradicting	motivations.	
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The	sequence	of	the	events	–	the	postulating	of	‘colonizers’	sickness’	followed	by	the	‘answer	by	example’	that	activates	the	myth	–	provides	a	syntagmatic	chain	that	supports	and	validates	Pak	Teh’s	forthcoming	criticisms	of	the	conduct	and	attitude	of	the	youths.	In	this	sense,	the	chain	of	signification	functions	on	a	self-validating	cycle	that	is	tautological,	where	opposition	to	Western	values	exists	only	insofar	as	it	is	sustained	by	the	Malay	community’s	vested	belief	in	the	myth	of	the	culturally	transgressive	Western	subject.	Through	Jefri	however,	the	narrative	attempts	to	mediate	this	overt	rejection	by	offering	a	recourse	for	the	recovery	of	Malay	essence	which	in	this	context,	is	ideologically	sutured	to	Malay	nationalism.		Jefri	explains	that	his	father	is	Jawa	(Javanese)	and	his	mother	is	an	orang	putih	(white	person).	To	this,	Mak	Bedah	says	“Anak	campur-la	ni”	(You’re	[of]	mixed	[parentage]	then).	Jefri	admits,	“nak	kata	Melayu	pun	bukan,	Jawa	pun	bukan,	
orang	putih	pun	bukan”	(can’t	really	be	called	a	Malay,	Javanese,	or	even	‘white’).	By	his	own	explanation,	Jefri’s	mixed	parentage	categorizes	him	in	the	hybrid-Malay,	New	Malay,	or	Other	Malay	category	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	While	these	categories	are	part	of	the	urban-rural	dichotomy,	Jefri’s	acceptance	by	both	Independence	Leaders	as	Malay,	is	televisually	observed	to	be	unproblematic.		Jefri’s	admission	of	not	fitting	into	any	traditional	ethnic	or	cultural	typecast,	seems	an	expression	of	awareness	and	acknowledgement	of	a	certain	‘lack’	that	precludes	his	inclusion	in	any	category	not	defined	solely	through	citizenship.	However,	while	Ucop	and	Daruih	‘deny’	their	heritage	through	a	wilful	adoption	of	Western	culture,	Jefri	is	keen	on	connecting	with,	or	strengthening,	his	Malay	roots	by	understanding	Malaysian	nationalism	through	Pak	Teh’s	and	Pak	Ark’s	Malay	nationalist	interpretation.	Given	that	Jefri	is	culturally	hybrid,	it	is	curious	that	in	this	instance	and	the	entire	episode	in	fact,	the	issue	of	religion	or	Islam	does	not	arise	and	is	a	non-issue.	While	a	Muslim	cannot	legally	marry	a	non-Muslim	in	Malaysia,	it	is	never	stated	in	the	narrative	if	Jefri’s	parents	were	married	in	Malaysia	or	overseas.	Since	his	mother	is	‘white’,	the	possibility	that	Jefri	is	non-Muslim	exists	until	he	gives	the	Muslim	greeting	“Assalamualaikum”	(Peace	be	upon	you)	to	his	elders	and	to	the	two	youths	when	he	meets	them.	
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This	suggests	that	the	normative	of	‘Malays	are	Muslims,	Muslims	are	Malays’	–	irrespective	of	which	polysemic	interpretation	to	Malay	is	used	–	is	not	just	present,	but	hints	at	the	degree	of	its	naturalization	for	it	does	not	even	warrant	any	notice	by	the	characters.	The	degree	of	naturalization	of	this	televisual	proposition	works	in	turn	to	reaffirm	the	logic	of	the	normative.238		Jefri’s	implicit,	unspoken	Malaysian	nationality	–	even	if	he	is	Javanese-‘white’	in	origin	and	thus	‘foreign’	–	and	his	automatic	inclusion	into	the	Malay	category,	however	conflicted,	isn’t	just	predicated	on	his	status	as	both	a	bumiputeh239	by	Khoo	G.C.’s	definition	or	an	Other	Malay240	by	Kahn’s	definition.	Jefri’s	inclusion	to	either	category	is	enabled	only	through	his	supra-Malay	Javanese	roots	–	what	ex-premier	Mahathir	viewed	as	part	of	the	Malays’	‘feudal	past’	(Milner	2011,	233-234).	A	popular	recursive	political	rhetoric	that	centres	on	the	notion	of	a	supra-Malay	category	was	identified	by	William	Roff	(1967,	232-233)	and	Anthony	Milner	(2011,	147,	148,	152,	155,	157-159)	as	the	cross-Archipelago	
Melayu	Raya	(Greater	Malaydom).	Farish	Noor	(2002,	92-100)	termed	this	same	political	concept	as	Malaya-Raya.	This	was	a	political	(or	ideological)	movement	that	sought	to	unify	the	variegated	communities	into	one	great	nation	of	bangsa	
Melayu	(Malay	race/nation).241	More	explicitly,	Milner	observed	that	from	as	early	as	the	1920s,	Malayan	historian	and	social	critic	Abdul	Hadi	postulated	that	the	Javanese	are	regarded	as	part	of	the	category	of	Malay	(2011,	129).		Therefore,	while	Jefri	is	not	peninsular	Malay	and	is	in	fact	Javanese,242	he	is	still	widely	considered	Malay	by	virtue	of	being	part	of	a	supra-category	that	existed																																																									238	Analyses	of	the	theme	of	Islam	in	Senario	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	239	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	‘bumiputeh’	is	formed	from	the	words	‘bumiputera’	(sons	of	the	soil)	and	‘orang	puteh’	(white	man).	It	refers	to	the	children	of	Malays	who	have	gone	overseas	and	returned	to	Malaysia	with	their	foreign	‘white’	spouses.	The	word	‘bumi’	in	the	term	references	their	access	to	Malay-only	or	bumiputera	privileges.	240	I	refer	to	Kahn’s	deployment	of	the	epithet	to	addressing	those	Malays	who	were	originally	from	Indonesia	but	have	been	living	in	Malaysia.	They	are	thus	different	in	attitude	and	still	practise	their	own	heritage	and	culture	that	are	different	from	the	peninsular	Malays	(Kahn	2006,	xix-xx).	241	Dismissing	geo-political	borders,	Malay	radicals	regard	the	original	inhabitants	of	the	Malay	Archipelago	as	part	of	the	supra-Malay	category.	This	includes	diasporic	Malay	communities	from	as	far	afield	as	Cape	Town,	South	Africa.	See	Milner	(2011)	and	Farish	(2002,	82-103)	for	more.	242	In	this	instance,	I	refer	specifically	to	Jefri’s	paternal	ancestry	because	within	the	context	of	our	discussion	on	his	Malay	identity,	only	his	Javanese	ancestry	qualifies	as	‘Malay’.	
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from	a	‘feudal	past’.	It	is	however,	curious	that	while	Jefri	explicitly	states	that	he	is	not	entirely	‘Malay’	and	identifies	as	half-Javanese,	he	speaks	peninsular/Malaysian	Malay	rather	than	Indonesian	Malay.	As	we	shall	observe	in	the	proceeding	chapters,	some	of	the	characters	playing	Indonesians,	do	speak	in	Indonesian.	Jefri’s	spoken	Malay	thus	seems	to	encapsulate	the	ambivalence	of	Malay/supra-Malay	identity	that	lies	at	the	fundamental	condition	of	Malayness.	Perhaps	this	reflects	the	untenable	nature	of	the	politically-motivated	Melayu-
Raya	concept,	for	unlike	what	is	popularly	imagined,	there	are	no	genuinely	monolithic	boundaries	to	what	is	Malay.		Within	the	episode’s	narrative	however,	Jefri’s	Javanese	ancestry	creates	a	wholly	acceptable	recourse	to	constitute	a	(Peninsular)	Malay	identity.	Within	this	paradoxical	rubric	of	continuity	and	change,	Jefri	represents	the	straddling	of	a	middle	ground	between	the	strident	Malay	nationalist	positions	of	Pak	Teh	and	Pak	Ark,	and	the	oppositional	cultural	denial	of	Ucop	and	Daruih.	However,	as	observed	through	Jefri’s	character,	this	conciliatory	position	is	only	possible	when	the	subject	chooses	a	trajectory	that	aspires	to	the	nationalist	imaginary	of	Malay.	In	such	a	position,	the	televisual	sign	‘Jefri’	functions	as	the	mediating	force	between	the	diametrical	positions	of	the	Malay	‘traditional’-‘modern’	binary.	Given	the	episode	was	aired	during	Mahathir’s	premiership,	it	would	seem	unsurprising	that	this	middle-ground	is	offered,	for	as	observed	in	Chapter	2,	Mahathir	was	responsible	for	the	New	Malay	and	Malaysia	Incorporated	national	initiatives	that	represented	a	shift	from	‘traditional’	Malay.		The	foregoing	analysis	has	thus	far	focused	on	the	signification	contained	within	what	is	primarily	a	very	lengthy	narrative	exposition.	Now	we	will	turn	to	
Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka’s	construction	of	historical	myths	and	its	socio-political	predilections	which	seem	grounded	in,	and	validated	by,	these	historical	myths.	In	describing	how	the	nation	gained	independence,	Daruih	reveals	that	his	understanding	is	wholly	informed	by	lessons	in	school.244	He	then	explains,	“Dulu	masa	…	sebelum	merdeka	dulu,	orang	Melayu	pegi	perang	sana,	perang	sini.																																																									244	Interestingly,	this	bridges	the	previous	point	in	Chapter	1	where	we	discussed	the	association	of	Senario’s	effects	on	children,	and	school	curriculum	as	a	state	ideological	vehicle.	
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Jumpak	Jepun,	jumpak	orang	putih.	Mintak	lepaskan	kitaorang	Melayu	ini.”	(In	the	past,	before	independence,	the	Malays	were	warring	here	and	there.	They	met	[or	fought]	the	Japanese,	and	the	‘whites’.	Asked	that	the	Malays	be	freed/released).	Though	Daruih	was	previously	seen	as	westernized	and	symptomatic	of	the	‘colonizers’	sickness’,	the	accuracy	of	his	explanation	informed	by	national	education,	is	not	disputed	by	his	elders.		Not	only	does	this	endorse	the	‘truism’	of	the	‘official’	account,	an	implicit	distinction	is	made	between	the	Malays	who	are	imagined	as	active	independence	fighters	and	the	non-Malay	communities	domiciled	in	Malaya	at	the	time.	What	is	more	problematic	however,	is	Daruih’s	conflation	of	Malay	struggles	–	insurrections	against	the	British,	struggles	against	the	Japanese	during	World	War	2,	the	subsequent	Malay	political	opposition	to	the	Malayan	Union	conceived	by	the	British,	and	the	independence	negotiations	with	the	metropole	–	into	a	one-dimensional	timeline.	The	suturing	of	events	that	ranged	from	the	late	1700s	to	the	mid-1900s	glosses	over	the	distinct	contributions	of	each	ethnic	group	within	the	various	historical	periods.245		In	fact,	Milner	observes	that	the	Malay	community	were	largely	cooperative	with	the	Japanese	during	their	occupation	of	Malaya	from	1942	to	1945.	A	Japanese-sponsored	Malay	paramilitary	Volunteer	Force	was	even	formed	and	its	commander,	Ibrahim	Yaacob,	held	one	of	the	most	senior	ranks	ever	to	be	given	to	a	non-Japanese	during	the	occupation	(Milner	2011,	149).	These	historical	facts	are	omitted	from	all	of	Senario’s	narratives.	In	two	other	episodes	set	during	the	Japanese	occupation	for	example	–	Hait	Nippon	Hait	(Ahmad,	&	Muhd	Sufian,	1999)	and	Penipu	Zaman	Berzaman	(Kamarul,	2012)	–	they	are	similarly	absent.	Moreover,	based	on	the	production	dates,	the	myth	is	maintained																																																									245	The	domiciled	Chinese	for	instance,	were	actively	engaged	in	resistance	towards	the	Japanese	(Milner	2011,	151),	though	this	was	largely	an	extension	of	the	war	between	China	and	Japan	during	the	years	1937-1945	(Wang	2000,	15-16).	However,	it	was	also	this	Chinese	anti-Japanese	movement	–	led	by	Chin	Peng	–	that	extended	its	opposition	towards	the	British	colonial	administration	after	they	returned	to	Malaya	post-World	War	2.	One	reason	for	the	bicultural	tensions	between	the	Malays	and	the	Chinese	in	the	years	after	World	War	2,	can	be	attributed	to	Chinese	dissatisfaction	at	Malay	cooperation	with	the	Japanese,	and	for	Malay	resentment	of	Chinese	brutality	against	them	as	a	result	of	the	former	sentiments	(Milner	2011,	151-152).	
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consistently	over	the	thirteen	years	between	which	these	episodes	were	produced.		It	would	be	specious	to	suggest	that	the	Malays	were	homogenously	compliant	or	the	non-Malays	were	uniformly	nationalistic.	Herein	lies	the	problem	with	Daruih’s	explanation.	By	the	very	act	of	oversimplification	–	by	design	or	otherwise	–	he	reiterates	the	myth	of	a	homogeneous	and	consistent	Malay	struggle	against	foreign	occupation	that	was	devoid	of	contributions	from	ethnic	minorities.	This	becomes	more	authoritative	precisely	because	he	foregrounds	the	point	that	this	was	learnt	at	school,	which	is	then	affirmed	by	Pak	Teh’s	tacit	agreement.	The	consequent	totalized	discourse	forecloses	any	possibility	of	alternative	interpretations	that	may	provide	counter	narratives	to	Malay	claims	of	absolute	rights	to	the	land.	This	suppression	of	conditions	which	might	allow	for	the	emergence	of	alternate	narratives	is	augmented	by	Daruih’s	compression	of	the	historical	timeline	which	presents	the	myth	simply	and	clearly	as	plain	fact.		Through	this	discursive	strategy,	the	earlier	inclusiveness	of	the	newspapers	is	reversed	by	this	mythic	historical	narrative.	Instead,	Pak	Teh	and	Pak	Ark	are	retroactively	(within	the	televisual	narrative)	validated	as	Malay	examples	of	independence	leaders	which	exclude	any	minorities	from	that	heroic	category.	The	mnemonic	trigger	for	the	tradition	of	Malay	warriors	is	once	again	evoked.	By	a	self-validating	act	which	attempts	to	suggest	that	Daruih’s	narrative	is	fact,	Pak	Teh	replies,	“tu	sebelum	merdeka,	betui.	Sekarang	ni,	negara	kita	dah	
merdeka.”	(correct,	but	that	was	before	independence.	Now,	our	nation	has	achieved	independence).	Pak	Teh’s	confirmation	that	Daruih’s	explanation	has	a	‘factual’	basis	is	made	credible	by	the	unspoken,	implicit	authority	that	he	holds	as	village	head,	and	as	an	independence	leader	who	has	lived	through	the	travails	of	the	independence	movement.			The	didactic	quality	of	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	and	its	exclusion	of	minority	voices	even	as	it	engages	with	the	wider	issues	of	the	Malaysian	category,	serves	to	present	a	foreclosed	discourse	to	viewers.	The	consequent	topology	of	
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Malaysian	nationalism	is	thus	shaped	by	this	diachronic	vocabulary	of	Malay	chauvinism	or	nationalism,	if	in	fact	they	are	not	ideologically	sutured,	that	centres	on	Melayuisme246	as	the	defining	element	to	the	identity	of	Malay.	However,	if	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka’s	references	to	the	Malaysian	ethnic	minorities	were	oblique,	these	references	became	observably	more	explicit	in	the	subsequent	years.	For	example,	an	episode	aired	two	years	later	in	1998	titled	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	(Jamil,	Ilya,	&	Khalijah,	1998),	was	premised	on	a	more	cogent	articulation	of	the	hierarchized	inter-ethnic	social	structure	obliquely	referenced	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.		
The	Kampung,	Class,	and	Exclusivity	of	Race	
Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	(Celebrate	…	Celebrate	…	Celebrate)	tells	the	story	of	granddaughters	Intan	and	Ucuk,	and	grandsons	Ku	and	Cin,	who	are	visiting	their	grandparents	Tok	Nasir	(grandfather	Nasir)	and	Nenek	Yan	(grandmother	Yan)	at	a	kampung	located	in	the	northern	state	of	Kedah	on	the	eve	of	Hari	Raya	(‘Day	of	Celebration’,	the	Islamic	Eid	al-Fitr).247	They	are	from	a	family	of	divorced	(or	separated)	parents	who	are	too	busy	working	in	the	city	to	have	accompanied	them	on	this	visit.	The	children	are	of	mixed	parentage	where	their	mother	is	Bangladeshi	and	their	Malay	father	Basiron	is	Tok	Nasir	and	Nenek	Yan’s	son.	Basiron	eventually	makes	it	to	the	kampung	in	time	for	the	celebrations	and	seeks	forgiveness	for	his	errors	(one	of	which	is	not	sending	money	to	his	parents	for	Hari	Raya).248		It	seems	clear	from	the	synopsis	that	the	episode’s	themes	of	filial	or	parental	absence	and	the	importance	of	family	values	–	the	significance	of	which	is	augmented	by	the	Hari	Raya	celebration	–	are	traditional249	in	nature.																																																									246	Melayuisme	is	“the	belief	that	the	interests	of	the	bangsa	Melayu	(Malay	race)	must	be	upheld	over	all	else”	(Ting	2009,	35).	UMNO’s	founding	president	Dato’	Onn	Jaafar	said,	“UMNO	did	not	adhere	to	any	ideology	other	than	Melayuisme”	(Ting	2009,	35).	This	was	first	mentioned	in	Chapter	2.	247	This	marks	the	end	of	a	month	of	Ramadhan	fasting	for	the	Muslims.	As	practised	in	Malaysia,	the	days	just	before	the	celebrations	would	result	in	a	mass	exodus	of	Muslims	back	to	their	hometowns,	since	it	is	traditional	to	celebrate	with	family.	248	All	female	characters	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	are	played	by	male	actors.	The	Bangladeshi	mother	is	only	spoken	of,	and	does	not	appear	on-screen.	The	significance	of	male	actors	performing	female	characters	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	7.	249	I	am	not	suggesting	that	they	are	culturally	specific,	for	these	themes	are	broadly	present	in	most,	if	not	all,	traditional	cultures.	
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Furthermore,	similar	to	Jefri’s	role	within	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	the	eventual	presence	of	the	father	Basiron	and	his	remorse	constructs	an	acceptable	resolution	that	aligns	his	position	to	a	preferred	Malay	family	values	position.	In	this	respect,	like	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	narrative	serves	to	demonstrate	what	is	deemed	unsuitable	by	the	wider	Malay	traditional	category	and	to	suggest	a	preferable	position.		It	is	interesting	that	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	elementary	logic	of	observable	or	demonstrable	‘reality’	is	similar	to	Pak	Teh’s	‘answer	by	example’	in	Negara	
Chekpa	Merdeka.	Its	consequent	effect	on	the	constructed	myth	and	its	denotative	and	connotative	validation	are	also	similar;	in	this	case,	that	the	only	accepted	definition	for	a	family	unit	is	one	enjoined	by	Malay	adat.	In	both	episodes,	especially	with	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	this	process	by	which	audiences	observe	the	characters	who	themselves	are	observing	thematic	transgressions	and	resolution,	can	be	read	as	a	highly	reflexive	process.	This	in	fact,	enhances	the	narratives’	ideological	power.		It	was	previously	asserted	that	the	articulations	of	inter-ethnic	structures	are	more	explicit	within	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.	These	can	be	observed	in	two	primary	scenes	of	the	episode	whose	significations	are	interrelated.	The	first	occurs	within	a	scene	where	Tok	Nasir	recounts	his	day	to	the	household	(Figure	5.3).	At	one	juncture,	referencing	his	attempt	to	purchase	clothing	for	his	grandchildren,	he	says	“Aku	ketuk	kedai	Cina	itu”	(I	knocked	on	the	shop[door]	of	that	Chinese	or	I	knocked	on	the	[door	of	the]	Chinese	shop).	While	referring	to	a	person	by	race	is	a	common	social	practice	in	Malaysia,	I	suggest	that	this	manner	of	address	is	often	employed	to	suggest	a	reduction	of	an	individual	to	characteristics	of	the	collective	group.	What	is	key	to	the	production	of	meaning,	are	the	paradigmatic	units	of	‘kedai’	(shop)	and	‘Cina’	(Chinese).	Hall	describes	this	reduction	to	a	few	simplified	essential	characteristics	as	being	central	to	racial	stereotyping	(2013,	234-237).	Furthermore,	this	representational	strategy	of	reducing	cultures	to	certain	totemic	signifiers	is	a	practice	of	naturalizing	difference	(Hall	2013,	234).	The	constructed	discursive	position	produces	meaning	by	referencing	the	colonial	stereotype	and	the	post-Malaysia	
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Incorporated	view	of	the	Chinese	as	being	the	rich	business	owners.	The	reduction	of	the	Chinese	to	an	economic	and	materialistic	group	by	the	imaginaries	of	the	Malay	community	is	thus	a	reproduction	of	a	discourse	that	is	historically	specific.		
	Figure	5.3	Still	from	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.	From	left:	Ku,	Cin,	Intan,	Ucuk,	Tok	Nasir,	and	Nenek	Yan.		In	the	second	major	scene,	the	grandchildren	assist	their	grandmother	in	making	traditional	kuih	(cakes).	Granddaughter	Intan	reveals	that	their	father	Basiron	has	a	good	job	in	the	city.	He	works	as	an	officer	for	the	“kong	si	gelap”	(triads).	Grandson	Ku	quickly	corrects	Intan	by	saying	“bukan	kong	si	gelap	lah.	Gong	xi	fa	
choi”	(Not	triads.	Gong	Xi	Fa	Cai	[a	common	Chinese	greeting	for	prosperity	offered	during	Chinese	New	Year]).	The	Chinese	prosperity	greeting	bears	no	real	reference	to	the	overall	conversation	at	all,	nor	does	it	make	any	logical	sense	in	the	flow	of	the	dialogue.	While	there	is	a	phonetic	play	on	sounds/words	between	both	terms,	I	suggest	that	a	more	compelling	explanation	exists	when	we	consider	that	after	Ku’s	correction	of	Intan,	Nenek	Yan	says	“Kacau,	kacau,	kacau!”	(Stir,	stir,	stir!250)	as	she	points	at	the	pot	for	making	the	cakes.	Considered	together,	the	entire	exchange	is	now	
																																																								250	Kacau	also	means	‘disturb’.	Interestingly,	a	related	word	is	‘kacukan’,	meaning	hybrid	or	mixed.	Given	that	Nenek	Yan	is	pointing	at	the	pot,	I	take	its	meaning	literally	as	‘stir’.	
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contextualized	around	the	idiom	of	‘stirring	the	pot’.251	The	supposedly	random	words	‘Gong	Xi	Fa	Cai’	are	now	antagonistic,	for	the	intent	is	‘to	agitate’	for	the	purpose	of	causing	‘tension	and	discord’.	As	we	shall	observe,	the	implied	meaning	and	antagonistic	value	of	these	intertextual	terms	can	only	be	fully	understood	when	read	in	the	context	of	each	other.		When	the	Chinese	immigrants	came	to	British	Malaya,	a	significant	number	of	them	were	inducted	into	the	Chinese	triads	(Barry	et	al.	2003,	39).	While	not	entirely	exclusive	to	the	ethnic	group,	Chinese	triads	do	still	represent	a	major	criminal	element	within	present	day	Malaysia	(Barry	et	al.	2003,	39-41;	Refugee	
Review	Tribunal	Response,	2007;	Foster	2013).	A	historically	specific,	discursively-produced	stereotype	of	the	Chinese	as	being	singularly	economically	motivated	is	thus	reinforced	by	linking	the	paradigmatic	units	of	‘kedai’	(shop)	and	‘Cina’	(Chinese).	This	meaning	is	strengthened	through	a	reduction	of	all	that	is	Chinese	to	that	of	the	materialistic	prosperity	greeting.	With	the	economic	reference	of	‘Gong	Xi	Fa	Cai’	and	the	addition	of	a	subliminal	reference	to	‘kong	si	gelap’	(triads),	it	would	not	be	remiss	to	venture	a	conceptual	leap	that	the	subtext	suggests	that	all	Chinese	are	crooks,	singularly	devoted	to	prosperity	and	enriching	themselves	at	the	expense	of	all	else/others.	This	would	certainly	fit	into	the	colonial	stereotype	of	the	Chinese	who	is	“inherently	dedicated	to	making	money	by	any	means	possible”	(Reid	2006,	14-15).		This	clear	delineation	of	difference	is	drawn	again	when	a	visitor	at	the	door	gives	the	traditional	Islamic	greeting252	of	Salam.253	The	characters	wonder	at	the	identity	of	the	visitor	and	Intan	advises	“Jangan	buka	Tok.	Orang	mintak	
hutang”	(Don’t	open	the	door,	Grandma.	Someone’s	here	for	payment	on	a	debt).	Granddaughter	Ucuk	suggests	that	it	might	be	Ah	Fatt	(a	typical	Chinese	name)																																																									251	Interpreted	to	mean	‘agitating	a	situation	on	purpose	to	cause	or	proliferate	tension	and	discord’.	252	While	the	theme	of	Islam	is	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	it	will	still	be	addressed	in	this	chapter	whenever	it	cannot	be	neatly	separated	from	any	present	discussions	on	the	theme	of	Malayness.	This	is	especially	true	since,	as	we	have	observed	in	Chapter	2,	both	themes	are	ideologically	sutured.	253	In	this	instance,	it	is	the	greeting	“Assalamualaikum”	(Peace	be	upon	you).	
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from	the	sundry	shop	delivering	flour,	while	grandson	Cin	retorts	“Takkan	Ah	Fatt	bagi	Salam”	(It’s	not	as	if	Ah	Fatt	would	give	a	Salam),	before	the	audiences’	whooping	and	laughter	is	heard.	They	subsequently	discover	that	it	is	Tok	Nasir	who	is	at	the	door.		There	are	several	important	textual	layers	to	this	exchange.	A	chain	of	equivalences	is	constructed	between	‘debt-collector’,	‘Chinese’,	and	‘Chinese	are	not	Muslims’.	The	shared	common	feature	between	the	previous	triad-Chinese	narrative	and	this	chain	of	equivalences	is	the	marking	of	difference,	an	othering	that	establishes	the	boundaries	between	both	cultures/races.	Hall	conceptualized	the	marking	of	difference	as	the	central	identifier	of	cultural	belongingness	(2013,	220)	and	a	signifier	of	‘them’	rather	than	‘us’	(2013,	219).	In	this	instance,	the	implied	meaning	can	be	read	as	reinforcement	of	the	notion	that	a	Chinese	cannot	possibly	greet	us	in	a	Muslim	way	because	‘they’	are	uninitiated	in	‘our’	ways,	a	corollary	of	the	normative	myth	that	all	Muslims	are	Malays.	The	earlier	debt-collector-triad-illegal	signifier	is	thus	given	a	further	additional	layer	of	connotative	meaning	that	hinges	on	the	discursively	produced	difference	between	Chinese	and	Malays	due	to	Chinese	irreligiousness	(since	Muslims	commonly	view	other	religions	as	deviant	non-religions).	Resultantly,	the	previously	asserted	Chinese	propensity	towards	criminality	seems	to	have	been	accepted	as	inevitable	and	natural,	and	their	inferior	religious	and	moral	positions	normalized.	As	a	televisual	regime	of	truth,	this	grounding	of	ideology	in	‘reality’	works	to	make	it	“appear	unchallengeable	and	unchangeable,	and	thus	is	a	reactionary	political	strategy”	(Fiske	2011,	36)	that	ensures	that	the	Chinese	and	Malay-Muslim	stereotypes	do	not	change	or	evolve.		Key	to	our	understanding	of	this	episode	is	the	audiences’	whooping	and	laughter	at	the	end	of	this	exchange	of	dialogue.	While	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	was	largely	sparse	on	comedic	content	and	resultantly	on	‘heard	laughter’,	Raya	
…	Raya	…	Raya	is	more	liberally	inflected	with	humour.	Therefore,	in	this	episode	the	signifier	‘laughter’	warrants	a	closer	examination.	Mills	described	the	laugh	track	as	part	of	sitcom’s	metadrama	that	enforces	or	tells	viewers	when	it	is	appropriate	to	laugh,	a	cue	for	viewers	to	interpret	the	text	as	being	
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funny	(2009,	31)	which	stimulates	a	homogenous	appreciation	of	the	humour.	The	ease	in	obtaining	viewing	pleasure	is	achieved	simply	by	laughing	along	with	the	rest	of	the	crowd,	resulting	in	the	producers’	control	over	meanings	derived	from	an	active	participation	in	the	cultural	process.	This	is	one	of	the	central	ways	that	comedy	is	a	highly	hegemonic	form.	It	is	significant	in	the	case	of	Senario	because	the	laughter	heard	by	home	audiences	is	not	generic	‘canned’	laughter	that	was	added	post-recording.		The	laughter	of	the	studio	audience	indicates	the	degree	to	which	dominant	Malay	narratives	or	myths	have	been	naturalized.	The	laughter	is	rooted	in	
Senario’s	constructed	televisual	regimes	of	truth	that	become	relatable	to	audiences	through	what	is	suggested	by	the	episodic	narrative	as	a	performance	of	their	lived	reality.	This	reflexive	process	is	key	to	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya’s	process	of	reaffirming	the	status	quo,	for	it	is	the	observation	of	a	performance	perceived	to	be	grounded	in	daily	life	by	those	who	can	relate	to	that	experience	in	reality.	Within	this	framework,	the	ideological	significations	prompting	Raya	
…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	laughter	are	already	understood,	as	evidenced	through	the	real	studio	laughter.		In	encouraging	the	wider	viewers	at	home	to	laugh	along	with	the	studio	audiences	at	the	end	of	that	chain	of	equivalences,	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	narrative	is	attempting	to	naturalize	(or	to	strengthen)	the	suggested	ideologically	dominant	meanings	of	Malay-versus-Chinese	by	encouraging	us	to	accept	the	text’s	proposed	meaning	and	laugh	about	it.	Augmenting	this	didactic	efficacy	is	the	laughter’s	existence	as	an	off-camera	‘voice’	when	viewed	on-screen.	Fiske	notes	that	this	creates	a	‘documentary	look’	that	traditionally	relates	documentary	drama	to	the	‘ideology	of	naturalism’	(2011,	30).	The	potency	of	this	laughter	may	thus	be	paralleled	to	what	is	known	as	the	“voice-of-God	narration”,	telling	viewers	how	to	understand	what	is	being	shown	by	telling	them	how	to	think	about	it	(Hall	2013,	66).	In	this	respect,	Senario’s	
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studio	laughter	serves	a	didactic	function	that	socializes	and	familiarizes	viewers	on	the	terms	of	membership	into	the	wider	community	of	Malay.254		This	entire	process	of	signification	represents	a	‘racialized	regime	of	representation’,	to	use	Hall’s	term	(2013,	222),	in	which	a	regime	of	truth	is	reiterated	to	validate	the	wider	discursive	supra-notions	of	Malay-Muslim	superiority;	since	all	Malays	are	Muslims,	they	are	presumed	to	abstain	from	criminal	acts	as	part	of	the	Muslim	ideal.	Since	these	‘truths’	and	stereotypes	are	deployed	across	time,	we	observe	that	Bhabha’s	notions	of	othering	and	stereotype	are	similarly	present	in	the	subtexts.	Within	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	the	superior	subject-position	is	fully	occupied	by	the	Malays,	and	is	exemplified	by	the	rural	village	Malays	who	hold	on	to	traditional	adat-informed	values.	Note	that	this	superior	Malay	Muslim	moral	high-ground	is	similar	to	the	findings	of	Rosya	&	Morris	(2013,	155)	on	Akademi	Fantasia255	which	in	turn	mirror	the	multitude	of	religio-political	discourses	discussed	in	Chapter	2.		The	narrative’s	meta-discourse	of	intra-group	difference	was	also	deployed	in	the	acknowledgement	of	rural	village	Malays	as	being	exemplars	of	the	community.	The	terms	“kong	si	gelap”	and	“gong	xi	fa	choi”	are	dialogically	relational	to	the	economic	prospects	in	the	city,	especially	since	most	triads	are	dependent	on	the	economic	wealth	in	the	city	(Refugee	Review	Tribunal	
Response,	2007;	Foster	2013).	A	possible	reading	suggests	that	the	relocation	towards	a	progressive,	liberal,	western-influenced	cosmopolitan	centre	at	the	expense	of	traditional	adat	governed	by	the	tenets	of	Islam,	is	akin	to	the	Chinese	economic	devotion	at	the	expense	of	all	else.	This	would	corroborate	in	part,	with	the	ethnographical	studies	of	both	Thompson	(2002,	69-71)	and	Bunnell	(2002)	that	was	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	Their	findings	suggest	that	those	who	have	moved	from	a	traditional	Malay	kampung	environment	to	the	city	centres	of	Kuala	Lumpur	or	Selangor	perceived	cosmopolitan	culture	as	being	incompatible	with	their	values	and	actively	sought	to	strengthen	existing	Malay	religio-cultural	convictions	through	communal	solidarity.																																																									254	This	also	references	our	discussion	in	Chapter	4	about	the	ideological	significance	of	Senario’s	popularity	with	the	younger	audiences.		255	Discussed	in	Chapter	1.	
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	The	associative	meaning	of	the	terms	“kong	si	gelap”	and	“gong	xi	fa	choi”	seems	to	suggest	that	by	seeking	riches	within	business	centres	traditionally	occupied	by	the	Chinese,	these	Malays	are	relinquishing	their	position	–	their	cultural	and	religious	purity	–	to	devote	themselves	to	material	success	like	the	Chinese.	This	in	turn,	is	predicated	on	the	logic	observed	in	the	earlier	distillation	of	‘Chinese’	to	an	economic	and	materialistic	group	signifier	by	Tok	Nasir’s	‘kedai’	(shop)	and	‘Cina’	(Chinese).	The	added	dimension	of	a	Malay	(Basiron)	being	employed	for	shady	business	on	behalf	of	the	Chinese	(triads)	amplifies	this	supposed	debilitating	effect.	Unlike	lawful	employment,	Basiron’s	instrumentalization	by	the	Chinese	triads	is	diametrically	opposite	to	acceptable	Malay	values.257	This	Malay	intra-group	marginalization	of	those	constructed	as	deviating	from	Malay	
adat	and	tradition,	is	part	of	a	larger	urban-rural	discourse	involving	those	viewed	as	New	Malays	and/or	hybrid-Malays.	As	we	have	observed	in	Chapter	2,	this	discourse	is	fundamental	to	the	fractious	rural-urban	othering	that	exists	within	the	Malay	community.		More	so	than	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	signifying	chains	are	centred	on	the	master-signifier	of	kampung,	which	in	turn	contains	two	broad	and	interrelated	significations.	The	first	is	predicated	on	the	practice	of	returning	to	the	kampung	during	Hari	Raya,	commonly	known	as	balik	
kampung.258	Within	this	context,	the	kampung	is	constructed	as	being	the	essence	of	Malayness;	the	nexus	of	adat	and	tradition.	The	very	act	of	‘going	home’	or	‘returning	to	a	hometown’	whose	locale	is	distinct	from	that	of	the	subject’s	daily	life	connotes	the	subject’s	decentred	point	of	origin.	Before	Basiron’s	return	to	his	parents’	home,	his	situation	was	constructed	as	being	less	than	ideal	(through	his	parents’	discussion	of	the	separation	from	his	wife,	his	parental	absence,	and	his	excessive	expenses).	Resolution	is	only	achieved	with	his	return,	crystallized	through	the	need	to	seek	the	forgiveness	of	his	parents	for	accrued	mistakes	(parental	irresponsibility,	lack	of	monetary	support	for	his																																																									257	This	is	contextual	to	our	discussion	on	Malayness.	I	am	not	suggesting	that	positive	values	are	exclusive	to	the	Malays.	258	While	it	literally	means	‘return	to	village’,	it	is	more	commonly	understood	as	‘return	to	hometown’.	
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four	children	and	his	parents	even	though	he	is	wealthy,	and	the	prioritizing	of	materialism	over	family).		There	are	two	paradigmatic	layers	to	Basiron’s	act	of	redemption,	both	of	which	are	part	of	the	wider	syntagmatic	chain	in	the	episode.	The	first	is	his	return	to	his	village	that	opens	up	the	possibility	for	his	recovery	of	‘traditional’	Malayness	which	is	similar	to	that	of	Jefri	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	However,	unlike	Jefri,	Basiron’s	decentred	position	is	by	choice.	His	shift	towards	a	recovery	of	Malayness	can	therefore	only	be	activated	through	the	second	paradigmatic	layer	–	the	source	of	tradition	and	culture	embodied	by	his	parents.	In	this	context,	Basiron’s	parents	Tok	Nasir	and	Nenek	Yan	are	metonyms	for	the	total	sum	of	the	traditional	Malay	category.	They	are	able	to	absolve	Basiron	of	his	cultural	or	traditional	deviations	precisely	because	they	occupy	a	position	of	cultural	and	historical	authority	similar	to	that	occupied	by	Pak	Teh	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.		However,	if	the	concepts	of	‘traditional	Malay’	and	the	cultural-spatial	marker	of	
kampung	is	viewed	through	the	discursivity	of	the	rural-urban	dichotomy,	Raya	
…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	elementary	problematic	lies	in	a	demarcation	of	class.	This	class	distinction	is	the	second	signification	of	the	master-signifier	of	kampung.	While	the	move	to	the	city	or	urban	centres	is	essentially	an	exercise	in	upward	class	or	social	mobility,	it	is	also	seen	as	a	debilitating	act	that	detracts	from	the	essence	of	the	traditional.	This	is	encapsulated	in	one	scene	when	Tok	Nasir	and	Nenek	Yan	assess	their	financial	ability	to	purchase	new	clothing	for	the	grandchildren.	Tok	Nasir	reveals	that	he	does	not	have	enough	money	and	asks,	“ada	lagi	duit?”	([do	you	have]	any	more	money?).	Nenek	Yan	replies,	“adalah.	
Dua	tiga	ratui	tu.	Tapi	cukup	kah	…..	sebab	bapa	tu	dulu	beli	kat	depak	barang-
barang	yang	ada	nama”	(I	suppose	so.	Two	[or]	three	hundred.	But	is	it	enough	…	because	[their]	father	buys	them	branded	goods).	This	needs	to	be	considered	in	the	light	of	an	earlier	scene	where	it	was	revealed	that	their	kampung	is	located	in	the	agrarian	northern	state	of	Kedah	which	locates	the	hometown	–	and	thus	origin	–	of	Basiron	as	firmly	in	a	Malay	rural	heartland.		
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The	northern	state	of	Kedah	is	also	incidentally	–	or	perhaps	not	incidentally	–		the	kampung	of	then	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	Mohamad	(Mahathir	2012,	12).	By	aligning	Basiron’s	point	of	origin	with	that	of	Prime	Minister	Mahathir’s,	the	sign	‘Basiron’	holds	a	subversive	signification	for	all	that	is	disagreeable	with	Mahathir’s	national	initiatives	which	prioritized	economic	and	modernization	considerations	over	the	traditional-cultural.	This	oppositional	reading	would	suggest	that	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	is	an	exploration	of	Mahathir’s	vision	of	Malayness.	The	self-reflexive	quality	of	the	observable	‘answer	by	example’	is	a	performance	of	New	Malayness	that	is	meant	to	demonstrate	its	inadequacy	in	upholding	the	historicized	adat-adhering	culture	perceived	as	the	Malay	ideal.	This	oppositional	position	is	probable.	However,	with	no	other	narrative	or	meta-discursive	cues,	it	is	an	inchoate	construction	which	given	the	immense	institutional	pressures	on	Senario’s	team,	is	understandable.	Regardless,	the	staging	of	the	episode	in	the	agrarian	northern	state	of	Kedah259	is	meant	to	ground	Basiron’s	point	of	origin	in	a	viewer-identifiable	Malay	traditional	heartland	that	is	far	removed	from	cosmopolitanism.		In	the	simple	exchange	between	Tok	Nasir	and	Nenek	Yan,	the	difference	in	class	and	a	corresponding	economic	disparity	between	the	comparatively	wealthy	father	–	the	supposed	triad	officer	who	works	in	the	city	–	and	the	grandparents	who	live	in	a	kampung	of	rural	agrarian	Kedah,	is	foregrounded.	This	rhetoric	of	class	difference	would	seem	to	conform	with	the	earlier	discussions	of	“kong	si	
gelap”	and	“gong	xi	fa	choi”	associations	with	the	economic	prospects	in	the	city,	and	the	role	of	Chinese	social	actors	within	that	discourse.	Moreover,	it	serves	to	magnify	Basiron’s	irresponsibility	through	his	placing	of	a	seemingly	considerable	task	of	attending	to	his	children’s	material	needs	onto	his	parents	without	any	contingency	of	monetary	support.		Basiron’s	irresponsibility	is	explained	by	Tok	Nasir,	“tu	lah	…	dulu	jangan	hantar	
Basiron	tu	belajar	kat	luar	negeri”	(that’s	why	…	in	the	past	[I	said]	don’t	send	Basiron	overseas	for	his	studies).	Here,	Basiron’s	upward	social	mobility,	his																																																									259	The	kampung’s	location	is	known	for	this	episode	because	it	was	mentioned	in	the	dialogue.	With	the	exception	of	Senario	Misteri	Bamboo,	every	episode	has	different	characters	and	narratives,	and	the	location	for	each	episode	is	not	always	revealed.	
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earning	potential,	and	the	excessive	lifestyle	leading	to	his	parental	absence	is	explained	by	his	time	spent	studying	abroad.260	The	polemic	seen	in	Negara	
Chekpa	Merdeka	of	a	corrupting	West	is	revived	in	these	two	simple	sentences.	When	this	is	taken	in	conjunction	with	the	‘kong	si	gelap’	and	‘gong	xi	fa	choi’	associations,	the	sign	‘city’	becomes	a	metonym	for	the	entire	ideological	terrain	of	the	‘corrupting	West’.	The	disparity	of	values,	tastes,	and	level	of	material	consumption	between	the	urban	and	rural-traditional,	is	emphasized	again	in	another	scene	when	Nenek	Yan	questions	her	grandchildren	about	their	parents	and	their	previous	Hari	Raya	celebrations.		In	answer	to	Nenek	Yan’s	question	about	their	previous	celebrations	in	the	city,	Cin	replies,	“Orang	kampung	pakai	baju	raya.	Kami	tak	pakai	baju!”	(The	people	in	the	village	wear	festive	clothing.	We	don’t	wear	any	clothing!).	Nenek	Yan	exclaims	“Amboi,	hampa	moden	sangatlah	tu.”	(No	clothes?	You’re	all	[or	that’s]	too	modern).	Ku	explains	that	they	celebrated	with	their	mother	at	her	hometown	in	Bangladesh.	It	is	here	that	Intan’s	explanation	of	Basiron’s	job	as	a	triad	officer	in	the	city,	and	the	“kong	si	gelap”	and	“gong	xi	fa	choi”	dialogue	occurs.	This	is	followed	by	Nenek	Yan	saying	“Kacau,	kacau,	kacau!”	(Stir,	stir,	stir!),	pointing	at	the	pot	for	making	traditional	Malay	cakes.	Ku	explains	that	it	was	fun	celebrating	in	Bangladesh	because	“kami	paling	putih”	(we	were	the	whitest	[fairest])	which	was	why	they	were	not	wearing	any	clothes,	so	as	to	“tunjuk	badan	putih”	(show	[our]	white	[fair]	bodies).	Nenek	Yan	reminds	them	that	this	year	will	be	different	since	it	is	the	kampung,	before	saying	“kacau	baik-
baik”	(stir	it	well).		There	are	three	textual	layers	to	this	exchange.	The	first	is	the	expression	that	the	city	practices	a	modern	lifestyle	that	is	inappropriate	to	Malay	culture	as	embodied	by	the	signifier	kampung.	This	is	articulated	through	Cin’s	distinction	between	clothing	in	the	kampung	and	the	city,	and	Nenek	Yan’s	reply	that	the	practice	is	too	modern.	The	second	is	the	ideological	grounding	of	this	modernity	and	inappropriateness	in	a	culture	and	ethnicity	that	is	non-Malay																																																									260	It	is	only	at	this	point	in	the	narrative	(with	the	conversation	between	Nenek	Yan	and	Tok	Nasir)	that	we	learn	of	Basiron’s	overseas	education,	and	his	extravagant	lifestyle.	
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when	Ku	reveals	it	occurred	at	their	mother’s	hometown	in	Bangladesh.	While	the	presumptive	religion	of	Basiron’s	wife	is	Islam,261	it	is	still	inadequate	in	fulfilling	the	tenets	of	Malay	adat.	Here,	non-Malay	culture-values	are	ideologically	associated	with	the	notion	of	lifestyles	that	are	excessive	and	modern,	eventually	leading	to	a	broken	family.262	Moreover,	the	sequence	in	which	the	kong	si	gelap	dialogue	occurs,	is	not	random.	The	Malay	intra-group	marginality	of	those	constructed	as	deviating	from	adat	and	tradition,	articulated	through	their	move	to	the	city	and	their	aligning	of	interest	with	the	Chinese,	serves	to	strengthen	the	sense	of	inappropriateness	as	established	in	the	first	textual	layer.	This	in	turn,	reaffirms	the	previously	discussed	ideological	construction	of	the	‘city’	as	a	metonym	for	the	source	of	moral	corruption.		The	third	textual	layer	is	the	implied	Malay	superiority	as	expressed	in	the	grandchildren’s	need	to	display	their	fairer	skin	amongst	the	darker-skinned	Bangladeshis.	It	is	ironic	that	while	the	British	colonizers	and	the	West	are	ideologically	constructed	as	a	source	of	negative	influence	that	debilitates	the	true	Malay	subject,	the	‘whiter’	skin	of	the	Malays	here,	is	an	aesthetical	mark	of	implied	superiority.	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka’s	colonizing	‘orang	putih’	(white	people)	in	this	sense,	has	been	replaced	by	the	Malay	‘orang	putih’	in	Bangladesh.	There	is	a	historical	precedent	to	this,	for	Milner	suggests	that	a	“Malay	colonialism”	occurred	prior	to	independence	in	the	1950s	where	non-Malay	Muslim	groups	in	Sabah263	were	told	they	were	“not	fully	civilized”	if	they	did	not	“become	Malay”264	(2011,	162-163).		This	focus	on	skin	colour	as	the	primary	signifier	of	difference	is	thus	an	aesthetical	discrimination	which	ideologically	sutures	stereotypes	to	colour.	In																																																									261	The	majority	religion	in	Bangladesh	is	Islam,	and	Malaysian	law	requires	that	non-Muslims	convert	to	Islam	before	they	can	marry	a	Muslim.	262	Nazli	Kibria	(2011,	121)	notes	for	instance	that	debates	about	Bangladeshi	migrants	have	abounded	regarding	“the	declining	influence	of	local	culture	in	the	home,	especially	in	the	raising	of	children”	resulting	in	a	“loss	of	cultural	identity”.	Further,	there	is	much	anxiety	over	Bangladeshi	inclinations	toward	“criminality”	and	the	practice	of	marrying	Malays	to	remain	in	the	country	(Nazli	2011,	121).	This	is	especially	relevant	to	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.	In	“the	late	1990s”	this	cultural	encroachment	and	the	tensions	from	cases	involving	“Malaysian	and	Bangladeshi	men”	were	even	“discussed	in	the	Malaysian	Parliament	as	a	social	problem”	(Nazli	2011,	121).	Also	see	Nayeem	Sultana’s	(2008)	work	on	the	Bangladeshi	diaspora	in	Malaysia.	263	A	state	in	East	Malaysia.	264	This	references	the	fluidity	of	the	Malay	category,	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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truth,	this	elementary	argument	undergirds	all	of	our	earlier	discussions.	This	reveals	the	extent	to	which	UMNO’s	extension	of	colonial	ideological	trajectories	into	the	postcolonial	period	that	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2	has	influenced	the	socio-cultural	spheres	of	Malaysian	society.	The	idiom	of	‘stirring	the	pot’	is	key	to	the	interpretation	of	this	scene.	This	master-signifier	contextualizes	the	entire	exchange	as	reactionary.	The	idiom	is	invoked	twice;	directly	after	the	dialogue	on	gong	xi	fa	cai	and	again	after	Ku’s	dialogue	on	their	fair-coloured	bodies	in	Bangladesh.	Both	cases	are	articulated	as	being	a	source	of	antagonism/anxiety	for	the	Malay	traditional	community.		The	televisual	dialogue	throughout	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	is	seemingly	simple;	that	is	the	central	ideological	power	behind	its	naturalization.	We	have	observed	that	the	dialogue	is	laden	with	implicit	descriptors	for	the	Malay	category,	their	inherent	state	of	religiosity,	and	the	obligations	imposed	by	these	states	of	being.	Furthermore,	it	was	observed	that	the	meta-discourse	of	the	urban	Malay	intra-group	faction	is	ideologically	associated	with	the	stereotype	of	the	Chinese	and	the	West,	and	is	in	turn,	equated	to	modernity	and	the	city.	This	othering	is	extended	to	a	Malay	intra-ethnic	hierarchization.	Moreover,	this	us-them	binary	is	established	through	viewer	identification	with	the	dominant	normative	which	constructs	the	exclusivity	of	the	traditional	Malay	category	within	the	wider	Malaysian	citizenry.		This	intra	and	inter-ethnic	exteriorizing	is	a	recurring	theme	in	Senario.	In	
Tandas	Awam	(Aznil,	&	Adiel,	1997)	for	example,	the	space	within	a	public	toilet	is	conceptualized	as	a	microcosm	for	the	nation’s	inter-racial	and	inter-class	dynamics.	In	Jejak	Karun	(Nizam,	1998),	the	three	main	ethnic	groups	are	represented	as	three	ethnic	groups	of	treasure	hunters	who	fight	over	hidden	treasure	on	Malay	land.	In	Muzium	(Muhd	Sufian,	&	Ahmad,	2000),	the	children	visiting	the	museum	are	shown	artefacts	and	their	corresponding	historical	narratives	that	reaffirm	the	hierarchized	position	of	each	ethnic	group	based	on	the	same	historical	myths	discussed	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	Wakil	Kampung	(Fauzita,	&	Anniesafinas,	2009)	depicts	a	Chinese	villager	spreading	misinformed	news	that	becomes	the	source	of	major	division	in	a	Malay	village.	
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Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	(Zulkeflee,		&	Anniesafinas,	2011)	identifies	intra-communal	differences	by	performing	the	inappropriateness	of	liberal	or	modern	values	through	the	meta-discourse	of	gender	dynamics.	Salah	Sangka	(Ahmad,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011)	similarly	articulates	the	separateness	and	distinctiveness	of	the	Malay	category	through	a	performance	of	an	inherent	Islamic	moral	superiority.		Noting	the	range	of	years	in	the	episodes	above,	it	is	clear	that	the	construction,	affirmation,	and	reinforcement	of	Malay	and	specifically	traditional	Malay	separateness/exclusivity	is	central	to	the	meta-discourse	contained	over	time	within	Senario.	Once	again,	this	aligns	almost	perfectly	with	what	we	have	discussed	of	Homi	Bhabha’s	notion	of	rigidity	to	the	meanings	of	stereotypes	that	are	sustained	by	the	dominant	powers	which	are	recurringly	deployed	across	periods	of	time	in	a	process	of	othering.	In	the	following	discussions	of	
Kantoi	(Nurul,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011),	Jejak	Karun	(Nizam,	1998),	Tandas	Awam	(Aznil,	&	Adiel,	1997),	and	Gong	Xi	(Muhd.	Sufian,	&	Kamalia,	2002),	we	shall	identify	the	observable	markers	of	Malay,	Chinese,	and	Indian	stereotypes	that	are	similar	to	the	subtexts	of	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	and	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.		
Visual	Caricatures	of	the	Representational	Regime	
Kantoi	(Busted)	first	aired	in	2011.	It	tells	the	story	of	Karim	and	his	friend	who	are	security	guards	at	a	museum	presumably	owned	by	Chinese	Muslim	convert	Tan	Abdullah.267	Karim	spends	beyond	his	means	and	has	to	borrow	from	loan	sharks.	He	discovers	that	his	friend	is	stealing	museum	artefacts	to	be	sold	on	the	black	market	to	supplement	his	meagre	income.	Karim	asks	to	be	included	in	the	scheme	so	that	he	is	able	to	settle	his	debts.	Tan’s	assistant	Bakar	realizes	that	the	museum	artefacts	are	missing	and	reports	the	matter	to	Tan.	Two	private	investigators	are	subsequently	hired	to	solve	the	mystery.	A	trap	is	laid	and	both	Karim	and	his	friend	are	eventually	apprehended.		
																																																								267	Tan	Abdullah	is	played	by	a	Malay	actor.	The	last	name	Abdullah	is	commonly	adopted	by	Muslim	converts	in	Malaysia.	This	differs	from	Malaysian	born	Muslims	who	carry	their	father’s	first	name	as	their	last	names.	The	name	‘Abdullah’	thus	identifies	one	as	a	Muslim	convert.	
		 168	
It	bears	pointing	out	that	with	only	a	few	exceptions,	almost	all	of	the	non-Malay	characters	in	various	episodes	of	Senario	are	performed	by	Malay	actors.	The	Chinese-Muslim	Tan	Abdullah	character	in	Kantoi	is	similarly	played	by	a	Malay	actor.	However,	this	becomes	problematic	when	the	actor’s	performance	is	observed	to	invariably	rely	on	an	essentialist	ethnic	caricaturizing,	since	it	is	an	attempt	at	constituting	non-Malay	from	a	Malay	imaginary.		There	are	two	facets	to	this	caricaturizing	of	ethnic	characters	in	Kantoi.	The	first	is	the	visual	distinction	of	class	difference.	Reviving	the	narrative	of	the	wealthy	Chinese	and	the	comparatively	poorer	Malays,	Tan	Abdullah	is	characterized	as	the	business	owner	to	whom	all	the	Malay	characters	in	the	episode	are	answerable.268	His	higher	position	within	the	conflated	social	and	economic	hierarchy	as	Chinese	and	pay-master	is	visually	signified	by	his	suit	jacket	and	his	comparatively	more	colourful	shirt	(see	figure	5.5).	Bakar,	who	is	Tan’s	assistant	is	dressed	in	a	light	pink	shirt	and	trousers	(see	figure	5.5),	while	Karim	and	his	friend	are	dressed	in	colourless	white	shirt	and	black	trousers	(see	figure	5.4).	Tan’s	attire	needs	to	be	understood	in	a	culturally-vernacularized	context,269	for	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	the	rural	viewership	is	
Senario’s	primary	demographic.	While	Tan’s	jacket	attire	may	be	common	in	the	cosmopolitan	areas,	its	connoted	social	status	is	arguably	more	pronounced	in	the	rural	areas.	Furthermore,	the	bland	shirts	of	Bakar	and	both	security	guards	connote	the	common	attire	of	Malaysian	office	clerks.		
																																																								268	It	is	unclear	how	it	is	that	an	individual	owns	a	museum.	Perhaps	it	is	a	private	gallery	though	it	is	not	made	clear	in	the	episode.	269	Historically,	suits,	blazers,	and	suit	jackets	are	not	part	of	Malay,	Chinese,	or	Malaysian	culture.	
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	Figure	5.4	Still	from	Kantoi.	From	left:	Karim,	and	Karim’s	friend.		
	Figure	5.5	Still	from	Kantoi.	From	left:	Tan	Abdullah,	and	Bakar.		However,	Senario’s	first	facet	of	visual	or	aesthetical	caricaturization	goes	beyond	mere	class	signification	into	the	visual	construction	of	ethnic	stereotypes.	For	example,	in	Jejak	Karun	(Nizam,	1998)	where	the	nation’s	three	main	ethnic	groups	are	metaphorized	into	three	ethnic	groups	of	treasure	hunters,	biological,	cultural	or	facial	features	are	exaggerated	for	full	ethnic	effect.	The	Indian	treasure	hunters	are	given	an	excess	of	facial	hair	(see	Figure	5.6)	while	the	Chinese	treasure	hunters	are	featured	with	long	upturned	eyebrows,	long	thin	moustaches,	and	long	sideburns	(see	Figure	5.7).	This	visual	
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construction	of	the	‘Chinese	face’	similarly	appeared	a	year	earlier	in	the	1997	episode	Tandas	Awam	(Aznil,	&	Adiel,	1997)	with	the	addition	of	a	long	wispy	beard	(see	Figure	5.8).	In	all	these	episodes,	the	non-Malay	characters	are	similarly	played	by	Malay	actors.		
	Figure	5.6	Still	from	Jejak	Karun.	The	Indian	treasure	hunters.		
	Figure	5.7	Still	from	Jejak	Karun.	The	Chinese	treasure	hunters.		In	the	abstract,	these	Chinese	facial	constructions	seem	similar	to	the	Western	construction	of	‘Oriental’270	characters	like	Dr.	Fu	Manchu	and	Ming	the	Merciless	(see	Figure	5.9).	While	the	fictional	villain	Ming	the	Merciless	was																																																									270	This	refers	to	the	historically	specific	term	to	communicate	Western	perceptions	of	Asia,	the	Near	East,	and	the	Far	East.	
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originally	introduced	in	1934	through	the	Flash	Gordon	comics,	Dr.	Fu	Manchu’s	character	was	introduced	much	earlier	in	1913	by	Sax	Rohmer’s	literary	fiction.		
	Figure	5.8	Still	from	Tandas	Awam.		The	Chinese	caricature.		
	Figure	5.9	From	left:	Ming	the	Merciless	in	the	film	adaptation	of	‘Flash	Gordon’	(Laurentiis,	&	Hodges,	1980)	and	Fu	Manchu	as	portrayed	on	the	film,	‘The	Mask	of	Fu	Manchu’	(Hearst,	&	Brabin,	1932)		In	her	analysis	of	Rohmer’s	writings	on	Fu	Manchu,	Urmila	Seshagiri	observes	that	the	‘devil	doctor’	(Fu	Manchu)	symbolized	the	Yellow	Peril,	thus	named	for	the	perceived	cultural	and	racial	threat	of	China	to	the	West	(2006,	162,	187-188).	This	was	an	articulation	of	British	and	American	Sinophobia	that	played	on	the	racial	prejudices	and	desires	of	white	audiences	(Sheshagiri	2006,	187-188).	With	Senario’s	consistent	deployment	of	similar	visual	constructions,	it	would	not	be	overreaching	to	suggest	that	the	Malays	have	assimilated	this	same	
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Sinophobia	with	roughly	the	same	implied	meanings.	Taken	broadly,	we	have	observed	that	Malay	anxieties,	prejudices,	and	desires	have	similarly	been	played	on	by	UMNO	in	their	othering	of	the	Chinese.	The	adoption	of	Western-colonial	Chinese	caricaturizing	reveals	another	facet	to	the	colonial	strategies	observed	to	have	been	adopted	post-independence	by	UMNO.		In	contrast	to	the	visual	particularities	of	the	Indian	and	Chinese	treasure	hunters	however,	the	Malay	treasure	hunter	in	Jejak	Karun	looks	entirely	ordinary	(see	Figure	5.10).	The	visual	articulations	of	these	peculiar	ethnic	caricatures	suggest	the	presence	of	an	underlying	racial	narrative	that	is	predicated	on	a	rhetoric	of	difference.	The	ordinary-looking	Malay	character	thus	signifies	an	unproblematic,	communally	accepted,	normalized	Malay	subject.	He	is	the	reference	against	which	the	other	two	ethnic	visual	constructions	are	measured,	whose	differences	in	turn,	exteriorize	them	from	the	dominant	normative	group.	This	is	a	visual	signification	for	the	racial	politics	of	differences	that	undergird	Malaysia’s	discourse	of	identity	where	the	dominant	normative	of	Malay	culture	represents	the	idealized	model.271			
	Figure	5.10	Still	from	Jejak	Karun.	The	Malay	treasure	hunter.																																																										271	This	is	aligned	with	the	National	Culture	Policy	(NCP)	of	1971,	for	example.	NCP	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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The	second	caricaturizing	facet	is	an	aural	differentiation.	The	speech	of	the	Indian	treasure	hunters	in	Jejak	Karun	for	example,	possess	a	sing-song	quality	that	is	accompanied	by	the	side-swaying	or	tilting	of	heads.	In	Kantoi,	Tan	Abdullah’s	spoken	Malay	is	exaggerated	with	a	Chinese	accent	inflected	with	discernibly	Chinese	expressions.	He	says,	for	example,	"Wah,	lu	dua	olang	ah.	
Haiyo!	Gua	tinggal	lu	olang	sekijap,	lu	olang	lilek-lilek	ah.	Wah,	lilek-lilek.	Lu	
goyang-goyang	apa	hal?	Aiyooo!"	(You	two.	I	leave	you	for	a	while,	[and]	you	start	relaxing.	Relax,	relax.	Why	are	you	swaying?).	Here,	the	terms	‘gua’	(I),	and	‘lu’	(you)	are	words	from	the	Chinese	Hokkien	dialect	(with	the	same	meanings).	The	expressions	(and	manner	of	use)	‘wah’,	‘haiyo’,	‘ah’	and	‘aiyooo’	which	are	articulated	liberally	by	Tan	throughout	the	episode,	are	commonly	found	amongst	the	speech	of	more	rural	Malaysian	Chinese.272	This	‘Chinese-ness’	is	augmented	with	Tan’s	phonetic	replacement	of	‘r’	with	‘l’	–	‘olang’	instead	of	‘orang’	and	‘lilek’	instead	of	‘rilek’	for	example.			These	speech	particularities	are	similarly	present	in	Tandas	Awam.	The	Chinese	character	says,	“hali-hali	mau	cuci”	(have	to	clean	daily),	“satu	olang“	(one	person),	and	“kamsiah,	kamsiah,	kamsiah.	Jalan	loh”	(thanks,	thanks,	thanks.	Walk	(move)).	Here,	the	switch	from	‘r’	to	‘l’	is	again	present	where	‘hali’	and	‘olang’	are	used	instead	of	‘hari’	and	‘orang’.	‘Kamsiah’	is	a	Chinese	Hokkien	term	for	‘thank	you’,	and	the	expression	‘loh’	is	frequently	used	by	vernacular	Chinese	speakers.	In	totality,	these	construct	a	Chinese	speech	pattern	in	Tandas	Awam	that	was	similarly	observed	in	Jejak	Karun	and	is	consistent	with	the	speech	patterns	of	Tan	Abdullah’s	Chinese	caricature	in	Kantoi.			The	fact	that	these	idiosyncratic	speech	identifiers	are	discernibly	Chinese	or	Indian,	suggests	that	they	do	exist	in	Malaysian	society.	However,	similar	to	the	production	of	meaning	with	‘kedai’	(shop)	and	‘Cina’	(Chinese)	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	
Raya,	this	is	a	reduction	of	the	entire	ethnic	community	to	a	few	simplified	essential	characteristics;	the	representational	strategy	of	reducing	cultures	to	certain	totemic	signifiers	to	naturalize	difference.	Furthermore,	as	we	have																																																									272	This	would	also	mean,	that	this	is	the	most	likely	version	of	Chinese-spoken	Malay	that	the	rural	demographic	of	Senario	will	experience	in	reality.	
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observed,	this	near-biological	essentializing	has	occurred	since	pre-colonial	Malaya,	and	does	not	account	for	the	realities	of	the	globalized	present.		In	spite	of	the	strident	condemnation	of	Western	values	and	culture,	the	close	alignment	of	Senario’s	Chinese	caricatures	to	similar	Western	historical	stereotypes	reveals	the	persistence	of	British	colonial	constructs	within	the	Malay	communal	imaginings	of	their	ethnic	‘others’.	Perhaps	this	reveals	an	attempted	critique	of	the	institutional	deployment	of	the	same	non-Malay	stereotypes	that	were	constructed	by	the	British	colonial	administration.	However,	when	considered	in	totality,	the	wider	syntagmatic	meanings	to	all	of	these	signification	chains	seem	to	suggest	otherwise.		
Senario’s	Malay	characters	all	speak	Malay	‘normally’.273	The	peculiarities	of	this	second	auditory	distinction	thus	function	in	similar	ways	to	the	first	distinction	which	visually	presents	Malay	characters	as	the	cultural	normative.	By	presenting	non-Malay	characters	speaking	normative	Malay	idiosyncratically,	it	augments	the	visual	peculiarities	of	these	same	characters	to	arrive	at	a	totalized	caricature	as	part	of	the	exteriorizing	process.	This	presentation	of	total	difference	–	in	looks,	speech,	and	as	observed	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	in	socio-economic	and	cultural	values	–	constructs	the	ethnic	minority	stereotype	as	different,	foreign,	alien,	and	thus	unassimilable	in	what	can	only	be	construed	as	a	process	of	othering.		The	premise	for	‘lelaki	lembut’	(effeminate	male)	characters	outlined	by	former	production	member	Hisyam	in	Chapter	4	can	be	applied	to	Senario’s	ethnic	caricatures/stereotypes.	At	the	elementary	level,	Hisyam	describes	that	humour	is	found	in	the	exaggerated	performance	of	an	effeminate	male	character.	I	suggested	that	this	conforms	to	the	Incongruity	Theory	since	it	is	the	disparity	between	the	true	gender	of	the	actor	and	the	gender	performed	that	is	humorous.	In	our	present	discussion	of	ethnic	caricatures,	this	same	humour	is	found	within	the	incongruities	between	the	speech	and	look	of	a	‘normal	person’	(constructed	as	the	Malay	subject)	and	non-Malay	caricatures.																																																									273	This	refers	to	how	they	would	normally	speak	in	everyday	Malaysian	society.	
		 175	
	It	is	not	mere	conjecture	that	the	incongruities	between	a	‘normal’	Malay	and	non-Malay	caricature	are	humorous.	Like	the	performance	of	an	effeminate	male	character,	it	easily	elicits	laughter.	The	first	line	of	Tan	Abdullah’s	dialogue	in	
Kantoi	is	accompanied	by	boisterous	laughter	and	again	on	each	subsequent	instance	of	the	Chinese	speech	pattern.	The	audience	responds	in	similar	ways	to	the	Chinese	in	Tandas	Awam	and	the	Chinese	treasure	hunters	in	Jejak	Karun.	The	head	swaying/tilting	and	accompanying	sing-song	quality	of	the	Indian	treasure	hunters’	speech	in	Jejak	Karun	similarly	result	in	much	laughter.	As	discussed	previously,	because	this	is	true	laughter	from	the	live	studio	audience,	it	reveals	the	strength	of	relationship	between	Senario	and	social	norms	since	such	laughter	can	only	be	elicited	when	an	understanding	of	the	norms	exists.		
Senario’s	humour	of	incongruities	can	also	work	as	a	subversive	tool	to	demonstrate	the	artificial	nature	of	social	norms	and	serves	to	undermine	their	supposedly	natural	or	self-evident	state.	However,	I	suggest	that	once	again,	the	cues	available	within	the	episodes	provide	a	more	coherent	signification	with	a	non-subversive	reading.	For	what	is	revealed	as	suitable	comedic	material	are	the	peculiarities	of	the	non-Malays	with	contrapuntal	meta-discourses	that	further	emphasize	the	unsuitable	nature	of	their	cultural	values.	From	this	perspective,	the	Superiority	Theory	for	humour	can	be	applied	to	explain	
Senario‘s	meta-narrative	of	Malay	primacy.	Framed	through	the	theory’s	dynamics	on	social	power,	Senario’s	laughing	‘at’	ethnic	minorities	is	thus	a	tool	employed	to	mock	others	to	reassure	themselves	of	their	own	dominance.	The	presence	of	superiority	on	Senario	is	therefore	contextualized	as	a	manifestation	of	the	socio-economic,	religious,	and	political	anxieties	of	the	Malay	community	that	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.			There	was	a	shift	from	this	Chinese	caricature	to	a	comparatively	more	accurate	portrayal	in	the	episode	Gong	Xi	(Congratulations)	(Muhd.	Sufian,	&	Kamalia,	2002)	that	first	aired	in	2002.	Gong	Xi’s	portrayal	of	Chinese	characters	are	different	from	the	rest	of	Senario’s	episodes	for	four	reasons.	Firstly,	the	
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episode’s	Chinese	characters	Mei	Wah,	Mei	Ling,277	and	Alex,	speak	Malay	without	the	earlier	speech	idiosyncrasies.	While	they	do	not	sound	like	Malay	native	speakers,	it	is	a	comparatively	more	accurate	portrayal	of	minority	groups	who	have	gone	through	the	national	Malay	education	system.	Secondly,	this	is	the	only	episode	that	contains	any	real	non-Malay	dialogue.	The	Chinese	characters	in	Gong	Xi	speak	Malay,	English,	Mandarin,	as	well	as	the	Chinese	dialects	Hokkien	and	Hakka.	Furthermore,	the	Malay	actor	who	plays	the	Malay	character	Jeri,	speaks	in	Mandarin,	Cantonese,	English,	as	well	as	Malay.		However,	what	is	truly	unique	about	Gong	Xi	is	the	fact	that	all	three	of	its	Chinese	characters	are	played	by	Chinese	actors	(see	Figure	5.11	and	Figure	5.12).	Only	one	other	episode,	‘How	are	you?’	(Shamsul,	&	Abdul	Samad,	1996),	featured	a	Chinese	actor.	This	rarity	of	casting	ethnic	Chinese	performers	is	the	third	reason	that	marks	it	out	as	significantly	different.	This	change	in	attitude	towards	non-Malays	was	however,	not	permanent	and	the	Chinese	caricature	would	return	(for	example,	Kantoi	aired	in	2011).	The	fourth	reason	is	premised	on	Gong	Xi	being	the	only	episode	with	a	Chinese	New	Year	narrative	as	well	as	a	Chinese	Lion	Dance	performance	(see	Figure	5.13).	While	the	Hari	Raya	celebration	is	a	recurring	theme	for	Senario,	the	sitcom’s	recognition	of	Chinese	New	Year	is	a	phenomenon	that	only	occurred	once	in	the	sitcom’s	history.		
	 	 	Figure	5.11	Still	from	Gong	Xi.	From	left:	Mei	Wah	and	Mei	Ling.		
																																																								277	Mei	Wah	and	Mei	Ling	are	female	characters	who	are	played	by	female	actors.	
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	Figure	5.12	Still	from	Gong	Xi.	From	left:	Mei	Wah,	Tuan	Besar	Alex,	and	Jeri.		
	Figure	5.13	Still	from	Gong	Xi.	Chinese	Lion	Dance.		While	the	text	itself	does	not	provide	any	evident	explanations	for	this	sudden	ethnic	inclusion,	it	may	be	productive	for	us	to	consider	if	there	were	any	potential	slippages	between	the	political	and	social	discourses	of	the	time	and	
Gong	Xi.	Arguably,	the	most	significant	political	development	in	the	year	that	
Gong	Xi	first	aired	(2002)	is	the	resignation	of	then	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	who,	at	the	time,	had	helmed	the	nation	for	22	years	(Kabilan	2002;	Saravanamuttu	2016,	188-189;	Ting	2009,	42).	Persuaded	by	UMNO	senior	members	to	retain	his	premiership	for	another	18	months	(Kabilan	2002;	Saravanamuttu	2016,	188-189;	Ting	2009,	42),	the	premiership	would	be	handed	to	then	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Abdullah	Badawi	in	2003.		
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Then	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Abdullah	Badawi’s	impending	ascendency	to	Prime	Ministership	introduces	several	accompanying	realities.	Carolina	Lopez	for	instance,	observed	that	public	and	political	events	across	the	year	2002	were	aimed	at	solidifying	Badawi’s	credentials	and	his	progressive	stance	to	Islam	as	a	lead-up	to	his	premiership	(2008,	65).	The	active	encouragement	of	Badawi’s	moderate	stance	was	in	fact	(Ong	2015,	27),	intended	to	contrast	sharply	with	then	outgoing	Prime	Minister	Mahathir,	whose	hard-line	approach	and	involvement	in	the	prosecution	of	former	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Anwar	Ibrahim	for	sodomy,	had	resulted	in	a	significant	loss	of	public	support	for	UMNO278	(Marzuki	2008,	36-38;	Saravanamuttu	2016,	175,	188).	This	loss	of	support	was	most	tangibly	felt	at	the	1999	general	elections	which	registered	significant	Malay	protest	votes	against	UMNO	(Gomez	2008,	10;	Saravanamuttu	2016,	175-178;	Ting	2009,	42).		This	backdrop	of	significant	political	cleavage	within	the	Malay	community	meant	that	non-Malay	votes	became	decisive	for	UMNO	in	the	coming	elections	(Saravanamuttu	2016,	178,	180;	Ting	2009,	42).	UMNO’s	subsequent	reinvention	of	itself	as	non-racialist	was	thus	imperative	for	the	party’s	survival	in	the	coming	2004	election.	Among	the	state	initiatives	that	were	implemented	in	2002	to	encourage	this	perception	of	a	non-racialist	UMNO	was	the	abolishment	of	ethnic	quotas	for	admission	into	public	universities	that,	since	the	1960s,	have	been	a	part	of	the	institutionalized	Malay	preferential	system279	(Lee	2015,	304;	Raman	&	Tan	2010,	11,	14).	Interestingly,	a	re-delineation	exercise	was	also	implemented	in	mid-2002,	which	at	its	conclusion	in	2003,	resulted	in	a	reduction	of	constituencies	with	an	over-weightage	of	Malay	seats	and	the	creation	of	more	ethnically	mixed	seats	(Abdul	Rashid	&	Tunku	Mohar	
																																																								278	Marzuki	Mohamad	suggests	the	cause	for	this	wide-scale	Malay	revolt	was	a	perceived	violation	of	the	ideological	Malay	ruler/protector	and	subject/protected	structure	with	Anwar’s	prosecution	(2008,	37-41).	279	This	development	in	2002	is	made	more	significant	when	we	consider	that	even	with	the	supposed	shift	from	ethno-nationalism	during	the	period	of	Malaysia	Incorporated	and	Bangsa	
Malaysia,	the	state	did	not	abolish	this	ethnic	quota	for	university	admission.	
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2006,	321;	Saravanamuttu	2016,	190-191),	which	would	translate	to	UMNO	being	less	reliant	on	Malay	votes.280			Considered	together,	even	if	Gong	Xi’s	ethnic	inclusiveness	was	not	an	apparent	consequence	of	the	state’s	political	strategy	in	2002,	it	is	indicative	of	political	and	social	considerations	in	that	particular	year	regarding	Malay-Chinese	relations	in	both	socio-national	discourse	as	well	as	popular	Malaysian	consciousness.	From	this	perspective,	it	would	not	be	too	much	of	a	conceptual	leap	to	question	if	Gong	Xi	was	part	of	the	contest	of	perception	in	canvassing	popular	support	for	this	newly-inclusive	UMNO	–	specifically	since	TV3	is	owned	by	UMNO’s	media	investment	group,	Media	Prima	Berhad.	Notwithstanding	these	important	innovations	in	Gong	Xi,	the	old	narratives	of	the	wealthy	Chinese	and	their	criminality,	the	metonym	of	city	as	the	corrupting	‘West’,	and	its	suture	to	the	sign	‘Chinese’	were	retained.	They	were	however,	signified	less	explicitly	through	the	characters	Jeri	and	Alex.		
	Figure	5.14	Still	from	Gong	Xi.	Jeri	and	his	arm-tattoo	of	stars.		
																																																								280	The	2004	general	elections	resulted	in	an	unsurprising	landslide	victory	for	UMNO	and	the	
Barisan	Nasional	(Case	2015,	43;	Saravanamuttu	2016,	189-191).	
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Jeri	is	a	Malay	from	the	city	who	works	for	a	Chinese	whom	he	refers	to	as	Tuan	
Besar	Alex	(Big	Boss	Alex).	The	nature	of	Jeri’s	work	is	never	mentioned.	Jeri	has	two	stars	tattooed	on	his	arm	(see	Figure	5.14)	and	there	is	a	lengthy	sequence	where	the	other	characters	discuss,	seemingly	out	of	a	novel	curiosity,	the	potential	meaning	of	the	stars.	No	conclusion	is	reached	in	this	lengthy	sequence,	and	the	significance	of	the	stars	is	never	referenced	again	for	the	remainder	of	the	episode.	The	scene	comes	across	almost	as	a	narrative	deviation	for	it	does	not	directly	contribute	to	moving	the	story	forward.	While	their	true	meaning	is	not	explicitly	stated,	the	deliberate	attempt	at	emphasizing	the	topic	–	through	the	lengthy	deviation	–	reveals	the	stars’	significance	to	Jefri’s	character	and	the	meta-narrative.		I	suggest	the	stars	are	meant	to	denote	Jeri’s	rank	and	membership	within	a	triad	where	Alex	is	a	‘Big	Boss’.	The	stars	are	a	simplification	of	recognizable	military-like	rank,	since	it	needs	to	be	identifiable	by	viewers.	Furthermore,	Jeri’s	attire	provides	an	impression	of	someone	who	can	be	‘rough’.	His	attitude	towards	Alex	is	another	indication.	Jeri’s	subservience	to	Big	Boss	Alex	is	revealed	when	he	stands	attentively	by	Alex	who	is	sitting	and	chatting	with	Mei	Wah	(see	Figure	5.12).	Without	even	looking	at	Jeri,	Alex	hands	him	the	jacket	with	a	single	instruction	of	“pegang”	(hold),	while	Jeri	complies	instantaneously.	This	deference	by	Jeri	is	present	in	his	interactions	with	Alex	throughout	the	episode.		A	possible	oppositional	reading	for	the	above	exists,	if	read	as	a	satire	for	the	Malay	administration’s	pandering	to	the	Chinese,	with	the	consequent	political	reliance	on	favourable	non-Malay	support.	The	embarrassment	of	a	subservient	Malay	(Jeri)	who	is	required	to	serve	the	needs	of	a	Chinese	(Alex)	occupying	the	position	of	‘boss’,	is	precariously	similar	to	the	anti-Chinese	polemics	legitimizing	Malay	nationalist	ambitions	that	has	been	circulating	since	British	Malaya.281	This	reading	is	even	more	compelling	since	the	episode’s	concession	on	ethnic	stereotyping	is	potentially	due	to	this	perceived	Chinese	electoral																																																									281	For	examples,	see	Foo	(2004,	82-83),	Reid	(2006,	14-15),	Shamsul	(1996b,	27),	and	Ting	(2009,	35-37).	
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power.	The	embarrassment	is	augmented	with	the	alluded	triad	connection	of	Jeri	and	Alex.	In	this	respect,	regardless	of	which	reading	position	is	taken,	Raya	
…	Raya	…	Raya’s	narrative	of	the	Chinese	and	‘kong	si	gelap’	is	still	present	and	simultaneously	reprised	with	the	suturing	of	the	‘city’s	economic	prospects’	with	‘Chinese	criminality’	as	both	Alex	and	Jeri	came	from	the	city	to	the	village.	Therefore,	Alex’s	social	status	signification	in	Gong	Xi	similarly	occupies	the	same	representational	space	as	Tan	Abdullah	in	Kantoi,	and	the	faceless	proprietor	Ah	Fatt	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.	
	
Conclusion	Much	of	what	is	written	in	this	chapter	coheres	to	our	previous	observations	on	the	nation’s	institutional	dogma	of	Malay	nationalism	and	cultural	binaries.	Through	the	analysis	of	several	episodes	of	Senario	that	first	aired	between	1996	to	2011,	we	explored	the	significations	of	Malay	identity,	and	the	caricaturizing	of	ethnic	minorities	(the	othering	process)	as	the	preferred	encoded	meaning	within	Senario.		The	discussions	in	this	chapter	have	brought	into	sharper	relief,	three	main	themes	of	Senario’s	essentialist	performances	of	identity.	The	first	theme	is	the	exclusionary	nature	of	national	narratives	that	pervade	popular	discourse.	
Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	represents	a	very	early	episode	that	articulated	nationalist	Malay	myths	which	are	foundational	to	the	legitimation	of	exclusive	ethnic	spaces	within	the	discourse	of	Malaysian	identity.	Within	this	wider	discourse,	it	was	observed	that	other	ethnic	communities	were	only	included	when	contextualized	through	the	colonizer-colonized	binary.	This	binary	was	further	associated	with	the	city-kampung	dichotomy	and	often	articulated	as	being	synonymous	with	the	urban-rural	discourse.	These	associations	are	syntagmatically	extended	to	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	and	Kantoi	where	colonial-era	stereotypes	that	sutured	race	to	economic	function	and	social	strata	were	reproduced.	All	these	reveal	that	the	scope	of	the	non-Malay	‘others’	can,	and	does,	fluidly	change	in	accordance	with	the	political	rhetoric	of	the	time.		
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The	second	theme	articulates	the	first	theme	tangentially	by	constructing	the	Malay	community	as	the	idealized	normative	within	the	country.	Within	this	dominant	narrative	that	recognizes	the	Malay	subject	as	the	status	quo,	non-Malay	‘others’	consequently	occupy	a	caricaturized	space	within	the	Malay	imaginary.	This	caricaturizing	is	furthermore	a	holistic	construction.	Aesthetic	differences,	speech	idiosyncrasies	–	and	building	on	the	first	theme	–	the	behavioural,	cultural,	and	socio-economic	gaps,	coalesce	into	a	totalized	‘other’.	This	un-evolving	and	totalizing	stereotype	is,	like	the	first	theme,	consistently	present	from	episodes	first	aired	in	1997	up	until	2011.	While	an	exception	was	made	with	Gong	Xi,	it	was	presumably	motivated	by	political	circumstances	of	the	time.		The	third	theme	is	the	contradictory	–	or	ambivalent,	to	use	Bhabha’s	term	–	nature	of	Senario’s	othering,	for	it	is	a	process	of	ethnic	de-assimilation	that	challenges	official	nation-building	initiatives.282	This	perhaps	reveals	that	political	will	for	national	inclusion	is	arguably	only	propagandistically	focused.	For	rather	than	the	bonds	of	Malaysian-ness,	homogenous	Malayness	is	instead	contrasted	with	its	ethnic	‘others’	to	prioritize	loyalty	to	(supra)race,	religion,	and	cultural	tradition.283	Within	this	framework,	nostalgia	that	is	validated	by	pseudo-historicism	is	often	deployed	on	Senario	as	a	mnemonic	and	emotional	trigger	for	the	soliciting	of	cultural	conformity	and	communal	solidarity.		As	part	of	the	process	of	othering,	Senario’s	recurring	reconstitution	of	Malayness	is	therefore	only	enabled	by	a	perpetual	re-delineation	of	what	is	non-Malay.	This	is	the	fundamental	formation	of	the	‘other’	where	Malay	identity	(as	performed	on	Senario	thus	far)	defines	itself	by	insisting	on	the	stereotypes	of	its	‘others’.	This	achieves	a	‘fixed’	meaning	to	the	stereotype	which	in	turn	allows	Malayness	to	define	itself.	The	episodal	narratives	have	thus	far	cohered	with	UMNO’s	conception	to	Malay	identity	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	It	is																																																									282	This	references	official	nation-building	propaganda	like	Bangsa	Malaysia	and	1Malaysia,	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	283	I	do	not	imply	that	this	is	unique	to	the	Malays	in	Malaysia.	Arguably,	the	Chinese	and	Indians	exhibit	similar	tendencies.	For	examples,	see	Cynthia	Enloe’s	(1967)	study	on	early	multi-ethnic	politics,	and	Khoo	Boo	Teik’s	(2013)	study	on	more	contemporary	Malaysian	Chinese	politics.	
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therefore	unsurprising	that	they	perfectly	encapsulate	Bhabha’s	notions	of	‘othering’,	‘stereotypes’,	‘rigidity’	of	meanings,	and	their	totalized	un-evolving	meanings	across	time.		While	our	focus	has	been	on	the	examination	of	the	actual	televisual	text,	it	should	be	reiterated	that	individual	agency	on	the	part	of	television	producers284	is	–	as	we	have	observed	in	Chapter	3	–	heavily	modulated	by	institutional	frameworks.	With	this	reality,	it	is	uncertain	as	to	how	much	of	the	text	is	a	consequence	of	conformity	to	institutional	pressure,	and	to	what	extent	the	text	reveals	a	socially	internalized	interpretation	of	Malayness	and	non-Malayness.	Both	cases	however,	do	not	detract	from	the	significations	present	in	the	text	nor	do	they	dilute	their	potential	effects	on	society.		Several	questions	that	arose	in	the	midst	of	our	discussions	were	not	addressed.	Among	these	are	why	the	mixed-race	marriages	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	and	
Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	invariably	feature	the	mothers	as	foreign.	Could	the	children’s	foreign	ancestry	not	come	from	their	fathers?	Furthermore,	what	is	
Mak	Bedah’s	true	function	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka?	While	she	was	included	in	several	of	the	scenes,	her	inclusion	was	narratively	superfluous.	These	questions	will	be	accounted	for	in	Chapter	7	when	we	discuss	Senario’s	representation	of	Malay	gender	relationships.		In	the	following	chapter,	the	focus	will	be	on	the	state	of	Malay	religiosity	on	
Senario	and	the	consequent	social	proprieties	that	function	to	provide	further	communal	cohesion	within	the	Malay	category.	Moreover,	we	will	observe	that	the	themes	of	Malay	nationalism	that	were	uncovered	in	this	chapter,	are	articulated	as	a	bond	for	supra-Malay	fraternity	when	viewed	from	a	wider	regional	perspective.	More	broadly,	these	will	demonstrate	how	Senario	attempts	to	reconstitute	the	parameters	of	Malayness	as	structured	by	the	conflated	identities	of	Malay,	Islam,	and	supra-Malay.		 																																																									284	Note	that	‘producers’	here	do	not	refer	to	the	job	designation	but	rather,	those	who	are	part	of	the	production	of	content	for	television.	
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CHAPTER	6	
	
The	Islamic	Senario	of	Malayness	
	
Kita	sekarang	ni,	buat	cara	baik.	Kita	bagi	salam	bagi	dia.	Den	kata,	ini	
orang	Melayu	punya	rumah;	orang	Islam.	Jadi	jika	kita	bagi	salam,	dia	
mesti	jawab	…	
	
We’ll	do	it	the	proper	(or	good)	way.	We’ll	give	our	salam.	I	say,	this	is	a	
house	owned	by	Malays;	by	Muslims.	If	we	give	our	salam,	he	must	answer	
…	 –Salah	Sangka	(Ahmad,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011)		The	distinct	simplicity	of	the	words	employed	in	the	excerpt	from	Senario	above	are	charged	with	descriptors	for	the	Malay	category,	their	state	of	religiosity,	and	communal	social	proprieties.	The	implicit	ideological	fixity	of	the	spatial,	material,	and	religious	boundaries	presented	by	those	five	sentences,	succinctly	frames	the	themes	of	this	present	chapter.	This	chapter	will	thus	provide	a	closer	examination	of	the	state	of	Malay	religiosity	on	Senario	and	the	consequent	social	proprieties	that	function	to	provide	further	communal	cohesion	within	the	Malay	category.		It	was	observed	in	the	previous	chapter	that	Senario‘s	descriptors	for	Malayness	are	broadly	constructed	through	the	themes	of	Malay	nationalism,	culture,	tradition,	and	history.	This	chapter	will	demonstrate	that	Senario	also	articulates	a	communally	embedded	condition	of	religiosity	that	further	defines	the	quality	of	being	Malay.	Most	strident	however,	is	the	manner	in	which	these	conditions	are	articulated	within	a	rubric	of	Malay-Islam	that	is	predicated	on	the	ideological	supra-Malay	superstructure.	There	are	two	overarching	trajectories	to	the	following	discussions.	The	first	is	Senario’s	articulation	of	Islamic	televisual	descriptors	that	builds	upon	the	previously	identified	Malay	signifiers.	The	second	reveals	how	the	representations	of	this	Islamic-Malayness	function	to	inform	and	influence	both	the	cultural	and	religious	subjectivities	upon	which	the	community’s	supra-Malay	imaginary	is	predicated.		
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The	discussions	in	this	chapter	will	primarily	draw	on	two	episodes:	Ta	Ti	Tu	(Jamil,	&	Norwani,	1997),	and	Salah	Sangka	(Ahmad,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011).	As	previously	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	the	strictures	of	religiosity	and	the	intra-communal	performatives	of	faith	as	practiced	in	the	quotidian,	are	perfectly	encapsulated	in	Ta	Ti	Tu.	Salah	Sangka,	which	was	first	telecast	in	2011	is,	on	the	other	hand,	a	clear	example	of	the	complex	interrelatedness	between	the	discursive	fields	of	regional	autochthony,	culture,	and	religion.	I	suggest	that	Malay	Muslims’	anxieties	for	their	presumptive	exclusive	rights	are	plainly	articulated	through	Salah	Sangka‘s	thematic	conflation	of	Malay,	Muslim,	and	within	the	wider	discursive	field,	the	category	of	supra-Malay.		
Perambulations	Between	Malay,	Muslim,	and	Malaysian	In	spite	of	Islam’s	dominance	as	a	constitutive	part	of	the	discourse	on	Malay	identity,	its	presence	on	Senario	is	not	as	overt	as	other	non-religious	descriptors	of	Malay.	Many	of	the	Islamic	identifiers	are	instead,	dialogically	included	or	crafted	into	character	appearance	that	subtly	alludes	to	Islamic	daily	life.	One	of	the	earliest	–	and	perhaps	the	only	–	episode	to	feature	a	wholly	didactically	Islamic	narrative	is	an	episode	from	1997	titled	Ta	Ti	Tu	(Jamil,	&	Norwani,	1997).		The	significance	of	the	title	Ta	Ti	Tu	is	attributable	to	the	words	being	one	of	the	basic	phonemes	(‘ta’	with	a,	i,	u)	in	Quranic	Arabic	and	Jawi.	Ta	Ti	Tu	thus	represents	a	fundamental	lesson	in	Quranic	recitation	and	more	broadly,	Islamic	studies.	The	episode’s	title	thus	perfectly	encapsulates	the	perceived	aims	of	this	didactic	episode.	More	tellingly,	the	title	reflects	the	religious	and	cultural	insularity	of	the	episode,	for	it	requires	fore-knowledge	of	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	significance	to	locate	its	meaning	in	relation	to	the	episodic	theme.			The	story	of	Ta	Ti	Tu	centres	on	an	elderly	lady	Mak	Aji	who	coaches	students	in	her	kampung	home	on	the	recitation	of	the	Holy	Quran.	Among	her	older	students	are	the	girls	Achik	and	Eja,	and	the	boys	Ninin,	Meon,	and	Jijoi	(see	Figure	6.1).	The	episode	starts	with	her	younger	students	Sarah	and	Nawfal	(see	Figure	6.2)	completing	their	final	lesson	before	they	go	home.	When	Mak	Aji	
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leaves	the	room	to	perform	her	prayers,	Achik	and	Eja	are	left	alone	and	become	distracted	from	their	reading.	The	boys	arrive	for	their	lessons	and	everyone	starts	to	play	around	which	interrupts	Mak	Aji’s	prayers.	She	returns	to	the	room	to	re-establish	order	in	the	class	before	leaving	again	to	continue	with	her	prayers,	which	leaves	the	children	to	horse	around	again.	It	should	be	noted	from	the	outset	that	except	Sarah,	all	characters	in	the	episode	are	played	by	male	actors.		
	Figure	6.1	Still	from	Ta	Ti	Tu.	From	left:	Achik,	Eja	Mak	Aji,	Ninin,	Meon,	and	Jijoi.		
	Figure	6.2	Still	from	Ta	Ti	Tu.	From	left:	Sarah,	and	Nawfal.	
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Ta	Ti	Tu’s	narrative	revolves	wholly	around	the	children’s	Quranic	lessons	at	Mak	Aji’s	kampung	house.	Like	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	that	was	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	central	narrative	is	its	didacticism,	for	there	is	no	actual	story	line	in	the	traditional	sense.286	The	episode	is	instead	structured	around	a	series	of	religious	instructions.	This	structure	functions	to	construct	an	idealized	on-screen	Malay	Muslim	subject	that	is	located	within	the	centre	of	Malay	symbolism	–	the	kampung.	This	is	achieved	in	Ta	Ti	Tu	through	three	methods	–	dialogic	instructions,	demonstration,	and	meta-narrative.	These	three	methods	will	broadly	direct	our	discussions	of	the	episode.		The	first	sentence	of	the	opening	scene	–	“Sadaqa	Allahu	l-Azeem”	(‘Allah	the	Almighty	has	spoken	the	truth’)	–	effectively	asserts	the	religious	axiom	that	undergirds	the	entire	logic	of	Islamic	faith.	Its	significance	is	foregrounded	for	the	viewers	by	Mak	Aji’s	explanation	on	the	utility	of	its	recitation	immediately	after.	The	act	of	explaining	emphasizes	the	verse,	elevating	its	presence	within	the	scene	from	mere	narrative	dissonance	to	an	element	that	demands	closer	attention	from	viewers.	This	act’s	reflexivity	is	similar	to	Negara	Chekpa	
Merdeka	and	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	where	Mak	Aji’s	explanation	is	instructional	not	just	for	the	characters	in	the	narrative	but	also	the	viewers	observing	the	exchange.	Here,	the	implicit	process	of	socialization	serves	firstly,	to	instruct	viewers	on	the	utility	of	this	Islamic	verse,	and	secondly,	to	inculcate	the	normalcy	of	its	daily	use	within	lived	Islamic	life.	As	we	shall	observe	next,	all	three	methods	–	dialogic	instructions,	demonstration,	and	meta-narrative	–	are	deployed	from	this	very	first	scene	to	present	a	faceted	Malay	Muslim	subject.		After	her	explanation,	Mak	Aji	goes	on	to	lament	that	as	a	result	of	her	advanced	age,	she	tires	easily.	With	the	conclusion	of	the	younger	students’	studies,	she	had	planned	to	retire.	However,	the	introduction	of	five	new	(older)	students	–	Achik,	Eja,	Ninin,	Meon,	and	Jijoi	–	strengthened	her	resolve	to	fulfil	her	responsibility	for	seeing	them	complete	their	Quranic	education.	Subsequently,	Sarah	and	Nawfal	are	commended	by	Mak	Aji	for	completing	their	Quranic																																																									286	One	that	broadly	adheres	to	the	basic	three-act	structure,	for	instance.	
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recitations	at	a	young	age.	Aesthetically,	both	younger	children	are	shown	to	be	attired	in	(religious-styled)	clothing	that	are	largely	considered	appropriate	by	the	community	(see	Figure	6.2	for	example).	When	Sarah	and	Nawfal	relay	their	parents’	intent	of	gifting	Mak	Aji	with	food	as	a	token	of	gratitude	for	the	lessons,	Mak	Aji	modestly	replies	that	it	is	not	needed.	This	prompts	the	older	student	Eja	to	remind	Mak	Aji,	“Jangan	ditolak	rezeki,	Opah”	(Don’t	reject	sustenance,287	Grandmother288).	Here,	I	suggest	that	the	performative	dimension	of	the	opening	Quranic	verse	may	be	augmented	by	a	conjunctional	study	of	the	characters’	religious	attires	as	well	as	the	dialogue.	The	sequencing	of	its	events	and	dialogue	requires	particular	attention,	for	it	reveals	a	layered	construction	to	the	faceted	Malay	Muslim	subject.		The	opening	verse	‘Allah	the	Almighty	has	spoken	the	truth’	is	the	master-signifier	that	quilts	the	meaning	of	the	floating	signifiers	within	an	ideological	field	that	posits	everything	Quranic	as	a	‘universal	truth’	that	is	beyond	question.	Within	this	field,	Mak	Aji	as	a	source	of	authority	on	Islamic	or	Quranic	knowledge	is	located	at	its	centre.	Within	the	episode’s	Malay	intra-communal	hierarchy	of	a	kampung,	Mak	Aji	thus	occupies	the	same	position	as	Pak	Teh	in	
Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	and	Basiron’s	parents	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.	If	the	opening	verse	sets	the	criteria	of	religiosity	(unquestioning	faith	in	God’	infallibility),	Mak	Aji’s	lament,	revealing	her	resolve	despite	her	frailty,	further	defines	its	quality.		Religious	lessons	often	involve	fees	and	thus	have	an	economic	facet.	My	reading	of	Mak	Aji’s	lament	however,	takes	its	cue	from	the	hadith289	of	the	Prophet	saying	that	the	best	among	Muslims	are	those	who	learn	and	teach	the	Quran	
																																																								287	Within	an	Islamic	context,	rezeki	has	a	broad	meaning	that	includes	livelihood,	subsistence,	income,	and	gifts.	It	is	meant	to	include	all	that	adds	to,	or	is	beneficial	to,	one’s	life,	however	small.	This	is	predicated	on	the	belief	that	everything	comes	from	God.	288	The	term	can	be	used	broadly	to	address	elderly	females	not	of	blood-relations.	289	The	Brill	Encyclopaedia	of	Islam	defines	hadith	as	a	collection	of	“what	was	related	about	the	Prophet	and	his	community”	(Gaiser,	2017).	It	is	common	for	Muslims	to	aspire	towards	emulating	what	is	recounted	in	a	sahih	(verified	as	genuine	by	a	rigorous	system)	hadith.	
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(Sahih	al-Bukhari	1996).290	Framed	in	this	context,	Mak	Aji’s	implicit	act	of	self-sacrifice	alludes	to	a	sense	of	religious	duty	that	transcends	her	physicality,	where	the	dissemination	of	Quranic	knowledge	is	prioritized	over	any	mortal	weakness.	Furthermore,	Mak	Aji	expresses	a	lament,	rather	than	a	passing	dialogic	comment,	which	seems	to	align	with	the	popular	notion	of	cabaran	(trial/challenge)	from	God.	Among	other	sources,	cabaran	is	a	notion	informed	by	the	first	line	of	the	Quranic	verse	2:286	that	says	“On	no	soul	doth	God	place	a	burden	greater	than	it	can	bear”	(Yusof	2000,	60).	This	becomes	especially	clear	when	she	ends	the	lament	by	saying	“tak	apalah	macam	ni”	(it’s	alright	that	it’s	like	this)	as	a	sign	of	tacit	acceptance.	All	of	these	signify	that	Mak	Aji’s	lament	is	not	focused	on	the	lessons’	economic	facet,	but	rather,	to	foreground	the	internal	Islamic	logic	of	the	opening	verse’s	‘universal	truth’	that	subordinates	Mak	Aji’s	mortality	as	subsidiary	to	the	pious	nature	of	her	work.		Eja’s	reminder	to	Mak	Aji	not	to	turn	down	rezeki	serves	two	functions.	The	first	establishes	the	transcendence	of	food	from	mere	worldly	sustenance	to	that	which	is	provided	by	God.	The	manner	of	its	deliverance	by	Eja	as	an	oft-repeated,	age-old,	commonly-known	word	of	wisdom	constructs	it	plainly	as	uncontested	normative	truth.	The	second	function	works	simultaneously	with	the	first	function	as	a	reminder	of	human	fallibility,	inherent	even	in	figures	of	Islamic	authority	like	Mak	Aji.	For	even	if	Mak	Aji’s	declining	of	food	is	merely	out	of	politeness	expected	of	one	who	is	beradat,	Eja’s	reminder	elevates	Mak	Aji’s	response	by	framing	it	Islamically.	In	this	sense,	any	meaning	imbued	through	adat,	is	doubly	reinforced	through	what	is	signified	as	being	complementary	to	Islam.	Thus,	regardless	of	her	socio-religious	standing	within	the	community,	this	reminder	locates	her	beneath	the	supposed	infallibility	of	Quranic	universal	truth.	This	act	is	especially	significant	when	we	consider	that	Eja,	the	person	who	provides	the	reminder,	is	a	new	student	who	is	presumably	still	lacking	in	Islamic	instruction.		
																																																								290	This	is	also	consonant	with	my	own	experience	of	being	taught	by	several	religious	teachers,	or	Ustaz.	They	never	failed	to	mention	that	there	was	much	pahala	(religious	merit)	in	teaching,	learning,	or	even	reciting/reading	the	Quran	(in	the	original	Quranic	Arabic).	
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The	wider	implications	of	Ta	Ti	Tu‘s	opening	scene	lies	in	its	relatability	for	viewers.	William	Roff	for	example,	noted	the	insistence	of	Malay	families	to	send	their	children	to	village	religious	schools	instead	of	the	secular	Malay	or	English	government	schools	during	the	period	of	British	Malaya	(1967,	26,	30,	71).	The	practice	of	sending	children	for	Islamic	education	or	recitation	of	the	Quran	is	still	adhered	to	by	most	Muslims	in	Malaysia.291	Like	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	the	on-screen	reconstruction	of	a	practice	that	exists	in	the	real	world,	creates	an	immediately	relatable	experience	for	viewers	that	allows	for	a	confirmation	of	their	similar	worldviews.	Where	the	strictures	of	adat	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	previously	dictated	social	proprieties,	the	tenets	of	communal	Islam	here,	further	refine	these	proprieties	to	locate	them	within	a	tighter	framework	of	Islamic	conservatism	that	is	overlaid	over	social	proprieties.	This	interweaving	of	adat	and	Islam	subsequently	produces	a	televisual	social	script	that	reaffirms	dominant	real	world,	communal	Malayness.		
	Figure	6.3	Still	from	Ta	Ti	Tu.	From	left:	Eja	reciting	a	Quranic	verse	before	she	gives	a	doa	(prayer/supplication).		This	Islamic	social	script	is	perhaps	most	explicit	when	Mak	Aji	instructs	Eja	to	recite	a	Quranic	verse.	Eja	starts	off	by	merely	reciting,	which	progresses	to	the	placing	of	one	hand	over	her	ear,	before	finishing	off	by	fluidly	upturning	both																																																									291	See	Azmil	(2012)	for	a	broad	overview	of	Islamic	education	(national	or	otherwise)	in	Malaysia.	
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palms	in	supplication	for	the	recitation	of	an	accompanying	doa	(prayer/supplication)	(see	Figure	6.3).	Through	this	display	of	the	associated	actions,	forms,	and	behaviour,	Eja	demonstrates	the	communally	encouraged	set	of	‘rituals’	that	accompanies	the	recitation	of	verses	and	prayers.	As	before,	the	matter-of-fact	manner	to	its	televisual	presentation,	normalizes	the	‘ritualism’	of	Islamic	religiosity	as	part	of	the	status	quo.		The	actions	are	thus	featured	as	a	part	of	Eja’s	and	Achik’s	Quranic	lessons	which	are	guided	by	explicit	strictures	dictated	through	the	Islamic	authority	signified	by	Mak	Aji.	This	opens	the	discursive	space	for	the	normalization	of	both	the	practice	of	Islamic	ritualism,	and	its	adoption	as	a	gauge	for	the	degree	of	one’s	religiosity.	This	instructive	articulation	of	Quranic	recitations	and	forms	is	repeated	several	times	with	Eja	and	Achik	before	Mak	Aji	leaves	to	perform	her	afternoon	prayers.	The	repetitive	preoccupation	with	this	process	throughout	the	episode	is	perceivably	deliberate,	suggesting	an	attempt	at	strengthening	the	normativity	of	this	Islamic	ritualism.		Much	like	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	and	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya’s	internal	structure	of	communal	positions,	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	formation	of	a	Muslim	subject	is	similarly	communally	hierarchized.	As	previously	indicated,	Mak	Aji	inhabits	the	position	of	religious	authority.	The	younger	students	Sarah	and	Nawfal,	occupy	a	tier	that	is	higher	than	the	older	students.	Their	higher	position	within	the	religious	field	when	compared	to	the	older	students,	can	only	be	understood	if	we	consider	the	formation	of	their	characters	from	the	national	Islamic	perspective	and	its	associated	significance	in	Malay	adat.		Within	an	Islamic	structure	of	influence,	Muslims	with	wider	and	more	in-depth	knowledge	of	Islam	are	commonly	accorded	with	higher	prestige	and	respect.	Wazir	Jahan	Karim	suggests	that	these	distinctions	between	the	alim292	(religious)	and	the	non-religious	have	a	social	significance	where	a	“Malay	who	
																																																								292	Wazir	termed	it	as	halim,	though	the	Kamus	Dewan	Edisi	Empat	(Malay	Dictionary	4th	Edition)	gives	two	separate	definitions	to	halim	and	alim	with	the	latter	bearing	the	intended	meaning.	
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is	beradat293	yet	halim	[alim]”	occupies	the	“uppermost	position	of	reverence	in	Malay	society”	within	the	“cultural	continuum	of	kasar	and	halus	(‘from	vulgarity	to	refinement’)”	(1992,	171,	translation	in	original).	This	is	a	notion	that	is	echoed	by	Suzanne	Brenner	(1995,	25-28)	and	broadly	alluded	to	by	Michael	Peletz	(1996).	Within	the	nation’s	cultural-political	framework,	it	legitimizes	the	top-down	structure	of	established	Islamic	bureaucracy	that	has	state	muftis294	issuing	fatwas295	determining	the	discourse	and	narrative	of	Islam	and	faith	within	Malaysia.	This	structure	is	further	replicated	between	the	Ulamas296	and/or	Imams297	and	their	congregations.	Dominik	Müller	notes	that	this	Malaysian	religio-bureaucratic	structure	is	based	on	an	authoritarian	system	of	knowledge	transmission	(2014,	39)	which	establishes	a	top-down	flow	of	Islamic	knowledge	to	the	masses.298	As	we	will	observe	in	the	following	discussion,	the	dynamics	of	this	normative	subordination	by	those	with	Islamic	credentials	is	mirrored	in	Ta	Ti	Tu	by	Sarah	and	Nawfal’s	meta-narrative	position.		The	construction	of	the	two	younger	students’	positions	within	this	Islamic	framework	is	clear.	From	the	outset,	viewers	are	informed	about	Sarah	and	Nawfal’s	completion	of	Quranic	studies,	an	act	which	is	aimed	at	establishing	their	Islamic	‘credentials’.	Moreover,	the	commendation	from	a	source	of	Islamic	authority	(Mak	Aji)	on	this	achievement	bears	an	implicit	elevation	of	their	standing	within	the	classroom	space.	From	an	aesthetical	perspective,	their	attire	is	religiously	appropriate	and	well-kept.	This	is	in	direct	contrast	to	the	older	students’	attires	which	are	unkempt	and	worn	in	a	manner	that	does	not	conform	to	Islamic	requirements	of	male	modesty	(aurat)	(see	Figure	6.4	for	example).	From	a	behavourial	perspective,	Sarah	and	Nawfal’s	conduct	as																																																									293	One	who	‘has’	adat	or	practices	adat.	294	A	Muslim	legal	expert	empowered	to	give	rulings	on	Islamic	matters.	In	Malaysia,	this	is	state-sanctioned	through	either	the	sultans	or	federal	religious	authorities.	295	Ruling	on	a	point	of	Islamic	law,	given	by	an	Islamic	authority;	e.g.	state	religious	departments	or	muftis.	296	Learned	Muslim	scholars	possessing	formal	qualifications	in	some	aspect	of	Islamic	study.	297	Someone	who	leads	a	congregational	prayer.	In	Malaysia,	this	title	for	the	congregational	prayer	leader	of	a	mosque	is	a	formal	appointment	by	the	various	state	religious	departments,	and	endorsed	by	the	state’s	Sultan.	298	One	reason	legitimizing	this	power	structure	is	the	traditional	Malay	concept	of	ilmu,	roughly	translated	to	mean	‘knowledge’.	Ilmu	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	
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demonstrated	through	their	manner	of	speaking,	is	measured,	composed,	and	respectful	towards	Mak	Aji	while	the	older	students	are	mischievous,	boisterous,	and	undisciplined	(see	Figure	6.4	for	example).	In	this	respect,	both	the	younger	students	are	constructed	within	the	narrative	as	embodying	the	aspirational	religious	aesthetic	–	the	beradat	and	alim	ideal.		The	differences	in	mannerisms	and	attitudes	are	further	emphasized	between	the	children	when	Sarah	and	Nawfal	return	in	a	later	scene	with	the	food	from	their	parents.	In	that	scene,	the	absence	of	the	mediating	force	of	Mak	Aji	(who	is	away	praying),	causes	the	true	attitudes	of	both	groups	of	children	to	come	to	the	fore.	In	contrast	to	the	undisciplined	older	students	who	are	loud	and	unruly,	Sarah	and	Nawfal	still	exhibit	a	composure	and	discipline	that	locates	them	on	the	higher	ground	of	halus	(refined)	comportment.		
	Figure	6.4	Still	from	Ta	Ti	Tu.	The	older	boys	are	horsing	around	in	Mak	Aji’s	absence.	Note	their	kain	
pelekat	(a	version	of	the	sarong)	which	traditionally	covers	their	legs	are	instead	worn	on	the	neck	(boy	in	front)	or	head	(boy	in	the	middle).	Furthermore,	their	knees	–	part	of	their	aurat	(concealed	anatomy),	are	uncovered.		While	an	argument	exists	for	age	being	the	primary	cause	for	any	difference	in	behaviour,	this	is	never	alluded	to	within	the	narrative	of	Ta	Ti	Tu.299	In	its																																																									299	Mak	Aji’s	praise	for	the	younger	students	are	the	only	reference	to	the	children’s	ages.	
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absence,	Mak	Aji’s	pre-emptive	commendation	to	Sarah	and	Nawfal	at	the	very	start	of	the	episode	provides	a	stronger	explanation	for	the	behavioural	contrast.	I	interpret	Mak	Aji’s	initial	commendation	as	pre-emptive,	since	it	organizes	the	ideological	field	(the	master-signifer,	in	other	words)	for	the	entire	episode.	This	pre-emptive	act	aligns	the	viewers’	interpretation	to	its	proposed	meaning	right	from	the	start	and	inoculates	the	Islamic	meta-narrative	from	any	significant	production	of	overt	counter-meanings.	This	is	aided	by	the	repeated	performative	of	instructional	Quranic	recitations	throughout	the	episode	which	functions	to	preoccupy	viewer	attention	with	what	is	an	explicitly	relatable	religious	lived	experience.		Islamic	education	and	tangentially	Islam,	are	consequently	elevated	as	the	mediating	elements	that	provide	balance	to	the	Malay	Muslim	subject.	The	added	presumptive	benefit	of	mastering	Quranic	education	at	a	young	age	–	further	demonstrated	through	the	contrast	with	the	unruly	older	students	who	have	yet	to	complete	their	studies	–	qualifies	the	traditional	normative	argument	for	introducing	Quranic	studies	to	children	when	they	are	young.	In	addition	to	the	cultural	halus	perspective,	the	religious	dimension	suggested	by	the	meta-narrative	of	Sarah	and	Nawfal	is	that	their	discipline	and	behaviour	is	presumed	to	be	engendered	through	an	observance	of	Islamic	akhlaq.300	The	practice	of	
akhlaq	through	self-mediation,	control,	and	discipline	serves	a	higher	Islamic	function	that	reacquaints	a	Muslim	to	his/her	fitrah.301	This	adherence	to	Islamic	
akhlaq	functions	to	reaffirm	the	higher	religio-social	standing	(beradat-halus	status)	of	Sarah	and	Nawfal	over	the	older	students.		The	significance	of	the	younger	children’s	completion	of	their	studies	is	therefore	prominent,	for	it	is	presumed	to	have	enabled	them	to	mediate	their	
akhlaq	through	Islam.	The	contrast	with	those	who	are	still	learning,	underscores	Islamic	education	as	a	determinant	for	positive	differentiation.	Islam’s	civic	function	is	thus	emphasized	through	its	deployment	to	shape																																																									300	Adibah	binti	Abdul	Rahim	defines	akhlaq	as	encompassing	that	which	governs	one’s	disposition,	behaviour,	attitudes,	actions,	and	values	(2013,	508).	301	Ammar	Fauzi	from	Indonesia’s	Islamic	College	describes	fitrah	as	embodying	the	concept	of	the	original	state	of	purity	when	Man	was	created	(2013,	34-35).	
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socially	adept	Muslim	individuals	within	a	communal	Islamic	environment.	Much	like	the	logic	of	observable	or	demonstrable	‘reality’	in	Negara	Chekpa	
Merdeka,	the	behaviourial,	aesthetical,	and	attitudinal	contrasts	between	the	two	groups	of	students	are	meant	to	illustrate	this	civic	function	of	Islamic	education.	In	this	regard	–	and	embodying	the	dualism	of	the	beradat-alim	ideal	–	the	utility	and	role	of	Islam	within	the	Malay	psyche	and	as	a	rubric	constituting	the	fabric	of	communal	living,	is	similar	to	the	rubric	of	Malay	adat.		Our	discussions	have	thus	far	demonstrated	the	three	dimensions	of	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	Islamic	didacticism.	We	observed	how	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	dialogic	Islamic	instructions,	demonstrations	on	recitations	and	ritualism,	all	work	cohesively	with	its	meta-narrative	to	introduce	the	grammar	of	discursive	Islam	which	can	subsequently	structure	or	reflect	quotidian	expressions	of	faith.	It	was	indicated	in	Chapter	2	that	the	start	of	Malaysia’s	Islamist	agenda	in	the	1980s	had	the	tangential	consequence	of	institutionally	legalizing303	what	Müller	notes,	was	an	orthodox	brand	of	Sunni	Islam	(2014,	3).	It	was	noted	that	the	progressive	stress	on	assimilating	Islam	with	public	governance	has	led	to	the	considerable	policing	on	expressions	of	faith	and	the	close	focus	on	Islamic	ritualism.	Taken	as	a	televisual	microcosm	of	these	wider	national	developments,	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	performative	dimension	is	therefore	aligned	with,	and	reflective	of,	this	state	of	religious	affairs	as	manifested	within	Malay	domestic	life.	
 The	considerable	hierarchization	of	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	characters	according	to	quotidian	understandings	of	the	state’s	brand	of	Sunni	Islam	and	Islamic	education	helps	to	normalize	the	suggested	unitary	identity	of	Malaysian	Muslim	within	national	discourse.	Taken	broadly,	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	religious	didacticism	performs	a	positive	social	function.	Its	objectives	are	plainly	to	encourage	a	standardization,	and	thus	homogenization,	of	Islamic	observances	and	to	demonstrate	these	sanctioned	versions.	In	this	respect,	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	aims	were	aligned	with	the	administration’s	efforts	to	establish	an	Islamic	bureaucracy	that	introduced	
																																																								303	I	refer	to	the	significant	increase	in	state	and	federal	legislations	and	policies	on	Islamic	affairs	and	Muslim	rights,	as	well	as	the	amendments	to	the	constitution	that	introduced	the	dual	legal	structure	of	Islamic	and	civil	law.	
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homogenizing	national	Islamic	policies.	Contextualized	thus,	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	domestic	expression	of	faith	is	in	fact	a	constitutive	component	of	statist	Islam.		Moreover,	whatever	resultant	ethnic	or	religious	exclusion	that	was	implicit	in	
Ta	Ti	Tu’s	televisual	performative	was	arguably	tangentially	produced	on	an	unconscious	level.	This	supposedly	peripherally-produced	exclusion	was	however,	not	always	unconscious	or	‘innocent’	in	Senario.	As	we	will	observe	in	the	succeeding	section,	Senario’s	exclusion	of	its	non-Malay	and	non-Muslim	‘others’	became	more	strident	in	its	later	years,	particularly	in	2011,	encouraging	not	only	religious	polarization,	but	also	conflating	it	with	communalist	ideas	of	supra-racial	and	nationalist	solidarity.		
(Re)Establishing	the	Tautology	of	‘Muslim	Malay’	One	episode	that	was	considerably	articulate	in	its	Islamic	and	racial	othering	was	Salah	Sangka	(Ahmad,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011)	that	aired	in	2011.	The	story	of	
Salah	Sangka	(Mistaken/Misunderstanding)	centres	on	an	Indonesian	bomoh	(shaman)	named	Wak	Jali,304	who	lives	in	a	remote	kampung	presumably	in	the	Malaysian	state	of	Negeri	Sembilan.	The	kampung	only	has	three	inhabitants305	–	the	elder	Wak	Jali	and	two	unnamed	youths.	Both	youths	rush	to	inform	Wak	Jali	that	their	house	is	haunted,	and	they	are	invited	to	stay	for	the	night.	Before	retiring	to	the	house,	Wak	Jali	establishes	magical	defences	around	the	compound	and	the	youths	are	asked	to	learn	the	associated	rituals	as	he	demonstrates	them.	At	one	point	during	the	night	when	the	youths	are	alone	in	the	living	room	of	Wak	Jali’s	house,	two	wandering	spirits	stumble	upon	the	abode.	They	gain	entry	to	the	house	despite	the	magical	defences	and	possess	the	youths	before	they	are	dispelled	by	Wak	Jali.	The	reason	for	their	presence	is	revealed	when	the	spirits’	father,	who	is	himself	a	spirit,	appears	at	the	house	to	explain	that	his	‘sons’	were	in	fact	searching	for	their	baby	pacifiers	or	dummies	that	were	lost	when	they	died.		
																																																								304	Wak	is	a	form	of	address	for	an	older	man,	typically	an	uncle.	305	This	is	mentioned	in	the	dialogue.	
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There	are	three	main	themes	in	Salah	Sangka	that	will	be	the	focus	of	our	discussions.	The	first	is	Salah	Sangka’s	articulation	of	fraternal	association	with	Indonesia	as	part	of	supra-Malayness.	The	second	further	conflates	this	supra-Malay	grouping	with	Islam307	as	part	of	an	inseparable	monolithic	bond	that	attempts	to	transcend	nationality	such	as	Malaysian	or	Indonesian	identities.	The	third	is	defining	what	lies	external	to	the	supra-Malay	identity	as	‘threats’.	All	three	themes	demonstrate	the	various	ways	by	which	Salah	Sangka’s	overt	prioritization	of	(supra)Malay	and	Muslim	identity	–	even	when	they	are	articulated	separately	–	functions	to	exclude	those	who	have	been	communally	evaluated	as	not	belonging	to	these	categories.		Unlike	the	previous	episodes,	Salah	Sangka’s	significations	and	meanings	of	its	subtexts	are	comparatively	more	layered	and	complex.	For	this	reason,	I	will	be	providing	a	much	closer	reading	than	the	previous	episodes.	Furthermore,	as	discussed,	every	element	(or	paradigmatic	unit)	within	a	signifying	chain	is	a	bearer	of	meaning.	Seemingly	‘spontaneous’308	actions	or	exclamations	within	the	episode’s	dialogue	must	therefore	not	be	brushed	off	as	being	merely	random;	even	if	our	theoretical	framework	is	not	considered,	that	would	be	too	convenient	a	dismissal.	As	signifiers,	spontaneity	does	in	fact	reveal	performers’	true	internalized	understanding	of	their	own	communal	socialization	and	acculturation.309	This	is	the	trajectory	of	our	analysis	for	Salah	Sangka.		Wak	Jali’s	song	from	the	opening	scene	is	productive	of	the	first	theme	on	‘fraternal	association	with	Indonesia’.	This	song	is	in	fact,	the	master-signifier	that	frames	all	of	the	episode’s	subtexts	within	its	ideological	field.310	Here,	Wak																																																									307	Note	that	the	discussions	on	Islam	in	this	chapter	are	contextualized	to	Malaysia’s	official	interpretations	of	orthodox	Sunni	Islam	as	well	as	the	communal	internalized	understandings	of	these	official	positions	which	were	previously	outlined	in	Chapter	2.	The	observation	in	Chapter	2	on	the	year-on-year	increase	in	Malays	choosing	to	identify	first	as	Muslims,	is	particularly	insightful	for	our	following	discussions.	308	While	not	part	of	the	analysis,	my	interview	with	Hisyam	reveals	that	there	are	no	improvisations	that	deviate	from	a	script	approved	by	the	censorship	board.	As	previously	discussed,	television	content	producers	err	on	the	side	of	caution	since	they	cannot	afford	for	an	episode	to	be	banned	based	on	a	careless	‘slip’	of	unscripted	dialogue	or	action.	309	From	the	perspective	of	humour,	this	is	also	clear	from	our	discussions	on	Humour	Theory	and	its	function	as	a	barometer	for	culture	and	society.	310	Once	again,	this	is	a	recurring	pattern	where	the	episode’s	trajectory	is	contained	within	its	very	first	scene;	the	narrative	exposition,	so	to	speak.	Furthermore,	this	is	necessary	for,	as	
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Jali	sings,	“Malaysia,	Indonesia,	dua	sahabat	sama”	(Malaysia,	Indonesia,	two	similar	friends).	To	understand	the	basis	of	Wak	Jali’s	assertion	of	friendship,	it	is,	once	again,	necessary	to	frame	it	through	the	supra-Malay	movements	in	Malaysia.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	there	is	a	recursive	political	rhetoric	of	the	cross-Archipelago	Melayu	Raya	(Greater	Malaydom)	supra-Malay	movement	in	Malaysia	(Milner	2011,	147,	148,	152,	155,	157-159;	Roff	1967,	232-233).311			The	Malaysian	government	has	introduced	numerous	initiatives	from	at	least	the	1980s,312	to	achieve	this	‘Malay	World’	aspiration.	Some	notable	developments313	are	the	Malay	World	Assembly,314	the	cultural-economic	Dunia	
Melayu	Dunia	Islam	(Malay	World	Muslim	World)	initiative,	and	the	establishment	of	Universiti	Kebangsaan	Malaysia’s	(National	University	of	Malaysia)	Institut	Alam	dan	Tamadun	Melayu	(Institute	of	the	Malay	World	and	Civilization)	that	has	centres	in	Indonesia	(Milner	2011,	183-184).	From	a	sociological	perspective,	from	at	least	the	1920s	(Milner	2011,	129,	147),	Indonesia	and	the	Malay	Peninsula	were	regarded	by	the	Malays	as	“one	community,	one	people,	with	one	adat	(custom),	and	what	is	more,	one	religion”	(Milner	2011,	147,	translation	in	original).	These	realities	demonstrate	that	the	notion	of	Dunia	Melayu	(Malay	World)	alluding	to	a	supra-Malay	category	does	not	merely	exist	on	a	state-political	level,	it	is	also	present	(to	a	degree)	within	the	Malay	social	mindset.		Given	this	historio-ideological	grounding,	Wak	Jali’s	assertion	of	brotherly	relations	mnemonically	activates	the	communal	perception	of	this	Dunia	Melayu	bond	that	transcends	even	nationality.	As	mentioned,	this	is	the	intended	effect	of	the	master-signifier	that	simultaneously	features	an	absence	of	similar	
																																																																																																																																																														discussed	previously,	Senario’s	non-recurring	format	requires	that	viewer	relatability	is	achieved	with	the	very	first	scene.	311	While	Farish	Noor	(2002,	92-100)	refers	to	a	Malaya-Raya,	it	refers	to	the	same	political	concept.	312	There	are	certainly	other	state	initiatives	that	predate	the	1980s.	However,	this	period	marks	the	start	of	a	concerted	effort	by	the	state	at	introducing	initiatives	that	directly	address	this	
Dunia	Melayu	aspiration.	313	See	Milner	(2011,	182-184)	for	a	more	detailed	list	of	developments.	314	First	held	in	the	state	of	Melaka	in	1982.	Subsequent	assemblies	have	been	held	in	Sri	Lanka,	Vietnam,	South	Africa,	Mindanao,	and	Madagascar	(Milner	2011,	183).	
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national	fraternal	reference	to	the	large	number	of	non-Malay	Malaysians.315	The	implicit	historical	reference	of	Wak	Jali’s	assertion	is	key,	for	the	initial	establishment	of	this	concept	reinforces	the	episode’s	later	subtexts	as	‘truism’.	The	narrative’s	ability	to	progress	in	this	trajectory	lies	in	the	construction	of	Wak	Jali	(Indonesia)	and	the	youths	(Malaysia)	as	metaphors	for	each	of	the	two	nations.		Audiences	are	never	explicitly	told	of	Wak	Jali’s	Indonesian	roots.	However,	he	speaks	in	Indonesian,	using	words	like	kaget	(terperanjat	–	startled),	sosok-sosok	
sijiu	(makhluk-makhluk	halus	–	supernatural	beings),	ngomong	gitu,	sih	(jangan	
cakap	begitu	–	don’t	say	that),	and	Malay	words	like	betul	are	pronounced	or	intoned	as	beturr	(correct),	kenapa	as	kenaa-pahh	(why),	and	jampi	as	jempi	(spell).	The	dialogues	of	the	characters	ensure	that	these	differences	do	not	go	unnoticed	by	the	viewers,	for	the	Malay	youths	query	Wak	Jali	on	Indonesian	terms	that	are	unclear	to	them.	Like	a	language	lesson,	the	explanations	are	always	followed	by	the	mention	of	their	Malay	word	equivalents.	Any	ambiguity	about	the	characters’	origins	are	addressed	by	Wak	Jali’s	explanations	of	“kalau	
di	Indonesia	…”	(‘if	it’s	in	Indonesia	…’,	or	‘in	Indonesia	…’),	and	the	youths’	“kalau	di	Malaysia	…”.	Moreover,	after	Wak	Jali’s	explanations,	the	youths	consciously	repeat	the	Indonesian	words	as	if	trying	to	commit	them	to	memory,	a	repetition	which	also	serves	to	reiterate	Indonesian-Malaysian	difference	yet	sameness.316		Dialogic	spatial	metaphors	are	also	mobilized	to	strengthen	the	proposed	shared	belonging-ness	to	a	Dunia	Melayu.	In	the	same	opening	scene,	one	of	the	youths	
																																																								315	In	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	for	example,	this	was	alluded	to	with	the	vernacular	papers.	316	This	paragraph	may	suggest	that	a	reading	of	the	episode’s	full	dialogue	would	provide	a	better	understanding	of	the	text’s	alluded	imaginary	of	Malay	identity	and	its	variations.	My	methodology	however,	prioritizes	the	quilting/representational	framework.	Thus,	the	inclusion	of	select	dialogic	segments	or	words/terms/phrases	–	effectively	the	master	signifiers	–	can	provide	more	substantive	insight	into	understanding	the	dynamics	of	communal	and	intra-communal	identity	within	Senario,	especially	when	considering	other	elements	of	its	mise-en-
scene.	An	example	of	this	was	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya’s	‘stirring	the	pot’	analysis	which	accounted	for	not	just	the	dialogue,	but	Nenek	Yan’s	pointing,	and	the	grandchildren’s	physical	act	of	stirring.	Through	this	analytical	framework,	Senario’s	replication	of	popular	understandings	to	these	different	variations	of	identity	is	consistently	addressed	throughout	the	three	chapters	of	analysis.	
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explains,	“dekat	kampung	kita	ini,	kita	tiga	keluarga317	aje	duduk	kat	sini”	(in	our	
kampung,	only	our	three	families	live	here).	The	use	of	the	inclusive	‘kita’	(we)	tells	the	viewers	that	Wak	Jali	is	‘one	of	us’.	It	is	interesting	that	a	similar	metaphor	is	observed	in	P.	Ramlee’s	1956	film	Semerah	Padi	(As	Red	as	Rice)	where	the	inhabitants	of	the	kampung	are	the	‘us’	who	are	united	against	the	threat	of	‘them’	–	“non-Muslim	wild	men	from	the	nearby	jungle	(hutan)”	(Kahn	2006,	117-122).318	In	effect,	the	episode’s	construction	of	shared	belonging-ness	establishes	the	basis	for	the	third	part	of	Salah	Sangka’s	theme	of	‘threat’,	which	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	section.	This	deployment	of	language	as	signification-metaphor	is	again	observed	with	the	two	spirits’	language	that	further	conflates	‘language’	with	‘land	of	origin’.			The	spirits	communicate	with	words	like	‘den’	(saya	–	I),	‘kator’	(kata	–	say),	and	‘ehkau’	(kau	–	you)	that	are	unique	to	the	state	of	Negeri	Sembilan.319	This	is	significant	for	the	earliest	permanent	settlers	in	that	state	are	supposedly	Minangkabau320	in	origin	(Peletz	1995,	80-81;	1996,	15-16;	2009,	63-64;	Stivens	1996,	2-3,	11,	48).	We	learn	towards	the	end	of	the	episode	that	the	spirits’	childhood	home	was	on	the	same	land	where	Wak	Jali’s	house	is	built.	Their	use	of	Negeri	Sembilan	dialect	thus	establishes;	(1)	the	spirits’	origin	and	Wak	Jali’s	house	are	in	Negeri	Sembilan,	(2)	the	Negeri	Sembilan-Minangkabau	heritage	is	what	connects	to	Wak	Jali’s	Indonesianness.	Both	these	points	strengthen	the	characters’	shared	heritage	of	supra-Malayness.		The	relationship	between	Indonesians	and	Malays	is	however,	tiered.	As	a	metaphor,	Wak	Jali	the	elder	is	reflective	of	Indonesia	as	the	older	of	the	two	nations.321	From	a	historical	perspective,	there	have	also	been	“large	numbers	of	people	of	Indonesian	origin”	in	Malaysia	since	at	least	the	1960s	(Milner	2011,																																																									317	While	the	youth	says	‘family’,	the	narrative	seems	to	suggest	that	each	of	the	three	characters	live	alone.	318	It	is	instructive	that	the	opening	of	Semerah	Padi	features	a	map	of	the	archipelago,	and	as	the	camera	zooms	in	on	the	map,	it	suggests	that	the	Malaysian	Malay	kampung	in	the	film	is	in	fact	set	in	Indonesia	(northern	Sumatra	to	be	precise).	The	film	can	be	viewed	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqVdH6XvZyA	319	The	youths’	non-use	of	the	Negeri	Sembilan	dialect	will	be	addressed	in	a	later	discussion.	320	West	Sumatra	in	Indonesia.	321	For	one,	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	was	formed	in	1945	which	predates	Malaysian	independence	by	12	years.	
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159).	During	the	Indonesia-Malaysia	confrontation,	this	has	even	led	many	Malays	to	regard	then-Indonesian	leader	Sukarno	as	a	“more	authentic	Malay	person”	than	the	“UMNO	prime	minister”	(Milner	2011,	159).	Through	the	performances	of	Wak	Jali	as	elder,	teacher,	and	bomoh,	Indonesians	are	thus	constructed	as	what	can	only	be	deemed	as	being	culturally	more	‘authentic’.	This	point	will	become	clearer	as	we	discuss	Wak	Jali’s	role	as	a	bomoh,	and	as	a	teacher.		
	Figure	6.5	Still	from	Salah	Sangka.	The	youths	mimic	Wak	Jali	move-for-move	as	he	instructs	them	on	casting	a	spell.		As	a	bomoh,	Wak	Jali	commands	communal	deference	similar	to	that	of	Mak	Aji	in	Ta	Ti	Tu	where	possessing	religious	or	spiritual	knowledge	confers	upon	the	subject	a	certain	degree	of	authority	or	communal	prestige.	His	role	as	a	teacher	is	demonstrated	by	his	religious	or	shamanic322	instructions	to	the	youths	in	casting	a	jampi	(spell),323	and	by	his	explanations	of	Indonesian	words.	His																																																									322	Wak	Jali’s	spell	is	facilitated	through	the	recitation	of	Quranic	verses	accompanied	by	a	specific	set	of	performatives	or	rituals.	Since	the	Islamic	revivalism	of	the	1970s,	Malay	bomoh	have	had	to	evolve	their	craft	to	solely	rely	on	the	Quran.	Even	so,	whether	this	is	Islamic	at	all,	is	a	question	that	has	yet	to	be	decisively	answered	by	the	Islamic	community.	Within	the	episode,	Wak	Jali	is	however,	positioned	as	an	individual	with	superior	Islamic	knowledge	(orang	yang	
berilmu).	323	Wak	Jali’s	casting	of	a	spell	is	meant	to	be	humorous	and	is	therefore	comprised	of	outlandish	physical	movements	in	the	slapstick	comedy	tradition.	One	possible	interpretation	to	the	
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elevated	status	within	the	kampung	is	further	strengthened	later	in	the	episode	where	he	alone	is	responsible	for	exorcizing	the	youths	who	are	possessed.324	The	reason	for	constructing	Wak	Jali’s	superior	position	is	made	clear	in	the	very	first	scene	when	the	youths	are	told	to	learn	the	spell	by	following	Wak	Jali	–	“kena	ikut;	kalau	tidak	macam	mana	kamu	nak	praktik-kannya?”	([you]	have	to	follow;	how	else	will	you	be	able	to	put	it	into	practice?).	(see	Figure	6.5).		This	explicit	directive	on	learning	from	him,	is	in	fact	alluded	to	at	the	very	start	of	the	episode	where	Wak	Jali	sharpens	his	parang325	(see	Figure	6.6).	Like	the	preoccupation	with	Jeri’s	stars	in	Gong	Xi,	the	significance	of	this	sequence	is	revealed	by	the	deliberately	lengthy	deviation	from	the	actual	narrative,	for	the	
parang	and	this	act	of	sharpening	are	never	referred	to	again.	In	this	sequence,	Wak	Jali	sharpens	the	parang	on	a	wooden	bench,	saying,	“Udah	tiga	hari	aku	
mengasah,	tidak	tajam-tajam.	Kenapa	pulak	tidak	tajam-tajam	ya?”	(I	have	been	sharpening	for	three	days	and	yet	it	is	not	sharp.	Why	is	it	still	not	sharp?).	He	then	exclaims,	“oh	patutlah	tak	tajam.	Diasahnya	diatas	kayu!”	(Oh,	no	wonder	it’s	not	sharp.	I’ve	been	sharpening	it	on	wood!).	He	moves	to	a	rock	and	says,	“asah	batu	baru	betul”	(sharpening	on	stone	is	[the]	proper	[method]),	and	sings	“Malaysia,	Indonesia,	dua	sahabat	sama”	(Malaysia,	Indonesia,	two	similar	friends)	while	he	sharpens	it	on	the	rock.		
																																																																																																																																																														comedic	nature	of	his	spell	casting	is	that	he	is	a	fraud.	However,	this	is	discounted	since	his	defences	actually	do	stop	the	spirits	from	entering,	and	he	also	exorcises	the	youths	in	a	later	scene,	both	of	which	proves	his	shamanic	ability.	324	An	argument	can	be	made	that	there	are	only	three	people	in	the	kampung	and	thus	only	Wak	Jali	can	exorcise	the	possessed	youths.	However,	exorcisms	can	only	(arguably)	be	performed	successfully	by	“ritual	specialists”	(Peletz	1996,	158)	(more	is	detailed	in	Peletz	1996,	158-161).	Furthermore,	Wak	Jali’s	character	could	have	been	conceived	as	a	Malay	instead	of	an	Indonesian.	These	two	points	support	my	assertion	about	Wak	Jali’s	elevated	position	within	the	narrative.	325	A	type	of	machete	commonly	used	in	Malaysia	and	Indonesia.	
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	Figure	6.6	Still	from	Salah	Sangka.	Wak	Jali	sharpening	his	parang	while	singing	about	Malaysian-Indonesian	friendship.		I	suggest	that	the	interpretation	of	this	sequence	lies	in	its	symbolic	reference	to	the	old	Malay	peribahasa	(proverb),	‘tajam	pisau	kerana	diasah’	(a	knife	is	sharp	because	it	is	sharpened).326	The	Malaysian	Dewan	Bahasa	dan	Pustaka	(Institute	of	Language	and	Literature)	defines	the	meaning	of	this	proverb	as	“Jadi	pintar	
(berani)	kerana	selalu	diajar	(diasuh)”	([To]	become	smart	(brave)	because	[one	is]	continually	taught	–	bracketed	Malay	words	are	from	the	original	source)	(Dewan	Bahasa	dan	Pustaka	2017).	Moreover,	his	realization	of	the	futility	in	sharpening	on	wood	(in	contrast	to	stone)	places	further	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	one’s	source(s)	of	learning.		Framed	through	the	proverb,	the	explicit	directive	(in	spell-casting)	to	follow,	and	learn	from,	the	signifier	of	Wak	Jali-Indonesia	thus	emphasizes	Malay	learning	from	Indonesians	possessing	similar	adat-ilmu	who	are	narratively	proposed	to	be	the	‘right’	source	for	the	purpose.	Wak	Jali’s	last	sentence	“asah	
batu	baru	betul”	(sharpening	on	stone	is	[the]	proper	[method])	is	meant	to	foreground	this	fact,	which	is	then	immediately	framed	through	its	context	–	the	master-signifier	of	the	Indonesian-Malaysian	song.	This	proposition	is	fully	catalyzed	within	the	signifying	chain	when	Wak	Jali	says	that	they	must	follow																																																									326	This	proverb	also	exists	in	Indonesia	with	a	similar	meaning	–	‘tajam	pisau	karena	diasah’.	
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(and	learn)	or	“how	else	will	you	be	able	to	put	it	into	practice?”.	It	is	interesting	that	this	construction	of	an	elderly	Indonesian	bomoh	with	similar	prestige	within	the	kampung	structure,	is	not	unique	to	Salah	Sangka.	This	metaphorized	character	is,	for	example,	reprised	through	the	Indonesian	bomoh	character	Wak	Dol	in	another	2011	Senario	production329	called	Senario	Misteri	Bamboo	(Azean,	Fauzita,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011).		We	have	thus	far	discussed	how	Salah	Sangka	constructs	the	fraternal	association	with	Indonesia	as	part	of	a	shared	supra-Malay	heritage.	The	scene	mobilizes	language	as	spatial	metaphors,	alludes	to	similarities	between	identities,	and	deploys	a	traditional	Malay	proverb,	all	of	which	is	meant	to	strengthen	its	premise	of	shared	supra-Malay	cultural	heritage.	Furthermore,	the	inclusion	of	the	proverb	and	Wak	Jali’s	performance	of	knife-sharpening	seems	to	subtly	suggest	that,	culturally	at	least,	Malays	should	look	to	Indonesia	for	a	more	‘authentic’	Malayness.330	To	reiterate,	the	narratives	of	each	Senario	episode	works	to	quickly	establish	viewer	relatability	since	it	does	not	have	recurring	stories	or	characters.	In	this	respect,	Salah	Sangka’s	construction	of	this	supra-Malay	subject	within	just	this	first	scene,	must	be	contextualized	as	the	narrative’s	exposition	for	the	entire	episode.	This	quick-exposition	approach	was	in	fact	identified	as	a	recurring	strategy	in	all	the	episodes	previously	discussed.331		
																																																								329	To	reiterate,	Misteri	Bamboo	is	the	only	Senario	production	that	runs	as	a	series.	330	This	brings	up	a	question	about	which	culture	(Malay	or	Indonesian)	should	be	the	subject	of	learning	in	reality.	A	discussion	of	that	topic	would	exceed	the	scope	of	this	thesis	which,	to	broadly	reiterate,	is	to	identify	the	meanings	contained	in	Senario.	331	This	was	first	mentioned	in	Chapter	5.	
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	Figure	6.7	Still	from	Salah	Sangka.	The	two	wandering	spirits	who	stumble	upon	Wak	Jali’s	house.		
Salah	Sangka’s	second	theme	–	the	conflation	of	Islam	with	this	supra-Malay	category	as	a	monolithic	identity	–	is	encapsulated	perfectly	by	the	opening	dialogic	excerpt	at	the	start	of	this	chapter.	Once	Wak	Jali	establishes	magical	defences	around	the	compound,	all	three	men	retire	into	the	house.	Two	wandering	spirits	(see	Figure	6.7)	stumble	upon	the	house	and	try	to	get	past	Wak	Jali’s	magical	defences.333	They	realize	that	Wak	Jali’s	spell	was	only	cast	in	the	front	portion	of	the	compound	and	they	eventually	gain	entry.	While	deciding	how	best	to	enter	the	house,	one	of	the	spirits	says:	
Kita	sekarang	ni,	buat	cara	baik.	Kita	bagi	salam	bagi	dia.	Den	kata,	
ini	orang	Melayu	punya	rumah;	orang	Islam.	Jadi	jika	kita	bagi	
salam,	dia	mesti	jawab.	Kalau	rumah	bukan	Islam,	kalau	dia	tak	
jawab,	anjing	yang	jawab;	salam	kita.		
																																																								333	It	is	worth	noting	that	at	this	narrative	juncture,	one	of	the	spirits	realizes	it	is	“Malam	
Jumaat”	(literally	means	Friday	night.	Islamically,	Malam	Jumaat	starts	on	Thursday	night	after	the	call	to	prayer	for	Maghrib,	the	fourth	prayer	of	the	day)	which	he	takes	as	license	to	“berpesta”	(celebrate/be	festive)	by	disturbing	the	people	inside	the	house.	There	is	no	real	Islamic	basis	for	the	popular	Malay	superstition	of	“Malam	Jumaat”	being	rife	with	departed	souls/spirits	returning	to	exact	revenge	on	the	living,	to	work	mischief,	or	returning	to	visit	their	families.	This	may	in	fact,	be	an	old	non-Islamic	assimilation.	Ustaz	Abdullah	Bukhari	Abdul	Rahim	Al-Hafiz	of	the	International	Islamic	University	Malaysia	explains	there	is	no	Islamic	concept	of	a	revenant	or	any	departed	soul	being	able	to	return	to	the	living	realm,	asserted	in	23:99-100	of	the	Quran	(Abdullah	2015).	He	further	addresses	the	“Malam	Jumaat”	belief	in	Abdullah	(2015).	Nonetheless,	Thursday	night	is	understood	to	be	an	Islamic	‘holy’	night,	though	for	reasons	entirely	different	from	those	suggested	by	Salah	Sangka.	This	is	an	indicator	of	Malay	Islam’s	syncretism	as	practised,	and	demonstrates	how	it	is	presented	as	common	unquestioned	knowledge	by	Salah	Sangka’s	religio-cultural	production.	
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We’ll	do	it	the	proper	(or	good)	way.	We’ll	give	our	salam.334	I	say,	this	is	a	house	owned	by	Malays;	by	Muslims.	If	we	give	our	salam,	he	must	answer.	If	this	is	a	non-Muslim’s	house,	if	he	doesn’t	reply,	a	dog	will	reply;	will	give	us	salam.		Several	assertions	are	implicit	within	the	dialogue;	(1)	Muslims	must	answer	a	
salam	for	it	is	the	‘proper’	(or	good)	way	of	Malays	and	Muslims,	meaning	(2)	only	a	non-Muslim	will	not	answer	a	salam.	(3)	Only	non-Muslims	will	have	dogs	as	pets,335	and	(4)	even	if	a	non-Muslim	does	not	return	a	salam,	his	dog	will.	Each	of	these	assertions	will	be	discussed	in	turn.		The	assertion	that	(1)	Muslims	must	answer	a	salam	is	grounded	in	the	dialogue’s	signifying	chain	of	‘Malays’,	‘Muslims’,	and	‘proper	(or	good)	way’	(the	
beradat-alim	rubric).	This	reinforces	the	presumption	that	only	Muslims	will	greet	other	Muslims	in	a	communally	and	religiously	prescribed	way,	which	is	further	equated	as	the	‘proper’	way.	A	similar	‘our	ways’	was	previously	identified	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	where	it	was	also	deployed	to	differentiate	Ah	Fatt,	the	non-Muslim	Chinese,	from	the	Muslim-Malay	characters.		The	assertion	that	(2)	only	a	non-Muslim	will	not	answer	a	salam	strengthens	the	first	assertion	that	by	not	answering	a	salam,	one	situates	oneself	outside	of	the	Muslim	community.	Furthermore,	the	normative	myth	that	all	Malays	are	Muslims	is	tangentially	strengthened,	for	by	saying	“this	is	a	house	owned	by	Malays;	by	Muslims”,	the	former	is	constructed	as	being	synonymous	with	the	latter.	The	Malay-Muslim-proper	signifier	is	thus	given	an	additional	layer	of	connotative	meaning	that	hinges	on	the	interchangeability	to	the	terms	‘Muslims’	and	‘non-Muslims’,	to	allow	for	synonymy	with	the	terms	‘Malays’	and	‘non-Malays’,	respectively.		
																																																								334	In	Malaysia,	this	is	commonly	understood	to	be	an	Islamic	greeting	between	Muslims.	The	greeting	of	“As-Salaam-Alaikum”	(peace	be	unto	you)	would	be	replied	with	“Wa-Alaikum-
Salaam”	(and	unto	you,	peace).	335	The	inference	from	the	dialogue	is	that	the	dog	is	presumed	to	be	inside	the	home,	as	opposed	to	work	or	guard	dogs	that	are	kept	outside.	The	religious	opinions	on	dogs	will	be	discussed	in	a	later	section.	
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The	conjunction	of	Malay	adat	and	Islamic	tenets	is	consequently	codified	and	suggested	as	a	communal	religio-social	script.	Non-Muslims	–	and	by	(constructed)	default,	non-Malays	–	are	consequently	imagined	as	having	‘improper’	ways	and	behaviour.	This	was,	for	example,	previously	observed	in	our	discussions	on	ethnic	minorities	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.336	It	is	instructive	that	while	the	pivotal	position	of	the	Malays	and	Muslims	was	certainly	alluded	to	in	earlier	episodes,	the	words	‘kami’	and	‘kita’337	was	always	used	instead	of	‘Malay’	and	‘Muslim’.	In	Salah	Sangka,	however,	the	(supra)Malays,	Muslims,	and	their	conflated	condition	are	explicitly	‘named’.	This	‘naming’	is	the	true	act	of	primacy	for	it	carries	an	implicit	communal	dimension	that	determines	the	outgroup	through	the	act	of	naming	the	ingroup.		There	seems	to	be	a	reprisal	of	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya’s	antagonistic	position	when	the	metaphor	of	a	dog	is	mobilized	in	“[i]f	this	is	a	non-Muslim’s	house,	if	he	doesn’t	reply,	a	dog	will	reply;	will	give	us	salam.”	To	understand	its	significance,	we	need	to	understand	how	dogs	feature	within	contemporary	Malay	Muslim	consciousness.	Malaysia’s	official	interpretation	of	orthodox	Sunni	Islam	on	the	topic	of	dogs	is	that	they	are	permitted	as	animals	of	utility	and	not	as	domesticated	pets338	(Jabatan	Kemajuan	Islam	Malaysia	2013,	5-6).	Given	this	official	religious	position,	the	assertion	that	(3)	only	non-Muslims	will	have	dogs	as	pets339	is	thus	qualified	by	this	simple,	and	visibly	identifiable	difference	between	a	Muslim	and	a	non-Muslim	household.		The	meanings	of	(4)	even	if	a	non-Muslim	does	not	return	a	salam,	his	dog	will,	are	comparatively	more	complex.	Scattered	throughout	the	Quran	and	hadith	are	several	mentions	of	dogs.340	While	there	are	variations	of	Islamic	interpretations	to	dogs,	for	our	context,	we	will	focus	on	Malaysia’s	official	religious	position.																																																									336	Discussed	in	Chapter	5.	337	‘Kami’	means	‘we,	but	not	you’	or	‘us,	but	not	you’.	‘Kita’	means	‘all	of	us’,	which	includes	‘you’.	338	For	example,	work,	hunting,	and	guide	dogs.	339	For	example,	the	controversy	caused	by	a	Muslim	activist	who	organized	the	2016	‘Touch	a	Dog’	event	that	aimed	to	change	negative	Malaysian	Muslim	attitudes	toward	dogs.	It	was	primarily	the	overwhelming	public	anger	and	denouncement	that	spurred	the	religious	authorities	to	view	the	event	negatively.	Death	threats	were	even	made	against	the	activist	that	forced	him	to	go	into	hiding.	See	“Syed	Azmi,	the,”	(2014).	340	For	example,	Surah	(Chapter)	5	verse	4	(5:4),	7:176,	18:18,	and	31:15	in	the	Quran.	The	most	commonly	known	example	from	the	hadith	is	Bukhari	4:538.	
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The	mufti	for	the	state	of	Perlis,341	Mohd.	Asri	Zainul	Abidin,	explains	that	the	dog	in	Surah342	7	verse	176	(7:176)343	is	a	simile	for	the	unchangeable	condition	of	the	hypocrite,	some	of	whom	are	the	ulama	who	prioritize	self-interest	over	Islam	(Mohd.	Asri	2013).	He	further	asserts	that	it	is	an	insult	to	be	equated	(menyamakan)	to	a	dog,	even	if	it	refers	to	‘loyalty’,	for	it	is	only	blind	loyalty	(kesetiaan	yang	membuta	tuli)(Mohd.	Asri	2013).	However,	a	very	different	account	of	dogs	appears	in	18:18.344	Mohd.	Asri	(2013)	explains	that	the	dogs	in	this	passage	symbolize	virtue,	for	they	accompany	those	who	are	‘fighting	for	truth’	(para	pejuang	kebenaran),	where	contextually	to	the	Quran,	‘fighting	for	truth’	refers	to	the	Islamic	monotheists	who	were	fighting	against	the	polytheistic	regime	at	the	time.345			Both	these	accounts	reveal	a	fluid	meaning	to	the	signifier	‘dog’.	Framing	our	reading	of	the	scene	to	the	two	Surahs	above,	Salah	Sangka’s	deployment	of	‘dog’	is	dual-edged.	It	connotes	the	negative;	(a)	the	irredeemable	hypocrite	if	he	is	a	Muslim	and	did	not	return	the	salam,	and	(b)	the	non-believer.	It	also	connotes	the	positive;	a	similitude	to	the	virtuous	dogs	aligned	to	Islam.	This	is	alluded	through	the	expectation	of	Salah	Sangka’s	dog’s	ability	to,	and	obligation	to,	return	the	salam,	if	the	‘hypocrite’	or	‘non-believer’	did	not.		Considered	together,	it	would	not	be	too	much	of	a	conceptual	leap	to	suggest	that	the	scene’s	fourth	assertion	–	(4)	even	if	a	non-Muslim	does	not	give	salam,																																																									341	The	mufti	of	Perlis	was	referenced	because	he	seems	to	be	the	only	state	mufti	who	is	actively	engaged	with	disseminating	Islamic	teachings	through	various	social	media	platforms	(twitter,	Facebook,	blogs,	and	Youtube	videos,	for	example).	He	is	thus	the	most	likely	to	feature	in	public	discourse	since	his	‘opinions’	on	Islam	are	the	most	accessible.	Popularly	referred	to	as	‘Dr.	Maza’,	he	has	been	mufti	since	2006,	and	his	blog	on	Islam	was	started	in	2007.	342	A	Chapter	in	the	Quran.	343	In	the	Quran,	7:176	states	“If	it	had	been	Our	will,	We	should	have	elevated	him	with	Our	signs;	but	he	inclined	to	the	earth,	and	followed	his	own	vain	desires.	His	similitude	is	that	of	a	dog:	if	you	attack	him,	he	lolls	out	his	tongue,	or	if	you	leave	him	alone,	he	(still)	lolls	out	his	tongue.	That	is	the	similitude	of	those	who	reject	Our	signs;	So	relate	the	story;	perchance	they	may	reflect”	(Yusof	2000,	170-171).	344	18:18	states	“Thou	wouldst	have	deemed	them	awake,	whilst	they	were	asleep,	and	We	turned	them	on	their	right	and	on	their	left	sides:	their	dog	stretching	forth	his	two	fore-legs	on	the	threshold:	if	thou	hadst	come	up	on	to	them,	thou	wouldst	have	certainly	turned	back	from	them	in	flight,	and	wouldst	certainly	have	been	filled	with	terror	of	them”	(Yusof	2000,	293).	345	It	is	interesting	that	this	duality	of	meaning	is	similar	to	how	non-Malays	are	imagined	in	
Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka;	minority	inclusion	only	occurs	when	framed	through	the	colonizer-colonized	discourse.	
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a	dog	will	give	salam	–	is	meant	to	establish	a	‘natural’	implicit	hierarchy.	Central	to	this	notion	are	the	irredeemable	quality	of	the	hypocrite	and	non-believer	which	is	contrasted	to	the	dog’s	potential	for	choosing	‘virtue’	over	‘reprehensibility’	through	its	‘actions’.346	This	is	the	scene’s	fourth	presumption;	(4)	even	if	a	non-Muslim	does	not	give	salams,	a	dog	will	give	salams.	The	mandatory347	and	voluntary348	exposure	to	Islamic-Quranic	education	from	an	early	age	would	mean	that	the	Islamic	simile	of	the	dog	and	the	implied	hierarchy	within	the	dialogue	is	presumably	inferred	and	understood	–	at	least	on	an	abstract	level	–	by	TV3’s	Muslim	rural	demographic.349			The	third	theme	of	Salah	Sangka	–	defining	what	lies	external	to	the	supra-Malay	identity	as	‘threats’	–	is	alluded	to,	within	a	series	of	events	in	the	scenes	after	the	spirits	gain	entry	into	the	house	proper.	For	the	discussion	of	this	third	facet,	I	employ	the	terms	‘foreign	threats’,	or	‘external	threats’	contextually	to	encompass	all	elements	that	are	communally	deemed	as	not	a	part	of	supra-Malayness	or	the	Dunia	Melayu.	These	‘threats’	are	thus	communally	presumed	to	dilute	the	shared	unifiers	of	language,	religion,	culture,	religion,	and	tradition.		The	spirits	eventually	give	their	salams,	and	the	youths	reply	appropriately.	While	the	youths	can	hear	the	spirits,	the	spirits	are	not	visible	to	the	humans.	Thus,	when	the	youths	open	the	door,	they	find	no	one	there	even	when	the	spirits	are	right	in	front	of	them.	The	youths	go	into	the	compound	for	a	better	look,	at	which	point,	the	spirits	walk	into	the	house	since	they	interpret	the	open	door	as	an	invitation	to	go	in.	When	the	youths	enter	the	house	again,	they	are	now	able	to	see	the	spirits.	Both	parties	are	shocked.350	The	spirits	eventually	run	out	of	the	house	into	the	outer	compound	while	both	youths	faint	on	the	sofa.	Wak	Jali	returns	to	the	room	and	mistakes	them	for	lazing	around.	He																																																									346	Fundamentally,	I	view	this	as	being	predicated	on	the	notion	that	the	profession	of	faith	is	key	to	one’s	redemption,	where	‘profession’	is	not	mere	lip-service,	as	illustrated	by	the	‘hypocritical	
ulama’.	However,	this	is	not	signified	in	the	scene,	though	it	may	be	interesting	to	note.	347	All	Muslim	school	children	are	required	by	Malaysian	law	to	take	Islamic	religious	studies	in	school,	where	it	is	an	official	school	subject.	348	Most	parents	supplement	school	religious	classes	with	Islamic-Quranic	classes	outside	of	school	hours,	as	reflected	in	Ta	Ti	Tu.	349	The	rural	demographic	is	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	350	The	narrative	logic	is	questionable	since	the	spirits	know	the	house	is	occupied	by	humans.	
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wakes	Youth	1,351	and	in	response,	Youth	1	sits	up,	stares	into	the	distance,	and	starts	blabbering	in	Thai352	and	Chinese	languages	(see	Figure	6.8).	Wak	Jali	thus	concludes	that	they	have	been	possessed	and	attempts	to	exorcise	Youth	1.354		
	Figure	6.8	Still	from	Salah	Sangka.	Possessed,	Youth	1	is	speaking	in	Thai	and	Chinese	languages.		When	Youth	1	falls	back	into	a	daze,	Youth	2	sits	up	and	starts	singing	the	hit	song	‘Nobody’	by	the	popular	K-pop	(Korean	pop)	girl	group	Wonder	Girls,	accompanied	by	effeminate	hand	gestures	and	shoulder	movements	from	the	dance	routine	in	the	official	music	video355	(see	Figure	6.9).	Youth	2	starts	singing	from	the	chorus	which	is	in	English,	but	when	it	reaches	the	Korean	verses,	he	sings	in	something	that	sounds	similar	to	Thai356	before	transitioning	fluidly	to	the	Chinese	Hainanese	dialect.	Wak	Jali	repeats	the	previous	process	of	exorcism	and	Youth	2,	presumably	still	in	character	as	one	of	the	Wonder	Girls’																																																									351	I	refer	to	them	as	Youth	1	and	Youth	2	only	to	facilitate	our	discussions.	352	Given	that	I	am	not	a	Thai	speaker,	I	checked	with	fellow	PhD	researcher	Treepon	Kirdnark,	who	is	Thai.	354	Again,	the	narrative	logic	is	questionable	since	the	spirits	have	already	exited	the	house,	unless	it	refers	to	some	residual	possession	by	virtue	of	the	youths’	proximity	to	the	spirits.	I	am,	of	course,	operating	under	the	assumption	that	the	possession	in	the	episode	requires	a	spirit	to	enter	and	take	control	of	a	physical	body.	355	For	Wonder	Girls’	official	Youtube	channel	and	the	music	video	of	‘Nobody’,	see	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZBn1e9pr2Q		356	The	feedback	from	Treepon	(see	footnote	352)	is	that	Youth	2	is	doing	a	very	poor	imitation	of	Thai.	Unlike	Youth	1’s	imitation,	the	only	Thai	word	that	can	be	identified	is	‘love’.	
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female	singer,	says	effeminately,	“eh,	buat	apa	tu?”	(eh,	what	are	you	doing?)	(see	Figure	6.10).		
	
	Figure	6.9	Stills	from	Salah	Sangka	and	the	Wonder	Girls	video.	Youth	2	(left)	mimics	dance	routines	of	the	Wonder	Girls	in	the	‘Nobody’	music	video	(right).		With	the	exorcism,	Youth	2	eventually	falls	back	dazed	and	Wak	Jali	subsequently	asks	the	comatose	youths	their	names	(see	Figure	6.11).	Youth	1	says	“Wonder”,	and	Youth	2	says	“Wonder	Girl”,	to	which	Wak	Jali	asks,	“Nak	
tukar	jadi	siapa?”	(‘Who	do	you	want	to	change	into?’	or	‘Who	do	you	want	to	become?’).	Youth	2	replies,	“Wonder	Man”,	before	Wak	Jali	eventually	returns	them	to	their	‘normal’	selves.		
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	Figure	6.10	Still	from	Salah	Sangka.	Youth	2	is	still	in	character	as	the	female	Wonder	Girl	singer.		
	Figure	6.11	Still	from	Salah	Sangka.	Wak	Jali	performs	the	final	exorcism	on	the	youths.		While	the	preceding	scenes	establish	and	nuance	the	specificities	of	the	ideological	Indonesian-Malaysian	supra-Malay	fraternity,	I	suggest	this	scene	metaphorically	coalesces	the	‘threats’	that	legitimize	the	need	for	closer	fraternal	relations.	Defined	through	Youth	1	as	Thai	and	Chinese,	and	through	
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Youth	2	as	Korean,	Thai,	Chinese,	and	effeminacy,	these	‘threats’	are	proposed	as	foreign,	external,	and	transgressive	to	the	shared	autochthonous	tradition,	culture,	and	religion	of	the	Dunia	Melayu.	Youth	1’s	and	Youth	2’s	performances	will	each	be	discussed	in	turn.		Youth	1’s	Thai	dialogue	is	part	of	the	lyrics	of	a	famous	1990	Thai	pop-song	called	คูก่ดั	(Adversaries)357	by	Bird	Thongchai.358	Speaking	the	lyrics,	Youth	1	says	(in	Thai),	“whenever	tooth	meets	tongue,	it’s	a	big	problem.	It’s	better	to	keep	oil	and	fire	separate.	Whenever	a	dog	and	cat	meet	each	other,	they	fight	every	time”.359	This	is	promptly	followed	by	the	Mandarin	word	‘bàozhà’	(explode),	before	Wak	Jali	interjects	by	saying	“udah!”	(enough!).	There	are	three	points	that	must	be	established	for	us	to	understand	Youth	1’s	performance;	(1)	the	Malaysian	socio-political	climate	in	2011,	(2)	how	the	song	alludes	to	the	conflicts	in	southern	Thailand,	and	(3)	how	it	is	relevant	to	the	Malays.		We	had	previously	noted	the	2009	Alkitab	contentions360	(Lopez	2015,	327)	that	rapidly	became	a	national	focal	point	for	religious	contestations.	When	the	High	Court	decided	in	favour	of	the	Church	in	2010,	some	interpreted	it	as	a	failure	to	safeguard	the	position	of	Islam	within	the	country	(Neo	2014,	754).	Muslim-Christian	relations	consequently	deteriorated	to	a	point	where	there	were	cases	of	arson	attacks	on	churches	in	2010	(“Malaysia	men	guilty,”	2010).	In	March	2011,	the	Malaysian	Home	Ministry	finally	released	35,000	bibles	that	had	been	impounded	(“Malaysia	to	release,”	2011)	–	a	decision	that	was	again,	not	viewed	kindly	by	segments	of	the	Malay	community.	It	should	be	noted	that,	at	the	time,	the	Chinese	were	the	largest	non-bumiputera361	Christian	ethnic-group	in	Malaysia	(Jabatan	Perangkaan	Malaysia	2011,	82).362		
																																																								357	The	official	music	video	can	be	found	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0CG2PYo1cA	358	Thanks	are	due	to	Treepon	Kirdnark	for	helping	me	to	identify	the	origins	of	these	lyrics		359	The	lyrics	in	English	can	be	found	at:	http://deungdutjai.com/2014/05/06/googutbird/	360	Malay-language	versions	of	the	Bible	were	seized	on	the	grounds	that	they	would	be	used	to	proselytize	to	Muslims	or	confuse	them.	This	was	mentioned	in	Chapter	2.	361	A	large	number	of	East	Malaysians	of	Orang	Asli	ancestry	(hence	bumiputera)	are	Christians.	362	The	2010	findings	indicate	that	Christianity	is	the	faith	of	1,549,193	non-Malay	bumiputera,	706,479	Chinese,	114,281	Indians,	22,870	‘Others’,	and	224,336	non-Malaysian	citizens.	
		 214	
In	April	2011,	a	month	after	the	release	of	the	bibles,	leading	Malay	daily	Utusan	
Melayu	published	an	article	titled	‘Ayuh!	Gerakkan	segera	1Melayu,	1Bumi’	(Quick!	Promptly	mobilize	1Malay	1Bumi363)	(Zaini	2011).	The	article	proposed	evidence	of	Chinese	solidarity	and	superior	political-economic	positions,	both	of	which	were	supposedly	detrimental	to	the	Malays.	It	referenced	another	article	published	a	year	before	(at	the	height	of	the	Christian-Muslim	contentions)	which	told	readers	to	look	at	the	Chinese	in	Singapore	and	the	subordinated	positions	of	Singaporean	Malays	(Zaini	2010).364	All	these,	the	author	asserts	in	the	2011	article,	are	concerns	that	should	unite	the	Malays	who	are	“satu	bangsa	
yang	cukup	selesa,	komplesen,	alpa	dan	tidak	peduli”	(a	race	that	is	too	comfortable,	complacent,	lazy,	and	unconcerned).365	The	article’s	rallying	call	started	with	its	very	first	sentence	–	“ORANG	Cina	telah	bersatu”	(The	Chinese	have	united).	Accounting	for	production	and	censorship	processes,366	Salah	
Sangka	(first	airdate	on	3	May	2011)	would	have	been	scripted	in	March-April	2011.	This	coincides	with	the	time	of	the	decision	to	release	the	bibles,	and	with	
Utusan	Melayu’s	article.	The	relevance	of	this	first	point	will	become	clearer	as	the	discussion	progresses.		The	lyrics	of	Youth	1’s	Thai	pop-song	describe	a	couple’s	relationship	that	is	plagued	with	fights.	I	suggest	that	Youth	1	uses	this	song	to	allude	to	the	southern	Thais	who	are	self-defined	Muslim	Malay	from	the	old	Malay	Muslim	sultanate	of	Patani	(Bajoria	&	Zissis,	2008).	Their	primary	contention	is	that	of	identity	subordination	by	a	dominant	Buddhist-Thai	identity.	One	primary	reason	for	the	continued	conflicts	in	the	south	are	these	provinces’	demands	for	autonomy	which	the	Bangkok	government	has	consistently	refused	(McCargo	2011,	844).367																																																									363	1Melayu	and	1Bumi	are	meant	to	parody	the	official	1Malaysia	nation-building	initiative	that	aimed	to	unite	Malaysians	regardless	of	race	or	religion.	However,	instead	of	all	Malaysians,	both	terms	propose	that	only	the	Malays	and	the	bumiputera	should	be	united	instead.	364	The	2010	article	was	titled,	“Orang	Cina	Malaysia,	Apa	Lagi	Yang	Anda	Mahu?”	(Malaysian	Chinese,	What	More	Do	You	Want?).	365	The	character	of	the	Malays	outlined	by	the	article	seems	similar	to	the	description	in	UMNO’s	book	Revolusi	Mental	(Mental	Revolution)	that	was	published	in	1971.	In	Revolusi	Mental,	the	Malays	were	described	as	backward,	lackadaisical,	oppressed,	and	exploited	(by	other	races).	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	366	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	367	For	a	detailed	study,	see	Abuza	(2011)	and	McCargo	(2011).	
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	The	allusion	seems	clear	from	‘whenever	a	dog	and	cat	meet	each	other,	they	fight	every	time’,	which	then	promptly	segues	to	the	Mandarin	‘explode’.	That	it	refers	to	Thailand	is	clear	from	the	Thai	pop-song	spoken	in	Thai	by	Youth	1,	and	specifically	the	parts	of	the	lyrics	chosen	for	the	dialogue.368	Youth	1’s	fluid	segue	to	the	Chinese	‘explode’	as	the	master-signifier,	frames	it	through	the	Patani	Malay	insurgents’	primary	form	of	attack	–	Improvised	Explosive	Devices	(IEDs)	and	grenades	–	almost	to	the	exclusion	of	other	weapons	(Abuza	2011,	8-11).	In	this	respect,	Youth	1	saying,	‘it’s	better	to	keep	oil	and	fire	separate’	thus	seems	to	aptly	summarize	Senario’s	position	on	this	issue.		It	should	be	noted	that	Patani	Malay	Muslims	–	also	called	Nayu	(McCargo	2011,	836)	–	have	lived	in	Kuala	Lumpur,	Malaysia’s	capital,	since	at	least	the	1970s	(Bunmak	2010,	200).	Furthermore,	many	Malay	and	Nayu	“families	in	both	countries	have	relatives	across	the	border”	with	decades	of	cross-border	movement	(Nayu	to	Malaysia,	Malays	to	South	Thailand)	(Funston	2010,	236).	Led	by	PAS	(Pan-Malaysian	Islamic	Party),	the	state	government	of	Kelantan	in	particular,	has	been	an	open	supporter	of	the	Nayu,	and	has	had	close	Islamic	ties	to	the	southern	Thai	region	(Funston	2010,	236).	Moreover,	since	the	introduction	of	the	Joint	Development	Strategy369	in	July	2003,	the	southern	Thai	provinces	and	the	northern	states	of	Kedah,	Perlis,	and	Kelantan	have	had	an	increase	in	cross-border	interaction	(Funston	2010,	241).	These	would	all	suggest	that	the	plight	of	the	Nayu	and	the	southern	Thai	conflicts	are	not	unknown	to	wider	Malay	society.	In	fact,	most	Malays	feel	“considerable	residual	sympathy	for	Patani	Malays,	viewing	them	as	a	kindred	and	repressed	minority”	(McCargo	2008,	xiii).		Framed	through	these	realities	–	and	especially	through	the	episode’s	explicit	articulation	of	supra-Malay	unity	–	the	inclusion	of	the	Chinese	‘explode’	is	thus	a																																																									368	It	would	be	disingenuous	to	propose	that	this	Thai	song	was	chosen	only	because	no	other	song	in	any	other	language	(especially	Malay)	addresses	a	similar	troubled	relationship.	369	This	was	an	initiative	aimed	at	“a	degree	of	integration”	for	the	states	involved	in	both	countries,	and	“envisaged	cooperation	across	a	wide	range	of	economic	and	social	issues	in	the	border	region”	–	among	which	are	the	development	of	education,	tourism,	and	the	promotion	of	“people-to-people	relations”	(Funston	2010,	241,	254).	
		 216	
calculated	decision	that	is	meant	to	transpose	the	subordination	of	Patani	Malays	to	the	tensions	between	the	Malays	and	Chinese	in	Malaysia.	This	echoes	the	persistent	warnings	by	Mahathir	that	without	UMNO,	Malays	will	eventually	be	subjugated	and	emancipated	under	the	yoke	of	the	Chinese.370	Fundamentally,	this	argument	is	similar	to	Prime	Minister	Najib’s	assertion	that	Malays	will	be	destitute	or	‘bastards’	without	UMNO’s	protection.	This	polemic	is	also	found	in	the	2010	and	2011	Utusan	Melayu	articles	that	called	for	Malay	solidarity	(1Melayu	or	1Bumi)	against	a	perceived	‘Chinese	threat’.	While	it	is	an	inversion	of	roles,	the	fundamental	warning	remains;	the	fragmentation	of	supra-Malay	fraternal	relations	will	lead	to	the	subjugation	of	Malays	as	reflected	in	the	plight	of	the	Patani	Malays.	What	is	perhaps	the	catalyst	for	these	sentiments	on	Senario	are	the	Christian-Muslim	tensions	at	the	time,	the	outcome	of	which	was	regarded	by	certain	Malay	socio-political	actors	as	evidence	of	encroachment	into	the	status	and	sanctity	of	Malays	and	Islam	within	the	nation.	This	sentiment	is	perfectly	encapsulated	with	Utusan	Melayu’s	2010	article	title	asking	the	Chinese	‘Apa	Lagi	Yang	Anda	Mahu?’	(What	More	Do	You	Want?),	and	the	title	of	its	own	rejoinder	in	2011,	‘Ayuh!	Gerakkan	segera	
1Melayu,	1Bumi’	(Quick!	Promptly	mobilize	1Malay	1Bumi).		Youth	2’s	performance	is	subtly	different	in	its	othering	where	the	song	by	Wonder	Girls	functions	to	intertextually	reference	the	K-pop	craze372	within	the	nation.	The	choice	of	song	is	not	incidental	for	it	was	highly	popular	in	Malaysia	(Seto	2010b)	and	is	thus	readily	identifiable	when	reproduced	on-screen.	Its	deployment	by	Youth	2	is	however,	meant	to	connote	the	wider	discourse	of	K-pop’s	unsuitability	to	Malay(sian)	culture.374	Central	to	this	connotation	of	‘unsuitability’	is	Youth	2’s	utterance	of	the	old	Hainanese	phrase	“nang	bo	ti	
nang,	kui	bo	ti	kui”	(human	not	like	a	human,	ghost	not	like	a	ghost)	which	is	qualified	by	his	random	singing	of	the	K-pop	song	while	possessed,	and	acting	beyond	the	acceptable	rubric	of	communal	adat	and	Islam.																																																									370	Discussed	in	Chapter	2.	372	See	Haryati	(2010,	258-259,	277-279),	Seto	(2010a)	for	examples	of	reception	of	Korean	popular	culture	in	Malaysia	circa	2010-2011.	See	Müller	(2015,	335-337)	for	examples	of	how	K-pop	has	been	popularly	adopted	in	the	years	2012-2013.	374	For	examples	of	criticisms	of	the	K-pop	phenomenon	in	Malaysia,	see	“After	BigBang	show,”	(2015)	and	“JAWI	to	seek,”	(2015).	
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	This	is	yet	another	invocation	of	a	Chinese	phrase	instead	of	an	Indian	or	Malay	phrase.	Connotatively,	this	extends	the	meta-narrative	of	unsuitability	to	the	signifier	‘Chinese’.	This	is	consistent	with	the	rhetorical	attribution	of	liberal	and	Western	influences,	which	contemporary	Korean	popular	culture	is	perceived	to	aesthetically	adopt,	to	the	Chinese	urban	category	which	was	previously	discussed	in	Chapter	3	and	Chapter	5.375	The	signifier	of	‘unsuitability’	is	further	associated	with	the	suggestion	of	effeminacy	signified	by	Youth	2’s	adoption	of	a	discernibly	feminine	persona.	The	notion	of	Youth	2’s	effeminacy	is	further	strengthened	by	his	request	to	turn	from	‘Wonder	Girl’	to	‘Wonder	Man’	just	before	the	exorcism	is	complete.		Considered	syntagmatically,	the	fluid	movement	from	the	themes	of	‘K-pop’	to	‘unsuitability’	to	‘effeminacy’,	crystalizes	the	association	between	all	three.	With	Youth	2’s	express	intention	to	change	from	‘Wonder	Girl’	to	‘Wonder	Man’,	this	meta-narratival	association	becomes	dialogically	explicit	for	the	viewers.	Where	the	sign	‘Wonder	Girl’	signified	‘K-pop’	before,	it	is	now	mobilized	to	connote	effeminacy.	Both	concepts	of	unsuitability	–	K-pop	and	effeminacy	–	are	therefore	thematically	sutured	by	this	fluid	segue	of	the	former’s	connotation	to	an	entirely	different	signified.	In	this	manner,	the	exclusionary	‘not	our	way’	or	‘proper	way’	from	an	earlier	scene	is	thus	ideologically	extended	to	the	Wonder	Girl-K-pop	and	Wonder	Girl-effeminate	signifiers.		One	does	wonder	why	these	two	themes	were	associated	with	such	seamless	dialogical	fluidity,	especially	when	they	are	quite	thematically	distinct.	Given	that	the	government	prosecution	of	former	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Anwar	Ibrahim	for	sodomy376	met	a	major	obstacle	in	2011,377	perhaps	this	was	part	of	the	contest	of	perception	in	canvassing	popular	support	against	Anwar	and	his																																																									375.	The	persistence	of	this	rhetoric	in	the	public	sphere	is	exemplified	by	recent	reports	such	as	“In	Friday	sermon,”	(2015),	“Infidels	backed	by,”	(2015),	and	“NGO	coalition	alleges,”	(2015).	376	He	was	first	charged	with	sodomy	in	1998	and	found	guilty,	only	to	be	released	in	2004.	See	“A	crisis	unfolds,”	(1999),	and	Marzuki	(2008,	35-40)	for	this	initial	charge.	See	“Anwar	Ibrahim	sodomy,”	(2010)	for	the	new	sodomy	charge.	This	was	briefly	discussed	in	Chapter	2	and	Chapter	5	(in	relation	to	Chinese	visual	representations	in	Senario).	377	See	“Malaysian	judge	rules,”	(2011).	
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political	associates.378	With	the	widespread	speculation	that	these	sodomy	charges	are	politically	motivated	under	the	direction	of	UMNO	and	the	Prime	Ministers379	themselves	(for	example,	see	Marzuki,	2008,	35-41),	this	may	not	be	too	great	a	presumption.	It	also	aligns	with	the	‘anti-gay	camp’	issue	that	arose	in	the	same	year,	where	the	conservative	Malaysian	state	of	Kelantan	‘identified’	66	schoolboys	for	an	“anti-gay	camp”,	allegedly	for	displaying	‘feminine	mannerisms’	(Buncombe	2011;	“’Effeminate’	boys	in,”	2011;	“Malaysia’s	anti-gay,”	2011).	It	was	felt	that	if	uncurbed,	the	13	to	17	year-old	students	“could	end	up	gay	or	transsexual”	(“’Effeminate’	boys	in,”	2011).	Even	if	this	was	not	an	apparent	consequence	of	Anwar’s	trial,	it	is	indicative	of	concerns	in	that	particular	year	regarding	non-normative	gender	and	sexual	identities/behaviours	in	both	socio-national	discourse	as	well	as	popular	Malaysian	consciousness.	This	is	a	strong	explanation	for	Salah	Sangka’s381	invocation	of	gender	deviance	in	its	construction	of	the	‘other’.		Taken	collectively,	the	readings	on	both	Patani	Malays	and	K-pop	reveal	a	communal	anxiety	of	Malay	cultural	and	religious	erosion.	This	is	in	fact,	explicit	in	the	association	between	Youth	1’s	performance	and	Christian-Muslim	contentions	at	the	time.	Curiously,	Youth	1’s	and	Youth	2’s	dialogues	can	be	further	explained	by	the	Malay	cultural	startle	reflex	called	latah.	Latah	is	described	by	Michael	Peletz,	among	others,382	as	a	behaviourial	complex	involving	“pathomimetic	behaviour”	(1996,	177).	As	a	cultural	elaboration	of	the	startle	reflex,	latah	is	widespread	in	the	Malay-Indonesian	world	(Peletz	1996,	177).	The	last	parallel	to	latah	is	interesting,	for	some	Malay	rural	communities	hold	the	belief	that	it	is	one	phenomenon	caused	by	spirit	possessions	(Peletz	1996,	186),	which	is	the	condition	of	both	youths	in	the	scene.	The	veracity	of	the	association	notwithstanding,	Peletz383	suggests	that	latah	serves	a	social																																																									378	See	AFP	(2015)	and	“Court	upholds	five-year,”	(2015).	379	Anwar’s	numerous	trials	and	charges	span	the	Prime	Ministerships	of	Mahathir	Mohammad,	Abdullah	Badawi,	and	the	incumbent	(as	at	June	2017),	Najib	Razak.	381	I	am	not	suggesting	it	has	ever	left	the	discursive	terrain.	Rather,	like	most	discourses,	the	popularity	or	‘top-of-mind’	nature	to	certain	topics	are	cyclical	and	related	to	current	affairs.	382	Michael	Kenny	(1990),	and	Robert	Winzeler	(1984)	for	instance,	have	provided	more	critical	studies	on	the	phenomenon.	383	Peletz’s	anthropological	observations	were	based	on	a	kampung	in	Negeri	Sembilan,	the	same	state	in	the	episode’s	narrative.	
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function	where	it	allows	for	women	to	“articulate	and	dramatize”	their	concerns,	which	often	include	“critiques	of	the	social	order”	(Peletz	1996,	177).384		In	many	respects,	the	presumed	intention	behind	the	proposed	meanings	of	this	scene	parallel	Peletz’s	suggestion	that	latah	is	a	means	to	‘articulate	and	dramatize	concerns’,	often	as	‘critiques	of	the	social	order’.	In	this	context,	‘social	order’	needs	to	be	understood	alongside	perceived	wider	Malay	apathy	towards	the	erosion	of	communal	cultural,	religious,	and	thus,	‘racial’	identity,	all	of	which	was	in	fact,	clearly	identified	in	the	2011	Utusan	Melayu	article,	‘Ayuh!	
Gerakkan	segera	1Melayu,	1Bumi’	(Quick!	Promptly	mobilize	1Malay	1Bumi)	(Zaini	2011).	It	is	evident	the	scene	proposes	that	current	practices	of	Malayness	in	the	face	of	global	challenges	such	as	the	K-pop	influence,	and	local	challenges	exemplified	by	Chinese	and/or	Christian	agency,	are	considered	detrimental	to	Malay	and	Muslims	values.	That	the	articulation	of	these	concerns	takes	the	form	of	latah	engendered	through	spiritual	possessions	–	both	linked	in	traditional	Malay	consciousness	–	is	itself	a	nod	towards	the	Dunia	Melayu	that	the	first	scene	set	out	to	establish.		The	constant	in	the	entire	scene	is	Wak	Jali,	who	can	only	be	contextually	construed	as	a	metonym	for	Islam.	This	is	signified	symbolically	through	his	utterance	of	the	Islamic	verse	“B-ismi-llāhi	r-raḥmāni	r-raḥīmi”	(In	the	name	of	God,	the	Most	Gracious,	the	Most	Merciful)385	that	precedes	both	instances	of	exorcism.	The	significance	to	this	performative	establishes	Wak	Jali’s	authority	and	ability	to	expel	from	the	Malay	Muslim	subject	that	which	is	foreign,	as	a	power	conferred	by	God;	tangentially	establishing	the	correlative	signified	of	‘sanctioned	by	God’.	Since	it	is	mediated	through	Islam,	and	normalcy	is	recovered	through	Islamic	piety	(metonymically	Wak	Jali),	it	proposes	that	redemption	can	only	be	effected	by	a	return	to	the	Islamic	faith,	which	ironically	is	the	motivation	behind	the	2011	anti-gay	camp.	Furthermore,	as	seen	in	the	previous	chapter	with	Basiron	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	this	conforms	with	a	recovery	of	the	Malay	subject	through	a	return	to	the	conflated	condition	of																																																									384	The	gendered	dimension	of	latah	and	thus	possessions,	is	discussed	in	Chapter	7.	385	It	is	not	uncommon	for	Muslims	to	start	any	endeavour	with	this	statement.	
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Malay	and	Muslim	signifying	traditional	Malay	values	–	and	synonymously,	Muslim	values.		In	either	case,	what	is	foreign	and	needs	to	be	expelled,	is	presented	as	a	spiritual	‘possession’	because	it	imbibes	the	Malay	subject	to	act	outside	of	the	prescribed	norms	of	the	Dunia	Melayu.	The	possessions	allow	for	a	demonstration	of	the	features	that	are	external	to	supra-Malay,	much	like	the	demonstrative	effect	in	the	example	of	the	Patani	Malay.	This	certainly	aligns	with	the	notion	of	possession-latah	as	an	outlet	for	the	articulation	and	dramatization	of	social	concerns	in	a	manner	and	form	that	would	otherwise	be	inappropriate	in	Malay	adat	(Peletz	1996,	177).	By	referencing	the	ideological	constructions	of	the	opening	scene,	Indonesian-Malaysian-Patani	solidarity	is	thus	proposed	as	a	defence	against	these	‘possessions’.	The	previous	act	of	‘our	way’,	‘proper	way’	being	the	Malay	Muslim	way,	expresses	the	narrow	boundaries	that	are	determined	through	this	metonymic	conflation	of	‘(supra)Malay’387	and	‘Muslim’.	Through	their	articulation	by	an	authority	figure	like	Wak	Jali,	these	boundaries	are	thus	signified	as	an	act	sanctioned	by	God,	for	it	is	through	the	Islamic	verse	that	the	‘foreign’	is	expelled.		By	extending	this	trajectory,	the	house	is	therefore	a	spatial-symbol	of	the	Dunia	
Melayu	writ-large	on-screen	as	a	closed-off	Malay	abode	(articulated	explicitly	by	Wak	Jali’s	magical	fencing	of	his	compound	through	the	Islamic	‘spell’,	however	flawed	its	implementation).388	The	expulsion	of	what	is	presented	as	foreign	from	the	house,	symbolically	the	Malay	subject	and	the	wider	Dunia	
Melayu,	signifies	a	rejection	of	all	that	does	not	meet	the	shared	unified	criteria,	to	be	external	to	the	Malay	imaginary	of	supra-Malayness.			In	the	scene	following	Wak	Jali’s	exorcism	of	the	youths,	they	are	queried	by	Wak	Jali	about	their	spiritual	possessions	and	the	reason	for	the	open	front	door.	After	being	told	that	the	events	that	unfolded	were	preceded	by	the	giving	of	a	
salam,	Wak	Jali	explains,	“Kalau	hantu	yang	beri	salam,	itu	tandanya,	hantu	itu																																																									387	Contextually,	Salah	Sangka	constructs	all	Malays	as	supra-Malays,	so	the	signifiers	‘Malay’	and	‘supra-Malay’	are	ideologically	sutured.	388	Suggesting	again,	the	fallibility	of	mortals,	regardless	of	the	breadth	of	religious	knowledge.	
		 221	
berilmu”	(If	a	ghost	gives	a	salam,	it	is	the	mark	of	a	ghost	who	has	knowledge).	Key	to	understanding	this	statement	is	the	cultural	significance	of	ilmu.	The	exact	translation	for	‘ilmu’	is	not	‘knowledge’	–	‘pengetahuan’	is	‘knowledge’.	Instead,	it	means,	in	a	non-literal	sense,	‘art’	or	‘science’	or	‘understanding’.	The	word	has	a	broad	range	of	cultural	meanings,	some	of	which	Peletz	interprets	as	‘esoteric	or	mystical	knowledge’	(1996,	25,	311)	and	‘spiritual	potency’	(1996,	104-105).	More	importantly,	one’s	possession	of	ilmu	is	culturally	regarded	as	a	virtue,	or	“’meta-virtue’	in	the	system	of	moral	evaluation	as	a	whole”	(Peletz	1996,	158).	With	respect	to	its	cultural	indication	of	‘virtue’	and	‘knowledge’,	possessing	ilmu	is	thus	broadly	regarded	as	a	mark	of	socio-cultural	prestige.		Wak	Jali’s	explanation	therefore	explicitly	legitimizes	the	otherworldly	or	‘foreign’	through	the	mediation	of	virtuous	ilmu	–	for	what	were	‘mistakenly’389	regarded	as	‘foreign’	or	otherworldly,	have	now	demonstrated	their	Malay	acculturation.	The	notion	of	latah	is	thus	made	more	relevant,	for	precisely	because	the	spirits	have	ilmu	and	are	part	of	the	Dunia	Melayu,	they	adopted	behaviours	(possessions)	to	signify	potential	threats	to	the	Malays	in	order	to	foreground	their	critiques	against	the	present	social	order.	It	is	through	the	spirits’	demonstration	of	understanding	of	‘proper	way/our	ways’	(the	beradat-
alim	ideal)	that	hostility	towards	their	presence	is	diminished.	The	sudden	acknowledgement	of	kindred	familiarity	is	articulated	in	the	episode’s	last	scene	where	the	spirits	are	explicitly	invited	into	the	house.	Now	joined	by	their	father	who	is	also	a	spirit,	all	three	spirits	are	invited	into	the	home	of	Wak	Jali,	where	it	is	explained	that	the	two	younger	spirits	were	in	search	of	their	baby	pacifiers,	or	dummies,	that	were	buried	in	the	vicinity	(see	Figure	6.12).		
																																																								389	Presumably,	the	reason	for	the	episode’s	title.	
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	Figure	6.12	Still	from	Salah	Sangka.	The	father	(also	a	spirit)	to	the	two	wandering	spirits,	explains	their	presence	at	Wak	Jali’s	home.	It	is	interesting	that	like	the	gendered	nature	of	possessions,	even	while	the	spirits	are	male,	they	feature	typical	feminine	aesthetic	motifs	like	long	hair,	long	nails,	and	flowers.	This	can	be	explained	in	part	by	popular	aesthetics	of	mythological	Malay	entities	such	as	the	pontianak	(female	vampiric	ghost).		Symbolically,	this	reprises	the	house’s	metaphor	as	Dunia	Melayu.	The	invitation	into	the	interior,	is	achieved	only	by	conforming	to	the	criteria	of	religion	and	ethnicity,	both	of	which	are	shared	elements	as	acknowledged	by	the	spirits	at	their	initial	discussion	for	entry.	The	spirits	are	therefore	included	within	the	Malay	imaginary	of	supra-Malay	even	in	death,	for	the	belief	in	an	Islamic	afterlife,	extends	the	intransigence	of	supra-Malay	dictates	beyond	the	worldly.	Within	this	context,	I	suggest	that	the	baby	pacifiers	are	symbols	of	temporality.	With	both	of	the	‘son-spirits’	being	grown	men,	their	baby	pacifiers	on	Wak	Jali’s	land	imbues	the	location	with	a	Malay	historical	past.	This	allusion	to	the	spirits’	‘historical	past’	on	Malay	land,	can	be	transposed	contextually	through	the	master-signifier’s	theme	of	autochthony.	This	in	turn,	strengthens	the	historical	Malay-Indonesian	heritage,	specifically	when	considered	through	the	signified	Negeri-Malay-Minangkabau	ancestry	of	the	spirits.390	
																																																								390	More	domestically,	this	also	connotes	the	notion	of	ancestral	lands	or	tanah	Melayu	(Malay	land).	These	were	effected	through	the	enactments	of	the	British	colonial	administration	with	the	purpose,	among	others,	of	protecting	Malay	land.	These	Malay	land	restrictions	have	been	upheld	till	the	present.	For	a	more	critical	discussion,	see	Shamsul	&	Athi	(2015).	For	an	example	
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	If	we	view	these	narrative	motifs	as	temporal	metaphors	for	Malay	personhood,	the	baby	pacifiers	signify	the	past,	while	Wak	Jali	and	the	youths	are	metaphors	for	the	present	lived-experience.	The	otherworldly	condition	of	the	spirits’	existence	–	that	of	death	–	symbolizes	human	mortality,	that	of	an	impending	future.	In	all	three	significations,	they	are	bound	by	the	rubric	of	supra-Malay	unifiers	–	‘our	way’	of	religiosity	and	Malayness	–	which	broadly	establishes	a	kinship	that	is	actualized	on-screen	through	their	solidarity	against	external	threats	to	this	fraternity.	Within	this	temporal	signification	chain,	the	future	condition	of	death	can	therefore	be	read	metaphorically	as	the	supra-Malay	ideal’s	prophetic	death	unless	a	recovery	of	the	Dunia	Melayu	is	effected	–	signified	through	a	recovery	of	the	symbolic	pacifiers	that	have	long	settled	in	Wak	Jali’s	compound.	This	would	encapsulate	both	Anthony	Milner’s	assertion	that	the	Malays	are	anxious	over	their	disappearance	from	the	world,	and	the	manifestation	of	that	fear	in	the	need	to	‘preserve’	this	perceived	Malayness	(Milner	2011,	16,	186,	217,	220,	227,	237-238).	This	theme	of	anxiety	was	also	observed	in	my	earlier	readings	on	Patani	Malays	and	K-pop.		Further,	it	is	ironic	that	while	Islamic	‘orthodoxy’	does	not	believe	in	the	return	of	departed	souls,	Salah	Sangka’s	central	narrative	vehicle	is	premised	on	the	idea	of	returning	souls	who	are	tied	to	a	worldly,	physical	object	that	is	in	fact,	Islamically	deviant	(see	Abdullah	2015	for	an	Islamic	explanation	of	this	impossibility).	Yet	the	souls	are	conceptualized	as	pious	Muslims	with	an	Islamic	bond	to	the	living	characters.	Like	Wak	Jali’s	practice	of	Malay	magic,	this	arguable	‘deviancy’	appears	to	be	the	normative	to	Malay	Islam	as	understood	by	the	‘traditional’	community,	for	the	idea	of	a	returning	soul	and	its	manifest	tie	to	a	physical	material	object	that	motivates	its	return,	is	a	belief	fostered	through	non-Abrahamic	religions	or	beliefs.	This	can	therefore	be	viewed	as	yet	another	indication	of	the	normalization	of	syncretism	within	Malay	Islam.		
																																																																																																																																																														of	how	perceived	encroachment	on	these	lands	has	elicited	violent	reprisals,	see	Lopez	(2015,	328).	
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As	part	of	a	discursive	formation,	these	themes	in	Salah	Sangka	are	shaped	and	governed	by	the	same	narratives,	polemics,	and	rhetoric	that	are	propagated	by	the	state.	This	reproduces	religious	orthodoxy	and	dogma,	for	the	state,	as	we	have	seen,	also	controls	much	of	the	nation’s	official	religious	infrastructure	through	legislature.	It	is	almost	impossible	to	examine	Malay	identity	and	culture	without	discussing	its	synonymy	with	Islam.	As	such,	Salah	Sangka	clearly	articulates	the	central	themes	that	were	discussed	in	Chapter	2	–	Malay	traditions,	culture,	Islam,	supra-ethnicity,	autochthony	and	irredentism,	as	well	as	exclusionary	ideals.	It	must	be	said	that	there	is	neither	a	real	discursive	shift,	nor	a	reorientation	of	the	historical	discourse	in	this	narrative,	since	as	we	have	observed	in	Chapter	2	and	the	previous	chapter,	these	form	the	discursive	terrain	already	in	existence	within	Malay(sian)	popular	consciousness.		
Conclusion	It	is	evident	from	this	chapter’s	discussions	that	Islam	is	the	central	theme	of	Ta	
Ti	Tu.	The	explicit	quality	of	its	instructional	Islamic	narrative	is	however,	unique	within	the	whole	run	of	Senario.	It	is	comparatively	less	clear	how	Salah	
Sangka	encapsulated	Islamic	themes.	At	first	sight,	Salah	Sangka’s	themes	are	overtly	about	the	sanctity	of	Malayness	and	its	intertwined	irredentist	ancestry	with	Indonesia	and	other	diasporic	Malays.	However,	our	discussions	demonstrate	that	Salah	Sangka’s	Islamic	themes	are	not	merely	present	but	they	are	intricately	assimilated	within	its	articulation	of	ancestry	and	irredentism.		In	almost	every	scene	of	the	episode,	the	narrative	is	inflected	with	an	Islamic	tenor,	even	if	it	is	often	deeply	embedded	within	or	articulated	through	performatives	of	irredentist	aspirations.	Yet,	it	is	only	with	a	fore-knowledge	of	Islamic	lore	(hadith	and	Quranic	knowledge)	–	precisely	the	function	of	early	Quranic	and	Islamic	education	proposed	by	Ta	Ti	Tu	–	that	any	real	sense	can	be	made	of	Salah	Sangka’s	subtext.	In	these	respects,	Salah	Sangka’s	Islamic	accents	were	sublimated	into	the	performances	of	(supra)Malayness.	That	Islam	is	‘invisible’	is	largely	attributed	to	the	degree	of	its	naturalization	as	part	of	the	discourse	on	Malay	identity	within	the	region.		
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It	is	instructive	that	the	14	years	in	between	the	first	airdates	of	Ta	Ti	Tu	and	
Salah	Sangka	demonstrate	such	a	vast	difference	in	Islamic	expression.	It	must	be	reiterated	that	Ta	Ti	Tu	was	first	aired	to	a	viewership	that	was	arguably	still	grappling	with	a	national	Islamization	policy,	while	Salah	Sangka	was	first	aired	to	a	demographic	that	was	well	on	its	way	to	identifying	more	as	Muslims	than	as	Malays.391	Institutional	Islam's	intricate	integration	into	social	and	domestic	fields	are	thus	reproduced	within	Salah	Sangka	to	demonstrate	how	social	codes	are	now	heavily	inflected	with	Islamic	mores.	That	these	Islamic	inflections	are	performed	conversationally	as	part	of	general	speech,	indicates	the	extent	of	naturalization	to	public	understandings	of	Islamic	practice	and	conformance.	In	this	respect,	while	Ta	Ti	Tu	seems	most	overt	in	its	didactic	intentions,	Salah	
Sangka	unapologetically	presumes	an	Islamic	viewership	who	are	already	Islamically	literate.		On	a	syntagmatic	level,	both	Ta	Ti	Tu	and	Salah	Sangka	are	framed	through	religio-ethnic	themes	that	similarly	constitute	the	unifiers	of	the	Dunia	Melayu.	The	similarity	is	not	coincidental.	The	primary	assertion	of	fraternal	bond	between	the	presently	disparate	communities	comprising	this	conceptualized	Malay	world	are	distilled	into	the	sign	‘our	ways’,	that	becomes	the	symbolic	definer	for	Malay	identity.	This	is	juxtaposed	against	the	almost	adversarial	position	to	Chinese	agency	that	is	revived	in	Salah	Sangka.	The	inclusion	of	the	Chinese	through	words	and	phrases,	functions	to	implicate	them	in	the	episode’s	process	of	othering.	Simultaneously,	the	Chinese	‘other’	is	meta-narrativally	presented	as	a	threat	to	supra-Malay	irredentism.	This	apparently	single-minded	position	towards	the	Chinese	seems	to	strengthen	Syed	Husin	Ali’s	observation	that	UMNO’s	stance	had	always	been	more	anti-Chinese	(and	Indian)	than	pro-Malay	(Ahmad	&	Kuttan,	2016).	In	this	respect,	Salah	Sangka	at	least,	demonstrates	the	slippage	between	UMNO	and	Senario.	This	position	is	however	absent	from	Ta	Ti	Tu,	which	seems	more	concerned	with	the	creation	of	an	exclusionary	ethno-religious	space	through	its	explicit	focus	on	Islamic	instructions.	Of	note	is	the	absence	of	any	reference	to	the	Indian	community																																																									391	Take	for	example,	the	Merdeka	Center	report	that	recorded	a	shift	towards	a	more	Muslim	rather	than	Malay	identity.	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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from	both	Salah	Sangka	and	Ta	Ti	Tu.	The	focus	on	a	potential	erosion	of	state-perceived	Malay	identity	will,	in	the	proceeding	chapter,	pivot	to	the	issues	of	gender	dynamics	where	we	will	discuss	the	dominant	conceptions	of	Malay	gender	relationships	that	are	reproduced	in	Senario.		 	
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CHAPTER	7	
	
A	Senario	of	Gender	Constructions	
	
Hey!	Kau	melawan	lelaki	ya?	…	Kau,	kalau	nak	jalan	dengan	aku,	mata	kau	
tu,	jangan	tengok	jantan-jantan	lain!	
	
Hey!	You	are	challenging	a	man,	ya?	…	If	you	want	to	walk	with	me,	your	
eyes,	[need	to]	stop	looking	at	other	males!		
–Bina	Semangat	(Fauzita,	&	Anniesafinas,	2007)		This	chapter	discusses	three	facets	to	dominant	conceptions	of	Malay	gender	relationships	that	are	reproduced	in	Senario:	(1)	Traditionally	interpreted	modes	of	gender	and	their	alternative	constructions,	(2)	the	affirmation	of	these	traditional	gender	modes	as	an	assertion	of	masculine	power,	and	(3)	the	constancy	of	normative	traditional	gender	relations	even	with	the	inversion	of	male-female	binary	roles.	Of	specific	concern	are	the	perceived	wider	religio-cultural	beliefs	and	practices	that	undergird	traditional	gender	relations.	Some	of	the	questions	on	gender	that	emerged	from	the	analysis	in	the	previous	two	chapters	were	left	largely	unaddressed.	I	have	previously	noted	several	of	these	questions	such	as	Mak	Bedah’s	role	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	and	a	tendency	towards	representing	‘foreignness’	only	by	female	characters.	Other	issues	such	as	the	tendency	for	male	actors	to	play	female	roles,	and	the	recurring	trope	of	women	characters	performing	a	specific	domestic	role,	were	previously	undiscussed.	Questions	such	as	these	will	be	addressed	in	this	chapter.			Given	our	focus	on	dominant	understandings	of	gender-based	relationships,	this	chapter’s	discussions	will	largely	reference	only	the	conflated	form	of	two	sets	of	gender	ideologies	–	Malay	and	Islamic.	This	alludes	to	a	popular	dominant	assertion	that	they	are	largely	similar	and	thus	mutually	reaffirming.	However,	I	am	aware	that	some	scholars	(for	example,	Brenner	1995;	Peletz	1995;	1996;	Wazir	1992)	have	convincingly	argued	that	the	cultural	dynamics	to	gender	relationships	may	historically	have	placed	less	emphasis	on	male	dominance,	and	thus	not	entirely	as	affirming	of	Islamic	gender	ideology.	By	discussing	these	two	mutually	(presently)	complementary	ideologies	as	a	unitary	Malay	identity,	
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I	am	therefore	alluding	to	the	more	contemporary,	popular	conflation	of	both	ideologies	as	practiced.	This	in	turn,	alludes	to	the	conflation	of	Malay	and	Islamic	identity	in	general.	One	overarching	statement	which	broadly	directs	our	discussions	is	Suzanne	Brenner’s	observation	that	both	these	gender	ideologies,392	…	present	an	unproblematic	image	of	men	as	potent,	self-controlled,	and	in	possession	of	the	higher	mental	and	spiritual	faculties	that	allow	them	to	maintain	order	in	their	own	lives	and	in	the	social	and	supernatural	world.	Women,	on	the	other	hand,	are	depicted	as	spiritually	impotent,	less	rational	than	men,	and	lacking	in	self-control.	Such	categorical	statements	about	the	nature	of	the	sexes	are	well	in	keeping	with	an	ideological	system	that	places	men	at	the	center	of	the	social,	moral,	and	symbolic	order.	 –Brenner	(1995,	31)		I	suggest	that	Malay	gender	ideology	as	observed	on	Senario	proposes	a	similar	set	of	dynamics	to	gender	relationships.	The	gender	figurations	described	by	the	statement	above	broadly	manifest	themselves	in	various	forms	throughout	the	episodes.	The	statement’s	underlying	assertions	are	not	dissimilar	from	the	criticisms	that	were	elicited	by	female	Malay	viewers	of	‘Asian	soap-operas’	who	were	deemed	susceptible	to	an	erosion	of	moral,	cultural,	and	Islamic	values393	(Mohd	Azlanshah,	2013).	It	also	calls	to	mind	the	blame	directed	at	Malay	factory	girls	(Minah	Karan)	who	attained	new	socio-economic	status	during	the	nation’s	period	of	industrialization,	and	the	bohsia	(girls	with	moral	laxity)	phenomenon	in	subsequent	decades.394	Similar	attitudes	of	male	UMNO	members	and	religious	authorities	were	also	previously	reflected	in	Chapter	2,	with	respect	to	the	subordinated	role	of	Wanita	UMNO	that	appears	to	serve	only	male	sectional	interests.																																																										392	Brenner’s	reference	to	Javanese	culture	(and	Islamic)	is	relevant	given	the	Dunia	Melayu	ideal,	the	large	presence	of	Indonesians/Javanese	in	Malaysia	(as	well	as	their	wide	assimilation	into	the	Malaysian	bumiputera	category	particularly	in	the	1970s-1980s),	all	of	which	are	manifested	concretely	in	the	Malays	of	Negeri	Sembilan,	among	others.	393	Discussed	in	Chapter	1.	394	To	reiterate,	the	term	Minah	Karan	(Minah,	the	Electronic	Lady),	as	these	factory	girls	came	to	be	known,	was	synonymous	with	“wantonness	and	promiscuity”	(Wazir	1992,	201).	Their	male	counterparts	were	called	Ahmad	Spaner	(Ahmad,	with	the	spanner)(Wazir	1992,	201).	The	
bohsia	girls	emerged	much	later	in	the	1990s,	and	involved	“heterosexual	teenage	girls	and	young	women”	(Ng,	Maznah,	&	Tan	2006,	141;	Peletz	2009,	198).	These	were	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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This	chapter	is	divided	into	two	sections.	The	first	section	will	establish	how	
Senario	reproduces	each	of	the	roles	in	the	traditional	gender	binary,	and	what	it	envisions	and	presents	as	constructions	that	contravene	or	embody	these	gender	differentials.	The	second	section	further	explores	the	roles	identified	in	order	to	understand	how	they	reflect	quotidian	social-religious	articulations	of	male	power.	The	latter	part	of	the	second	section	pivots	from	these	traditional	depictions	to	identify	Senario’s	gender	role	inversions	though	noting	that	they	still	signify	similar	binary	conceptions	of	gender,	albeit	with	inverted	dynamics.	Primarily	informing	these	discussions	are	the	works	of	Suzanne	Brenner	(1995),	Aihwa	Ong	(1995),	Michael	Peletz	(1995,	1996),	Maila	Stivens	(1996),	and	Wazir	Jahan	Karim	(1992).	Several	episodes	from	the	preceding	two	chapters	will	be	revisited,	while	two	previously	unreferenced	episodes	will	be	introduced	to	the	discussions:	Bina	Semangat	(Fauzita,	&	Anniesafinas,	2007),	and	Dalam	Hati	Ada	
Taman	(Zulkeflee,	&	Anniesafinas,	2011).		It	bears	pointing	out	from	the	outset	that	this	chapter	is	not	aimed	at	redefining	the	Malay-Muslim	gender	paradigm.	Rather,	it	is	to	identify	the	reproduction	of	existing	ideologies	within	Senario	which,	as	will	be	evident,	is	largely	patriarchal.	It	should	further	be	made	clear	that	this	chapter’s	discussions	on	representations	of	gender	are	not	meant	to	suggest	they	are	unique	to	Malaysia	or	the	Malays.395		
Modes	of	Gender	
Senario’s	representation	of	gender	differentiation	is	often	understated,	a	subtlety	that	perhaps	reflects	the	extent	to	which	these	same	gender	functions	are	unquestionably	accepted	in	lived-reality.	Among	the	episodes	previously	discussed,	one	of	the	earliest	to	feature	this	inconspicuous	reproduction	of	gender	roles	is	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	In	this	episode,	the	character	Mak	Bedah396	is	constructed	as	a	‘domestic	woman’	whose	one	observable	narrative	function	is	as	a	homemaker.	In	the	episode,	just	before	the	men	begin	their																																																									395	In	European	and	American	class-based	societies	for	example,	women	have	been,	and	still	are,	associated	with	domesticity,	among	others	(Blackwood	1995,	125).	396	Wife	of	the	Independence	Leader	Pak	Ark	who	is	interviewed	by	Jefri.	They	are	later	visited	by	Ucop	and	Daruih.	
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discussions,	Mak	Bedah	excuses	herself	on	the	pretext	of	preparing	tea	and	snacks.	She	only	returns	after	Ucop	and	Daruih	have	answered	Pak	Teh’s	questions	on	the	nation’s	independence.	Mak	Bedah	is	the	only	female	character	within	this	entire	episode,	and	the	men’s	conversation	literally	stops	when	she	enters	the	scene	with	a	tray	of	tea	and	snacks.	Moreover,	there	is	a	narrative	pause	that	emphasizes	her	act	of	passing	cups	of	tea	from	her	tray,	before	the	conversation	continues	–	though	the	episode	ends	shortly	after	(see	Figure	7.1).		
	Figure	7.1	Still	from	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	Mak	Bedah	serving	coffee	and	kuih	(Malay	cakes).		It	is	evident	that	Mak	Bedah	is	absent	through	most	of	the	men’s	‘serious’	conversation.	She	‘disappears’	from	view	just	as	it	starts,	and	‘reappears’	just	as	it	is	about	to	end.	In	her	absence,	we	know	she	is	in	the	kitchen	for	this	was	explicitly	expressed	prior	to	her	initial	exit	from	the	scene.	Mak	Bedah’s	role	is	thus	relative	to	her	function	as	a	‘nourisher’,	which	is	in	turn	defined	through	her	status	within	the	domestic	unit,	for	even	in	her	absence	she	is	bound	to	the	imaginary	of	a	domestic	kitchen.	Fundamentally,	this	function	as	‘nourisher’	parallels	Wazir’s	observation	of	women’s	responsibilities	as	the	organizers	of	feasts	at	Islamic	events	(1992,	221),	a	communal	role	I	had	suggested	was	a	mere	extension	or	broadening	of	‘their	responsibilities’	as	domestic	
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homemakers,	albeit	on	a	wider	scale.	Mak	Bedah’s	relational	function	–	for	her	role	is	determined	as	complementary	to	the	position	of	her	husband	and	other	males	–	suggests	her	peripheral	social	and	domestic	position,	in	relation	to	the	men.		On	a	symbolic	level,	the	men’s	preoccupation	with	‘serious’	issues	suggests	the	relative	freedom	of	mobility	of	husbands	and	males	generally.	For	while	the	men	engage	themselves	in	expansive	discussions	about	national	and	historical	issues	and	their	roles	within	these	issues	–	an	expression	of	achievements,	prestige,	and	status	–	Mak	Bedah	is	largely	confined	to	her	domestic	grammar.	This	differentiation	may	be	explained	by	the	traditional	notion	that	women’s	concerns	should	be	focused	on	domestic	specificities	like	“social	relations”,	“order	within	the	family”,	and	“social	reproduction”,	while	men	are	thought	to	be	occupied	with	wider,	non-domestic	issues	(Peletz	1996,	187-189,	204).		This	ascription	of	Mak	Bedah	to	a	domestic	and	social	role	conforms	to	the	dominant	Malay	view	of	women’s	position	relative	to	men’s.	As	a	basis	for	social	relations	in	the	Malay	context,	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka’s	gender	ideology	is	operationalized	by	its	relatability	to	lived-experience.	This	explains	its	inconspicuousness	with	respect	to	how	these	gender	modes	are	reproduced.	More	specifically,	the	replicated	‘ordinariness’	undergirds	its	considerable	communicative	ideological	power.	This	relativist	or	relational	role	of	female	characters	is	however,	not	unique	to	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	One	reprisal	of	Mak	Bedah’s	domestically-defined	function	is	seen	in	Nenek	Yan,	the	character	of	the	grandmother	in	the	episode	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.		While	Mak	Bedah’s	social	position	is	merely	alluded	to	in	Negara	Chekpa	
Merdeka,	Nenek	Yan’s	domestic	position	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	is	clearly	signified	in	scenes	where	her	husband	is	not	present.	The	signification	of	her	position	as	‘matriarch’	of	the	household	is	thus	only	possible	in	the	absence	of	her	husband.	This	in	turn,	connotes	that	her	position	is	derived	relative	to	her	husband	(as	‘wife’	to	‘husband’),	which	allows	for	her	domestic	status	relative	to	her	grandchildren	(as	‘grandmother’	to	‘grandchildren’).	In	both	dynamics,	she	is	
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defined	contextually	to	the	relationships	within	the	domestic	sphere.397	Spatially,	the	domestic	televisual	spaces	are	also	clearly	gendered	to	reflect	this	relational	identity.	Nenek	Yan’s	authority	is	articulated	almost	entirely	in	scenes	occurring	in	the	kitchen,	while	Tok	Nasir’s	scenes	occur	largely	in	the	living	room,	where	the	arranged	seating	is	reminiscent	of	a	household	head	holding	court	(see	Figure	7.2).	Moreover,	in	one	of	the	few	occasions	when	we	see	her	in	the	living	room,	her	position	in	the	mise-en-scene	(Figure	7.2)	symbolically	signifies	that	Nenek	Yan’s	authority	in	this	male-gendered	space	is	clearly	marginalized	or	subordinated,	for	she	is	neither	seated	in	the	centre	beside	Tok	Nasir,	nor	is	she	in	full	view,	facing	the	camera.398		
	Figure	7.2	Still	from	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.	From	left:	Cin,	Nenek	Yan,	Tok	Nasir,	Ucuk,	Intan,	and	Ku.		
Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	conformity	to	‘traditional’	gender	modes	is	further	reflected	in	the	manner	in	which	Nenek	Yan	and	Tok	Nasir	interact	with	other	members	of	the	household.	As	was	shown	in	Chapter	5,	Nenek	Yan’s	conversations	with	her	grandchildren	take	the	form	of	questions	and	answers	that	flow	in	both	directions,	indicative	of	each	party’s	interest	in	the	details	of	the	other’s	social	and	domestic	life.	Tok	Nasir	however,	mostly	only	voices	his																																																									397	This	alludes	to	kinship	theory	which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	discussion.	For	a	detailed	examination	of	kinship	theory	and	how	it	is	imbricated	in	Malay	social	dynamics,	see	Peletz	(1995,	1996),	Stivens	(1996),	and	Wazir	(1992).	398	Note	that	the	granddaughters	(Ucuk	and	Intan)	as	represented	on-screen,	are	more	affectionate	to	the	grandfather	and	are	spatially	located	more	centrally	within	the	scene.	At	first	glance,	this	would	contradict	our	reading	of	the	dynamics	between	Tok	Nasir	and	Nenek	Yan.	However,	the	grandchildren	act	and	speak	in	a	way	that	suggests	that	they	are	young	–	not	even	teenagers	–	in	which	case,	the	cultural	power	dynamics	represented	by	the	children	should	not	be	factored	into	the	reading.	
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concerns	in	general,	and	is	at	times	almost	monologuing.	Nenek	Yan’s	keen	interest	in	the	details	and	welfare	of	her	grandchildren	strengthens	the	notion	of	her	‘domesticity’,	since	this	preoccupation	with	her	grandchildren	ultimately	references	her	supposedly	biological	or	reproductive	function	as	a	female,	and	her	maternal	role	of	nurturing	the	young.		With	respect	to	their	constructions	as	religio-cultural	female	ideals,	the	characters	of	Mak	Bedah	and	Nenek	Yan	thus	embody	much	of	what	is	communally	preferred	of	Malay	women,	or	even	women	generally.	However,	
Senario’s	encouragement	of	traditional	gender	relationships	has	not	always	been	performed	‘positively’.	As	we	shall	observe,	unlike	the	characters	of	Mak	Bedah	and	Nenek	Yan,	Senario	does	frequently	casts	a	negative	light	on	any	construction	that	departs	from	the	traditional	female	domestic	role.	One	episode	that	was	especially	explicit	in	its	pejorative	construction	of	non-domestic	females	is	the	allegorical	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	(In	the	Heart	is	a	Garden)	that	first	aired	in	2011.399	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	tells	the	story	of	two	friends,	Superman	and	Batman,	who	are	both	a	little	overweight	and	generally	do	not	conform	to	the	popular	aesthetics	of	typical	superheroes	(see	Figure	7.3).		
	Figure	7.3	Still	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	From	left:	Superman	and	Batman.																																																									399	Among	the	episodes	viewed,	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	is	the	only	episode	to	feature	superhero	characters.	It	is	also	the	only	episode	with	computer	generated	backgrounds	(green	screen)	in	some	of	its	scenes.	These	are	mixed	with	scenes	with	regular	backdrops.	
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	Catwoman	appears	one	day,	and	despite	attempts	by	both	Batman	and	Superman	to	attract	her,	she	remains	unimpressed.	Wonder	Woman	subsequently	appears	and	is	similarly	unresponsive	towards	Batman’s	and	Superman’s	expressions	of	interest	in	her	(see	Figure	7.4).	He-Man	then	makes	his	appearance.	He-Man’s	looks	and	physique	are	attractive	to	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman,400	and	they	start	flirting	with	him	(see	Figure	7.5).	Both	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	compete	for	his	attentions	before	they	decide	to	‘share’	him,	which	is	a	decision	He-Man	welcomes.	After	a	brief	period	of	being	a	‘trio’,	He-Man	disappears	and	leaves	both	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	in	an	old	and	decrepit	state.			
	Figure	7.4	Still	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	From	left:	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman.		
																																																								400	Both	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	are	played	by	female	actors.	
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	Figure	7.5	Still	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	He-Man	appears	and	both	Wonder	Woman	(left	corner)	and	Catwoman	starts	to	flirt	with	him.		
Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman’s	synopsis	suggests	yet	another	cautionary	tale	that	narratively	focuses	on	notions	of	superficiality,	material/aesthetical	impermanence,	and	as	the	title	suggests,	the	importance	of	inner	beauty	over	external	physical	aesthetics.	While	these	themes	are	positive	and	aspirational,	they	are	communicated	negatively	by	the	meta-narrative.	Broadly,	two	such	constructions	in	the	episode	are	of	interest.	The	first	is	the	construct	of	a	Malay	female	who	does	not	conform	or	adhere	to	‘traditional’	notions	of	Malay	female	conduct	–	the	adherence	to	what	‘Asian	soap-opera’	Malay	female	viewers	previously	identified	as	the	santun	ideal.401	The	second	problematic	construct	is	the	suggestion	that	foreign-external	influence	is	generally	associated	with	this	deviatory	behaviour.	It	will	become	clear	in	the	following	discussions	that	both	function	on	different	levels	to	reaffirm	the	primacy	of	‘traditional’	hierarchical	gender	ideology	as	one	recourse	to	the	erosion	of	Malay	identity.		
																																																								401	Responding	to	criticisms	that	their	consumption	of	‘Asian	soap-opera’	was	eroding	their	cultural	and	religious	values	and	morals,	these	women	asserted	that	they	could	simultaneously	still	be	santun	-	respectable,	decent,	well	mannered,	or	conforming	to	accepted	standards	of	what	is	proper	(Mohd	Azlanshah	2013,	655).	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	
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The	first	construct	of	a	non-adat	conforming	female	broadly	takes	three	forms;	(1)	the	caricaturizations	of	Catwoman	and	Wonder	Woman	as	figures	of	impropriety,	(2)	the	narrative’s	construction	of	male	characters	as	being	comparatively	more	‘proper’	than	the	women,	and	(3)	the	objectification	of	Catwoman’s	and	Wonder	Woman’s	sexuality,	where	they	are	in	fact,	only	spoken	of	in	terms	of	their	attractiveness	and	desirability.	Each	of	these	three	aspects	will	be	discussed	in	turn.		Catwoman’s	and	Wonder	Woman’s	aural	and	visual	caricaturizations	are	evident	from	the	outset.	Aurally,	both	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	speak	in	a	sultry	and	almost	flirtatious	manner,	rolling	their	‘r’s	and	aspirating	non-existent	‘h’s	in	the	enunciation	of	their	words.	This	speech	idiosyncrasy	is	accompanied	by	a	constant	use	of	the	English	‘I’,	‘you’,	and	‘you-olss’	(you	all),	the	last	with	a	sultry	drawl	of	the	‘olss’.	When	Catwoman	first	appears	for	example,	she	says	"nama	I,	Catwoman.	I	che-de-ra	(cedera).	I	bar-rhu	(baru)	ajaa	(aja)	lepas	lawan	dengan	
Jho-ker	(Joker)"	(my	name	is	Catwoman.	I	am	injured.	I	have	just	fought	with	Joker).402	Wonder	Woman’s	appearance	is	similarly	followed	by,	“I,	Wonder	Woman.	I	nak	tah-nya	khat	you;	tadi	I	sesat	tauu	(tau).	I	nak	tau	kat	sini	ke	Planet	
Zoo-Hah-Rahh-Ree	(Zuharari)?”	(I	am	Wonder	Woman.	I	want	to	ask	you;	I	lost	my	way	earlier.	I	want	to	know	if	this	is	Planet	Zuharari?).		These	vocal	idiosyncrasies	occur	throughout	the	episode	and	are	intermittently	accompanied	by	visual	caricaturizations	that	are	formed	through	the	women’s	body	postures	and	movements.	In	Catwoman’s	case,	the	effect	is	accentuated	by	the	complementary	flicking	of	her	whip	(see	Figures	7.6	and	7.7	for	example.	Also	note	Catwoman’s	body	posture	in	Figure	7.5).	This	emphasis	on	their	bodies403	is	made	further	explicit	in	scenes	designed	only	to	showcase	their	dance	routines	(see	Figure	7.7),	though	similar	scenes	are	conspicuously	absent	for	the	men	–	even	the	supposedly	attractive	He-Man.																																																									402	Arguably,	a	point	can	be	made	that	Catwoman	emphasizes	her	‘r’	because	she	is	in	character	as	a	cat.	However,	this	does	not	explain	the	same	excessive	emphasis	on	the	‘h’.	403	Unlike	their	aural	caricaturizations,	these	‘seductive’	or	flirtatious	visual	figurations	are	comparatively	more	restrained	–	presumably	due	to	Malay-Muslim	proprieties.	In	this	regard,	the	performances	of	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	tread	a	fine	balance	between	being	culturally	tasteful,	yet	being	obvious	enough	to	suggest	both	characters’	negative	inclinations.	
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	Figure	7.6	Still	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	pose	while	they	converse.		
	Figure	7.7	Stills	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	do	a	short	dance	routine.		It	is	relevant	here	to	provide	a	cultural	context	relating	to	the	traditional	Malay	metaphysical	beliefs	that	undergird	the	legitimization	of	Malay	gender	binaries.	According	to	Michael	Peletz,	primary	among	cultural	beliefs	that	encourage	a	
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dichotomization	of	gender	roles	is	the	notion	of	akal	(reason)	and	its	diametric	opposite	nafsu	(desire/passion)(1995,	88-93;	1996,	205-207).	The	perpetual	struggle	for	dominance	between	bodily	passions-desires	and	reason-rationality	consequently	determines	one’s	actions	and	behaviour.	‘Proper’	actions	–	that	is	to	say,	actions	that	conform	to	communal	social	and	religious	mores	–	are	thus	regarded	as	‘rationality’s’	dominance	over	‘passion’	while	‘improper’	actions	reveal	a	lack	of,	or	inability	to	control,	one’s	baser	desires	(Peletz	1996,	205).	Therefore,	it	seems	clear,	even	if	not	explicitly	expressed	by	Peletz,	that	conformance	to	adat	is	indicative	of	akal	while	culturally	deviatory	behaviour	reveals	a	nafsu-governed	individual.		These	notions	are	similar	to	pan-Islamic	constructions	that	situate	women	as	more	“emotional,	sexual,	and	irrational	than	men”	and	hence	“must	be	carefully	controlled	by	men	so	that	they	do	not	lead	the	latter	astray	from	the	proper	path,	thereby	wreaking	havoc	on	the	social	and	religious	order”404	(Brenner	1995,	30-31).	This	belief	that	men	have	better	controlled	nafsu	and	women	are	predisposed	to	lead	men	astray,405	is	reflected	in	the	episode’s	construction	of	its	male	characters.	Both	Superman’s	and	Batman’s	behaviours	and	desires	for	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	are	expressed	in	a	comparatively	more	restrained	manner,	reflecting	their	supposedly	greater	control	over	nafsu.	This	is	in	contrast	to	Wonder	Woman’s	and	Catwoman’s	sultry-flirtatious	behaviour	in	general	(even	before	He-Man	appears).		He-Man’s	appearance	triggers	the	women’s	culturally	‘improper’	or	‘tak	elok’406	behaviour	that	escalates	into	an	unabashed	competition	for	He-Man’s	attentions	(see	Figure	7.8).	In	addition	to	their	flirtatious	behaviour,	both	women’s																																																									404	I	reiterate	that	Brenner	is	writing	on	Javanese	culture.	Her	ideas	are	however	still	relevant	given	the	Dunia	Melayu	ideal,	the	large	presence	of	Indonesians/Javanese	in	Malaysia	(as	well	as	their	wide	assimilation	into	the	Malaysian	bumiputera	category	particularly	in	the	1970s-1980s),	all	of	which	are	manifested	concretely	in	the	Malays	of	Negeri	Sembilan,	among	others.	This	point	was	first	mentioned	at	the	start	of	this	chapter.	405	This	seems	contradictory.	If	men	have	better	control	of	their	desires/lust,	it	follows	that	they	would	not	be	easily	swayed	by	the	seduction	of	women	which	would	render	the	notion	of	needing	to	‘carefully	control’	women	unnecessary.	This	paradox	of	self-control	is	in	fact,	the	focus	of	Brenner’s	(1995)	article.	406	By	its	contravening	of	social	propriety,	the	behaviour	resulting	from	the	dominance	of	nafsu	over	akal	is	thus	regarded	as	tak	sedap	(offensive/distasteful)	and/or	kasar	(crass/unrefined)(Peletz	1996,	205).	
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inappropriately	open	admiration	for	his	physique	is	signified	through	words	like	
hensemnya	(so	handsome)	and	“I	suka	lelaki,	badhan	yang	berketul-ketul”	(I	like	men,	with	muscular	bodies).	This	explicit	articulation	of	the	women’s	physical	attraction	to	He-Man	functions	to	further	reinforce	the	notion	of	their	‘tak	elok’	behaviour.	The	focus	on	physicality	is	paralleled	by	Wonder	Woman’s	and	Catwoman’s	preoccupation	with	their	own	appearance,	evidenced	through	scenes	where	Wonder	Woman	applies	lipstick	or	where	both	women	argue	over	who	has	the	better	figure	based	on	their	own	criteria	of	‘big	chest’	and	‘slim	waist’.	These	contrapuntally	serve	to	foreground	their	awareness	of	personal	sexual	appeal	and	by	extension,	signifies	their	state	of	being	governed	by	nafsu.			
	Figure	7.8	Still	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	Catwoman	and	Wonder	Woman	fight	over	He-Man.		Considered	alongside	the	earlier	caricaturizations,	these	significations	connote	the	women’s	non-adat	adhering	comportment	that	mnemonically	associates	with	the	ascribed	nature	of	akal-men	nafsu-women	and	corresponding	Islamic	gender	ideologies.	The	resulting	image	is	that	of	a	Malay	female	who	exudes	and	maintains	an	excessive	amount	of	sexuality,	and	who	is	unembarrassed	by	her	potency	in	attracting	usually	‘proper	acting’	males	(and	if	Brenner	is	to	be	believed,	the	males	would	be	led	down	a	slippery	slope	of	deviatory	behaviour).			
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This	meaning	is	in	fact,	implicitly	proposed	by	the	narrative.	After	He-Man’s	appearance	elicits	Wonder	Woman’s	and	Catwoman’s	excessive	adorations	and	flirtations	(see	Figures	7.5	and	7.8),	he	places	the	hilt	of	his	sword	–	without	any	objections	from	either	woman	–	against	each	of	their	chins	in	turn	(see	Figure	7.9).	This	act	is	not	mentioned	in	the	dialogue	nor	is	it	explained	by	any	possible	context	in	the	scene.	Instead,	there	is	a	perceptible	pause	as	this	performance	is	brought	to	its	conclusion	before	dialogue	resumes.	It	would	be	disingenuous	to	try	and	interpret	the	symbolism	of	the	sword	as	non-phallic,	and	the	act	as	not	connoting	sexual	improprieties	between	the	three.		
		Figure	7.9	Stills	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	Top:	He-Man	puts	his	sword	to	Wonder	Woman’s	chin	while	Catwoman	excitedly	handles	her	whip.	Bottom:	He-Man	puts	his	sword	against	Catwoman’s	chin	as	she	seemingly	relishes	the	act.	
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	Other	than	this	phallic	act	however,	He-Man	does	not	attempt	to	court	or	attract	the	attentions	of	either	female	characters,	unlike	Superman	or	Batman.	While	the	scene	with	the	sword	clearly	connotes	sexual	relations	between	the	three	characters,	I	suggest	that	the	master-signifier	of	‘improper	women’	frames	the	scene’s	signification	to	Brenner’s	observation	that	women	must	be	controlled	or	they	will	lead	men	astray.407	This	becomes	especially	clear	when	we	consider	that	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	are	not	merely	aware	of	their	overwhelming	sexuality,	they	are	in	fact	consciously	engaged	in	its	enhancement.	In	this	respect,	the	subtext	suggests	that	it	is	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman,	with	their	effusive	sexuality	that	is	flaunted	overtly,	who	seduce	He-Man	and	‘lead	him	astray’.		This	subtext	is	further	strengthened	through	He-Man’s	own	poses	as	he	‘exercises’	(see	Figure	7.10).	Instead	of	connoting	nafsu,	his	performance	of	masculine	sexuality	is	instead	presented	as	an	unavoidable	consequence	of	exercise,	which	contrasts	with	the	innate	nature	of	the	female	characters’	seductive	behaviour.	Symbolically,	this	establishes	‘flirting’	as	a	gendered	activity	even	if	‘attraction’-‘desire’	are	not	gender	specific	in	the	episode.	The	connoted	gendered	flirting	is	made	more	evident	by	the	cultural	significance	of	Catwoman’s	and	Wonder	Woman’s	open	displays	of	laughter.	Unchecked,	female	laughter	is	culturally	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	losing	control	to	nafsu,	further	indicating	‘cheekiness’,	all	of	which	brings	the	woman’s	“morals	into	question”	(Peletz	1996,	127).	Laughter	by	itself	is	hardly	negative	and	their	laughter	is	not	entirely	unrestrained.	When	their	caricaturizations	of	cultural	impropriety	and	gendered	flirting	are	read	together	however,	it	connotes	that	their	laughter	may	actually	allude	to	questionable	morals.		
																																																								407	Women	are	more	“emotional,	sexual,	and	irrational	than	men”	and	hence	“must	be	carefully	controlled	by	men	so	that	they	do	not	lead	the	latter	astray	from	the	proper	path,	thereby	wreaking	havoc	on	the	social	and	religious	order”	(Brenner	1995,	30-31).	
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	Figure	7.10	Stills	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	Top:	He-Man	explains	that	he	is	‘exercising’.		The	women’s	connoted	sexual	deviancy	and	erotic	aggression	in	these	scenes	calls	to	mind	the	same	polemics	that	were	levelled	against	the	Minah	Karan	during	the	nation’s	period	of	industrialization.408	To	reiterate,	economic	improvements	accorded	these	mostly	rural	Malay	girls	with	relative	freedom,	mobility,	and	some	autonomy.	With	newfound	assertiveness	of	femininity,	they	were	subsequently,	and	unsurprisingly,	blamed	for	an	erosion	of	traditional	familial	relations	and	the	emergence	of	other	domestic	ills,	all	of	which	was	compounded	by	the	then	reinvigorated	Islamic	conservatism.	The	polemics	that	undergird	the	examples	of	the	Minah	Karan	in	the	1970s-1980s	and	the	bohsia	of	the	1990s,	now	seem	to	subtextually	inform	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman’s	construction	of	female	characters.	The	resilience	of	this	female	stereotype	reveal	a	consistency	to	the	normalized	practice	of	ascribing	moral	decadence	to	Malay	women,	justified	or	otherwise,	across	a	period	of	more	than	30	years.		The	narrative	similarly	constructs	Minah	Karan’s	deviant	counterpart,	Ahmad	
Spaner,	in	the	character	of	He-Man.	It	bears	repeating	that	while	men	constituting	the	Ahmad	Spaner	category	often	formed	sexual	liaisons	with	the	
Minah	Karan,	they	were	not	viewed	pejoratively	(Wazir	1992,	201-202).	In	fact,	while	the	Minah	Karan	were	subsequently	unable	to	find	suitable	marriage	partners,	the	Ahmad	Spaner	were	still	viewed	as	suitable	candidates	by	mothers																																																									408	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	
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seeking	husbands	for	their	daughters	in	the	kampung	(Wazir	1992,	201-202).	These	differing	standards	of	communal	judgement	correspond	to	two	concessions	made	for	He-Man;	He-Man’s	‘exercise’	poses,	and	his	accidental	lapse	of	self-control	that	is	understood	to	be	a	temporary	dominance	of	nafsu	over	akal.	The	narrative	certainly	connotes	the	temporariness	of	nafsu‘s	dominance	given	He-Man’s	subsequent	recovery	of	akal,	demonstrated	by	his	non-sexual	comportment	following	the	phallic	scene.		
Minah	Karan’s	and	Ahmad	Spaner’s	differing	reputations	are	also	analogously	reconstructed	in	the	episode	after	He-Man,	Wonder	Woman,	and	Catwoman	decide	to	become	a	‘trio’	(see	Figure	7.11).	Following	this	decision,	He-Man	disappears	in	a	flash	of	light	and	reappears	back	in	Superman’s	and	Batman’s	abode	where	he	tells	them	it	is	time	for	him	to	move	on.	When	the	narrative	cuts	back	to	the	scene	where	He-Man	left	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman,	we	see	that	both	women	are	now	left	in	a	decrepit	state	and	their	movements	are	rigid	and	stiff	(see	Figure	7.12).	They	are,	for	the	lack	of	a	better	description,	‘sucked	dry’,	or	‘used	up’,	and	they	are	left	wondering	where	He-Man	went,	and	what	happened	to	them.		
	Figure	7.11	Still	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	The	women	decide	to	‘share’	He-Man	and	become	a	‘trio’.		
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		Figure	7.12	Stills	from	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman.	Catwoman	and	Wonder	Woman	left	old	and	decrepit.		The	connotations	are	abundantly	clear.	He-Man	moves	on	in	life	like	Ahmad	
Spaner,	while	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	like	Minah	Karan	(and	bohsia	girls),	are	changed	by	the	experience	and	are	left	in	a	debilitating	state	that	signifies	their	morally	vacant	and	thus	undesirable,	‘condition’.	This	explains	the	metonymical	‘used	up’	aesthetics	as	part	of	the	consequent	caricaturization	of	their	deviancy.	Their	communal	undesirability	is	made	clear	by	Superman’s	and	Batman’s	shock	and	disgust	(they	also	faint)	upon	finding	the	women	in	this	condition.	On	an	overarching	syntagmatic	level,	the	continued	moral	erosion	of	
Minah	Karan	–	enabled	through	the	city	as	signified	by	He-Man409	–	constitutes	the	previously	discussed	metonymic	signification	of	the	city	as	a	locus	of	decadence.	Reprising	the	same	polemics	that	were	mounted	against	the	Minah																																																									409	This	reference	to	the	city,	and	its	representation	as	a	site	of	decadence	will	become	clear	when	we	discuss	He-Man’s	connotative	signification	in	the	next	few	paragraphs.	
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Karan	and	bohsia,	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	therefore	reaffirms	the	belief	that	an	erosion	of	Malay	cultural	and	religious	values	will	occur	through	its	womenfolk;	qualified	at	least	in	part,	through	the	belief	in	women’s	dominant	nafsu.		One	other	dimension	to	the	critiques	against	Minah	Karan	was	their	ethnically	unbiased	sexual	relations	with	both	Malay	and	non-Malay	men	(Wazir	1992,	201).	The	case	of	Minah	Karan	aside,	the	mixing	of	sexes	among	those	of	different	ethnic	and	cultural	backgrounds	is	often	viewed	with	much	trepidation.410	From	an	inter-ethnic	perspective,	He-Man’s	metaphoric	signification	thus	takes	on	a	duality	in	its	connotative	meaning.	In	addition	to	his	signification	as	‘men	like	Ahmad	Spaner’,	it	will	soon	become	clear	in	the	following	discussions	that	he	also	connotes	Western	and	Chinese	influence/men.	This	is	the	second	construct	which	suggests	that	deviant	behaviour	is	generally	associated	with	foreign-external	influence.411	It	may	well	be	that	‘influence	from	the	West’	is	connoted	simply	through	the	reality	of	the	characters	being	‘Western’	superheroes.	However,	this	does	not	account	for	He-Man’s	differences	from	the	other	four	characters.	Further,	the	trio’s	deviancy	does	not	implicate	Batman	and	Superman	and	thus	does	not	account	for	how	Batman	and	Superman	are	‘influenced	by	the	West’.		I	suggest	instead,	that	He-Man’s	second	connotative	signification	is	made	explicit	by	his	difference	–	both	in	appearance	and	in	speech	–	when	compared	to	the	other	four	characters.	His	visual	figuration	in	this	respect,	is	achieved	through	his	yellow	or	blonde	hair,	connoting	‘Western	men’.412	He	speaks	idiosyncratically	like	a	non-native	Malay	speaker,	and	mostly	uses	short,	efficient	sentences	to	communicate.	This	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	other	characters	who																																																									410	This	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	later	in	the	following	two	paragraphs.	While	increasingly	less	so	in	Malaysia,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	unease	over	inter-racial	marriages	–	perhaps	testament	to	the	dominance	of	ethnic	stereotyping	and	attendant	prejudices	–	is	not	confined	to	the	Malay	community.	411	It	is	unclear	if	this	superhero	episode	is	merely	a	consequence	of	the	sharp	increase	in	superhero	movies	within	that	period.	In	the	same	year	when	the	episode	first	aired	in	2011	for	example,	there	were	at	least	five	superhero	movies	that	screened	in	Malaysian	cinemas;	The	
Green	Hornet,	Thor,	X-Men:	First	Class,	Green	Lantern,	and	Captain	America:	The	First	Avenger.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	introduces	another	whole	new	facet	to	our	discussion	on	‘Western	influence’.	412	The	industrialization	period	which	fostered	the	Minah	Karan	phenomenon	was	largely	facilitated	by	the	influx	of	multinational	companies	into	Malaysia’s	free	trade	zones,	which	included	their	expatriate	executives	(Ng,	Maznah,	&	Tan	2006,	117;	Wazir	1992,	177).	
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speak	fluent	conversational	Malay.	Furthermore,	when	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	compliment	him	on	his	looks	and	physique,	he	says	“tor-che,	tor-che”	which	is	Cantonese	for	‘thank	you,	thank	you’.	Here	again,	the	Chinese	are	imbricated	in	the	communal	moral	evaluation	of	negative	external	influence.		It	should	be	reiterated	that	the	signification	chain	of	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya‘s	associative	terms	‘kong	si	gelap’	and	‘gong	xi	fa	choi’	suggests	that	Malays	who	would	seek	riches	within	the	business	centres	traditionally	occupied	by	the	Chinese,	are	relinquishing	their	position	–	their	cultural	and	religious	purity	–	to	devote	themselves	to	material	success	like	the	Chinese.413	Thus,	the	Chinese	as	signified	through	He-Man’s	‘thanks’,	metonymically	reprises	the	same	position	that	sutures	‘Chinese’	to	‘city’,	since	it	is	the	city	that	enables	the	women’s	decadence,	and	the	city	is	perceived	to	be	populated	by	the	Chinese.	The	performances	of	collective	anxieties	thus	transcend	intra-ethnic	concerns	to	connote	the	anxiety	over	a	loss	of	‘purity’	for	the	Malay	race	through	Malay	women’s	sexual	deviancy	with	non-Malay	men,	specifically	Chinese	and	Western,	in	a	morally	vacant	‘city’.	While	similar	articulations	over	the	loss	of	Malay	‘purity’	were	observed	in	preceding	chapters,	here	it	is	specifically	transposed	onto	the	Malay	womenfolk	who	are	constructed	as	a	category	perceived	to	most	likely	allow	for	this	ethnic	‘contamination’.		In	reality,	communal	anxieties	over	a	woman’s	apparent	role	in	the	loss	of	communal	‘purity’	–	or	perhaps	more	specifically	a	loss	of	ethnic-cultural	‘authenticity’	–	can	take	different	forms.	One	example	that	illustrates	this	reality	is	the	case	of	the	Malay	youth	Kadir.	Peletz	(1996,	124-125)	observed	that	Kadir’s	parents	were	not	overly	concerned	about	his	unchaperoned	intermingling	with	a	girl	(and	associated	cultural	stigmas).	Their	unease	was	instead,	focused	on	the	girl’s	non-Malay	ancestry,	and	her	lack	of	the	requisite	domestic	female	traits	or	skills.414	While	Peletz	does	not	explicitly	say	it,	the	
																																																								413	Discussed	in	Chapter	5.	414	Kadir	lived	in	the	city	and	frequently	associated	with	a	girl	who	was	of	Indian-Chinese	parentage.	She	also	did	not	know	how	to	cook	(Peletz	1996,	124-125).	
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parents’	unease	can	be	attributed	to	the	girl’s	lack	of	relational	identity.415	This	is	interlinked	with	‘ethnic	anxiety’	since	it	is	construed	as	a	cultural	disconnect	from	the	typical	Malay	identity.	Once	again,	even	when	the	situation	for	a	potential	loss	of	‘authenticity’	is	created	by	the	decisions	made	by	a	male,	communal	misgivings	nonetheless	focus	on	the	female’s	culturally-perceived	deficiencies.	Of	note	is	that	Kadir’s	parents’	concerns	here	are	broadly	consonant	with	what	was	previously	observed	as	Nenek	Yan’s	subtly	conveyed	unease	of	her	son’s	Bangladeshi	wife	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya.		Extending	the	trajectory	across	the	episodes	discussed,	those	that	feature	inter-racial	marriages	–	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	and	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	–	share	three	common	features.	(1)	The	husbands	are	Malay	or	bumiputera	men.	(2)	The	wives	are	non-Malays,	non-bumiputera,	and	foreign.	And	(3)	the	non-Malay	wives	are	never	Chinese.	These	three	commonalities	were	clearly	identified	in	our	previous	discussions	concerning	Jefri’s	‘white’	mother	and	Basiron’s	Bangladeshi	wife.	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman,	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	and	Raya	…	
Raya	…	Raya	thus	broadly	share	similar	subtextual	propositions	relating	to	(1)	ethnic-cultural	dilution	effected	either	by	Malay	women	(Catwoman	and	Wonder	Woman),	or	through	Malay	male	association	with	non-Malay	women	(‘white’,	and	Bangladeshi	mothers),	and	(2)	the	erasure	of	the	Chinese	from	any	variant	of	a	Malay	(domestic)	imaginary.	It	is	apparent	that	this	problematizes	women	without	signifying	the	same	for	men.	This	implicit	articulation	of	masculine	power	within	Senario	will	be	the	focus	of	our	next	section.		
Gender	Relations	as	an	Articulation	of	Social	and	Cultural	Power	This	section	will	address	Malay	socio-cultural	articulations	of	masculine	power	through	three	instances	of	their	expression	on	Senario.	The	first	relates	to	the	performance	of	female	characters	by	male	actors.	The	second	is	the	meta-narratively	implied	male	appropriation	of	female	cultural	rights.	The	third	is	the	enduring	nature	of	the	normative	gender	binary	even	when	manifested	within	instances	of	gender	inversion.	Since	these	expressions	are	undergirded	by																																																									415	With	her	lack	of	domestic	skills	revealing	a	detachment	from	female	domesticity,	her	identity	is	thus	not	relationally	defined	by	her	role	within	a	household,	nor	through	her	kinship	identity(ies).	
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cultural	and	religious	gender	ideologies,	they	demonstrate	some	of	the	various	ways	that	Senario’s	male	characters	ideologically	articulate	their	masculinity	as	a	form	of	socially	and	culturally-sanctioned	power	over	women.		While	Senario	does	feature	women	actors	playing	female	roles,	it	also	frequently	features	male	actors	performing	female	roles.416	These	male	actors	do	not	perform	as	cross-dressers	or	transvestites	when	playing	female	roles,	nor	do	they	exaggerate	female	mannerisms	to	create	humour	through	the	obvious	gender	incongruity.417	In	fact,	while	played	by	men,	some	characters	like	Nenek	Yan,	the	grandmother	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	are	completely	convincing	in	their	performance	of	female	roles.418	On	this	basis,	it	may	be	argued	that	viewers	are	neither	meant	to	fixate	on	the	gender	incongruity	between	actor	and	character,	nor	does	the	gender	disparity	itself	become,	or	contribute	to,	the	comedy.		The	unproblematic	performances	of	these	‘female	impersonators’419	and	their	reception	by	viewers	can	perhaps	be	explained	in	part	by	the	long	tradition	of	Southeast	Asian	male	stage	performers	playing	female	roles.	In	Indonesian	
Ludruk	for	instance,	integral	female	roles	have	traditionally	been	performed	by	men420	(Brandon	2009,	48-49;	Osnes	2001,	200;	Peacock	1987,	19,	34,	77).	These	‘female	impersonators’421	(Osnes	2001,	200;	Peacock	1987,	206)	who	were	also	invariably	transvestites	(Peacock	1987,	175,	204,	207),	are	historically	similar	to	the	transvestite	performers	of	traditional	Mak	Yong	in	Malaysia	(Peletz	2009,	186-188;	Raybeck	1986,	65).422																																																											416	From	the	episodes	discussed,	the	three	females	in	both	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	and	Ta	Ti	Tu	are	played	by	men.	Interestingly,	the	converse	–	women	playing	male	characters	–	has	never	occurred	on	Senario.	417	Except	for	Youth	2’s	temporary	(and	thus	exaggerated)	effeminacy	in	Salah	Sangka	qualified	by	his	state	of	spiritual	possession.	418	The	performance	was	so	convincing	that	I	had	to	check	the	credits	to	confirm	it	was	a	male	actor	playing	Nenek	Yan.	419	The	‘origin’	of	this	term	is	addressed	later	in	my	discussion	of	the	Indonesian	Ludruk.	420	In	broader	Asian	contexts,	this	calls	to	mind	the	Onnagata	or	Oyama	male	performers	in	Japanese	Kabuki	theatre	who	played	women’s	roles,	and	Chinese	male	operatic	performers	who	played	female	characters	in	Peking	(or	Beijing)	Opera.	Both	are	only	mentioned	in	passing	here,	since	regional	and	Malaysian	art	forms	would	be	more	relevant	to	our	focus.	421	Hereafter,	I	will	refer	to	the	performances	of	non-queer	gender	inversion	on	Senario	and	the	performers	as	‘female	impersonations’	and	‘female	impersonators’,	respectively.	422	Malay	transvestism	will	be	addressed	in	the	next	section.	
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These	local	traditions	from	the	region	suggest	that	Senario’s	impersonations	may	be	socially	benign.	However,	I	argue	that	they	are	originally	based	on	gender	differentials	rooted	in	the	assumed	cultural	legitimacy	of	male	power	and	authority.	By	extending	this	historical	practice	to	Senario,	I	assert	that	the	Malay	cultural	rubric	for	male	primacy	is	sustained,	strengthened,	and	further	normalized	for	the	contemporary	milieu.	Central	to	this	argument	are	the	motivations	legitimizing	the	historical	exclusion	of	women	from	certain	traditional	performance	styles.	Ludruk423	for	instance,	deemed	it	too	taxing	and	physically	demanding	for	women,	since	it	traditionally	lasts	from	late	evening	to	early	dawn	(Brandon	2009,	48-49;	Osnes	2001,	200).	Two	earlier	forms	of	
Ludruk424	were	also	performed	as	dances	of	invulnerability	to	demonstrate	strength	and	magical	powers	(Brandon	2009,	48;	Osnes	2001,	200).	These	reflect	two	realities;	(1)	the	implicit	naturalized	position	of	women	as	weaker	than	men,	and	(2)	the	cultural	belief	that	ilmu	(knowledge)	and	akal	(reason)	is	concentrated	in	men,	which	functions	to	legitimize	and	naturalize	the	implicit	position	of	male	strength.		The	gendered	nature	of	the	akal-nafsu	binary	was	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter.	Ilmu	was	also	previously	described425	as	possessing	a	broad	range	of	cultural	meanings,	two	of	which	are	‘esoteric	or	mystical	knowledge’	and	‘spiritual	potency’	(Peletz	1996,	25,	104-105,	311).	Of	further	salience	to	the	term	ilmu	is	its	evolution	from	the	older	term	sakti	(magic)	(Peletz	1996,	104).	Taken	together,	the	akal-ilmu	cultural	rubric	determines	that	a	dominance	of	
nafsu	in	women	impedes	any	potential	female	advancement	in	ascetic	practices	(Brenner	1995,	28-29;	Peletz	1996,	158-168)	which	thus	strengthens	the	perception	of	the	mystical	potency	and	strength	of	men.	This	mystical	dimension	would	explain	the	cultural	perception	of	women	being	unable	to	perform																																																									423	There	is	a	comparatively	larger	body	of	work	dealing	with	the	historical	performances	of	
Ludruk	than	Mak	Yong.	Moreover,	the	Mak	Yong	scholarship	I’ve	come	across	approaches	it	vocationally	and	refers	only	to	its	contemporary	practice	in	post	Islamic-revivalist	Malaysia	(for	example,	Shafi,	Tye,	&	Baboo,	2015).	I	will	thus	be	referring	to	Ludruk.	The	approximate	‘synonymy’	between	both	is	qualified	by	Peletz’s	observation	that	much	of	Peacock’s	data	on	
Ludruk	demonstrate	many	commonalities	with	the	Malaysian	Mak	Yong	as	well	as	other	Javanese	proletarian	dramas	(2009,	187).	424	Ludruk	Bendang	and	Ludruk	Lerog.	425	This	was	addressed	in	our	discussion	of	Salah	Sangka	in	Chapter	5.	
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Ludruk.	From	a	physical	perspective,	the	assumption	that	women	are	unable	to	physically	sustain	a	performance	seems	logically	suspect	when	we	consider	that,	in	addition	to	their	domestic	‘chores’,	women	have	traditionally	been	associated	with	agricultural	work	and	other	forms	of	wage	labour	(Brenner	1995,	24).	I	suggest	instead,	that	this	power	appropriation	can	be	better	explained	by	the	communal	need	to	preserve	women’s	domesticity	since	it	is	perceived	to	be	a	central	constituent	of	their	relational	identity.		These	rationales	for	men-only	performances	bear	direct	relevance	to	Senario’s	unproblematic	female	impersonation.	While	these	impersonations’	long	historical	tradition	normalizes	their	performance	on-screen,	their	original	ideological	motivations	remain	unchanged.	By	reproducing	the	practice	on	
Senario,	it	is	merely	an	subtextual	extension	of	the	same	historical	tradition	for	the	appropriation	of	female	agency.	This	is	alluded	to	by	Ludruk	performer	Mr	Soenarto,	who	explains	that	this	practice	is	“an	artefact	of	the	feudal	era	when	people	did	not	want	to	look	at	genuine	women	but	at	those	who	create	an	illusion	of	women’s	qualities”	(Peacock	1987,	171).		This	explanation	introduces	another	symbolic	layer	which	relates	to	the	earlier	normalized	mistrust	of	women	who,	left	unchecked,	are	likely	to	lead	men	astray.426	Since	women	cannot	be	trusted	to	‘behave’	and	thus	‘perform’	the	proprieties	of	adat,	female	impersonation	realizes	the	male’s	imagined	feminine	ideal.	The	projection	of	a	male-imagined	feminine	ideal	is	made	discernible	since,	unlike	female	characters	such	as	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	who	are	played	by	female	actors,	none	of	Senario’s	impersonated	female	characters	are	culturally	or	religiously	deviant.	This	male	appropriation	of	female	representation	on	Senario	thus	symbolically	reasserts	male	authority	and	voicings	with	respect	to	determining	the	roles	of	women	in	both	social	(since	they	are	performed	publicly	on	stage	and	television),	and	domestic	(since	the	performances	are	set	within	household	narratives)	contexts.		
																																																								426	This	again,	refers	to	Brenner’s	observation	discussed	earlier.	
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The	appropriation	of	power	by	Senario‘s	male	characters	is	not	merely	confined	to	female	impersonation.	In	Salah	Sangka	for	example,	male	primacy	is	made	explicit	through	the	total	absence	of	female	representation	in	a	narrative	set	in	matrilineal	Negeri	Sembilan.	The	story’s	setting	of	Negeri	Sembilan,	and	the	spirits’	associated	Minangkabau	heritage	would	suggest	that,	according	to	traditional	Negeri	Sembilan	adat,	it	is	not	the	men	but	the	womenfolk	who	own	land.427	However,	the	spirits’	return	as	a	symbolic	reclamation	of	ancestral	Malay	land	and	supra-Malay	autochthony	is	realized	by,	what	should	have	been,	non-landed	males	(and	thus	they	should	have	had	no	land	to	reclaim,	or	on	which	to	stake	a	claim).	This	plainly	‘natural’	inversion	of	power	to	Salah	
Sangka’s	gender-signification	implicitly	strengthens	the	common	understanding	that	the	privileging	of	men	through	Islamic	gender	ideology	must	be	prioritized	over	any	matrilineal	adat	practices.428	This	presentation	of	myth/ideology	simply	as	normative,	functions	similarly	to	Daruih’s	compression	of	the	independence	timeline	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka;	both	are	totalized	discourses	that	foreclose	any	possibility	of	alternative	interpretations.		Arguably,	the	only	representation	of	non-male	gender	in	Salah	Sangka	is	the	temporary	effeminacy	of	Youth	2	when	he	is	possessed.	While	this	framing	allows	for	an	additional	textual	reading,	it	still	aligns	with	the	previous	signification	of	a	foreign-external	threat	to	Malay,	supra-Malay,	and	Islam.	In	this	reading	however,	these	threats	gain	‘admittance’	into	the	Malay	personhood	through	the	upsetting	of	social	gender	norms	–	though	invariably	still	linked	to	an	‘affliction’	of	femininity.	The	effeminacy	caused	by	a	gendered	possession429	of	an	originally	male	host	body	is	thus	seen	as	the	subordination	of	what	should	have	naturally	been	male	dominance,	or	simply,	a	female	appropriation	of	male	authority.	Here,	the	traditional	gendered	nature	of	possessions	is	clearly	
																																																								427	A	discussion	of	Negeri	Sembilan’s	adat	pepatih	(customary	laws	of	Minangkabau	origin	that	are	bilateral	in	nature)	goes	beyond	our	scope.	For	close	studies	on	the	matrilineal	adat	pepatih,	see	Peletz	(1995;	1996),	and	Stivens	(1996).	428	This	would	align	with	Salah	Sangka’s	primary	thematic	focus	of	supra-Malay	and	Islam.	429	Spiritual	possessions	are	culturally	understood	as	being	gendered.	It	is	commonly	believed	that	only	Malay	women	are	often	possessed,	for	a	variety	of	culturally-rationalized	reasons.	See	Peletz	(1996,	157-189)	for	closer	studies	of	the	phenomenon.	The	relevance	of	this	gendered	nature	of	possessions	to	Salah	Sangka	will	be	discussed	later	in	the	chapter.	
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signified	through	the	temporary	effeminacy,	and	male	rationality	is	eventually	regained	through	the	exorcism.		The	symbolism	for	each	of	the	textual	layers	associated	with	possession	thus	becomes	clear.	For	it	is	not	simply	the	absence	of	females,	but	the	oblique	representation	of	a	distorted	femininity	through	the	negative	implications	of	gendered	possessions	that	signifies	a	loss	of	male	akal.	The	exorcism	through	Wak	Jali’s	ilmu	(believed	to	be	concentrated	in	men)	thus	reasserts	male	authority	by	regaining	akal	and	expelling	the	feminine	distortion.	The	representation	of	a	distorted	femininity	is	key,	for	it	signifies	a	distortion	of	the	‘natural’	gender	order	of	Islam	caused	by	matriliny’s	usurpation	of	male	authority.	At	a	meta-narratival	level,	these	significations	together	with	the	previous	readings	of	Catwoman,	Wonderwoman,	Minah	Karan,	and	bohsia,	all	similarly	reaffirm	the	loci	of	male	dominance.		This	section	has	thus	far	focused	on	identifying	the	different	methods	by	which	masculine	power	is	imagined	and	articulated	on	Senario.	The	observed	male	appropriation	of	female	agency,	and	the	presence	of	male	voices	(female	impersonations)	to	determine	female	cultural	constructions,	both	reveal	a	similar	underlying	anxiety	over	the	loss	of	male	control	over	women.	One	explanation	for	this	anxiety	and	its	manifestation	as	an	excess	of	control,	lies	perhaps	with	a	communal	anxiety	over	Malay	masculinity	itself.	Senario’s	illustration	of	this	male	control	and	the	underlying	anxiety	is	however,	not	always	as	‘straight-forward’	as	we	have	observed	thus	far.	One	episode	that	subtextually	communicates	this	male	anxiety	and	control	through	an	inversion	of	the	normative	gender	binary,	is	the	episode	Bina	Semangat	(Build	Morale/Motivation/Spirit)(Fauzita,	&	Anniesafinas,	2007)	that	first	aired	in	2007.430		The	cultural	meanings	of	the	word	semangat	broadly	refers	to	an	individual’s	‘life	force’	(Peletz	1996,	105,	153),	though	it	also	relates	to	how	‘spirited’	one	is,																																																									430	To	reiterate,	I	was	unable	to	obtain	a	private	copy	of	this	episode.	Therefore,	no	stills	from	the	episode	can	be	included.	
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or	one’s	‘energy’	and	‘motivation’.	This	explains	why	a	‘motivation	camp’	is	termed	‘kem	bina	semangat’	(building	motivation	camp)	in	Malay.431	The	episode	
Bina	Semangat	is	thus	a	story	of	four	youths	who	are	sent	to	a	kem	bina	
semangat.	The	effeminate	Kassim,	the	overweight	Azim,	and	the	former	boy	scout	Razak,	were	sent	by	their	parents	for	being	lemah	semangat	(weak	in	motivation	or	unspirited).	Seri	Ayu,	who	is	the	only	female,	was	sent	by	her	parents	because	she	is	too	spirited	(terlebih	semangat).	Encik	(Mister)	Mat	is	the	fierce,	militant-trainer	with	a	large,	thick	moustache	that	he	wears	with	pride	as	a	symbol	of	his	overt	masculinity.	The	five	characters	go	through	several	tests	to	build	their	motivation	and	team	spirit.	Mat	is	revealed	as	a	fraud	when	he	starts	bawling	on	hearing	that	his	cat	has	died.	His	moustache	is	subsequently	revealed	as	a	fake	stick-on.		The	themes	of	this	episode	are	primarily	illustrated	through	three	characters	–	the	effeminate	Kassim,	the	hyper-masculine	trainer	Encik	Mat,	and	the	masculine	girl	Seri.	Each	of	these	characters	encapsulates	one	of	the	three	dimensions	of	our	discussions:	Seri	is	the	strong,	non-relational/non-domestic	female	subject	who	resists	being	feminized;	Kassim	represents	the	negotiation	between	male-female	binaries	that	conforms	to	the	Other	Malays	in	the	urban-rural	dichotomy;	and	Mat	performs	the	‘masculine-ideal’	who	attempts	to	mediate	both	the	‘affliction’	of	effeminacy,	and	the	usurpation	of	male	power	when	masculinity	is	performed	on	the	wrong	end	of	the	gender	binary.	Each	will	be	discussed	in	turn	through	the	episode’s	narrative	progression.		Like	akal	and	ilmu,	the	metaphysical	semangat	(as	opposed	to	‘motivation’)	is	culturally	believed	to	be	concentrated	in	men	(Peletz	1996,	105,	153,	177,	186,	200,	207).	Ideologically,	Seri’s	explicitly	declared	‘terlebih	semangat’	thus	names	her	as	not	merely	too	spirited,	but	also	too	masculine;	her	attitude	and	comportment	is	demonstrably	more	masculine	than	all	the	male	characters.	Her	lack	of	the	general	qualities	of	Malay	femininity	thus	disassociates	Seri	from	the																																																									431	Motivation	camps	are	common	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore,	among	others	in	the	region.	These	are	usually	introduced	through	extra-curricular	activities	in	schools,	often	as	part	of	a	school-holiday	camp.	The	activities	are	often	similar	to	those	implemented	in	outdoor	team-building	camps	or	workshops.	
		 254	
usual	Malay	construction	of	relational	gender	identity.	On	this	basis,	Seri’s	presence	at	the	camp	is	presumably	caused	by	her	parents’	wish	for	her	to	be	feminized	(since	it	was	her	parents	who	sent	her).	Meta-narratively,	Seri’s	masculine	power	needs	to	be	neutralized	by	Mat’s	hyper-masculinity,	which	is	signified	through	his	position	of	authority	as	a	trainer.	The	camp’s	militarist	quality	is	key,432	for	this	mnemonically	signifies	an	unchallengeable	military	hierarchy	so	that	the	signifier	‘Mat’	has	adequate	symbolic	power	to	successfully	counteract	Seri’s	overt	masculinity.		Mat’s	attempts	at	feminizing	Seri	are	first	introduced	in	a	scene	where	Mat	takes	Seri’s	measurements	on	the	pretext	of	obtaining	sizing	for	uniforms.	While	traditional	proprieties	are	respected	–	he	only	measures	her	shoulders	and	height,	both	from	her	back	–	he	also	conveys	his	lechery	by	rubbing	his	hands,	inspecting	Seri	from	head	to	toe,	and	paying	extra	attention	to	this	measuring	process	that	is	starkly	missing	when	he	measures	the	boys.	Seri	however,	is	totally	oblivious	or	indifferent	to	this	overt	sexualizing	of	her	body,	and	even	takes	a	deep	breath	to	enlarge	her	chest,	which	is	an	act	similar	to	men	‘puffing	up’	their	chests	to	simulate	bigger	pectorals.	The	boys	start	wolf	whistling	though	that	does	not	faze	her	either.	Seri’s	single-minded	focus	on	her	own	masculinization	thus	results	in	an	unawareness	that	her	body	is	being	objectified.	If	she	does	notice	but	is	indifferent	to	it,	the	signification	is	thus	her	disconnect	from	her	female	sexuality,	for	she	cannot	identify	and	relate	to	the	thing	that	is	objectified.	She	is	instead,	absorbed	in	becoming	more	masculine,	by	accentuating	her	symbolic	maleness	(puffed	up	chest).		
																																																								432	The	participants	are	all	dressed	in	uniform	white	t-shirts	that	are	tucked	into	cargo	trousers.	They	also	stand	to	attention,	and	are	only	allowed	to	be	at	ease	on	the	trainer’s	command.	This	all	resembles	a	cadet	corp	or	national	service	rather	than	a	simple	non-military	motivation	camp	for	youths.	An	argument	could	also	be	made	that	this	is	a	common	Malaysian	model	for	facilitating	motivational	training	as	part	of	a	school’s	‘uniformed	groups’	co-curricular	activities.	Examples	of	‘uniformed	groups’	within	the	Malaysian	context	are	the	Boy	Scouts	and	the	Girl	Guides.		
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This	objectification	of	Seri	and	her	attendant	feminization	is	observed	again	when	Mat	calls	Seri	“darling”.	When	Seri	objects,433	Mat	chides,	"hey,	kau	
melawan	lelaki	ya!	Tambah	dia	jadi	laki	kau,	kau	nak?"	(hey,	are	you	challenging	a	man?	Do	you	want	[me]	to	‘add’	him	as	your	man?	[points	to	Kassim]).	Mat’s	imposition	of	a	relational	identity	–	since	‘romantic’	relations	necessitate	a	counterpart	–	functions	with	the	presumed	inherent	gender	position	of	females	as	being	subservient	to	men.	Kassim,	signifying	this	female	subservience	in	contrast	to	the	masculine	Seri,	is	therefore	a	calculated	reference	by	Mat	that	hints	at	the	meta-narrative	gender	inversion.	However,	as	the	story	unfolds,	we	will	observe	that	even	though	genders	may	be	inverted,	the	gender	binary	is	rigidly	adhered	to.		Seri	is	made	to	choose	a	male	partner	and	she	chooses	effeminate	Kassim.	Mat	tells	Kassim,	“...	awak	kena	jadi	kekasih	kepada	Seri.	Sebab	apa	-	bagi	pengalaman	
semangat	kepada	Seri	yang	tak	berminat	pada	lelaki."	(…	you	need	to	be	a	love-interest	to	Seri.	Reason	why	–	give	some	semangat	experience	to	Seri	who	has	no	interest	in	men).	In	spite	of	the	inversion	of	normative	gender	roles	with	respect	to	biological	sex,	Seri’s	choice	of	Kassim	still	conforms	to	conventionally	understood	categories	of	masculine-feminine	binaries.434	Likewise,	the	cultural	
semangat	binarism	is	upheld,	for	Seri’s	abundantly	strong	semangat	(and	hence	masculine)	is	complementary	to	Kassim’s	weak	semangat	(and	hence	feminine).	Of	note,	is	the	inherent	stronger-weaker	power	dynamics	within	this	gendered	ideological	pairing	that	is	also	mirrored	in	Mat’s	overt	symbolic	power	to	feminize	the	masculine	Seri.	The	challenge	posed	by	Kassim’s	effeminacy	is	thus	neutralized	by	Seri,	and	he	is	instead	forced	to	reconnect	with	his	maleness	by	roleplaying	as	a	man.	This	will	become	clear	later	in	the	analysis.		When	Seri	breaks	off	their	role-play	handholding,	Kassim	retorts	in	a	non-effeminate	and	brusquely	male	manner,	“hey!	Kau	melawan	lelaki	ya?	…	Kau,																																																									433	Addressing	someone	as	‘darling’	–	especially	a	man	to	a	woman	–	is	generally	not	a	common	occurrence	in	Malaysia.	This	is	usually	construed	as	flirtatious	conduct	if	the	parties	are	unmarried	or	not	related.	Furthermore,	Mat	says	it	in	an	obviously	seductive	tone.	434	The	reading	would	have	been	significantly	different	if	Seri	had	chosen	the	hyper-masculine	Mat	for	instance,	since	a	homoerotic	meaning	would	have	been	signified	instead.	
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kalau	nak	jalan	dengan	aku,	mata	kau	tu,	jangan	tengok	jantan-jantan	lain!”	(Hey!	You	are	challenging	a	man,	ya?	…	If	you	want	to	walk	with	me,	your	eyes,	[need	to]	stop	looking	at	other	males).	This	brusque	retort	further	establishes	metonymically	that	Kassim	still	possesses	a	degree	of	latent	masculinity.	Signified	through	his	tone	and	delivery,	and	by	the	actual	message	communicated,	the	narrative’s	hint	at	Kassim’s	latent	masculinity	seems	to	televisually	reconstruct	what	Peletz	observed	was	the	communal	belief	that	all	transvestites	or	effeminate	men	need	only	to	be	“convinced	they	are	men”	(1996,	130).435	This	communal	understanding	of	male	gender	fluidity	presumes	a	suppressed	or	dormant	state	of	masculinity	which	is	largely	consonant	with	our	discussion	of	the	Islamic	motivations	for	the	‘anti-gay	camp’	in	the	previous	chapter.	As	such,	the	subtext	proposes	that	Kassim’s	present	gender	orientation	can	be	‘corrected’.		Subtextually,	Kassim’s	outburst	forces	him	out	of	the	third	space	(as	he	is	neither	male	nor	female)	since	he	is	called	to	perform	his	gender	in	accordance	with	norms	associated	with	the	male	sex.	Kassim	responds	to	Seri’s	challenge	to	his	male	authority	by	allowing	his	latent	masculinity	to	come	to	the	fore.	Gender	binaries	thus	remain	stable	and	undisrupted,	even	if	he	is	‘temporarily’	afflicted	with	the	possession	of	dominant	nafsu	–	for	the	inherent	strength	of	male	akal	will	ultimately	prevail.436	The	subtext	thus	draws	upon	the	cultural	and	religious	notion	that	‘men	need	only	be	convinced	of	their	maleness’	to	inoculate	against	disruptions	to	the	binary.	However,	Kassim’s	‘recuperation’	of	masculinity	is	signified	by	aggression	towards	Seri’s	agency	–	his	tone	and	comportment	when	he	warns	Seri	seem	to	contain	a	threat	for	violence.	This	seems	to	propose	that	an	antagonistic	male	position	is	a	legitimate	form	of	power	re-appropriation	when	faced	by	women	who	challenge	their	authority.																																																									435	This	also	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	the	tolerance	of	lelaki	lembut	on-screen	up	until	the	1990s	(Hisyam,	personal	communication,	October	10,	2015).	Gender	fluidity	in	men	is	traditionally	tolerated	since	they	were	often	regarded	as	being	‘only’	gender	fluid	and	not	sexually	deviant.	They	were	thus	viewed	more	as	a	curiosity	rather	than	stigmatized	(unless	overtly	sexually	deviant),	since	it	is	believed	that	they	would	eventually	revert	to	their	biological	gender	(Peletz	1996,	123,	129-131).	436	Here	I	reference	the	significance	of	the	gendered	notions	to	both	nafsu-akal	and	possessions	that	were	established	earlier	on	in	our	discussions	in	this	chapter	and	in	the	previous	two	chapters.	
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	This	proposition	of	male	aggression	is	made	explicit	(though	an	inversion	of	who	is	‘male’)	in	the	following	sequence	where	Seri	responds	threateningly	to	Kassim’s	outburst,	"apa	kau	cakap	tadi?	Ulang	balik,	ulang	balik"	(What	did	you	just	say?	Say	it	again,	say	it	again).	Kassim	recoils	to	his	previous	effeminate	self	and	coyly	says	"takda	apa,	takda	apa"	(nothing,	nothing).	Seri	then	grabs	him	by	his	shirt	collar	while	saying	"kurang	ajar!"	(rude!)	and	throws	him	onto	the	ground	while	threatening	to	"Pijak	kau,	kalau	kata	lagi.	Faham?!"	(I’ll	step	on	you	if	you	say	it	again.	Understood?!).	Seri’s	re-establishment	of	her	masculine	authority	over	Kassim	is	achieved	through	the	same	aggressivity	implicit	in	Kassim’s	retort.	Kassim’s	‘recuperation’	of	masculinity	is	thus	a	temporary	performance	and	there	is,	ultimately,	no	true	redistribution	of	power	since	the	symbolic	male	–	Seri	–	still	exhibits	the	same	strategies	towards	the	symbolic	female	–	Kassim.	Even	in	the	subtext’s	symbolic	contestations	over	power,	it	demonstrably	adheres	to	the	rigid	binarity	of	male-female,	and	the	rivalrous	structure	of	protagonist-antagonist.	Interestingly,	Seri	–	like	Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	–	is	constructed	as	firmly	ensconced	in	her	‘problematic’	position.	In	contrast	to	the	women,	the	signifying	of	Kassim’s	latent	masculinity	illustrates	the	potential	for	a	return	to	a	‘true’	or	‘authentic’	male	Malay	identity	–	like	Basiron	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	and	Jefri	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka.	In	this	respect,	the	earlier	observed	problematization	of	women	is	repeated	in	Bina	
Semangat.		The	power	dynamic	demonstrated	by	Seri	over	Kassim	is	similarly	reflected	in	Mat’s	symbolic	power	over	Seri.	Both	Mat’s	and	Kassim’s	aggressive	position	towards	Seri	is	introduced	using	the	same	words,	“kau	melawan	lelaki	ya?”	(you	are	challenging	a	man,	ya?).	Subtextually,	their	aggressions	are	thus	ideologically	‘justified’	as	a	legitimate	male	strategy	to	counteract	subjective	female	agency.	This	same	male	aggression	is	similarly	observed	in	Kassim’s	warning	to	Seri,	which	counteracts	Kassim’s	own	effeminacy.	Moreover,	Seri’s	biological	sex	as	opposed	to	performed	and	identified	gender,	transforms	her	body	into	a	representation	of	the	binary	in	question.	Mat’s	attempt	at	feminizing	Seri	through	the	sexualization	of	her	body	is	in	fact,	meant	to	reconnect	Seri	with	her	
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‘latent’	femininity,	much	like	Kassim’s	latent	masculinity.	However,	Seri’s	indifferent	or	oblivious	response	marks	her	out	as	being	unable	to	identify	with	(or	to	resist)	the	‘re-inversion’.	While	the	dynamics	of	power	remain	similar,	the	awareness	of	performed	gender	is	markedly	different	between	Seri	and	Kassim;	Seri	‘knows’	she	is	a	‘man’	even	though	society	says	otherwise,	while	Kassim	is	less	confident	and	fluidly	negotiates	between	both	genders.		The	question	therefore,	is	whether	Bina	Semangat	is	simply	a	performance	of	‘correct’	gender	roles?	Or	is	the	episode	a	social	commentary	on	how	popular	discourse	attempts	to	(re)define	‘traditional’	notions	of	gender?	More	specifically,	is	Bina	Semangat’s	subtext	merely	reflecting	quotidian	developments	of	gender	ambiguity,	and	inversions	of	binary	roles	in	general?	It	is	particularly	enticing	to	read	Bina	Semangat	from	this	perspective	since	the	narrative	demonstrates	gender	‘deviance’	and	the	attempts	at	‘correcting’	them,	but	acknowledges	that	the	attempts	are	ultimately	unsuccessful	(Kassim	and	Seri	are	still	‘unchanged’).	This	open-ended	nature	to	Bina	Semangat	is	a	departure	from	Senario’s	usual	episodic	formula	for	it	does	not	attempt	to	prescribe	a	workable	solution.			Mat’s	break-down	signifies	as	much,	for	his	hyper-masculine	façade	is	a	performance	that	cannot	be	maintained.	His	public	bawling	which	leads	to	a	reveal	that	his	moustache	–	the	symbol	of	his	overt	masculinity	–	is	also	a	fake,	suggests	that	Seri	is	after	all,	the	most	masculine	amongst	them.	An	antagonistic	or	overtly	masculine	insistence	on	clear	gender	roles	is	thus	unsustainable	and	identified	as	an	ineffective	position	–	since	Seri	and	Kassim	are	left	‘uncorrected’	even	though	they	were	temporarily	made	to	perform	‘correctly’.	Kassim’s	momentary	lapse	into	normative	masculinity	however,	signifies	the	belief	that	non-normative	gendered	Other	Malays	at	least,	can	return	to	their	biological	gender,	reflecting	the	biological-psychological	discourse	that	commonly	undergird	gender	‘re-education’	initiatives.	
	In	hindsight,	the	episode’s	title	plays	on	the	duality	of	semangat’s	meaning.	We	are	told	that	this	is	a	camp	to	bina	semangat	(motivate)	though	its	cultural,	
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metaphysical	meaning	is	never	alluded	to	narratively.	Subtextually	however,	the	camp	is	a	correctional	facility	that	seeks	to	align	each	character’s	gender	more	‘properly’	or	‘naturally’	to	their	biological	sex	as	framed	through	the	gendered	signifier	of	semangat.	This	need	for	gender	to	be	‘legible’	in	accordance	with	distinct	poles	of	male-female	is	broadly	consonant	with	the	communal	need	to	mark	gender	through	traditional	roles	determined	by	both	adat	and	Islamic	gender	ideologies.		
Conclusion	This	chapter	foregrounded	three	facets	to	Senario’s	reproduction	of	Malay	gender	relationships;	(1)	traditionally	interpreted	modes	of	gender	and	their	alternative	constructions,	(2)	the	affirmation	of	these	traditional	gender	modes	as	an	assertion	of	masculine	power,	and	(3)	sustaining	normative	gender	relations	even	with	the	inversion	of	binary	roles.	By	correlating	their	performances	with	generally	understood	wider	religio-cultural	beliefs	and	practices,	and	with	historical	developments,	the	potential	motivations	for	their	televisual	articulations	were	identified.	These	motivations	were	invariably	found	to	be	re-articulations	of	the	gender	ideologies	of	adat	and	Islam.		
Senario’s	portrayal	of	female	anomalous	behaviour	does	however	acknowledge	that	communitarian	cleavages,	not	least	in	views	on	gender	relations,	exist	within	the	Malay	community.	Viewed	from	this	perspective,	it	is	likely	that	
Senario’s	re-articulations	of	adat	and	Islamic	gender	ideologies	is	a	response	to	challenges	to	dominant	conservative	notions	of	gender	modes.	We	observe	in	particular	that	it	is	the	slippage	between	not	just	lived-reality,	but	customary	
kampung	proprieties	as	practiced,	and	television’s	social	reality	that	informs	
Senario’s	constructions	of	its	female	‘others’.	On	this	point,	there	seems	to	be	a	specific	focus	on	the	imagined	traits,	comportment,	or	behaviour	of	women	that	is	largely	aligned	with,	and	possibly	informed	by,	quotidian	encounters	with	the	phenomena	of	Minah	Karan,	bohsia,	and	Ahmad	Spaner	that	spanned	several	decades	across	Malaysian	history.	This	strategy	would	appear	to	demonstrate	Bhabha’s	theorization	of	the	dominant’s	deployment	of	fixed	stereotypes	
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longitudinally	across	time	periods	towards	sustaining	its	own	demarcations	of	gender	roles.		Of	particular	interest	is	Bina	Semangat‘s	unusual	(for	Senario)	open-ended	narrative.	Theoretically,	this	does	in	fact	illustrate	my	assertion	in	Chapter	2	of	the	Malay	condition	when	framed	through	the	Lacanian	fantasmatic	gap.	With	the	santun	Malay	woman	as	the	object	of	desire	(the	ideal),	Malays	are	thus	‘taught’	‘how	to	desire’	through	the	Lacanian	fantasy	of	adat.	The	gap	between	the	symbolic	relevance	of	adat	and	the	increasingly	globalized	realities	of	urban	21st	century	Malaysia	can	never	be	closed,	for	the	fantasy	conceals	the	irreconcilability	of	both.	As	previously	discussed,	this	irreconcilability	is	rooted	in	the	fact	that	both	the	desire	and	fantasy	are	“arrested,	fixated	form[s]	of	representation”	(Bhabha	1994,	107)	that	does	not	address	the	realities	of	the	present.	In	this	sense,	Bina	Semangat	does	not	prescribe	a	workable	‘solution’	to	sexual/gender	deviancy	precisely	because	it	cannot	identify	a	‘solution’	apart	from	asserting	the	dictates	of	fantasmatic	adat.	Despite	gender	re-education	initiatives	for	instance,	non-normative	gender	identification	continues	to	proliferate	in	Malay	society,	among	others.		
Senario’s	expressions	of	cultural	and	religious	gender	ideologies	demonstrate	some	of	the	various	ways	that	Malay	masculinity	can	be	articulated	as	a	form	of	socially	and	culturally-sanctioned	power	over	women.	While	some	may	justify	these	televisual	performances	as	being	aligned	with	acts,	behaviours,	and	social	scripts	found	in	lived-reality	generally,	these	social	scripts	and	attitudinal/behaviourial	codes	are	in	fact,	part	of	the	patriarchal	discourse	on	Malay	Muslim	women.	With	this	reality,	Senario’s	performances	of	gender	are	not	merely	reflective	of	the	subordinate	female	subject	within	a	male	patriarchal	discourse,	they	function	to	further	entrench	and	re-legitimize	the	implicit	imbalance	of	power	within	the	Malay	religio-cultural	rubric	of	gender	relations.		 	
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CHAPTER	8	
	
Summary	of	Chapters	This	thesis	has	sought	to	reveal	how	the	constituents	of	a	dominant	form	of	Malayness	are	reconstructed	on	the	sitcom	Senario.	By	exploring	the	correlation	between	socio-political	issues	and	Senario’s	representations	of	Malay	identity,	we	foregrounded	the	relationship	between	Malay	nationalist	ideology	and	Malay	social	desires.	Our	analysis	further	yielded	an	understanding	of	the	political	expediencies	of	the	state’s	interpretation	of	Malay	identity.	The	primary	focus	was	interpreting	Senario‘s	significations	of	dominant	and	subversive	meanings	of	Malayness	as	understood	through	corresponding	political	and	popular	civic	pressures	of	the	time.	Overarchingly,	we	observed	that	Senario	communicated	the	state’s	political	rhetoric	about	a	specific	version	of	Malayness	that	was	primarily	focused	on	determining	–	for	political	expediencies	–	who	is,	and	what	it	means	to	be,	Malay	and	Muslim.		The	historical	and	national	context	for	this	study	was	established	in	Chapter	2	where	we	broadly	charted	the	post-independence	evolution	of	Malayness	as	a	national	identity	determined	by	UMNO’s	religio-ethnic	discourses.	UMNO’s	dominant	position	within	the	governing	coalition	was	observed	to	have	enabled	the	deployment	of	Malay	historical	narratives	and	race-encoded	Islamic	prerogatives	to	secure	the	support	–	at	a	primal,	emotional	level	–	of	Malay	and/or	Muslim	communalists.	While	non-state	defined	Malayness	exists	–	such	as	the	Other	Malays	category	–	the	state	under	UMNO	has	gone	to	extensive	lengths	to	ensure	that	a	partisan	interpretation	of	Malayness	endures.	It	was	observed	that	this	often	resulted	in	the	subordination	of	ethnic	and	religious	minority	identities.	Dominant	Malay	and	Muslim	gender	ideologies	have	also	largely	prevailed	through	this	partisan	influence.	We	noted	that	while	pro-women	actors	have	actively	challenged	these	Malay-Muslim	hierarchies	of	gender	that	sustain	the	hegemony	of	male	privilege,	their	successes	in	obtaining	state	concessions	to	women’s	rights	is	without	real	political	will	on	the	part	of	the	state.	An	increasing	number	of	women’s	rights	groups	–	both	Islamic	and	secular	–	have	also	emerged	more	recently,	though	they	are	often	actively	
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demonized	by	ideological	leaders	of	the	mutually-affirming	Malay	and	Islamic	patriarchal	superstructure.		In	Chapter	3,	we	considered	the	relationship	between	UMNO	and	free-to-air	(FTA)	television	stations.	Our	discussions	revealed	that	the	state	under	UMNO	controls	all	FTA	television	stations,	commercial	or	otherwise.	As	such,	the	pressures	directly	or	indirectly	regulating	television	productions	were	found	to	be	invariably	exerted	through	political	decisions.	Malaysian	television	thus	often	appears	to	serve	sectional	interests	–	that	of	the	UMNO	elites	–	rather	than	Malaysian	society	in	general.	Taking	a	wider	perspective,	we	noted	that	the	complex	broadcasting	legislative	apparatus	functions	at	an	elementary	level	to	normalize	and	maintain	the	state’s	influence	over	public	discourse	regarding	Malay	identity.	In	particular,	we	uncovered	the	importance	of	‘narrowcasting’,	which,	in	practice,	allows	for	a	racial	and	geographical	categorization	of	Malaysian	electorates.	It	was	unsurprising	to	note	that	TV3’s	Malay	and	non-urban	viewership	is	the	largest	viewership	segment	among	all	of	MPB’s	FTA	channels.	We	suggested	that	the	close	similarity	between	TV3’s	primary	demographic	and	the	range	of	characters	in	Senario	allowed	for	a	close	reflection	of	its	non-urban	viewers	on	screen.	This	made	Senario’s	institutionally-constructed	televisual	myths	and	narratives	highly	relatable	for	its	target	audience.		Chapter	4	shifted	to	a	more	theoretical	discussion	that	addressed	the	polysemy	of	television,	the	political	form	of	the	situation	comedy	genre,	the	social	value	of	comedy	and	humour,	and	the	different	signifying	methods	by	which	all	these	are	represented	televisually.	Drawing	on	arguments	relating	to	representational	or	signifying	systems	(cultural	or	otherwise),	it	was	shown	that	televisual	signs	or	cues	are	central	to	the	derivation	of	meaning	on	television.	By	transposing	the	Lacanian-Žižekian	system	to	this	signifying	system,	it	was	found	that	both	similarly	described	the	process	by	which	dominant	meanings	are	sustained	within	signifiers.	This	was	also	correlated	to	the	idea	that	a	televisual	text’s	‘preferred	meaning’	encodes	the	dominant	perception	of	reality	as	‘realism’,	a	process	consonant	with	the	notion	of	myth-making.	A	complementary	discussion	
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on	Humour	Theory	further	demonstrated	sitcom’s	political	relevance	in	circulating	shared	communal	meanings	preferred	by	the	dominant	ideology.	Sitcom,	and	by	extension	Senario,	was	therefore	identified	as	an	ideological	vehicle	that	depends	on	myth-making.	Furthermore,	it	was	shown	that	the	Lacanian-Žižekian	quilting	process	functions	to	frame	the	signifying	system’s	dominant	meanings	in	order	for	its	comedic	narrative	to	‘make	sense’.		In	Chapter	5,	the	first	chapter	of	textual	analysis,	I	examined	the	sitcom’s	replication	of	institutional	Malay	nationalism	and	related	cultural	binaries.	In	my	analysis	of	scenes	from	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	and	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	I	demonstrated	how	Senario	often	deploys	pseudo-historicism	as	a	mnemonic	and	emotional	trigger	for	the	soliciting	of	cultural	conformity	and	the	legitimation	of	ethnic	exclusionary	spaces	within	the	discourse	of	Malaysian	identity.	It	was	observed	that	the	Malay	kampung	is	constructed	as	a	transcendental	signifier	for	authentic	Malayness;	the	nexus	of	adat	and	tradition.	Communal	anxieties	over	an	erosion	of	Malay	identity	and	values	were	identified	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	especially,	an	episode	that	deployed	historical	stereotypes	of	Chinese	and	Indians	in	a	process	of	othering	to	strengthen	its	own	representation	of	traditional	Malay	authenticity.	Across	several	episodes	aired	between	1996	to	2011,	it	was	observed	that	Senario	recurringly	constructed	‘normal’	Malay	characters	while	ethnic	minorities	were	largely	represented	as	idiosyncratic	caricatures.	These	essentialist	performances	of	identity	largely	take	three	forms;	the	exclusionary	and	monolithic	nature	of	national	narratives	pervading	popular	discourse,	the	construction	of	the	Malay	community	as	the	idealized	normative,	and	the	disassociation	of	positive	interest	in	minority	cultures	through	de-assimilating	narratives	of	‘othering’.			In	Chapter	6,	the	idea	of	a	synonymous	Islamic	and	supra-Malay	identity,	with	respect	to	how	both	related	to	everyday	Malayness,	was	given	greater	clarity.	The	focus	of	my	analysis	was	Ta	Ti	Tu’s	explicitly	instructional	Islamic	narrative,	and	Salah	Sangka’s	themes	on	the	sanctity	and	irredentism	of	the	Dunia	Melayu	(Malay	World).	Unlike	the	episodes	from	earlier	years,	it	was	found	that	Salah	
Sangka’s	Islamic	accents	were	sublimated	into	the	performances	of	
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(supra)Malayness.	That	Islam	is	‘invisible’	is	attributed	to	the	degree	of	its	naturalization	as	part	of	the	discourse	on	Malay	identity	within	the	region.	Thus,	while	Ta	Ti	Tu	(first	aired	1997)	seems	overt	in	its	didacticism,	Salah	Sangka	(first	aired	2011)	unapologetically	presumes	an	Islamic	viewership	who	are	already	religiously	literate	(perhaps	reflecting	the	results	of	national	Islamization	policies).	Articulations	of	Islam	and	a	fraternal	supra-Malay	bond	were	also	distilled	into	the	sign	‘our	ways’,	constructed	as	the	symbolic	definer	for	Pan-Malay	identity.	The	adversarial	position	to	Chinese	agency	was	also	revived	and	juxtaposed	against	this	Pan-Malay	identity	as	a	threat	to	the	Pan-Malay	ideal.	Ta	Ti	Tu	achieves	the	same	insularity	by	creating	an	exclusionary	ethno-religious	space	through	its	explicit	focus	on	Islamic	instructions.	Of	note	is	the	absence	of	any	reference	to	the	Indian	community,	as	a	threat	or	otherwise,	in	both	episodes.		The	focus	shifted	to	Senario’s	implicit	gender	hierarchies	in	Chapter	7.	Three	facets	to	Senario’s	reproduction	of	Malay	gender	relationships	were	foregrounded;	traditionally	interpreted	modes	of	gender	and	their	alternative	constructions,	the	assertion	of	gender	modes	as	an	articulation	of	masculine	power,	and	the	adherence	to	normative	gender	relations	even	when	gender	roles	are	inverted.	These	performances	of	gender	invariably	coincided	with	the	general	understandings	of	adat	and	Islamic	gender	ideologies	that	mutually	reaffirm	the	loci	of	Malay	male	dominance.	A	close	textual	reading	identified	a	specific	focus	on	the	imagined	traits,	comportment,	or	behaviour	of	women	that	is	largely	aligned	with,	and	possibly	informed	by,	quotidian	encounters	with	the	phenomena	and	discourses	of	Minah	Karan,	bohsia,	and	Ahmad	Spaner	that	spanned	several	decades	of	Malaysian	history.	The	televisually-imagined	feminine	ideal	and	the	transgressive	female	constructions	in	Senario	were	both	found	to	be	symptomatic	of	existing	cultural	and	religious	male	anxieties.	
Senario’s	constructions	of	gender	are	thus	not	merely	reflective	of	the	subordinate	female	subject	within	a	male	patriarchal	discourse;	they	function	to	further	entrench	and	legitimize	the	imbalance	of	power	in	the	Malay	rubric	of	gender	relations.			
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Conclusions	At	its	core,	this	thesis	identified	at	a	textual	level,	the	methods	by	which	Senario	encodes	the	dominant	tropes	of	Malay	identity.	Drawing	on	existing	scholarship	on	Malayness	in	political	discourse,	I	demonstrated	how	these	tropes	function	in	a	television	sitcom	within	the	context	of	Senario.	I	posed	three	questions	in	Chapter	1	which	formed	the	basis	for	this	study:		 	(1)	What	dominant	narratives	of	Malay	identity	are	performed	on		
							Senario?	(2)	Who	are	exteriorized	through	the	differences	hierarchized	by	Senario									and	how	does	Senario	(re)construct	this	hierarchy	of	difference?	(3)	How	does	this	affect	the	fixity	of	state-defined	configurations	to	the												nationalist	Malay	narrative?		While	each	of	the	chapters	of	analysis	addressed	specific	aspects	of	these	questions,	I	would	now	like	to	focus	on	ideas	that	are	overarching	concepts	across	the	chapters.	In	sum,	it	is	observed	that	there	are	three	broad	themes	about	Malayness	that	are	communicated	by	Senario.	These	themes	directly	address	the	questions	above.		 (1) Senario’s	performances	of	Malay	identity	are	consonant	with	popular	notions	of	Malayness	prevalent	in	the	communal	social	mindset.	These	understandings	of	communal	identity	cohere	with	state	narratives	of	Malayness	and	Islam,	which	includes	an	adherence	to	their	related	gender	ideologies.439	(2) Malay-Muslim	characters	are	televisually	represented	as	the	imagined	normative	ideals.	This	includes	non-Malaysians	who	are	perceived	to	be	part	of	the	Dunia	Melayu.	Non-Malay	and	non-Muslim	constructions	are	contrasted	in	varying	degrees	to	establish	those	who	are	exterior	to	this	Malay	imaginary.																																																									439	I	make	clear	at	this	point,	that	I	consider	both	Islamic	and	Malay	gender	ideologies	as	being	a	constitutive	part	of	the	dominant	understanding	of	Malay	identity.	As	such,	I	will	not	make	specific	distinctions	between	gender	relationships	and	Malayness	or	Islam	since	I	consider	all	three	to	be	facets	of	one	similar	Malay-Muslim	worldview.	
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(3) State-defined	configurations	of	Malay-Muslim	identity	(and	by	extension	non-Malay-Muslim	identities)	are	consistently	reaffirmed	and	strengthened	on	Senario.	Given	Senario’s	ability	to	normalize	related	religio-political	rhetorics	on-screen,	these	televisual	representations	evolve	with	shifts	in	political	polemics	that	reshape	or	reinstate	formulations	of	Malayness.		These	three	themes	about	Malayness	are,	as	observed	in	the	three	chapters	of	analysis,	overtly	communicated	by,	or	reflected	in,	Senario.	Each	of	these	themes	will	be	discussed	in	turn	in	the	proceeding	sections.			
Senario’s	Malayness	as	Consonant	with	Popular	Notions	of	Malayness	What	aspects	of	Senario’s	performances	of	identity	are	consonant	with	quotidian	understandings	of	Malayness,	all	of	which	to	a	degree,	reflect	state	narratives?	One	of	the	most	evident	is	the	sitcom’s	performances	of	identity	that	seem	to	conform	to	‘statist	Malay’,	‘traditional	Malay’,	and/or	Islamic	identity.	From	the	close	reading	of	the	episodes,	it	seems	clear	that	these	performances	refer	to	a	notion	of	a	monolithic	Malay	identity	presented	as	unquestionably	‘authentic’	Malay.	Given	that	varying	forms	of	Malay	adat	exist	(one	which	I	drew	attention	to	in	Salah	Sangka	was	adat	pepatih	that	is	Minangkabau-influenced),	the	notion	of	‘traditional’	seems	a	vague	reference	to	a	distilled	total	sum	of	a	multitude	of	Malay	traditions.		Moreover,	how	historical	or	authentic	is	‘traditional	Malay’	when	its	material	basis	is	determined	by	state	(re)formulations	which	prioritize	or	deprioritize	Islamic	and	cultural	constituents	of	Malayness	depending	on	the	political	discourse	of	the	time?	The	pivotal	position	of	Islam	today	can,	for	instance,	be	attributed	to	the	broader	currents	of	Islamic	reinvigoration	that	were	observed	nationally	in	state	Islamization	policies	from	at	least	the	1980s.	I	have	pointed	out	the	televisual	evolution	of	religious	expression	as	reflected	in	the	differences	between	Islamic	representations	in	Ta	Ti	Tu	(1997)	and	Salah	Sangka	(2011).	Both	episodes	are	prime	examples	of	how	Senario’s	narratives	evolve	in	accordance	with	changes	in	religious,	social,	and	political	interpretations	of	
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Malayness	as	a	way	of	life.	Episodes	that	rely	heavily	on	understandings	of	Malay	
adat	(Salah	Sangka	and	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	for	example),	episodes	that	functioned	to	inculcate	Malay	Islam	(Ta	Ti	Tu	for	example),	and	episodes	reconstructing	these	communal	lived	realities	further	demonstrate	that	the	potentially	separate	identities	of	‘Malay’	and	‘Muslim’	have	been	televisually	reinterpreted	to	mutually-affirm	a	unitary	identity.		It	bears	repeating	that	both	Malay	adat	and	Islam	are	not	as	mutually	affirming	or	complementary	as	commonly	believed,	or	as	suggested	by	Senario.	That	they	are	regarded	as	such,	and	have	been	since	at	least	the	1970s,	is	largely	attributable	to	the	concerted	1970s	Islamic	revivalism	and	the	subsequent	national	Islamization	policies	that	started	from	at	least	the	1980s.	It	was	mentioned	in	Chapter	2	that	these	national	developments	resulted	in	the	progressive	evolution	of	Malay	traditional	adat	in	order	to	be	more	congruent	with	Islamic	beliefs.	One	central	example	embodying	this	shift	–	primarily	because	it	features	in	our	analysis	of	Salah	Sangka	in	Chapter	6	–	is	the	Malay	
bomoh	(shaman).	I	had	identified	both	the	ambivalent	attitudes	of	the	Malays	toward	the	symbolism	presented	by	the	figure	of	the	bomoh	in	Chapter	6,	as	well	as	the	bomoh’s	shift	from	presumably	paganist	rituals	to	a	sole	reliance	on	Quranic	verses	as	part	of	its	ritualist	Islamic	evolution.		The	figure	of	the	bomoh	thus	bear	direct	relevance	to	my	earlier	questions	about	the	authenticity	of	prevailing	notions	of	Malay	traditions	as	well	as	the	state’s	role	in	encouraging	its	propagation.	It	is	more	productive	for	our	purposes	to	discuss	the	bomoh	in	terms	of	its	dichotomous	embodiment	of	both	‘old’	Dunia	
Melayu	Hindu-Buddhist	influenced	traditions,	and	a	comparatively	more	recent	resurgent	Islam.	We	are,	in	this	sense,	framing	it	fundamentally	as	an	adat-Islam	binary.	However,	these	contradictions	between	adat	and	Islam	have	largely	been	resolved	–	or	at	the	very	least	–	found	a	compromise	in,	to	use	Wazir	Jahan	Karim’s	terms	from	our	discussions	in	Chapter	2,	the	state’s	“adatization	of	Islam”	or	the	“Islamization	of	adat”	(Wazir	1992,	16)	that	allowed	for	a	conciliation	between	Malay	and	Islamic	identities.	Michael	Peletz’s	observations	are	broadly	consonant	with	Wazir’s,	and	further	identifies	that	spiritual	potency	
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–	originally	a	pre-Islamic	(Hindu-Buddhist)	notion	–	is,	in	its	more	Islamic	form,	still	highly	valued	post-Islamic	resurgence	(1996,	103-104).		Among	others,	studies	by	Aihwa	Ong	reveal	that	state	–	and	by	extension,	communal	–	rhetoric	of	Islamic-Malay	identity	is	frequently	mobilized	against	a	modern,	liberal	Malayness	rather	than	questions	about	adat‘s	congruency	with	Islam	(1995,	174-180).	This	tendency	produces	the	prevailing	unquestioning	acceptance	of	adat‘s	complementarity	to	Islam	which	ensures	that	its	dominant	narrative	is	frequently	framed	through	the	traditional-modern	or	kampung-urban	binaries	instead	(Ong	1995,	180-184).	As	observed	throughout	this	thesis,	the	ideological	role	of	the	state,	within	the	context	of	this	form	of	identity	construction,	is	inherently	crucial	to	the	conciliation	of	the	dichotomous	elements	within	both	traditional	‘Malay’	and	resurgent	Islamic	identities.		The	meta-narratives	of	episodes	such	as	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	Raya	…	Raya	…	
Raya,	and	Gong	Xi	further	strengthen	the	presumption	that	Senario’s	representation	of	communal	lived	realities	are	dictated	by	political	polemics	of	the	time.	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka’s	nationalist	assertions	of	Malay	opposition	to	the	British	colonial	administration	as	key	to	the	nation’s	independence,	and	its	subtle	nod	towards	ethnic	inclusivity	moderated	by	Malay	agency,	reflects	the	key	themes	of	the	nation-building	discourse	proliferating	in	the	1980-1990s.	The	same	reproduction	of	popular	discourse	is	observed	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya’s	encapsulation	of	generally	understood	themes	on	inter-racial,	inter-cultural,	and	inter-faith	relations,	as	well	as	its	portrayal	of	traditional-modern	positions.	
Gong	Xi‘s	overt	inclusion	of	the	Chinese	was	identified	as	being	potentially	motivated	by	political	expediencies.		Whatever	form	it	takes,	these	televisual	examples	of	‘traditionalism’	contradict	the	reality	of	UMNO’s	trajectories	of	‘progressiveness’	for	the	Malays.	The	attempts	at	‘modernizing’,	‘urbanizing’,	or	perhaps	more	accurately,	‘progressivity’	of	the	Malays,	is	evidenced	across	the	years	through	initiatives	like	Revolusi	Mental	in	1971,	the	New	Malays,	and	the	industrialization	period	of	Malaysia	Incorporated	in	the	1980s-1990s.	I	have	demonstrated	how	these	
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contradictions	are	evident	in	Senario	and	the	various	ways	by	which	these	initiatives	and	their	quotidian	discourses	informed	the	meanings	of	the	sitcom’s	subtexts.		The	symbolisms	of	‘city’	and	‘kampung’	for	instance,	are	derived	from	the	national	collective	understanding	of	the	nation’s	evolving	discourses	of	‘urban-modern’	and	‘rural-traditional’,	respectively.	The	discourse	of	New	Malay	is	perhaps	the	most	notable	connotation	for	the	‘city-urban-modern’	signifier,	for	it	encapsulated	all	that	was	meant	to	be	‘modern’	and	‘urban’	at	the	time.	More	broadly,	the	signifier	also	connotes	the	‘urban’	and	‘economic’	policies	of	the	Malaysia	Incorporated	initiative	that	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	The	discourses	of	more	traditional	Malays	that	emphasized	tradition,	culture,	and	Islam,	appears	to	be	connoted	through	the	sign	kampung.		These	meanings	of	‘city’	and	‘kampung’440	are	connoted	in	almost	all	the	episodes	discussed.	The	sign	‘city’	as	metonym	for	the	entire	ideological	terrain	of	the	‘corrupting	West’	and	conjoined	as	a	relational	metonym	for	‘Chinese’	or	‘non-Malay’	in	general,	draws	upon	these	national	narratives.	Contrastingly,	in	the	episodes	discussed,	the	city	is	never	represented	as	a	site	of	progressive	Malay	modernity.	More	accurately,	even	if	Malays	are	televisually	represented	as	being	from	the	city	or	bearing	traits	of	modernity	(lifestyles,	behaviour,	worldviews),	they	are	invariably	the	characters	who	are	culturally	or	religiously	problematized	(for	example,	Jeri	in	Gong	Xi,	and	Basiron	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya).	The	symbolisms	of	these	dichotomies	were	further	sutured	to	the	discourse	of	class.	Among	others,	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	and	Kantoi	revived	colonial	structures	of	racial	categories	that	were	based	on	their	economic	position	or	function.	In	both	these	episodes,	the	Chinese	are	ideologically	reconstructed	as	wealthy	business	owners	while	the	majority	of	Malay	characters	are	portrayed	as	economically	disadvantaged.																																																									440	To	reiterate;	the	majority	of	episodes	viewed	featured	a	kampung	locale.	Common	backdrops	include	the	interior	of	a	kampung	house,	its	compound,	and	the	environs	of	the	entire	village.	In	episodes	with	comparatively	less	provincial	settings	like	Tandas	Awam	and	Salah	Sangka,	viewers	are	often	never	told	of	the	exact	location,	and	Senario’s	characters	would	invariably	be	conveyed	as	originating	from	a	non-cosmopolitan	part	of	Malaysia.	
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Senario	thus	presents	a	contradiction	to	UMNO’s	trajectories	of	Malay	‘progressivity’.	The	sitcom’s	subtexts	propose	an	adherence	or	a	return	to,	‘traditional’	or	‘authentic’	Malay	by	overzealously	propagandizing	the	cultural	and	religious	benefits	of	traditionalism.	It	is	perhaps	the	viewer-relatable	factor	that	is	at	play	here,	since	the	sitcom’s	Malay	demographic	is	largely	rural	in	mindset.	Regardless	of	the	reason,	the	subsequent	episodic	subtexts	aggrandize	the	rural	kampung	and	its	associated	symbolic	meanings,	often	by	contrasting	its	virtues	against	cosmopolitan	centres	that	are	reproduced	as	holistically	diametric	opposites.	These	kinds	of	significations	do	not	reconcile	the	fundamental	contradictions	of	‘traditionalism’	and	‘progressiveness’	that	afflict	the	contemporary	Malay	psyche.	I	suggest	that	Senario‘s	subtext	is	instead	stating	that	these	are	irreconcilable	positions	and	proposing	that	the	former	is	deemed	more	virtuous	by	communal	moral	evaluation,	and	thus	encouraged	over	the	latter.		It	may	be	argued	that	these	reveal	an	unwaveringly	relativist	approach	that	is	central	to	the	Asian	values	political	discourse.	This	argument	would	see	Asian	values	and	traditions	(adat	and	Islam)	as	a	central	part	of	the	mediating	framework	for	communal	‘progressive-ness’.	Framed	thus,	the	outwardly	diametrical	trajectories	of	‘traditionalism’	and	‘progressiveness’	can	potentially	be	reconciled.	This	‘middle-ground’	argument	would	certainly	align	with	official	state	discourse.	However,	our	discussions	in	Chapter	2	on	Homi	Bhabha’s	theorization	of	the	dominant’s	manufacture	of	‘ambivalence’	suggest	that	the	inconsistencies	presented	by	being	both	‘progressive’	yet	‘traditional’,	are	deliberately	produced	as	an	apparatus	of	power.	Consider	for	instance,	the	official	criticisms	by	political	actors	against	the	effects	of	‘Asian	soap-operas’	even	when	these	television	programmes	were	in	fact	imported	by	the	state	through	the	‘Look	East’	policy	of	modernization.	This	rejection	of	the	‘values’	inherent	in	these	‘Asian	soap-operas’	and	its	supposedly	negative	effects	on	Malayness,	contradicts	the	entire	Asian	values	discourse	as	a	mediating	framework.		
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Further,	if	the	New	Malays	are	meant	to	encapsulate	the	ideal	of	‘Malay	progressivity’,	this	‘middle-ground’	would	in	fact	be	the	irreconcilable	gap	of	the	Lacanian	fantasy	for	it	conceals	the	impossibility	of	simultaneously	being	traditionally	Malay,	yet	progressive	(the	New	Malay	ideal).	Senario	certainly	makes	this	clear	from	the	urban,	overseas	graduate	(New	Malay)	Basiron	in	Raya	
…	Raya	…	Raya	who	could	only	‘recover’	his	Malay	roots	by	returning	to	the	symbol	of	Malay	traditionalism	(the	kampung)	to	seek	the	forgiveness	of	his	parents	(communal	figures	of	cultural	authority).	The	criticisms	against	Ucop’s	and	Daruih’s	adoption	of	non-Malay	behaviour	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	similarly	demonstrates	the	impossibility	of	reconciling	this	gap.		Framed	politically,	these	contradictions	are	perhaps	deliberately	manufactured	as	‘distractions’	to	encourage	the	community’s	continuous	preoccupation	with	clarifying	Malay	and	Islamic	identity.	This	was	in	fact	suggested	by	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	in	his	critique	of	both	Revolusi	Mental	and	The	Malay	Dilemma	(2006,	147-185).	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	believed	that	the	objective	of	both	publications	was	to	exonerate	UMNO-BN	coalition	leaders	for	their	lack	of	vision	and	subsequent	failings	in	governance.	It	would	explain	the	paradox	of	the	‘traditionalism’	and	‘progressiveness’	initiatives,	both	of	which	were	encouraged	by	the	UMNO-dominated	government,	and	observed	explicitly	on	Senario.		
Senario’s	constructions	of	non-Malay	and	urban	social	actors	as	threats	to	the	sanctity	of	Islam	and	authentic	Malayness	might	potentially	engender	greater	communal	solidarity.	However,	this	notion	of	‘Malayness	under	threat’	also	frequently	manifests	televisually	as	an	anxiety	regarding	Senario’s	Malay	female	characters.	The	deployment	of	old	frames	of	female	reference	such	as	Minah	
Karan	and	bohsia	reveal	the	communal	preoccupation	with	anxieties	over	female	transgression	of	adat.	Senario’s	significations	of	female	deviancy	as	observed	in	
Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman,	and	the	inversions	of	gender	in	Bina	Semangat	both	demonstrate	that	while	these	anxieties	over	an	intra-communal	erosion	of	Malayness	do	appear	in	multiple	forms,	they	almost	always	problematize	non-
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santun441	femininity.	In	the	case	of	Salah	Sangka’s	possessions,	it	is	not	merely	deviant	females	but	femininity	itself	that	becomes	the	issue.		From	this	perspective	of	gender	relations,	what	communal	solidarity	is	canvassed	by	Senario?	The	underlying	rhetoric	of	Senario	seems	similar	to	the	previously	observed	criticisms	against	rural	female	Malay	viewers	of	‘Asian	soap-operas’	in	the	1990s.	As	noted	in	Chapter	1,	the	official	discourse	of	the	time	centred	on	fears	of	these	women’s	deviation	from	adat	and	Islam,	all	of	which	would	be	a	‘threat’	to	the	cultural	values	of	Malay	women,	and	the	’purity’	of	Malay	cultural	identity.	This	discourse	certainly	correlates	with	our	findings	on	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman	and	Bina	Semangat.	Whatever	the	assertions	then,	‘communal	solidarity’	would,	in	this	case,	refer	to	the	strengthening	of	communal	moral	policing	of	Malay	women,	as	part	of	the	revived	emphasis	on	
adat.	While	these	realities	may	suggest	that	Senario	is	highly	gender-biased	(these	anxieties	are	only	projected	onto	females),	it	can	be	argued	that	the	sitcom	merely	reflects	popular	and	state	discourse	which,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	2,	prioritizes	Malay	and	Muslim	men’s	interests	over	women’s	interests.		
Malay-Muslim	as	a	Televisual	Normative	Ideal	The	themes	identified	in	the	previous	section	reveal	that	the	hierarchies	of	differences	constructed	through	Senario’s	ethnically	and	religiously	essentialist	performatives	function	to	entrench	tiered	relations	as	being	natural.	These	effects	similarly	extend	to	gender	relations	since	gender	is	a	major	facet	of	both	cultural	and	religious	ideologies.	Apart	from	intra-communal	fragmentation	along	each	side	of	the	adat	and	religious	binaries,	a	central	feature	of	Senario‘s	tiered	relations	is	inter-communal	divisions.	Undergirding	this	discourse	on	external	threats	are	Chinese	agency	and	Western	influence.	The	performances	of	a	collectively	‘homogenous’	supra-Malayness	engenders	loyalty	to	race,	religion,	values	and	tradition,	and	partisan	loyalty,	rather	than	the	fraternal	bond	of	citizen-hood.																																																										441	Women	who	are	santun	are	respectable,	decent,	well	mannered,	or	conforming	to	accepted	standards	of	what	is	proper	as	outlined	through	adat.	
		 273	
It	was	observed	that	the	Chinese	are	connoted	frequently	in	Senario	while	there	is	an	absence	of	any	major	consistent	reference	to	the	Indian	community.	This	formula	seems	to	illustrate	Syed	Husin	Ali’s	observation	of	an	anti-Chinese	(and	Indian)	UMNO	rather	than	a	genuinely	pro-Malay	party	as	frequently	self-declared	(Ahmad	&	Kuttan,	2016).	However,	while	the	Chinese	(and	infrequently,	Indians)	are	alluded	to	reductively,	it	is	nonetheless,	still	an	acknowledgement	of	Chinese	(and	Indian)	presence	within	the	Malay	imaginary.	The	deployment	of	the	Hainanese	“nang	bo	ti	nang,	kui	bo	ti	kui”	in	Salah	Sangka	for	instance,	is	predicated	on	an	intertextual	link	to	a	communal	cultural	bank	that	has	assimilated	the	Chinese	phrase	into	conversational	Malay.		This	same	assimilation	is	apparent	in	reality	where	words	such	as	tauke	(‘business	owner’	or	‘boss’),	and	ah	pek	(uncle)	are	recognized	by	the	Malaysian	
Dewan	Bahasa	dan	Pustaka	(Institute	of	Language	and	Literature)	as	part	of	the	Malay	lexicon	(Pusat	Rujukan	Persuratan	Melayu,	2017)	even	when	they	are	Hokkien	(Chinese	dialect)	in	origin.	Furthermore,	the	title	of	the	Senario	episode	
Gong	Xi	itself,	is	transliterated	from	the	Chinese	words	‘congratulations’.	In	these	respects,	Senario	makes	an	indirect	nod	to	cultural	hybridity,	even	if	they	are	often	represented	as	a	tiered	intercultural	structure	meant	to	denote	an	erosion	of	state-perceived	Malay	identity.	These	do,	however,	suggest	an	inherent	syncretism	to	quotidian	Malay	culture	which	indirectly	acknowledges	the	potential	for	a	positive	Malay	and	Malaysian	hybridity,	if	these	identities	can	evolve	without	divisive	state	or	religious	interference.		Mnemonic	and	emotional	triggers	of	nostalgia	that	are	validated	by	pseudo-historicism	were	observed	to	be	central	features	on	Senario.	While	it	may	be	argued	that	protection	of	adat	and	Islam	will	preserve	the	(supra)Malay	race	and	thus	address	communal	anxieties	of	‘vanishing’,	it	does	not	follow	that	this	will	result	in	economically	successful	or	(relativist)	progressive	Malays	as	envisioned	in	concept	of	the	New	Malay.	While	the	blame	for	a	recessive	Malay	economic	position	is	directed	at	ethnic	minorities,	the	state	simultaneously	maintains	the	conditions	for	communal	insularity	by	encouraging	‘traditionalism’	without	making	significant	strides	at	sustained	Malay	
		 274	
competitiveness	at	the	wider	societal	level.442	With	Senario’s	narratives	that	contrast	traditional	rural	Malays	against	caricatures	of	wealthy	Chinese	for	example,	the	fact	that	poverty	and	wealth	are	conditions	that	are	not	race	or	culture	specific	is	elided	on-screen.443	In	its	place,	Senario	reproduces	the	ambivalent	position	of	the	state	without	proposing	that	the	undergirding	logic	of	its	many	rhetorical	assertions	should	be	questioned.	These	issues	are	instead	reframed	by	Senario	as	being	attributable	to	racial,	cultural,	and/or	religious	differences.	Once	again,	this	recalls	Syed	Hussein	Alatas’	critique	of	UMNO’s	social	(re)engineering	that	seems	aligned	with	Syed	Husin’s	observation	of	an	anti-Chinese	(and	Indian)	UMNO.		These	realities	provide	an	account	of	Senario	that	conforms	to	our	earlier	understandings	of	institutional	pressures	governing	content	production.	As	previously	indicated	however,	with	the	administration’s	longitudinal	process	of	normalizing	statist	Malay	narratives,	it	would	be	difficult	to	determine	whether	
Senario’s	meta-narratives	are	largely	a	product	of	institutional	pressures,	or	a	reflection	of	communal	discursive	understandings	of	Malay.	What	is	clear	within	the	episodes,	is	the	formulaic	nature	of	Senario’s	narrative	structure	observed	throughout	the	episodes	discussed	in	the	chapters	of	analysis.444		At	the	start	of	each	episode,	Senario’s	narrative	exposition	consistently	pre-empts	the	entire	episode’s	meta-narrative	for	the	viewers.	I	assert	that	these	pre-emptive	expositions	function	as	the	Lacanian-Žižekian	master-signifier,	which	at	the	connotative	level,	ensures	that	the	episode’s	signs	are	read	through	themes	relayed	from	the	outset.	Meanings	can	then	be	anticipated	by	Senario’s	ethnically	and	religiously	homogenous	demographic,	for	they	are	already	cued	to																																																									442	To	reiterate	the	point	in	Chapter	2;	those	who	gained	–	and	who	are	still	gaining	–	considerable	economic	benefits	from	state	and	federal	Malay	initiatives	are	the	elites	and	those	well-connected	to	politicians.	443	For	example,	the	most	recent	Household	Income	Survey	in	2014	(conducted	every	5	years)	by	the	government’s	Department	of	Statistics	reveals	that	the	“bottom	40%”	income	earners	in	Malaysia	are	comprised	of	all	three	ethnic	groups	in	almost	equal	numbers	(Economic	Planning	Unit,	2017).	Bumiputera	and	Indian	earners	are	both	at	the	17.1	mark,	while	the	Chinese	fare	a	little	better	at	16.3.	In	2009,	the	bumiputera	group	was	in	fact,	slightly	better	at	14.4	while	the	Chinese	was	15.2,	and	the	Indian	earners	at	15.5.	444	It	should	be	reiterated	that	with	the	exception	of	the	13-episode	Senario:	Misteri	Bamboo,	
Senario’s	episodes	are	mostly	one-parter	or	two-parters	with	self-contained	narratives	and	characters	that	have	no	association	to	other	episodes.	
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frame	their	interpretations	through	the	master-signifier.	The	different	variations	to	the	meanings	and	context	of	the	traditional	Malay	proverb	in	Salah	Sangka	for	example,	are	narrowed	through	the	framing	to	ensure	that	the	proverb’s	preferred	set	of	meanings	are	understood,	and	that	its	interrelatedness	to	other	signs	within	the	episodes	are	interpreted	through	that	framing.	In	effect,	Malay	viewers	are	not	only	shown	how	they	should	think	(the	function	of	the	pre-emptive	cues),	they	are	also	told	what	they	should	be	thinking	about	(the	function	of	the	narrative’s	signification	chains).		One	illustration	of	this	broad	tendency	to	curtail	viewer	subjectivity	is	observed	in	Senario’s	overly	didactic	narratives.	While	episodes	such	as	Ta	Ti	Tu	and	perhaps,	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	seem	the	most	overt	in	their	intentions,	the	other	episodes	discussed	are	no	less	didactic,	though	arguably	less	overt.	Negara	
Chekpa	Merdeka	for	example,	simplifies	the	nation’s	historical	narrative	with	its	proposition	of	a	unitary	version,	an	account	that	is	broadly	reprised	by	Salah	
Sangka’s	implicit	assertion	of	supra-Malay	irredentism.	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya	attempts	to	critique	a	broad	range	of	issues	involving	the	Malays,	such	as	inter-racial	marriages,	erosion	of	cultural	values,	urbanization,	and	faith	or	race	as	moral	indicators.	These	themes	are	similarly	transposed	onto	gender	in	Dalam	
Hati	Ada	Taman	and	Bina	Semangat.	The	ethnic	caricatures	in	Kantoi,	Jejak	
Karun,	and	Tandas	Awam	further	present	a	visually	‘legible’	stereotype	on	which	these	themes	can	then	be	identified	with.	All	these	methods	conform	with	the	formulaic	‘answer	by	example’	that	was	introduced	in	Chapter	5	with	Negara	
Chekpa	Merdeka	which	in	hindsight,	represents	the	primary	overarching	didactic	strategy	of	Senario	across	all	the	episodes	discussed.	This	didacticism	may	however,	be	due	to	the	censorship	authorities’	insistence	on	‘cautionary	tales’	or	for	narratives	to	depict	negative	characters	turning	over	a	new	leaf	through	the	guidance	of	adat	or	Islam.		Thematically,	none	of	the	episodes	viewed	that	first	aired	before	2011	were	explicit	in	their	Malay	exceptionalism.	I	had	previously	indicated	in	Chapter	6	that,	from	the	pre-2011	episodes	discussed,	the	pivotal	position	of	the	Malays	and	Muslims	was	certainly	alluded	to,	though	less	overtly	with	the	words	‘kami’	
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and	‘kita’445	instead	of	‘Malay’	and	‘Muslim’	that	was	present	in	the	episodes	from	2011.	This	explicit	‘naming’	is	the	true	act	of	primacy	in	that	it	identifies	the	outgroup	by	naming	the	ingroup.	This	is	similar	to	our	discussion	in	Chapter	3	on	TV3’s	method	of	identifying	rural	viewers	through	its	identification	of	urban	viewers.	The	dialectical	paradox	however,	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	deployment	of	both	the	master-signifier	and	the	act	of	naming	opens	up	the	space	for	counter-narratives	to	exist	in	reference	to	the	dominant	master-signifier.	The	discursive	terrain	for	those	struggling	to	uphold	equal	minority	constitutional	rights	for	instance,	only	exists	in	reference	to	the	socio-political	discourse	of	‘naming’	the	pivotal	group.		Consider	my	previous	point	regarding	Senario’s	negative	connotations	of	Chinese	social	actors	through	the	deployment	of	Chinese	words	and	phrases.	This	inclusion	introduces	the	space	for	an	oppositional	reading	that	the	Chinese	
are	already	assimilated	within	the	Malay	imaginary,	as	evidenced	by	the	Chinese	phrase	in	conversational	Malay.	More	significantly	–	and	this	point	runs	across	all	the	episodes	discussed	–	the	fantasmatic	impossibility	of	UMNO’s	surface	rhetoric	of	Malay	‘progressivity’	would	not	have	been	observable	if	Senario’s	performances	did	not	demonstrate	that	‘traditional	Malay’	is	ultimately	at	odds	with	New	Malay.	In	this	sense,	the	paradox	lies	in	the	fact	that	this	oppositional	reading	is	made	possible	only	because	of	Senario’s	strategy	of	‘answer	by	example’.	By	aligning	itself	to	state	narratives	however,	even	if	Senario	unearths	these	spaces,	the	question	is	whether	the	sitcom’s	largely	rural	Malay	demographic	can	read	beyond	these	proposed	imaginaries	of	tautological	Malayness.		
A	Senario	of	Political	Discourse	With	themes	relating	directly	to	the	constituents	of	the	Malay	category,	it	would	be	easy	to	regard	Senario	as	a	comedy	about	Malayness	or	a	satire	on	Malays	–	and	following	that	notion	–	a	form	of	‘ethnic	humour’.	This	however,	does	not	account	for	its	evidently	(supra)Malay	Malaysia	televisual	imaginary.	Is	this	a																																																									445	‘Kami’	indicates	the	exclusive	first	person	plural,	the	‘we,	but	not	you’	or	‘us,	but	not	you’.	‘Kita’	indicates	the	inclusive	first	person	plural,	i.e.	‘all	of	us’,	which	includes	‘you’.	
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satirizing	of	a	supra-Malay	society446	or	Malaysian	Malay	society?	Can	it	even	qualify	as	‘satire’	or	‘parody’,	or	even	parody	to	achieve	satirical	humour?447	What	qualifies?	The	K-pop	possession	in	Salah	Sangka	definitely	does,	but	certainly	not	the	didacticism	in	Ta	Ti	Tu	or	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka	(except	maybe	the	‘rapper	boys’).	In	fact,	as	indicated,	Senario	seems	to	be	more	didactically	driven	than	it	is	satirical,	in	any	true	sense	of	the	word.		This	vagueness	about	Senario	tangentially	foregrounds	the	point	in	Chapter	1	about	its	classification	as	a	sitcom,	for	as	previously	noted,	Senario	is	unusually	sparse	on	actual	humour,	satirical,	ethnic,	or	otherwise.	Even	in	episodes	with	more	on-screen	laughter,	the	degree	to	which	laughter/humour	is	featured	is	still	comparatively	lower	than	American	sitcoms,	for	instance.	As	first	mentioned	in	Chapter	5’s	discussion	of	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	the	humour	in	Senario	serves	an	ideological	role	where	it	attempts	to	naturalize	the	dominant	meanings	of	the	text’s	signifiers	by	proposing	when	and	what	should	be	interpreted	as	funny.	In	effect,	this	humour	aims	at	glossing	over	nuances	of	arguments	like	the	privileging	of	the	traditional	over	the	urban-modern	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	
Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman,	and	Bina	Semangat,	as	well	as	the	Malay-Chinese	narratives	in	almost	all	the	episodes	viewed.	Senario’s	humour	also	inoculates	the	text	against	contrarian	questionings	over	its	performatives,	such	as	the	sitcom’s	ethnic	caricaturizing	in	Tandas	Awam,	Jejak	Karun,	and	
Salah	Sangka’s,	as	well	as	its	gender	stereotypes	in	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman,	and	
Bina	Semangat,	among	others.		The	text	proposes	instead,	that	the	positions/narratives	put	forth	by	Senario	should	be	laughed	at	and	are,	in	reality,	not	viewed	as	problematic	by	the	wider	Malay	community.	Senario‘s	humour	thus	serves	a	didactic	function	that	socializes	and	familiarizes	viewers	on	the	terms	of	membership	into	the	wider																																																									446	It	is	ironic	that	despite	Malay	enthusiasm	at	including	Indonesians	as	‘Malays’	in	Malaysia,	Indonesians	oppose	any	attempts	at	reductively	categorizing	them	as	‘Malays’.	Joel	Kahn	for	instance,	noted	how	those	who	called	themselves	‘Indons’	in	Malaysia,	see	themselves	as	being	culturally	and	morally	superior	to	Malaysian	Malays,	as	well	as	being	not	as	close-minded	(2006,	xx)	447	To	put	this	into	context,	Senario	‘parodies’	an	assortment	of	specifically	Malaysian	character	types	and	like	most	satirical	humour,	depends	on	its	audience	recognizing	the	social	groups	to	which	the	characters	belong.	
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community	of	Malay	for	it	homogenizes	the	worldview	and	values	of	the	viewer/s	presumably	to	that	of	the	dominant	group.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	sections,	there	are,	among	others,	ethnic	and	religious	hierarchies	of	differences	featured	within	Senario.	The	text’s	humour	in	this	sense,	aids	in	entrenching	these	tiered	relations	as	natural.	That	Senario	aims	to	be	didactic	is	a	fact	that	becomes	more	evident	when	we	consider	the	instances	where	there	is	an	absence	of	laughter	accompanying	the	sitcom’s	over-valourizing	of	pro-Malay	communitarian	narratives	–	for	viewers	are	instead,	encouraged	to	take	these	positions	seriously.	Therefore,	even	if	Senario’s	laughter/humour	is	deployed	liberally	in	some	episodes,	the	sitcom	is	still	comparatively	more	didactic.	This	is	especially	evident	when	we	account	for	both	its	considered	absence,	and	deployment,	of	humour.		There	appears	to	be	a	shift	in	Senario’s	focus	from	Malaysian	society	in	the	earlier	years,	towards	supra-Malay	society	in	the	later	years.	This	change	in	focus	specifically	illustrated	how	Malaysian	Malay	lived-experience	is	imagined	as	imbricated	in	the	wider	supra	category.	Perhaps	Senario’s	shift	is	merely	symptomatic	of	the	increasing	frequency	in,	or	insistence	on,	speaking	of	Malaysian-ness	solely	as	Malayness.	This	trajectory	certainly	aligns	with	national	discourse.	In	this	respect,	we	are	discussing	Senario	in	relation	to	its	racialization	techniques	and	how	it	reconstructs	‘race’	and/or	‘Malay’	in	line	with	popular	national	discourse.	The	associability	or	interchangeability	of	these	varying	identities	can	and	does	subordinate	national	identities	–	both	Malaysian	and	Indonesian.		It	bears	reiterating	here	that	the	Dunia	Melayu	(Malay	World)	movement	is	first	and	foremost,	a	political	notion.	By	alluding	to	an	imagined	irredentist	past	on	a	regional	scale,	Malaysian	Malay	is	recast	with	historical	authenticity.	I	had	previously	proposed	in	Chapter	2	that,	among	others,	this	movement	may	be	motivated	by	a	notion	that	Malay	identity	needs	to	be	more	distinct.	The	shifting	boundaries	of	Malayness	from	one	transitional	national	milestone	to	the	next	imply	that	it	would	need	to	be	constantly	re-nuanced.	I	noted	in	Chapter	2	that	this	differentiation	between	Malay	and	non-Malay	has,	from	at	least	the	1960s,	
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resulted	in	the	evolving	categories	of	Melayu	(Malay),	Bumiputera	(Sons	of	the	soil),	Bumiputera	Melayu	(Malay	sons	of	the	soil),	Melayu	Muslim,	Muslim	
Melayu,	and	Muslim.	While	these	categories	are	an	assertion	of	difference	–	of	what	Malay	is	not,	of	what	is	non-Malay	and/or	what	is	non-Muslim	–	they	do	not	seem	to	include	the	category	of	New	Malay.	More	specifically,	these	evolving	categories	do	not	seem	to	focus	on	‘progressivity’	as	a	determinant	of	Malay	identity.	This	aligns	with	what	we	have	observed	of	Senario’s	representation	of	Malayness.		We	should	recall	from	Chapter	2	that	the	New	Malay	identity	was	ideologically	sutured	to	the	economic	growth	of	the	1990s	Malaysia	Incorporated	initiatives.448	By	1997,	Malaysia	had	taken	the	full	brunt	of	the	Asian	financial	crisis	that	resulted	in	a	pivot	back	to	communalist	ethnic	nationalism	and	the	rhetoric	of	Malay	values	and	tradition.449	The	ideological	collapse	of	Malaysia	Incorporated	consequently	led	to	a	popular	belief	that	the	accompanying	progressive	economic-based	New	Malay	identity	was	unsustainable.	By	the	time	of	Senario’s	popularity	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	it	would	follow	that	
Senario	would	have	been	dis-incentivized	from	any	positive	portrayal	of	the	New	Malay	identity,	as	was	in	line	with	popular	social	discourse	of	the	time.	This	may	explain	Senario‘s	tendency	to	construct	negatively,	characters	that	generally	conform	to	the	New	Malay	archetype	while	simultaneously	staging	more	traditional	characters	in	a	positive	light.	As	observed	in	our	analysis,	Senario’s	negative	staging	of	non-traditional	characters	is	frequently	sutured	to	the	ideologically-broad	signifiers	of	‘the	West’	and	‘city’.	This	negative	stereotype	is	in	fact,	the	only	type	of	New	Malay/Other	Malay	representation	featured	in	all	the	episodes	of	Senario	viewed	for	this	research.		
Senario’s	central	subtextual	construction	of	a	non-Malay	axis	of	difference	thus	runs,	to	varying	degrees,	across	all	the	episodes	discussed.	Performing	a																																																									448	The	Malaysia	Incorporated	brand	of	economic	nationalism	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	449	In	Chapter	2,	we	discussed	the	immense	dissatisfaction	by	large	segments	of	the	Malay	community	at	the	relinquishing	of	bumiputera-owned	corporations	to	Chinese	businesses	as	a	national	economic	recovery	strategy	after	the	Asian	financial	crisis.	It	was	noted	that	this	resulted	in	the	strident	revival	of	‘hate	speech’	against	non-Malays.	
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multitude	of	Malay	characters	proposes	that	you	can	be	Malay	in	a	multitude	of	ways	and	yet	still	be	considered	(supra)Malay.	Characters	with	(supra)Malay	ancestry	(eg.	Ucop,	Daruih,	and	Jefri	in	Negara	Chekpa	Merdeka,	Basiron	in	Raya	
…	Raya	…	Raya,	the	spirits	in	Salah	Sangka,	and	effeminate	Kassim	in	Bina	
Semangat)	are	subtextually	presented	as	being	part	of	the	community	even	if	their	behaviour	may	temporarily	deviate	from	communal	approval.	In	contrast,	
Senario’s	‘foreign’	characters	who	do	not	have	Malay	ancestry	(eg.	Basiron’s	Bangladeshi	wife	in	Raya	…	Raya	…	Raya,	the	ethnic	caricatures	in	Jejak	Karun	and	Tandas	Awam,	and	Tan	Abdullah	in	Kantoi)	are	subtextually	never	fully	accepted450	by	the	Malay	characters	even	if	some	of	the	characters	are	‘constitutionally	Malay’.451	Interestingly,	while	Senario’s	female	characters	share	Malay	ancestry,	those	who	deviate	from	adat	are,	to	varying	degrees,	similarly	excluded	(Wonder	Woman	and	Catwoman	in	Dalam	Hati	Ada	Taman,	and	Seri	in	
Bina	Semangat452).	In	this	sense,	while	a	multiplicity	of	masculine	Malayness	is	accepted,	performing	interpretations	of	Malay	femininity	that	goes	against	the	dominant	political	interpretation	becomes	the	object	of	Senario’s	narrative	vilification.			From	the	perspective	of	the	dialectical	paradox	however,	this	reference	to	multiplicity	–	of	Other	Malays	–	can	be	taken	positively	as	a	broadening	of	the	Malay	category	since	various	Malay	identities	are	‘acknowledged’	on	national	television.	Similar	to	the	Chinese	references	discussed	earlier,	the	inherent	fluidity	of	Malayness	here	belies	its	ethnic	syncretism.	Framed	thus,	Senario’s	subtexts	can	potentially	be	considered	as	subversive,	though	I	argue	that	they	were	never	intended	to	serve	as	a	broader	critique	of	UMNO’s	racial	politics	or	the	dominant	group’s	conception	of	statist	Malay	identity.	That	they	might	be	read	as	subversive,	is	an	indirect	consequence	borne	of	a	deep-rooted	ambivalence	to	what	Malayness	truly	encompasses	–	given	the	periodical	shifts	
																																																								450	The	only	exception	is	of	course,	Gong	Xi.	I	have	already	identified	in	Chapter	5	that	the	political	motivations	behind	Gong	Xi	makes	it	unique	to	Senario.	451	Malay	as	defined	by	the	Federal	Constitution.	This	was	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	452	While	Kassim	demonstrates	the	ability	to	‘reconcile’	with	his	latent	masculinity,	Seri	is	unable	to	‘reconnect’	with	her	femininity.		
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in	state	interpretations,	since	it	usually	bends	according	to	the	political	objective	of	the	period	–	and	what	it	is	meant	to	unflinchingly	exclude.		
Senario’s	significations	do	at	least	foreground	two	points	with	respect	to	both	Malay	identity,	and	Malay	gender	relationships.	In	scripting	these	narratives,	the	writers/producers	draw	from	a	personal	or	quotidian	interpretation	of	race	and	gender	relations	(and	the	attendant	variables).	These	interpretations	invariably	coincide	with	state	determinations	on	quotidian	Malay	identity.	Senario’s	motifs	of	Malayness	are	thus	essentially	political	discourses	on	Malay	insularity,	provinciality,	class,	village	life,	Islamic	expression,	sexual	and	female	repression,	and	the	complete	adequacy	of	mutually-affirming	cultural-Islamic	systems	towards	life.	By	this	apparent	relatability	and	reflection	of	lived	Malay	reality,	is	
Senario	thus	self-reflexive,	in	the	sense	that	it	contains	an	image	of	itself	–	the	mirrored	reality	for	viewers	–	that	in	turn	translates	to	viewers’	social	reality	which	is	then	referenced	again	by	producers-writers	in	a	cyclic	process.	Because	
Senario’s	producers	and	writers	draw	from	their	experiences	within	the	same	political-social	system	as	the	viewers,	it	would	therefore	be	appropriate	to	wonder	if	Senario	is	self-referential.	If	it	is,	can	we	interpret	these	subtexts	as	indicative	of	UMNO’s	success	with	its	divisive	strategies	for	projecting	or	displacing	collective	communal	anxieties	onto	ethnic	minorities?	Regardless	of	how	we	account	for	these	questions,	they	demonstrate	that	Senario	can	be	regarded	as	a	‘socially	engaged’	sitcom	even	though	it	may	represent	only	one	side	of	the	divide.	In	this	sense,	we	are	referring	to	Senario’s	engagement	with	Malay	society	through	the	very	issues	and	discourses	the	sitcom	chooses	to	stage.		
Senario’s	‘social	engagement’	similarly	extends	to	its	female	characters.	While	women’s	rights	may	have	been	on	the	political	agenda	in	the	past,	women’s	economic	independence	that	culminated	in	the	gender	movements	of	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s	led	to	a	more	overt	challenge	by	some	quarters	to	state	patriarchal	and	religious	power.	This	may	explain	the	frequent	construction	of	female	Malays	as	deviating	from	dominant	conservative	understandings	of	Malayness	and	Islam.	While	the	nature	of	Minah	Karan’s	and	bohsia’s	deviancies	
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are	the	focus	of	Senario’s	cautionary	narratives,	the	many	other	economically	successful	women	who	are	also	santun	are	unrepresented.	Instead,	the	feminine	ideal	appears	to	be	only	santun	women	who	are	subordinated	by	their	relational	identity	to	men	and	domesticity.		Considered	together,	I	again	contend	that	these	televisual	representations	foreground	the	fundamental	issue	of	Malaysian	identity	today	–	the	rigid	insistence	on	a	traditional	20th	century	Malay	rubric	within	an	increasingly	globalized	21st	century	Malaysia.	From	this	perspective,	Senario	reflects	two	realities	about	the	intricate	relationship	between	Malayness	and	UMNO.	First,	it	is	the	culmination	of	UMNO’s	Malay	social	engineering	since	both	the	viewers	and	producers-writers	are	part	of	the	Malay	community.	Second,	if	Senario’s	subtexts	are	in	fact	racialist,	and	if	they	are	meaningful	to	viewers,	Senario’s	significations	may	be	taken	as	measurable	indications	of	communal	(viewers,	live	audiences,	producers,	and	actors)	agreement	with	statist	constructions	of	Malayness.			Ultimately,	Senario	has	the	potential	for	looking	‘through’	or	‘past’	statements	on	ethnicity	and	religion.	However,	it	instead	focuses	on	encouraging	what	should	be	problematized	as	obstacles	to	cultural	hybridity.	Its	significations	are	thus	fundamentally	at	odds	with	the	UMNO	government’s	surface	rhetoric	of	national	unity.	Senario’s	frequently	racializing	subtexts,	I	am	sure,	are	not	unique	to	Malay	programming	or	more	broadly	to	the	genre	of	sitcom.	To	varying	degrees,	I	presume	that	content	produced	for	the	Chinese	and	Indian	demographics	contain	similarly	racialist	signifying	elements,	often	embodying	the	lowest	common	denominating	elements	for	immediately	relatable	characters,	narratives,	in	order	to	connect	with	viewers.	This	observation	however,	seems	to	introduce	more	questions	which	are	better	suited	for	other	studies	that	specifically	address	them.	Some	of	the	potential	directions	for	future	studies	are	outlined	in	the	final	section.		
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Extension	of	Research	This	research	represents	a	first	and	essential	contribution	to	the	study	of	
Senario,	and	Malaysian	sitcoms	more	generally.	I	have	demonstrated	the	significance	of	the	state	within	Malaysian	broadcasting,	and	the	impact	this	has	had	on	the	performances	of	Malay	identity	on	Senario.	I	have	also	shown	how	these	performances	of	identity	reiterate	dominant	notions	of	Malayness	as	understood	by	the	increasingly	conservative	rural	Malay	social	mindset.	As	indicated	at	the	end	of	the	last	section,	there	are	further	opportunities	for	research	that	this	study	opens	up.	In	the	next	two	paragraphs,	I	will	briefly	discuss	two	such	extensions	of	study,	both	of	which	relate	to	themes	of	nation-building.		One	evident	lacuna	in	the	scholarship	on	Malaysian	sitcoms	is	the	absence	of	works	on	Chinese	and	Indian	language	content	in	general.	Within	this	context,	my	thesis	on	Senario	may	be	taken	as	a	framework	for	similar	textual	studies	that	focus	on	these	minority	language	sitcoms	and/or	television	comedy,	and	Malaysian	television	content	in	general.	Some	questions	that	may	parallel	this	current	work,	pertain	to	what	themes	these	non-Malay	Malaysian	sitcoms	contain,	and	whether	themes	similar	to	those	identified	in	Senario	are	mirrored	contextually	to	minority	languages,	ethnicity,	culture,	and/or	religion.	Moreover,	findings	from	these	types	of	studies	can	be	repurposed	for	further	comparative	studies	of	popular	sitcoms	(all	languages/ethnicity)	in	Malaysia.	Of	particular	interest	are	the	differences	in	significations	between	Malaysian	sitcoms	in	the	1980s	and	early	1990s	(the	‘nation-building’	era)	with	sitcoms	from	the	years	after	2003	(when	Mahathir	finally	relinquished	his	premiership).		Of	related	interest	is	whether	the	themes	contained	within	Senario,	and	the	discursive	position/s	the	sitcom	privileges,	are	also	present	within	other	forms	of	popular	Malaysian	media.	Since	Senario’s	themes	on	Malay	identity	are,	as	observed,	largely	determined	by	political	rhetoric	and	popular	communitarian	discourse,	we	are	necessarily	referring	to	the	presence	of	these	same	state-defined	understandings	of	Malay	identity	within	other	popular	media.	
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Comparative	textual	studies	between	works	of	different	Malaysian	media	would	thus	be	of	great	interest.		This	study	of	Senario	also	identifies	the	gaps	or	deficiencies	that	exist	in	the	current	political	economy	of	Malaysian	broadcasting.	From	the	perspective	of	policymaking,	this	thesis	has	revealed	the	need	to	re-evaluate	the	national	broadcast	legislation	that	allows	for	these	essentialist	ethnic	and	religious	themes	on	Senario.	What	recommendations	can	be	made	for	a	revision	of	current	broadcast	legislations	to	circumvent	ethnic	stereotyping	and	insularity,	and	how	can	these	be	formulated	without	being	perceived	as	an	erosion	of	state	influence?	In	short,	what	implementable	revisions	to	policy	can	be	proposed	to	the	authorities,	given	the	existing	political	sensitivities?	Another	related	area	for	potential	study	is	narrowcasting’s	effects	on	Malaysian	national	unity.	From	this	perspective,	it	would	be	beneficial	to	explore	how	narrowcasting,	as	practised	in	Malaysia,	can	be	reframed	to	encourage	cultural	assimilation	instead	of	propagating	cultural	insularity.		These	two	potential	areas	for	study	are	examples	of	scholarship	that	can	be	built	upon	this	research.	My	close	reading	of	Senario	has	demonstrated	the	various	ways	by	which	a	dominant	form	of	Malayness	is	reconstructed	on	television.	I	also	identified	that	these	reconstructions	are	deeply	rooted	in	specific	dominant	historical	interpretations	of	Malay	culture	and	faith.	The	slippage	between	political	discourse	and	Senario’s	televisual	representations	was	foregrounded,	and	my	analysis	established	the	significance	of	this	slippage	towards	sustaining	the	position	of	the	nation’s	dominant	political	party.	While	all	these	are	important	realities	about	Malaysian	sitcoms,	the	existing	gap	in	scholarship	means	that	these	realities	have	gone	largely	unrepresented	in	academia.	With	this	scenario,	this	thesis	thus	stands	as	the	first	major	study	of	a	Malaysian	sitcom,	and	the	first	ever	analytical	reading	of	Senario.	It	is	also	the	first	to	engage	with	the	longest	running	sitcom	to	ever	air	in	the	history	of	Malaysian	television.	More	broadly	as	a	framework,	this	work	is	the	first	critical	textual	study	of	how	statist	Malay	identity	is	constructed	on	Malaysian	television.	With	the	realities	of	present	day	Malaysia,	this	thesis	is	a	critically	needed	step	
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towards	understanding	Malaysian	sitcoms,	and	the	wider	ideological	processes	of	Malaysian	television	in	general.		 	
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